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Abstract 
This thesis seeks to analyse to what extent, in what ways and with what success does 
the Chinese government seek to manage its interaction with sport globalisation in 
Olympic Movement, football and basketball? Held et aI's (1999) conceptualisation of 
globalisation provides the major theoretical framework for the analysis. In order to 
analyse the behaviour of the Chinese state we adopt Houlihan's (1994) concepts of 
'reach' and 'response' which focus attention on global actors and pressures external to 
the country and state (reach) and the capacity of states to determine their response. A 
set of quantitative and qualitative indicators of globalisation have been identified. 
Data were collected from a number of sources including official government 
documents, news media, and a series of 32 interviews with Chinese officials. The 
analysis reveals that the Chinese government has demonstrated a desire and a capacity 
to manage the impact of the Olympic Movement, global football and basketball on 
domestic sport practices; and second, the Chinese government has attempted, with 
reasonable success, to manage the impact of commercial interests on Chinese 
domestic football, basketball and other Olympic sports practices, elite athletes and 
professional clubs. However, a number of tensions exist: first, between the priorities 
of commercial clubs and national teams' development; and second, between the 
highly paid and internationally mobile 'star players' and the centrally controlled elite 
development system. 
Key words: globalisation, commercialisation, sport policy, Olympic Movement, 
football, basketball, China 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 Research aim and objectives 
The aim of this thesis is to analyse China's engagement in global sport through an 
examination of the cases of the Olympic Movement, elite football and elite basketball. 
There are several reasons for identifying this particular research aim, namely, the 
political, economic, cultural and academic importance of this process of engagement 
in the global context. 
Considering first, the political aspect, the PRC is one of the five permanent members 
of the UN Security Council and the world's largest developing country under a 
Communist regime (Zhang, X.J. 2006: 25). Any decision the Chinese government 
makes in relation to the global affairs would arguably have some impact on the rest of 
the world. Noting the increasing number of governmental and non-governmental 
organisations in the global context (Chan, 2006), it is important to investigate the role 
and importance of the Chinese state within these organisations in general and those 
concerned with global sport, such as the IOC, FIFA and FIBA in particular. Indeed, 
this research echoes Houlihan's argument which highlights that, in addition to the 
economic and cultural dimensions, a third, but less commonly explored, dimension of 
globalisation is the development of a global organisational infrastructure for sport, 
evident in both the governmental and non-governmental spheres (2005: 53). 
Second, regarding the economic aspect, China's economy has maintained an average 
annual growth rate of9.4 percent since it adopted the open-door policy in 1978. Since 
1993 it has ranked first in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI). The total value 
of its imports and exports rose from US$20.6 billion in 1978 to US$1150 billion in 
2004, ranking third in the world, and of this over half was from foreign investments 
(Zhang, X.I. 2006: 25). According to The Economist, in 2008 China's GDP will push 
ahead of Germany to make China the world's third biggest economy after America 
and Japan. (pam, 2007: 85). With the movement of goods, capital and labour across 
. 
borders, we are interested in the role of the national government in dealing with the 
challenge from foreign investment (multi-national companies) in the Chinese elite 
sport system. Quoting from Jackson et al. (2005: 207), a possibility exists that "These 
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MNCs are contributing to the advancement of post-industrial capitalism - a political, 
economic and cultural system that is fundamentally changing the nature of the nation 
state and the international flow of people, products and ideas." Furthermore, other 
authors such as Hall and Soskice (2001), Garrett (1998), Weiss (2003) and Scharpf 
(2000) also remind us to 'bring institutions back in' to the study of globalisation and, 
indeed, into capitalism more generally. It is argued that while nations may experience 
common pressures, the existence of different institutional and cultural environments 
means that they respond in different ways and achieve different outcomes. In this 
sense, Weiss (2003: 27-8) argues that "domestic institutions, depending on their 
characteristics, can hinder or enable states to respond to new challenges and 
accomplish new tasks, thus softening, neutralizing, or exaggerating the potentially 
. constraining effect of the global market". The argument of these authors suggests that 
it is very important to focus on Chinese domestic sport institutions, such as the 
General Administration of Sport (GAOS), the Chinese Olympic Committee (COC), 
the Chinese Football Association (CF A) and the Chinese Basketball Association 
(CBA). 
Third, regarding the cultural element, when Communist China under the leadership of 
Mao Zedong initiated the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), Western cultural products, 
such as competitive sports, were regarded as 'evil capitalism' which could 
contaminate the ideological purity of Chinese Communism (Fan and Xiong, 2003: 
333; MacFarquhar, 1997:2; Dong, 2003: 75; Ness and Raichur, 1983: 81). After the 
Cultural Revolution, China practised the 'open door policy' and embraced world 
capitalism by joining the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and bidding to host the 
2008 Olympic Games in Beijing. Regarding sport as an important cultural practice 
(Giulianotti and Robertson, 2007: 107-9; Jarvie, 2006: 2; Houlihan, 2005: 56), we are 
interested in the process whereby these Western cultural flows of elite sport reached 
into the Chinese state and the ways in which the Chinese government responded to 
them. John Tomlinson claims that "the de facto common denominator of both the 
process and the experience of globalisation is the global capitalist economic system" 
(2007: 164). He also reminds us that ''the issue of the increasing general 
commodification of culture deserves most attention" (fomlinson, 2007: 164, original 
emphasis). Houlihan (2005: 52) raises the same issue as Tomlinson and reminds us to 
refocus on the issue of "the spread of particular cultural practices", or "the recognition 
2 
Chapter I Introduction 
of global commercial interests in major sports events such as the Olympics and the 
soccer World Cup" when carrying out research in relation to sport globalisation. 
Finally, and most importantly, we attempted to echo the argument of Houlihan (1994) 
and Maguire (2000: 366) in which they point out the need to develop criteria by which 
to judge the 'reach' and 'response' of global flows in local cultures. Thus, our biggest 
challenge was to contribute to current academic debates by developing indicators 
which will help examine the phenomenon of sport globalisation in the Chinese 
context. These indicators will be outlined and justified in the section on reliability and 
validity in the methodology chapter and the section on methodological reflection in 
the concluding chapter. In addition, in relation to the concepts of 'reach' and 
'response', Houlihan (2005: 56) highlights the problem that, although many studies of 
globalisation exhibit a quite proper concern with the extent to which the deep 
structure of culture is affected by sports globalisation, they generally fail to give 
significant consideration to the role of the state, due to too great a focus on the 
arguably shallower impacts of globa~isation such as the commercialisation of cultural 
commodities. We, therefore, attempt to refocus on the role of the state to investigate 
the trajectory of its relationship with global sport by asking three key research 
questions: i) to what extent did or does the Chinese government have a choice in its 
relationship with sport globalisation?; ii) to what extent can the Chinese government 
manage its interaction With sport globalisation?; and iii) in what ways does the 
Chinese government seek to manage its relationship with sport globalisation? 
In order to achieve the research aims and answer the three key research questions 
outlined above, a number of more concrete objectives can be delineated: 
1. To analyse the impact of socio-economic and political change since 1949 on the 
development of sport within China and on the development of international 
sporting contests. 
2. To examine the relationship between China and the Olympic Movement. 
3. To examine the development, structure and organisation of elite football in China. 
4. To examine the development, structure and organisation of elite basketball in 
China. 
3 
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, 
5. To explore the utility of globalisation theories for analysis of the development of 
sport policy in China. 
1.2 Research phases in relation to indicators and the analytical 
framework 
The indicators generated and the analytical framework adopted for this research are 
the key tools for this thesis. There are five research phases in relation to the indicators 
and analytical framework: i) review of the literature on globalisation to generate 
research questions and identify indicators; ii) data collection and initial analysis by 
indicators; iii) second round analysis adopting the framework of Houlihan (1994, 
2003); iv) third round analysis adopting the framework of Held et al (1999); and v) 
evaluation of these two frameworks by using the four criteria suggested by Jarvie 
(2006). 
In the first and second phase, the researcher drew on theories at the macro level (from 
the three main schools of thought on globalisation) to identify concepts and 
approaches which would be helpful in guiding preliminary decisions, including 'the 
selection of three case studies, the identification of interviewees and the selection of 
relevant documents to review. Thus, we conducted the literature review in relation to 
the globalisation theories, which not only helped us to grasp the main debates among 
the three main schools of thought on globalisation (hyperglobalists, sceptics and 
transformationalists), but also assisted us in deductively generating the indicators for 
the collection and analysis of relevant data. In the third phase, the framework of the 
patterns of globalisation (see Figure 2.1) developed by Houlihan (1994, 2003) was 
adopted to help us grasp the complexity, trajectory and momentum of the relationship 
between China and global sport. In the fourth phase, the framework of the theorization 
of globalisation (see Table 2.1) developed by Held et al. (1999) was used to focus on 
the debate over the state's role in the global process, which is very finnly focused on 
what the government did and the policy of government regarding its relationship with 
globalisation. In addition, the indicators that were generated to measure the 
relationship between the Chinese state and global sport were inspired by, and derived 
from, the works of these three main schools of globalisation theorists as mentioned in 
4 
Chapter I Introduction 
the first phase. In the final phase, the analysis of China's relationship as reflected in 
the three case studies is concluded and Jarvie's 'four useful values of theory to 
analyze sport phenomena' (2006: 19) were used in order to examine the utility of the 
frameworks of Held et al (1999) and Houlihan (1994, 2003). 
1.3 Globalisation frameworks and theories 
The frameworks of I kid et al. (1999) and Houlihan (1994, 2003) are important 
analytical tools for this study. They have strong theoretical implications but they are 
not theories which have clear causal drivers and a sense of causal process (Sabatier, 
2006: 321-2). Schlager argues that "Frameworks provide a foundation for inquiry by 
specifying classes of variables and general relationships among them". (2006: 294) In 
that sense, Houlihan provides a framework of the 'patterns of globalisation', identifies 
a set of variables (such as 'global reach' at economic, political and social levels and 
varieties of 'local response' - passive, participative and conflictual) and provides 
guidance in investigating and grasping the complexity, trajectory and momentum of 
the relationship between China and global sport. However, as Schlager reminds us, 
"Frameworks organize inquiries, but they cannot in and of themselves provide 
explanations of behaviour and outcomes. Explanation and prediction lie in the realms 
of theories and models" (2006: 294). Indeed, we do not attempt to explain 'a sense of 
causal process', rather, we investigate and analyse the complexity, trajectory and 
momentum ofthe relationship between China and global sport by utilizing Houlihan's 
framework. 
In addition, Schlager notes that "frameworks provide a metatheoreticallanguage that 
can be used to compare theories, allowing policy scholars using different theories to 
use a common language, to learn from one another, and to identify pressing questions 
to pursue" (2006: 294). The framework of Held et al. (1999) was adopted to compare 
three main schools of globalisation theory, to target the emphasis of the state-centered 
focus and to highlight certain questions, such as the three key theoretical research 
questions and the debate over the state's role in the global process. As Ostrom argues, 
"frameworks bind inquiry and direct the attention of the analyst to critical features of 
the social and physical landscape" (quoted in Schlager, 2006: 294). This is the rational 
5 
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for adopting the framework of Held et al. (1999), namely, to help maintain a focus on 
an analysis of the state's role in the global process. 
There are three main schools of globalisation theory summarized in the framework of 
Held et al. (1999): hyperglobalists, sceptics and transformationalists. This tripartite 
schema is intended as a preliminary way of understanding the general contours of 
scholarly debates, rather than as a rigid template into which all writers must be neatly 
located. What is at stake in the debates between these three positions is not simply 
what globalisation means, but whether, and in what senses, it is present at all (Holton, 
2005: 5). According to the hyperglobalists, cross-border economic relationships 
engendered by free trade and the increased mobility of capital and labour, render 
national economies outmoded and undermine the role of national governance (see for 
instance Ohmae 1990, 1995; Reich 1991; Strange 1994, 1996 and Albrow, 1996). A 
number of influential scholars were also interested in cross-border inter-dependencies, 
such as Immanuel Wallerstein and world-system theorists, and these helped to 
stimulate the hyperglobalists and worked in parallel with them (Holton, 2005: 7). 
Indeed, Ohmae (1995: 5) argues that globalisation has led to the 'end of the 
nation-state' . 
As for the sceptics, such as Hirst and Thompson (1998), Weiss (1997), Vogel (1996) 
and Gilpin (2001), they argue that theories ofhyper-globalisation have mistakenly 
concluded that cross-border activity is intrinsically trans-national. Instead, the sceptics 
consider that nations remain alive and well (Holton, 2005: 9). Even if some functions 
are lost, others are gained (Mann 1993). National markets and national policies in 
domains such as education, training and infrastructural planning remain of 
considerable importance, and this throws doubt on theories of the imminent decline of 
the nation-state (see also Weiss 1997). Indeed, sceptics have had a good deal of 
success in scrutinizing and evaluating speculative propositions in the light of more 
considered accounts which are better grounded in evidence than those of the 
hyperglobalists. They usually take an "approach" in order to begin a process of 
seeking out clearer and more plausible concepts in an effort to avoid the pitfall of 
applying simplistic theories to very complex social changes. This has required a 
measure of skepticism towards propositions that are regarded as self-evident by many 
and cherished as articles of faith by some (Holton, 2005: 9-10) 
6 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
The view taken by the transfonnationalists, such as Held et al. (1999) and Held and 
McGrew (2002, 2003), is that the world of nation-states cannot contain or have within 
its structure all the many significant elements of global life, including the ordering of 
territory. The case for using the tenn 'Globalisation' is that it enables us to understand 
the extent to which many fonns of transfonnation arc no longer containable within or 
fully controlled by inter-national arrangements. These include mobility of finance and 
technology which create and re-create complex spatial divisions of labour, global 
communications technology, and the operation of global social movements (Held et al. 
1999). The transformationalists' line of argument is critical of certain aspects of both 
the hyperglobalist and sceptic approach. Put simply, their position is twofold. Firstly, 
transforrnationalists agree with the hyperglobalists' contention that the world is 
undergoing a fundamental transformation, but they disagree with their claim of 'the 
end-state' due to the important role of the state during the globalizing process (Marsh 
et al. 2006: 175). Secondly, transforrnationalists consider that the sceptics' thinking is 
too 'sceptical'. The power of national governments is not necessarily diminished by 
globalisation, but, on the contrary is being reconstituted and restructured in response 
to the growing complexity of the process of governance in a more interconnected 
world (Held et aI., 1999: 9). 
Regarding theories, Sabatier (2006: 321-2) sets out four criteria for identifying a 
'theory'. Among them, the two most important are: i) it should be logically coherent; 
and ii) it should have clear causal drivers and a sense of causal process. In that sense, 
any globalisation theory has to demonstrate its capability to deal with the issue of 
causation (Held et ai, 1999: 12). As mentioned by Holton (2005: 7), the 
hyperglobalists' thinking was underpinned by theories such as Dependency theory, 
World Systems theory and World Society theory, which can all fit in to Sabatier's 
criteria for a theory. As for the sceptics, they took a sceptical and reflective 
"approach" to examining the hyperglobalist exaggerated argument but did not provide 
any causation. In that sense, we would regard the argument of the sceptics as an 
"approach", rather than a "theory". Regarding the transformationalists, such as Held 
et aI., they set out the World Systems theory in 1999 and invited a group of 
distinguished globalisation theorists to attempt to supplement the adequacy theories of 
globalisation in 2007 (Held & McGrew, 2007b: 7). 
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It is not our purpose to raise the issue of whether globalisation is a theory, theories or 
an approach when setting out to explain China's response. Instead, we are aware of 
the differences and problems in the globalisation literature and that there are a variety 
of terms used but which are not always used consistently. In order to address these 
problems, we will use the terms the writers use to describe their own work, using the 
words theory, theories, concept or approach while referring to particular authors. 
Finally, as far as this research is concerned, we are in sympathy with the definition of 
globalisation advanced by Hay and Marsh (2000). Their version of the concept 
requires thinking of globalisation as something other than a singular and inexorable 
process causing change - a juggernaut beyond human control. Rather they see 
globalisation as a trend, and the effect of a range of processes such as cross-border 
interconnection and inter-dependence, but a trend which is reversible by 
counter-trends. Globalisation is the explanandum, which means 'that to be explained', 
not the explanans, which means 'the explanation of change'. Globalisation, in short, is 
an effect not a cause (Hay and Mash, 2000: 6; Holton, 2005: 10). 
1.4 Thesis structure 
In Chapter 2, Patterns of Globalisation, two main themes will be addressed. They are: 
the varieties of globalisation and the 'reach and response' of the nation-state. We 
begin to outline the first theme by examining the definition of globalisation itself and 
by looking at the competing definitions of globalisation found among the three main 
schools of globalisation theorists. The three dimensions of globalisation focusing on 
political, economic and cultural affairs will then be discussed. It is clear that there is a 
central, recurring fault-line running through debates about the relationship between. 
globalisation and the state. The main division is between those who argue that global 
interconnections have become so intense that autonomous states no longer exist and 
those for whom the state remains a fundamental political actor. At the end of the first 
theme (varieties of globalisation), the key debate between the three main schools of 
thought will be summarized using the Theorization of Globalisation framework 
developed by Held et aI. (1999). Regarding the second theme ('reach and response' of 
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the nation-state), the Patterns of Globalisation framework developed by Houlihan 
(1994,2003) - will be introduced and its utility illustrated by an examination of the 
relationships between globalisation and nation-states in France, Japan, Taiwan and 
, 
India. Indeed, by undertaking the literature review of Patterns of Global is at ion, the 
three major schools of globalisation can be better understood which paves the way for 
us to observe and analyse global sport phenomena in the Chinese context. For some 
researchers, the theories used can help them predict the development of their research 
objects. But we do not attempt to do so. We regard globalisation theories as a 'tool' to 
guide us in approaching and analysing our research objects in a more 'theoretical' 
way. 
In Chapter 3, Chinese Sport Development, we explore the development of Chinese 
society since 1949, identifying the main changes in the political, economic, and social 
development of society in that period and highlighting how such changes are reflected 
in the sports system. The central arguments of this chapter are fourfold. The chapter 
begins by reviewing at the first Mao Zedong period (1949-1965), during which China 
sought to join with the Soviet Union against the capitalist states. Secondly, it looks at 
the second Mao Zedong period (1966-1976), which initiated the Cultural Revolution 
and subsequently isolated the PRC from the outside world. Thirdly, it examines the 
era of Deng Xiaoping (1977-1992), which practised the 'open door policy' in order to 
develop the relationship with world capitalism. Finally, attention is devoted to the 
period of Jiang Zemin (1993-2004), in which the PRC joined the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) and thus became more closely integrated into the world 
economic system. 
In Chapter 4, Methodology, we discuss the ontological and epistemological 
assumptions of three major research paradigms: Positivism, InterpretivelRelativism 
and Critical Realism. The outcome of the reflection on these three paradigms is the 
adoption of a critical realist approach which argues that the outcomes of a social 
phenomenon are shaped by the constant dialectical interplay between agency and 
structures (CasseU, 1993; 1984; Marsh, 1999; Bhaskar, 1989a). In addition, critical 
realists also argue that structures can be changed because of the outcomes of the 
actions of agents operating within the structures. In short, it is 'agents who bring 
structure into being, and it is structure which produces the possibility of agency' 
9 
Chapter I Introduction 
(CasseU, 1993: 12). Furthermore, the reliability and validity of documentary materials, 
semi-structured interviews and indicators will be discussed in this chapter. The core 
aim of this study is to analyse the process of China's engagement in global sports 
(using the cases of the Olympic Movement, elite football and elite basketball), and to 
focus on the relationship between structure and agency (organisations) in order to 
examine the attitude and values of the Chinese government regarding global sport 
using the indicators and two theoretical frameworks - Houlihan (1994,2003) and 
Held et al. (1999). 
In Chapter 5, The Case of the Olympic Movement, we locate the PRC's current policy 
toward global sport and the Olympic Movement in its historical context. Three phases 
are identified: withdrawaVisolation, manipulative engagement and, most recently, 
enthusiastic engagement. These phases have been shaped to a significant extent by 
internal ideological shifts, for example, from internationalist socialism to cultural 
isolation, and by external diplomatiC concerns, for example the dispute with Taiwan. 
It is within this historical socio-economic context and utilizing the indicators and two 
theoretical frameworks of globalisation - Houlihan (1994,2003) and Held et al. 
(1999) - that China's current relationship with the Olympic Movement is analysed. 
In Chapter 6, The Case of Elite Football, we begin to investigate the relationship 
between the Chinese state and FIFA by examining China's membership of FIFA, its 
participation in competitions, its FIFA ranking and the strategies used to gain 
representations in FIFA. Subsequently, we go on to explore the strategies the Chinese 
government adopted to build up its elite football system by scrutinizing its 
administrative structure, player selection, training and competition system, and 
financial income. By so doing, we attempt to measure the impact of global football on 
the PRC. Finally, the chapter reviews the ways in which the Chinese government 
attempts to manage the consequences of a more commercial football system by 
considering the values and attitudes of the government regarding commercial football 
and the tension between the Chinese professional football clubs and the government. 
Finally, Houlihan's (1994,2003) concepts of 'reach' and 'response' will be adopted to 
analyse the behaviour of the Chinese state. These concepts focus attention on global 
actors and pressures external to the country and state (reach) and the capacity of states 
to determine their response. 
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In Chapter 7, The Case of Elite Basketball, we start by exploring the relationship 
between the PRC and FIBA through examining China's FIBA membership, FIBA 
world ranking, and the number and position of Chinese sports representatives in FIBA 
and the Asia Basketball Confederation. Focusing the analysis on these indicators will, 
it is hoped, provide a unique opportunity for us to identify the trajectory of the 
relationship between the Chinese government and global basketball. This discussion is 
followed by an examination of the strategies the Chinese government adopted in order 
to build up its elite basketball system with particular emphasis on examining its 
administrative structure, its selection, training and competition system for Chinese 
elite basketball players, and its source of income. By so doing, we aim to assess the 
effects of global basketball on the development of Chinese elite basketball. Third, the 
relationship between the Chinese state and commercialization is examined by 
focusing on the values and attitudes of the government regarding commercial 
basketball and the tension between the Chinese professional basketball clubs and the 
government. Finally, the behaviour and the capacity of the Chinese government to 
respond to global basketball will be summarized by utilizing Houlihan's (1994, 2003) 
concepts of' reach' and 'response'. 
The final chapter, Conclusions, returns to the research questions identified in the 
opening chapter and addresses the key theoretical and methodological insights 
provided in Chapters 2 and 4. More specifically, the first three sections of the chapter 
summarise the evidence that emerges from the discussion in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 in 
order to attempt to answer the three research questions. The first three sections are not 
concerned substantively with the study's theoretical and/or methodological insights. 
However, these insights are incorporated into the analysis where appropriate. It is in 
the fourth and final section of the chapter that the study's methodological and 
theoretical insights are considered in more depth. The section on methodological 
reflection will focus on four main methodological challenges which we attempted to 
overcome in order to raise the validity and reliability for this research, namely, the 
indicators, the data collection, the author's position as a Taiwanese researcher and the 
author's position as a critical realist. The fmal section will focus on evaluating the 
usefulness of the two frameworks adopted for analysis of the development of sport 
policy in China in terms of globalisation, by using Jarvie's criteria of 'Four useful 
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values of theory to analyze sport phenomena'. These criteria are: i) asking theoretical 
questions to explain or generalize about sport, culture and society; ii) allowing 
theoretical testing; iii) illuminating circumstances or equally destroying certain 
cherished myths; and iv) stimulating new ideas (Jarvie, 2006: 19). 
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Chapter T,vo: Patterns of Globalisation 
2.1 Varieties of globalisation 
Globalisation has become a fashionable concept in the social sciences, a core dictum 
in the prescriptions of management gurus, and a catchphrase for journalists and 
politicians of every stripe. It is widely asserted that we live in an era in which the 
greater part of social life is determined by global processes, in which national cultures, 
national economies and national borders are dissolving. Central to this perception is 
the notion of a rapid and recent process of economic globalisation (tlirst & Thompson, 
1998: 1). According to Held et al (1999), it is possible to distinguish three broad 
schools of thought in relation to globalisation: the hyperglobalists, the sceptics, and 
the transformationalists. 
2.1.1 Hyperglobalists 
The hyperglobalists' school, which includes neo-Marxists and neo-liberals, shares 
similar conceptions of, and conclusions about, the nature of contemporary 
globalisation. All of them agree that globalisation is a powerful force and tendency, 
that globalisation is primarily an economic phenomenon (CaIlinicos, 1994,2007; 
Amin, 1996; Redwood, 1993; Ohmae, 1990; 1995). For the hyperglobaIists, such as 
Ohmae, contemporary globalisation defines a new era in which people everywhere are 
increasingly subject to the discipline of the global market (Ohmae, 1990; 1995). 
Hyperglobalists argue that globalisation, as an economic phenomenon, is generating 
'denationalization' by the establishment oftransnational networks of production, trade 
and finance. In this 'borderless' economy, national governments are regarded as 
transmission belts for global capital, or simple intermediate institutions sandwiched 
between increasingly powerful local, regional and global mechanisms of governance 
(Hoogvelt, 1997; Reich, 1991; Ohmae, 1990; 1995). According to this view, the 
power of the world market is considered to be much more influential than nation-
states (Strange, 1996: 4) and, from the hyperglobalists' point of view, economic 
globalisation is constructing new forms of social organisation that are replacing, or 
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will eventually replace, traditional nation-states as the primary economic and political 
units of world society (Reich, 1991; Ohmae, 1990; 1995). 
Although neo-Marxists and neo-liberals predict the end of the nation-state due to the 
impact of the global market, they have different explanations of the outcome. Among 
neo-Marxists, globalisation is understood as the extension of monopoly capitalist 
imperialism or a new form of globalised capitalism. Furthermore, contemporary 
globalisation represents the reaction of global imperialism and the triumph of an 
oppressive global capitalism which creates and reinforces structural patterns of 
inequality within and between countries (Callinicos et aI, 1994, 2007; Harvey, 2003) 
with the result that the role of the nation-state and government would retreat to that of 
the agent of monopoly capitalism (Am in, 1997). From the nco-liberals' viewpoint, 
globalisation is a process of integration into the global economy, a process which does 
not necessarily produce a zero-sum outcome. On the contrary, nearly all countries 
have a comparative advantage in producing certain goods which can be exploited in 
the long run, although some groups within a country may be worse off as a result of 
global competition (Ohmae, 1990, 1995; Redwood, 1993). To sum up, for neo-
Marxists, globalisation is imperialism, and for neo-liberals, globalisation is 
characterized as progressive, a huge positive step for humanity. Among neo-Marxists 
and neo-liberals, all accept that the power of economic globalisation is far superior to 
national sovereignty, and that the hyperglobalist's thesis represents globalisation as 
embodying nothing less than the fundamental reconfiguration of the 'framework of 
human action' (Albrow, 1996: 85) 
2.1.2 Sceptics 
Sceptics, such as Hirst and Thompson, argue that globalisation is essentially a myth 
which conceals the reality of an international economy increasingly divided into three 
major regional blocs, namely, Europe, Asia-Pacific and North America, in which 
national governments remain very powerful (Hirst & Thompson, 1998). The sceptics, 
arguing from an analysis of the history of the international economy and its regimes 
of regulation, suggest that the international economy which developed during the 
1980s and early 1990s by comparison with the economic integration of the Gold 
Standard period has not produced unprecedented levels of integration in either the real 
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or the monetary economy. Thus, they argue that what is called 'globalisation' today is 
a phenomenon of 'internationalisation' of economic activity among developed 
countries (Weiss, 1998; Vogel, 1996; Hirst & Thompson, 1998). Some of the sceptics, 
such as Ruigrok and Tulder, consider that the global economy, at this moment, is 
more accurately described ~s a series of interlocking regional economies because 
most global financial activity and trade is dominated by three major regional blocs 
(Ruigrok and Tulder, 1995). Hirst & Thompson (1998: 9) also argue first that the 
. international economy has been determined, both in its structure and in the 
distribution of power within it, by the major nation-states and second that the 
important aspect of these MNCs is that they retain a clear national home base; they 
are subject to the national regulation of the mother country, and by and large they are 
effectively policed by that home country. Hirst & Thompson (1998) stress that, far 
from the nation state being undermined by the processes of internationalisation, these 
processes strengthen the importance of nation state in many ways (Hirst, & Thompson, 
1998: 17). From the sceptics' perspective, the power of national governments is 
enhanced in the global economy because, as Hirst & Thompson maintain "the state as 
a source of constitutional ordering, limiting its own and others' powers, and guiding 
action through rights and rules, is central to the rule of law" (Hirst, & Thompson. 
1998: 192). In summary, the sceptics argue that the impact and trajectory of 
globalisation has been exaggerated and that what we are witnessing is better described 
as economic internationalisation or regionalisation, in which power is still retained by 
national governments (Weiss, 1998, 2003; Vogel, 1996; Hirst & Thompson, 1998, 
2002). 
2.1.3 Transformationalists 
Finally, for the transformationalists, such as Rosenau and Giddens, contemporary 
patterns of globalisation are conceived of as historically unprecedented, leading states 
and societies around the world to experience a process of significant change in which 
they try to adapt to a more interconnected, but highly uncertain, world (Giddens, 1990, 
1996; Rosenau, 1997; Held et a1. 1999). At the heart of the transformationalists' thesis 
is a conviction that globalisation is a central driving force behind the rapid social, 
political and economic changes that are reshaping modern societies and world order 
(Held et al 1999: 7; Held & McGrew, 2007b). Besides, transformationalists believe 
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that contemporary globalisation is reconstituting or 're-engineering' the power, 
functions and authority of national governments. Without question states still 
maintain the ultimate legal claim to effective supremacy over what occurs within their 
own territories, but the transformationalists argue that the jurisdiction of international 
governance derived from international law will, to a certain extent, be expanded; at 
the same time as Held et al. (1999: 8) note, the jurisdiction of international 
governance has to face the constraints and the obligations derived from the same law. 
Indeed, the argument of the transformationalists is that globalisation is associated not 
only with a new 'sovereignty regime', but also with the emergence of powerful new 
non-territorial forms of economic and political organisation in the global domain, 
such as multinational corporations, transnational social movements and international 
regulatory agencies. In this sense, world order can no longer be conceived as purely 
state-centric or even primarily state governed, as authority has become increasingly 
diffused among public and private agencies at the local, national, regional, and global 
levels. 
National-states are no longer the sole centres or the principal forms of governance or 
authority in the world (Rosenau, 1997). Rosenau maintains that, given this changing 
global order, the forms and functions of the state have to adapt as governments seek 
coherent strategies of engaging with a globalising world. Distinct strategies are being 
followed, ranging from the model of the nco-liberal minimal state to the models of the 
deVelopmental state (governments as the central promoter of economic expansion) 
and the catalytic state (governments as facilitator of coordinated and collective action). 
In addition, governments have become increasingly outward looking as they seek to 
pursue cooperative strategies and to construct international regulatory regimes to 
manage more effectively the growing array of cross-border issues which regularly 
surface on national agendas. According to transformationalists, rather than 
globalisation bringing about the 'end of the state', it has encouraged a spectrum of 
adjustment strategies and, in certain respects, a more activist state. Accordingly, the 
power of national governments is not necessarily diminished by globalisation but, on 
the contrary, is being reconstituted and restructured in response to the growing 
coniplexity of the process of governance in a more interconnected world (Held et ai, 
1999: 9; Holton, 2005; Held & McGrew, 2002, 2007a, 2007b). 
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2.2 Competing definitions of globalisation 
2.2.1 lIyperglobalists and sceptics 
Among the hyperglobalists and the sceptics, there are several competing views on 
globalisation, which vary, for example, in terms of the power accorded to national 
governments and the pattem of stratification. Firstly, regarding the power of national 
governments, hyperglobalists state that economic globalisation is bringing about the 
'denationalisation' of economies and that the role of the national government is 
becoming that of a simple intermediate institution sandwiched between increasingly 
powerful local, regional and global mechanisms of governance. Strange (1996: 4) 
describes it more directly, 'the impersonal forces of world markets ... are now more 
powerful than the state to whom ultimate political authority over society and economy 
is supposed to belong ... the declining authority of states is reflected in a growing 
diffusion of authority to other institutions and associations, and to local and regional 
bodies'. But, sceptics tend to disagree with the assumption that intemationalisation 
forecasts the emergence of a new, less state-centric world order. They do not believe 
that national governments are becoming paralysed by international requirements. On 
the contrary, they argue that government is increasing central to the regulation and 
active promotion of cross-border economic activity. So, national governments are not 
the passive object of internationalisation but its major designer (Weiss, 1998; Vogel, 
1996; Hirst &Thompson, 1998). Indeed, Gilpin (1987) believes that 
internationalisation is a by-product of multilateral economic order, initiated by the 
USA, as the major power after the Second World War, and that it created the 
momentum for the liberalisation of national economies. In this respect, global 
economic power is still held strongly by the governments of nation-states, especially 
those within the G8. Accordingly, sceptics argue that the nation-state plays a 
significant role in the global market, a view which contrasts sharply with 
hyperglobalists such as Ohmae who argues that 'in a borderless world traditional 
national interest has no meaningful place' (1995: 64). 
Secondly, regarding the patt~rn of stratification, hyperglobalists claim that economic 
globalisation is generating a new competitive pattern in the global economy. The 
17 
Chapter 2 - Patterns of Globalisation 
traditional North-South division with the old core-periphery structure will be 
overtaken by a more complicated type of economic power (Strange, 1996; Reich, 
1991; Ohmae, 1990, 1995). One consequence of this phenomenon will be the 
development of new forms of social organisation replacing traditional nation-states, as 
the primary economic and political units of world society are emerging from 
economic globalisation. However, the sceptics claim that internationalisation has not 
been accompanied by an erosion of North-South inequalities but, on the contrary, by 
the growing economic marginalisation of many 'Third World' states as trade and 
investment flows within the rich North intensify to the exclusion of much of the rest 
of the globe (Weiss, 1997; Hirst &Thompson, 1998,2002). 
2.2.2 Hyperglobalists and transformationalists 
There are several major contrasts between the view of the hyperglobalists and 
transformationalists on globalisation, such as those regarding historical trajectory and 
conceptualisations of globalisation. 
Regarding historical processes, hyperglobalists consider globalisation as a long 
process of global integration (Ohmae, 1995; Clark, 1997). According to this 
perspective, globalisation is not only a linear historical journey, but also a relatively 
smooth process of human development. In contrast the transfonnationalists tend to 
conceive history as a process punctuated by dramatic upheavals or discontinuities. 
Such a view stresses the contingency of history and how epochal change arises out of 
the confluence of particular historical conditions and social forces. This view infonns 
the transfonnationalists' tendency to describe the process of globalisation as 
contingent and contradictory. For, according to this thesis, globalisation pulls and 
pushes societies in opposing directions; it fragments as it integrates, engenders 
cooperation as well as conflict, and universalises while it particularizes. Thus the 
trajectory of global change is largely indetenninate and uncertain (Rosenau, 1997; 
Held et al 1999) 
Second, regarding conceptualisations of globalisation, hyperglobalists state that 
globalisation defines'a new era of human history in which 'traditional nation-states 
have become unnatural, even impossible business units in a global economy' (Ohmae, 
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1995: 5) and claim that globalisation reorders the 'framework of human action' 
(Albrow, 1996: 85). In this perspective, national governments become increasingly 
unable to control what happens within their borders or to fulfil by themselves the 
demands of their own citizens. Thus, the sense ofa global civilisation defined by 
universal standards of economic and political organisation, such as the IMF, WTO 
and the UN, is emerging, and states and peoples are increasingly the subjects of new 
public and private global or regional authorities (Gill, 1995; Ohmae, 1995; Strange, 
1996; Cox, 1997). On the contrary, the transformationalists deny the hyperglobalists' 
rhetoric concerning the end of the sovereign nation-state, and assert that a new 
'sovereignty regime' is displacing traditional conceptions of statehood as an absolute, 
indivisible, territorially exclusive and zero-sum form of public power (Held, 1991). 
Consequently, it is argued that governments have to adjust the form and functions of 
the state, in order to adapt the changing global order, and seek coherent strategies of 
engaging with a globalising world. Thus, transformationalists reject the claim that 
globalisation is bringing about the 'end of the state'; instead, it has encouraged a 
spectrum of adjustment strategies and, in certain respects, a more activist state (Held 
et aI, 1999; Holton, 2005; Scholte, 2005; Held and McGrew, 2007a). In sum, the 
hyperglobalists consider globalisation as a reordering of the' framework of human 
action', whereas the transformationalists insist that the power of national governments 
is not necessarily diminished by globalisation but that, on the contrary, it is being 
reconstituted and restructured in response to the growing complexity of processes of 
governance in a more interconnected world (Rosenau, 1997) 
2.2.3 Sceptics and transformationalists 
The major difference between sceptics and transformationalists is related to the 
position and power of the state. Sceptics argue that internationalisation depends on 
state acquiescence and support. Indeed, Gilpin, a sceptic, considers 
internationalisation largely a by-product of the US-initiated multilateral economic 
order which, in the aftermath of the Second World War, created the impetus for 
liberation of national economies (Gilpin, 1987). Similarly, Hirst notes 'the role of the 
state as a source of constitutional ordering, limiting its own and others' powers, and 
guiding action through rights and rules, is central to the rule of law' (Hirst & 
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Thompson, 1998: 192). Accordingly, national governments play a decisive role in 
manipulating the process of globalisation. 
Transformationalists, on the contrary, consider not only that globalisation is 
transforming state power and world politics, but also that national governments are 
having to reshape and reconstruct their functions and authority due to the powerful 
force of globalisation. According to the proponents of this view, contemporary 
processes of globalisation are historically unprecedented such that governments and 
societies across the globe are having to adjust to a world in which there is no longer a 
clear distinction between international and domestic, external and internal affairs 
(Ruggie, 1993; Linklatcr & MacMillan, 1995; Held et aI., 1999: 9; Giddens, 2002; 
Held & McGrew, 2007a, 2007b). For Rosenau, the growth of'intermestic affairs' 
defines a 'new frontier', the expanding political, economic and social space in which 
the fate of societies and communities is decided (1997: 4-5). In this respect, 
globalisation is conceived as a powerful transformative force which is responsible for 
a 'massive shake-out' of societies, economies, institutions of governance and world 
order (Giddens, 1996). In short, for sceptics, the role of national governments in 
globalisation is active and dominant, whereas for transformationalists, it is passive 
and being forced to adapt. Sceptics consider states as a driving force of globalisation, 
whereas transformationalists regard globalisation as an engine which is reshaping 
modem societies and world order. 
In short, the key debate between the three main schools among globalisation theorists 
can be summarized using the framework developed by Held et al (1999) -
Theorization of Globalisation (see Table 2.1). 
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Table 2.1: A framework for the theorization of globalisation 
Hypcrglobalists Sceptics Transformationalist 
Advocates IOhmae (1990, 1995); !Hirst & Thompson (1998), ~leld et al. (1999), Held and 
lReich (1991), Strange iWeiss (1997), Vogel (1996) IMcGrew (2002, 2003) and 
1994,1996)and land Gilpin (2001) lGiddens (1990, 1991) 
IAlbrow (1996) 
Driving IGlobal market and States and markets ~ombined forces of 
forces echnology Imodernity 
Power of lOeclining or eroding iReinforced or enhanced lReconstituted, restructured 
national lamong developed countries 
governments 
Summary The end of the nation- ~nternational isation depends Globalisation transforming 
argument :state whose role will be Ion state acquiescence and state power and world 
eplaced by MNCs and ~upport politics 
GBs 
Source: adapted from Held et al., 1999: 10 
2.3 Economic emphasis in globalisation 
The focus of this section is on economic globalisation and its interconnection with 
cultural issues and whether, for example, global culture is affecting or reshaping 
global economic activities. First, we discuss the relationship between multinational 
organisations and nation-states under economic globalisation and examine the 
'factors' which govern the relationship between multinational organisations and 
nation-states. 
As noted, hyperglobalists, such as Ohmae and Strange, emphasize global economic 
integration (such as the establishment of a global trading system, the integration of 
financial markets, and the spread oftransnational production systems) and draw 
attention to the surpassing of the power of national governments by global marketing. 
From this perspective, multinational organisations, such as the WTO, GATT and IMF, 
even though they are member state organizations, are taking power from national 
governments and facilitating MNCs to sell their products all over the world. 
Hyperglobalists state that today's globalisation is driven by companies, not countries. 
Appadurai (1998: 3) also notes that transnational media corporations have made 
significant inroads into national cultures and national identities with the consequence 
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that the role of the modern state as a manager of culture is gradually diminishing. 
However. as argued by the hyperglobalists. it is almost impossible that national . 
governments will give up completely (or at least not without a considerable struggle) 
the power to influence and shape the culture of their people, which is related to their 
political legitimacy . 
A contrary analysis is presented by the sceptics, who argue that the significance and 
impact of globalisation is considerably exaggerated because 'states continue to use 
their power to implement policies to channel economic forces in ways favourable to 
their own national interests and ... [obtain] a favourable share of the gains from 
international economic activities' (Gilpin, 2001: 21). Sceptics argue that national 
governments remain central to the governance of the world economy, for they alone 
have the formal political authority to regulate economic activity due to the 
geographical rootedness of MNCs. They consider multinational organisations such as 
the OECD (the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development), which 
comprises developed countries, as agents of governments which enable them to 
dominate the flow of global trade, investment and technology (Hirst and Thompson, 
1998). Thus, sceptics doubt that nationhood can be eroded by transnational forces. 
especially by the development of a global mass culture. They argue persuasively that 
national cultures include aspects related to the development and management of 
political identity, and self-determination and that states are capable of retaining 
substantial control in these areas (Weiss, 1998; Vogel, 1996; Hirst & Thompson, 1998, 
2003). 
Indeed, one of the leading authors among the sceptics' camp, Linda Weiss, attempts 
to develop a heuristic and simplified figure (2003: 6; also see Figure 8-3) to 
demonstrate that state agency can shape certain outcomes by the discourse of 
'political logic of insecurity and competition'. According to Weiss (2003: 2-15), the 
structures constraining and enabling (facilitating) state agencies in the global context 
can be regarded as two dimensions: 'economic logic of exit' and 'political logic of 
insecurity and competition'. For 'economic logic of exit', globalisation is seen to be 
intrinsically constraining because openness involves the fall of national barriers to 
trade, investment, and financial flows, exposure to increasing capital mobility (via the 
multinationalisation of production and growth of global financial markets), and also 
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confonnity with intergovernmental agreements requiring, for example, that 
governments open their markets to foreign trade and financial institutions as well as 
eliminating certain subsidies to industry. Unlike the constraining aspect with its 
economic logic of exit, the enabling dimension of globalisation reveals a political 
logic of competition and insecurity, which generates incentives for governments to 
take initiatives that will strengthen the national system of innovation and social 
protection. However, while the sceptic's case is persuasive in relation to government 
in the stronger industrialised countries, the capacity to resist 'global mass culture' 
among poor states is far weaker. 
For some transfonnationalists, such as Giddens (2002), global markets are effectively 
beyond political regulation, and economic globalisation is in danger of creating a 
'runaway world'. Governments have no choice but to adapt to the forces of economic 
globalisation. Moreover, Held. et at. (1999: 429) state that globalisation has reshaped 
the global order and reduced the inequality between centre and periphery countries. 
What this argument fails to acknowledge is the extent t? which core states dominate 
many influential organisations, such as the UN, WIO and GAIT, which shape 
decisions in such manner as to protect the interests of international corporations. 
However, despite this objection, Held et al (2002: 57) observe that the political 
dynamics of multilateral institutions tend to mediate 'power centres', for instance 
t~ough the consensual modes of decision-making, such that the.y are never merely 
tools of dominant states and social forces. However, Held is unclear about the kind of 
world order being constructed and whose interest is served by the operation of these 
multilateral institutions. A number of authors have also contributed to a greater 
awareness of the ways in which globalisation is contested and resisted by states and 
peoples (Geyer & Bright, 1995; Frieden & Rogowski, 1996; Burbach et al., 1997). In 
so doing, these arguments acknowledge the need for a sophisticated framework of 
how globalisation impacts on national economies and national communities, 
. recognising its differential consequences and the great importance of the fonns in 
which it is managed, contested and resisted (Axford, 1995). Central to this analysis, is 
the role of national governments in globalisation. However, as the transfonnationalists 
argue, the crucial question is not what kind of strategy or policy national governments 
adopt, but the power they possess. 
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Second, we focus on the significance of cultural issues in the relationship between 
MNCs and local people under economic globalisation. Central to the organisation of 
the new global capitalist order is the multinational corporation. Today transnational 
production considerably exceeds the level of global exports and has become the 
primary means for selling goods and services abroad. Multinational corporations now 
account for at least 25 percent of world production and 70 percent of world trade, 
while their sales are equivalent to almost 50 percent of world GDP (Perraton, 1997; 
UNCTAD, 2001). This means that MNCs can be regarded as the promoters of global 
culture because their goods are ubiquitous in our daily life. As Cvetkovich and 
Kellner (1997:15) state, 'there is no corner of the world immune from the viral forces 
of a global consumer and media culture'. Due to global media production and 
transmission, which are owned and promoted by multinational corporations, we can 
see cultural commodities everywhere, on TV, video, internet and film, in magazines 
and newspapers, and even emblazoned on bags, caps and T-shirts. That means 
everything we see, hear, and wear is possibly related to the world culture, especially 
the part dominated by multinational corporations. Although multinational 
corporations are the source of global culture, it does not necessarily mean, for 
hyperglobalists, that they are eroding local cultures and traditions. 
Indeed, Tomlinson refutes the argument that local culture is homogenized by global 
culture. He notes that "extravagant claims for media power seem to arise where 
theorists come to see the media as determining rather than as mediating cultural 
experience: that is, at the centre of things rather than as related to other practices and 
experiences" (Tomlinson 1991: 63). Most hyperglbalists believe that mass media have 
very considerable capacity to manipulate local cultures, but, unfortunately, they 
ignore 'the power of free will' of local people. Local people can select and transform 
the original meaning conveyed by mass media to what they want or give them new 
meanings. Indeed, Cvetkovich and Kellner (1997:27) repeatedly call for a deeper 
exploration of "the complex relations between local situations and their global 
contexts". 
Global culture is held to be mainly a recent media-driven construct. Local and 
national cultures have strong emotional roots for large numbers of people, but global 
culture lacks such 'ethnic-based' appeal. While global culture can certainly draw upon 
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folk and national cultures, it is not (yet) based on shared global stories and memories. 
In this sense, it is 'memory-less', mixed and dependent upon the profit-seeking 
production of mass-mediated signs and symbols (Perry, 1999). Whereas local culture 
is closely tied to place and time, global culture is free of these constraints: as such, it 
is 'disconnected', 'disembedded' and 'de-territorialized', existing outside the usual 
reference to geographical territory (Featherstone, 1990, 1995). People in local 
communities have collective memories, feelings and consciousness and have 
particular ways of dealing with culture from the outside, especially relating to global 
culture. Accordingly, Howes (1996: 191) states that 'rather than let consumer goods 
colonize them, local peoples instead "colonize" consumer goods, imposing their own 
system of values and practices on them and maintaining their cultural integrity'. In 
this perspective, people in the third world are not 'passive consumers' of goods from 
transnational corporations, on the contrary, they have the ability to indigenise 
products to serve their own cultural interests. People receiving mass media should not 
be seen as a p'rocess of passive assimilation, but as an active transformation of images 
and in line with the receiver's cultural norms and values. For example, Harding (1995) 
shows how the Women's National Basketball Association (WNBA) imagery, as 
broadcast on Sky TV, has been appropriated by young British inner-city black youth 
as an affirmation of their own identity. 
2.4 Cultural emphasis in globalisation 
In this section, we focus on the cultural dimension of globalisation. Within the 
hyperglobalists' camp, Marxists and Non-Marxists, all accept that the power of 
economic globalisation is far superior to that of most nation-states, and can 
fundamentally reshape the 'framework of human action' but there is far less 
agreement in relation to the significance of the cultural sphere. Ohmae, a non-Marxist, 
for example, argues that the nation-state, from the viewpoint of the capitalist market, 
is becoming meaningless. He argues that we should think of a world of regional 
economies 'where the real work gets done and the real markets flourish': 'what 
defines [these] is not the location of their political borders but the fact that they are the 
right size and scale to be the true natural business units in today's global economy. 
Theirs are the borders - and the connections - that matter in a borderless world' (1995: 
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5). From this perspective, the global economy is having a broad impact which 
includes culture and these borderless international corporations and organisations are 
achieving a 'quiet revolution' in world culture. Morley and Robins (1995: 80), sharing 
the same viewpoint of Ohmae, argue that 'the creators of the universal cultural space 
are the new global cultural corporations' , such as News Corporation and Media 
Corporation whose long-term goals are to dominate markets for the next generation of 
audiovisal products (see also Aksoy and Robins, 1992). Moreover, these global 
cultural industries understand the importance of achieving a real equi-distance, or 
equi-presence, of perspective in relation to the whole world of their audiences and 
consumers (Morley & Robins, 1995: 80). Thus, they try to create world-standardized 
cultural products, which are assembled from all over the world and turned into 
commodities for a new 'cosmopolitan' marketplace, such as world music, tourism, 
ethnic arts, fashion, cuisine, cinema and news, (Morley and Robins, 1995: 80) or 
sports. Therefore, Ohmae, and Morley and Robins, consider that a new global culture 
is being reshaped by the global economy, especially by the global cultural industries. 
Although Galtung, a Marxist, admits that world culture can be convertible into 
commodities and profit be made from it, he considers that the power of culture can 
have an even greater significance. He identifies five types of imperialism, including 
economic, political, military, communication and cultural imperialism, and maintains 
that cultural convertibility is much more flexible and powerful than the others 
(Galtung, 1971: 87). Through cultural manipulation - a liberal democracy - as a 
consequence or a condition for economic development, centre nations can set "the 
condition for exercising effective control over Periphery nations" (Galtung, 1971: 
100). Thus, cultural imperialism can be thought of as an important mechanism for 
centre nations to extend their impact in periphery nations because it is based on 
exploitation through cultural domination rather than weapons or direct violence 
(Galtung, 1971: 91). For Galtung, culture is not only one kind of good, a tool of 
making money or consuming behaviour, but also a value, a thought which can be 
implanted and bring invaluable long term benefit for centre nations (1971: 93). 
Tranformationalists, in contrast to the hyperglobalists' analysis, refute the view that 
globalisation must simply evolve in a single direction toward global markets. They 
argue that, in addition to acknowledging the importance of the economic sphere, we 
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should pay more attention to the cultural aspect, because it also provides a social basis 
for us to understand the phenomenon of globalisation. Giddens argues that cultural 
globalisation is 'a further and quite fundamental aspect of globalisation, which lies 
behind each of the various institutional dimensions' (1990: 77). Waters (1995) shares 
the same point of view as Giddens, arguing that "We can expect the economy and the 
polity to be globalised to the extent that they are culturalised". He goes on to 
emphasize that "We would also expect that the degree of globaIisation is greater in the 
cultural arena than either of the other two" (Waters, 1995: 9-10). In that sense, 
knowing how culture acts on the world is very important, if we truly want to realize 
the meaning of globalisation. In order to understand the meaning of globalisation 
Houlihan argues that it is important to define culture in the context of globalisation. 
From Houlihan's perspective, "Culture may therefore be defined as an integrated set 
of values: practices, and attitudes that give each community its distinctiveness" 
(Houlihan, 1994:357). 
All tranfonnationalists, even Marxists, such as Galtung, pay considerable attention to 
the cultural aspect, but cultural globalisation, for them, has a different meaning. For 
example, Hannerz, views the cultural dimension as a source of manipulation, trying to 
homogenize world cultures through Western capitalism for the benefit of the market. 
He claims that "The murderous threat of cultural imperialism is here rhetorically 
depicted as involving the high tech culture of the metropolis, with powerful 
organisational backing, facing a defenceless, small-scale folk culture" (Hannerz, 1990: 
108). In addition, Hannerz (1990: 111-(16) also attempts to use 'cultural flows' to 
catch the main meaning of cultural globalisation, which are 'cultural commodities', 
the actions of the state in organizing and managing meanings (such as developing, 
maintaining, and refining national identity), 'fonn of life' (the dissemination of 
habitual perspectives and dispositions) and 'activities of social movements'. 
The argument of Galtung (1971) and Hannerz (1990) is echoed by Cvetkovich and 
Kellner (1997). They attempt to use the term to describe the ways global economic, 
political and cultural forces are rapidly penetrating the earth in the creation of a world 
market, new transnational political organisations, and a new global culture. They 
argue that expansion of the capitalist world market into areas previously closed to it 
(i.e., in the communist sphere or developing countries that attempted to pursue their 
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own independent line of development) is accompanied by the decline of the nation-
state and its power to regulate and control the flow of goods, people, information, and 
various cultural fonns (1997: 3). 
Thus, hyperglobalists consider cultural globalisation as a process of homogenisation 
which is toward a commoditized culture. However, Roberston rejects the conclusion 
ofhyperglobalists and stresses that globalisation processes do not lead to 
homogeneity. For Roberston, global processes involve both the particularization of 
universal ism and the universalization of particularism (Robertson, 1992: 130). 
Maguire (1999: 21) accepts Roberston's viewpoint, and argues that polyculturalism, 
not homogenization, is one of the main features of global processes. 
2.5 Political emphasis in globalisation 
The then Secretary of the United Nations Kofi Annan argued, in his address 'the Role 
of the State in the Age of Globalisation' , that' ... globalisation challenges their 
[States'] ability to perfonn their historic function of providing security to their 
citizens, in all three of its aspects - physical security, economic security, and 
psychological security' (Annan, 2004: 242). He emphasised that national 
governments have to change their traditional role to deal with the impact of 
globalisation. But the question is what is the genuine face of globalisation? Annan 
mentions that the speed and ubiquity of modern communications, multinational 
companies producing a vast number of products and cross-border investment are 
among the key factors generating a global economy and giving us the beginnings of a 
global society and culture (Annan, 2004: 240). Obviously, for Annan, the dynamics of 
globalisation are technology and multinational corporations but he reminds us that 
states still attempt to retain the sovereignty in the process of globalisation at the same 
time. He argues that' ... the sovereign State remains a highly relevant and necessary 
institution; indeed, the very linchpin of human security' (Annan, 2004: 240). 
Moreover, he stresses that due to the power of globalisation, even the best-organized 
States are not finding globalisation easy to manage (Annan, 2004: 241). From this 
perspective, under the tide of globalisation, no single state can escape its effect, but is 
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required to 'respond' to it. For different states, there is a variety of responses 
depending on the reaction of the recipient culture. 
Houlihan (1994: 370-372) identifies three possible responses, passive, participative 
and conflictual, which are derived from the relationships between global culture and 
local cultures. But he emphasizes that it is likely that a country might fit, partially at 
least, more than one of those categories and that they will respond to different 
. elements of globalisation in slightly different ways, thereby covering two of those 
types of responses. Elsewhere Houlihan (2003: 357) stressed that a significant 
determinant of the trajectory of globalisation in general is 'the behaviour of states', 
but state behaviour, it must be remembered, is mediated by the reality of the power 
and position of states in the global society. For example, a superpower state, such as 
the US, is not only able to participate in the process of globalisation, but is also able 
to determine significantly the direction and intensity of globalisation. By contrast, 
even for many rich powerful countries with large economies such as France, it is very 
difficult to withstand the pressure of cultural and economic globalisation when the 
source lies in a superpower state such as the US even when their power is mediated 
through the EU system. If powerful and well-established European economies are 
struggling, then what will be the relationship to globalisation within the countries of 
South Asia and South East Asia such as India; Taiwan, Malaysia and Singapore which 
are generally new industrial economies and have quite distinct cultures? The 
following sections explore these questions in more detail as a means of examining the 
role of the state in facilitating, mediating and responding to globalisation. 
2.5.1 The role of the state in facilitating globalisation 
The focus in this section is on the role of the state in the process of globalisation. 
Annan (2004) argues that globalisation is primarily an economic phenomenon whose 
momentum derives from global technology and the global market. From this 
perspective, the US can be regarded as the most significant faciIitator of globaIisation, 
because it dominates global traffic in information and ideas. We can see that 
American products, such as music, movies, television, software (Rothkopf, 1997), 
advertising media, casual clothing, fast food and sports (notably basketball) have 
become pervasive (Leiber & Weisberg, 2002: 277). Moreover, this pervasive 
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influence of American products is tied to open markets and global consumerism 
leading some authors, such as Leiber and Weisberg (2002: 281) to argue that 'the US 
does not force anyone to use these American products, but they have, nevertheless, 
enormous popularity and consumer attraction'. On the surface, it is plausible to 
suggest that people choose these products freely, a high proportion of which are 
produced by US companies. However, what is especially important is who has the 
power to control the channels of sale, the promotion and dissemination of advertising 
in the competitive global market. While it might be argued that the major MNCs 
achieved their advantage due to success in the competitive market, this would be to 
grossly oversimplify the complex phenomenon of the global economy. For example, 
Rothkopf (1997) argues that the dominant leadership of the US came at the same time 
as the formation of international organisations such as the United Nations, the World 
Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. From this perspective, these international 
institutions can be regarded as agencies of the US promoting its global influence. 
Moreover, some authors argue that it is difficult to separate the US government from 
overseas trade because trade and investment agreements such as GATT and NAFT A, 
and treaties and institutions like Bretton Woods and the WTO established the 
reciprocity policies ofthe US that, in turn, facilitated US business access to foreign 
markets and legalised and legitimatised the rights of the big corporations (Gienow-
Hecht, 2000: 476; Ashman, 2004: 147; Anderson-Gold, 2001; Mosley, 1991). In 
addition to taking advantage of the activities of those international organisations to 
dominate the global market, the US has been active in creating barriers through these 
same agencies to the export of products and services from less developed countries to 
the US and also to prevent other countries from gaining greater share in the markets in 
which US companies can compete most effectively. Examples of this behaviour 
include the interest rates imposed on aircraft from Brazil, the tariff and quota on 
bananas imported by the EU, and shrimp disputes with India, Malaysia, Pakistan and 
Thailand (Dilevko & Gottlieb, 2002: 141-142). 
In addition, US media, films and technology also play important roles in facilitating 
globalisation. For media, the global market for news and TV programmmes is 
dominated by US companies. According to a study for UNESCO by Nordenstreng 
and Varis in 1974, the US was the major exporter of television programmme at that 
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time (quoted in Sinclair, 1996: 6). During the 1980s, many other countries, in both 
Europe and Latin America, imported 25percent or more of their broadcast media from 
the US (Holton, 1998: 166). Regarding global news information, the American CNN 
channel has pervasive global influence, especially during major events, such as the 
Gulf War of the early 1990s (Holton 1998: 110) and invasion in Iraq in 2003. Stam 
argues that through the manipulation of news the US can influence the perception of 
events held by powerful interests, such as governments as well as those of global 
viewers. He argues that' ... The military view literally became our view ... For the first 
time the media embraced the purposes and the visual technology of the warrior 
state ... ' (Stam, quoted in Holton 1998: 110) In relation to films, IIollywood feature 
films dominate in the cinema. In 1991, 'Terminator 2' was the top grossing film in 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, and Mexico, while 'Dances with Wolves' 
held top position in Austria, Demark, Egypt, France, Iceland, the Netherlands, Poland, 
Spain and Switzerland (Barber 1995: 308). Due to the prevalence of American films, 
globally, it is very possible to spread common values, attitudes and lifestyles of 
America through these popular films to subvert viewers' traditional values or customs. 
Gienow-Hecht also notes how these types of export (of cultural industries) are 
promoted by the US government. He observes that "American diplomats started 
imagining that the US needed to sell the American way of life abroad. Public figures 
as well as policymakers exhorted the authorities to exert more influence through 
culture around the world" (Gienow-Hecht, 2000: 467). 
Global technology is dominated by a series of high-tech US companies, such as 
Microsoft and Intel and, manufacturing corporations, such as Ford and GM (General 
Motors), remain powerful global enterprises. Even though American companies 
dominate in many global high-tech markets, the American government continues to 
act to maintain that superiority through its capacity to set technological standards, 
define software standards as well as producing the most popular information products 
through the 'Global Information Infrastructure' set up by the former Clinton 
administration (Rothkopf, 1997). Indeed, Rothkopf (1997), a former senior official in 
the US Department of Commerce during the first term of the Clinton administration, 
stresses that besides continuing to award many of the largest infrastructure 
development contracts, the American government will not only support its 
corporations to win overseas contracts but also decides the trade rules governing 
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international trade in the global telecommunications market, the global regulatory 
environment, encryption standards, privacy standards, intellectual property 
protections, and basic equipment standards. From this perspective, it is very obvious 
that states can be predominant actors in facilitating globalisation, even though their 
action and influence are often very discreet. 
Ashman reaches the same conclusion regarding the important role of the state in 
supporting the expansionary ambition of major corporations. Ashman suggests that 
"unless you also target the structures of military and political power that are 
responsible for US domination you won't get far in your anti-corporate struggles" 
(Ashman, 2004: 145) and Ashman uses the term, "the steel fist in the invisible hand of 
the market" (Ashman, 2004: 145) to describe the national power underpinning 
American corporations in the global market. Although the US has huge influence in 
global media, films and technology, it is not necessarily over-extended as the US 
shares the role in facilitating globalisation with other powerful nation-states. After the 
end of 19th century empires, the system of political and economic networks survived. 
The British in India and the Middle East, the Germans in Africa, and the French in 
Indochina all implanted their own culture abroad as a powerful tool to vitalize trade, 
commerce, and political influence and attract intellectual elites for their own interests 
abroad (Gienow-Hecht, 2000: 479). Based on the foregoing examples, it must be 
acknowledged that there is considerable evidence to suggest that the state can be a 
powerful impetus in stimulating and shaping the spread of globalisation. 
2.5.2 Illustrative cases of the role of the state in mediating and responding to 
globalisation 
This section focuses on the reach and response to global culture from European and 
Asian countries. First we will explain the meanings and types of reach and response. 
In order to capture and embody the concept of globalisation, we utilize Houlihan's 
framework (see Figure 2.1) (1994, 2003) in which he discusses the concepts of 
'reach' and 'response' to develop a more useful conceptualisation of globalisation. 
For Houlihan, 'reach' refers to the depth of penetration by the global culture of the 
local culture, whereas 'response' refers to the reaction of the recipient culture. He 
emphasizes that 'reach' might be total or partial and response might be passive, 
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participative, or conflictual, and that it is likely that a country might be located in one 
, 
or more of those categories and that they will respond to different elements of 
globalisation in slightly different ways, which might cover two of those types of 
response. 
Figure 2.1: Patterns of Globalisation 
Economic A B C 
D E F 
Cultural! G H I 
Ideological 
Passive Participative Conflictual 
I Response I 
Source: (adapted from Houlihan, 1994: 371; Houlihan, 2003: 360) 
To identify the depth of reach, Houlihan borrows Hannerz's terminology of 
globalisation in terms of cultural flows: 'cultural commodities, the actions of the state 
in organizing and managing meanings (such as developing, maintaining, and refining 
national identity), "form of life" (the dissemination of habitual perspectives and 
dispositions)' (Hannerz, 1991: 111-116), which represent economic, political and 
social aspects (Houlihan, 1994: 370). Regarding social aspect, this aspect is difficult 
to define when Houlihan calls it "social" but very often he is referring to a broader set 
of cultural and ideological'values. For Houlihan, what he so-called social aspect is 
trying to cover the broad cultural values in the society, thus social ideology is not just 
the ideology of political party but the dominant ideas within society and the everyday 
values. According to this, we attempt to modify the title -"social"- in Houlihan's 
framework instead of "cultural/ideological" in a way which both about cultural values 
and everyday ideology of the population. In addition, Houlihan (1994: 370) argues 
that total reach would imply a penetration of all three cultural flows, while partial 
reach would suggest that the impact of globalisation could be confined to one or two 
flows. To explain the concept of depth of reach more clearly, see Table 2.2. 
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Table 2.2: The summary of reach of global culture 
Meaning Example 
Economic Consumption of The reception of satellite television sports broadcasts 
commodities 
Political Actions of the state The development, maintenance, and refinement of 
national identity by involvement in major international 
sports events such as the soccer World Cup and the 
Olympic Games 
Cultural! Deep structure of cultural The extent to which the values the of global capitalist 
Ideological processes sport individualism and commercialism are adopted by local athletes or local clubs 
Source: adapted from (Houhhan, 1994: 370-1; Houhhan, 2003: 360) 
Regarding these three types of response, they are summarized, with examples in Table 
2.3. 
Table 2.3: The three types of response 
Passive Participative Contlictual 
Meaning Either an enthusiasm for A process of negotiation, Not only the possession 
the external culture or an bargaining, and of sufficient resources to 
inability to challenge the accommodation between enable resistance but 
global culture the global culture and also a set of values that 
local cultures; leads to rejection or 
A sufficient control over attempted rejection of 
resources to provide the global culture 
recipient cultures with 
leverage 
Example Unable to challenge the Shifts in public funding Olympic boycotts or 
(Actions of the state) foreign clubs or MNCs to protect/promote advocating and 
that exploited or particu lar sports organizing GANEFO 
abandoned their young- (Games of the New 
talented athletes Emerging Forces) 
Source: adapted from (Houlihan, 1994: 370-1; Houlihan, 2003: 360) . 
In interpreting Houlihan' s framework (1994, 2003) of the patterns of globalisation 
(see Figure 2.1), it is relatively easy to specify these concepts in the abstract but 
possibly much more difficult to apply them in practice. To date, there are relatively 
few empirical materials that explore the impact of globalisation, in particular those 
that focus on cultural globalisation in specific countries. Therefore, in the next section 
we will look at four well-researched examples, which illustrate both the meaning of 
the concepts of conflictual, participative and passive as well as the reach and response, 
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but also the difficulty of locating countries unequivocally in one relationship rather 
than others (e.g. overlap between one more relationships). Four examples to help us 
understand the concepts of reach of global culture and the response of local cultures in 
'managing' globalisation are France, Japan, Taiwan and India. 
France 
From the 1 i h to the 19th century, France was a powerful country and a major colonial 
power. However, from the middle of the 20th century the French government became 
increasingly concerned that its 'high culture', including the French language, opera, a 
'superior' cuisine and arts, was being eroded by American English, American movies, 
McDonald's fast food and cheap commercial commodities. This perception promoted 
French resistance to global, particularly US culture, and stimulated and reinforced its 
self-image as a culturally distinctive nation with its own colonial experience as 
cultural imperialists (Gienow-Hecht, 2000: 486). The French concern was illustrated 
by the fact that Hollywood films regularly captured more than 50 percent of the 
French cinema audience during the 1 990s (Leiber and Weisberg, 2002: 279). France 
sought to stem the tide of American culture through regulations and subsidies and 
ardently asserted a 'cultural exception' in trade negotiations. Under the headline 'The 
Higher the Satellite, the Lower the Culture,' the former French Minister of Culture, 
J acques Lang, strongly condemned US cultural imperialism in a 1991 interview 
(Gienow-Hecht, 2000: 478). In the summer of 1994, his successor passed the so-
called loi Toubon (Toubon law) that forbade the use of foreign vocabulary in 
advertising, scholarship, and television in order to defend the 'language of liberty' 
against a debased 'commercial English.' Violators supposedly faced fines of up to 
$10,000 or six months in jail. The law was later dismissed. 
To protect the French film industry, the French government forced the French pay 
channel, Canal Plus, which was partly owned by the American company, Vivendi-
Universal, to account for one third of all the capital invested in French film and to 
become heavily involved in co-production (Looseley, 2003: 233). In addition, the 
French government spends approximately $1 billion per year promoting the French 
language and culture internationally (Leiber and Weisberg, 2002: 278). In Spring 
2001, Jack Lang, Minister of Education, and Tasca, Minister of Culture, announced a 
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five-year plan, the main purposes of which were to promote the creative arts and 
culture in schools to produce tomorrow's creators, to generate more discerning 
audiences, to wean the young off standardised commercial entertainments, to assist 
their social mobility, and to help them choose their futures (Looseley, 2003: 230). 
Another French Minister of Culture, Trautman, drafted a cultural cha~er that clearly 
restated the ambition to change cultural practices by educating public taste (,modify 
modes of behaviours', 'sensitizing new generations') (Looseley, 2003: 231). This 
second charter stressed the important function of French culture and invokes the 
national identity of France. It was argued that culture "cannot be reduced to its artistic 
dimension alone but embraces everything which allows individuals to apprehend the 
world and social relationships, to act individually and collectively upon these, and to 
situate themselves with regard to collective memory" (Looseley, 2003: 231). From 
this perspective, the French government regarded the cultural sphere and the 
definition of national value as a new battle to be fought through a public service 
discourse against the perceived negative consequences of commodification and 
globalisation, and particularly these cultural products originating in America. 
Due to the pressure of globalisation coming from America, the French government 
attempted to manage it not only by shaping national cultural policy, through 
legislation, subsidy and education, but also by seeking to influence international 
policy, through organisations, such as the EU and also through international alliances. 
In order to protect French creative industries, Lang addressed the concept of 'French 
cultural exception' during the closing stages ofGA TT talks in 1993, when France's 
refusal to allow cultural artefacts (particularly audiovisual ones) to be subject to the 
general rules of free trade meant that culture was excluded from the final agreement 
(Looseley, 2003: 232). Operating through the EU, France not only successfully 
refused to allow their audiovisual industries to be opened up to free trade under the 
GAIT trade-in-services agreement, but also sought to implement a European content 
quota (Sinclair, 1996: 23) in which France required that at least 40 percent of TV and 
radio programms be made domestically and was allowed to maintain an elaborate 
system for subsidizing its movie industry (Leiber and Weisberg, 2002: 279). 
Furthermore, Lionel Jospin, the French Prime Minister, travelled to Japan in 
December 1999 to seek support (from Japan) to mediate the huge impact of America. 
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The corollary was that Japanese and French officials agreed to work together to craft 
alternatives to US-imported 'global standards' (Meunier, 2000). 
Although the French government has demonstrated its capacity to mediate the 
pressure of globalisation through legislation, subsidy and education in domestic 
affairs and by a strategy of regional cooperation, such as that with the EU and Japan, 
it did not totally detach itself from the structure of the global market as indicated by 
the French government's retreat from banning 'commercial English' on its ?Wll soil. 
According to Houlihan's framework (1994, 2003), France's position was located 
somewhere between participative (box E) and conflictual (box F). On the one hand, 
France agreed to the policy of free trade under the GATT trade-in-services agreement 
to participate in the system of global markets but the French government was 
reluctant to see its 'high culture' and French identity invaded by global culture, 
particularly American culture, which forced the French government to take radical 
action, for example to forbid the use of foreign vocabulary. From the French case, we 
can see that no matter how strong and wealthy a state is, it still has to participate in 
the process of globalisation. In order to avoid missing out on the benefits of 
globalisation, the French government did what they could to manage the adverse 
impact from America and the global free market on its cultural and national identity. 
However, what was the experience of other countries that have less power than France? 
In order to answer this question we will examine cases from Asian countries in the 
next section. 
Japan 
Among the G8 countries, Japan was the first located in Asia. To explore how it 
responded to globalisation and the depth of reach of the global culture, we will 
discuss the case of Japanese football culture. It was not until 1896 that football was 
formally introduced at the Tokyo Higher Teacher Training Institute, and the Football 
Association of Japan (JF A) was established in September 1921. In June 1965 the 
'Japan Soccer League' (JSL), featuring company teams, was launched. In 1991, the 
Japan Professional Football League (J. League) was established and its original aim 
was to strengthen the national team and to secure the rights to host the 2002 World 
Cup finals. At the end of 1998 two divisions (11 and 12) were created out of the then 
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existing 1. League and semi-professional teams in the JFL (Home & Bleakley, 2002: 
100). As a result of the adopted marketing strategy, the J. League was packaged and 
sold as a new, trendy, leisure pursuit, and football was portrayed as international, 
casual, fast, and lively. In addition, more Japanese boys and girls began to play 
football at school and university (Home and B1eakley, 2002: 102). To learn new skills 
and tactics, the J. League recruited leading players from Europe and South America. 
Besides the 1. League, the soccer lottery Toto was introduced nationwide in March 
200 I and was managed on behalf of the Ministry of Education through an affiliated 
organisation, the National Stadium and School Health Centre of Japan, whose slogan 
was 'for all sports of Japan' (Home & Bleakley, 2002: 102). Finally, the popular 
football comic books, 'Captain Tsubasa', the cartoon and subsequent animation series 
seized the imagination of entire generations of young football players around the 
world (Home & Bleakley, 2002: 103). From the perspective of depth of the reach, 
football culture permeates all three cultural flows: football per se is a popular 
commodity; the government promotes sports by the slogan 'for all sports of Japan' 
and the participation rate for football in schools and universities has dramatically 
increased; and football-related comic book culture is pervasive in Japan. On the basis 
ofthis case, one could conclude that the new capitalist football culture has total reach 
in Japanese society. 
From the perspective of response, the Japanese government, at least on the surface, 
seems to have played a very active role by underwriting the bid to host the 2002 
World Cup finals and in facilitating the development of the football industry by 
establishing the 1. League and by encouraging students to play football. However, the 
new football culture had been substantially manipulated by interest groups, such as 
media companies, advertising companies, sporting industries and the 1. League itself. 
An illustration of commercial interests taking priority is the rejection by 1. League 
officials of the proposal from the government that the best professional football team 
in the J. League becomes 'Japan's team'. The role of the Japanese government in 
mediating the new football culture seems blurred, but it is still certainly involved in 
the promotion and development of football as a new element in popular culture. 
Accordingly, the type of response to globalisation found in Japan is, on the basis of 
this brief example, best described as participative. 
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Taiwan 
After 'the Chinese Communist Party' took over mainland China in 1949, both the 
PRC and Taiwan used sport as an element in their struggle for recognition of their 
claims to each other's territory (Chan, 1985; Guttman, 1984), with the issue of "Two 
Chinas" in the Olympic Games being a particularly good example. In the run up to the 
Olympic Games in Montreal in 1976, due to the 'Two Chinas' issue, Taiwan was 
asked by Canadian officials, who were under pressure from mainland China, to 
participate under a name other than its official name 'the Republic of China'. Even 
Lord Killanin, the president of International Olympic Committee at the time, agreed 
to the Canadian demands and the IOC proposed that Taiwan compete under the 
Olympic flag and in the name of IOC. Finally, the Taiwanese government rejected the 
conditional offer, boycotting the games on 16 July 1976 (Slack et ai, 2003: 355). In 
October 1979, the IOC executive board recognized mainland China as the Chinese 
Olympic Committee (COC) and allowed it to use the PRC flag and anthem. For 
Taiwan, it was forced to use the new title, the Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee 
(CTOC), and a different flag and anthem which, on the surface, had been agreed upon 
by the IOC and Taiwan (Slack et ai, 2003: 357) as a condition of their continued 
participation in the Olympic Games. Although Taiwan subsequently missed the 1980 
Olympics, it did compete in successive Olympic Games and set up The National 
Council on Physical Fitness and Sport (NCPFS) in 1996 to promote participation in 
sports at all levels and help all athletes in Taiwan (National Council on Physical 
Fitness & Sport: 2002). 
According to Houlihan's framework (1994, 2003), the Two Chinas episode in the case 
of Taiwan can best be categorized as political reach and conflictual response (box F). 
At the Montreal Olympics, Taiwan was the sole representative of China but it was not 
a formal member of the IOC. Furtbennore, Taiwan struggled to preserve its official 
status and national identity under pressure from both Canada and the IOC. More 
importantly, the boycott was limited to political gestures: suggesting that the depth of 
reach was partial. After the Two Chinas issue, Taiwan continued to engage in the 
Olympic Movement as a means of retaining its international prestige through sporting 
success. From this perspective, the Taiwanese government successfully encouraged 
and supported elite athlete participation in the Olympics for a clearly political purpose. 
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Consequently, the reach of the Olympic Movement could be regarded as partial and 
the response of the Taiwanese sport authorities and government as participative due to 
the latter's capacity to manipulate the Two Chinas issue for nationalist purposes. 
India 
In the case of India, focus is on the media dimension and how India responded to 
Western cultural products. From the beginning, India's ruling Hindu nationalists have 
attacked foreign satellite television networks, arguing that 'their growing presence 
undermines Indian traditions and promotes Western-style decadence' (Chad ha and 
Kavori, 2000: 417). In order to block the negative impact of Western media, the 
Indian government devised two legislative measures designed to restrict the inflow of 
foreign content into the country, namely the Cable Networks Regulation Act and the 
Broadcasting Bill. The former restricts foreign equity ownership within cable 
networks to 30 percent, and requires all cable operators to be Indian citizens. 
Moreover, this Act provides for the mandatory transmission of two channels of the 
state-owned Doordarshan network and contains a stringent programming code that 
allows the government to prohibit the transmission of foreign programmes and 
advertisements that are deemed violent, indecent or otherwise objectionable (Cable 
Networks Regulation Act, 1995, quoted in Chadha & Kavori 2000: 420). The 
Broadcasting Bill provides that, not only do all private broadcasters have to obtain 
licenses from the government-controlled broadcasting authority, but also that licenses 
are to be granted only to companies that are incorporated in India and have a majority 
Indian ownership (Chadha & Kavori, 2000: 420). 
In addition, the Indian government has established a separate satellite channel, known 
as the 'Metro Channel', to stimulate further indigenous programming. Finally, the 
government has approved a variety of tax exemptions and subsidies for domestic 
media production (Chadha & Kavori, 2000: 420). Due to these initiatives the Indian 
government can not only develop a national media production industry, but also 
effectively limit the inflow of Western cultural products into the Indian market. Hence, 
some authors, such as Kalyani Chadha and Anadam Kavori (2000: 418), argue that 
current claims about the pervasiveness of Western cultural products and the onset of 
media imperialism via the inflow of imported content, appears to be vastly overstated 
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in the Asian context. Actually, On the one hand, India set an agenda or discourse 
regarding 'the crisis oflndian traditions invaded by Western-style corruption'. On the 
other hand, the government exploited the discourse to acquire substantial resources 
through the limiting of ownership by foreign companies by law, promoting 
indigenous programming through the 'Metro Channel' and encouraging domestic 
media production by tax exemptions and subsidies, to resist Western media products. 
According to Houlihan's framework (1994, 2003), in terms of response, India exhibits 
a conflictual relationship with globalisation through setting an agenda or discourse of 
'the crisis oflndian traditions invaded by Western-style corruption' to the attempted 
rejection of global culture. Regarding the reach, it seems to be impossible to block 
Western media products through cable TV, satellite TV, terrestrial TV or VCD, DVD 
or internet in the global market arena. However, although a substantial proposition of 
Indians speak English, they often prefer local programmes to imported Western ones 
(Hong, 1998: 46), thus suggesting a partial penetration by global media culture. 
2.6 Conclusion 
The cases of France, Japan, Taiwan and India have been used to illustrate the various 
relationships to globalisation, but it is difficult to identify in the current research 
literature examples of a passive response to the global culture or a country which is 
able to avoid the reach of the globalisation. However, the transmission of the 
Olympics provides a useful possible example. NBC spent $3.55 billion for summer 
and winter Olympics broadcasting rights from 2000 to 2008 (Rivenburgh, 2003: 49) 
and used its position as a major rights holder to influence Olympic coverage presented 
to the public. For example, NBC asked the 2004 Athens Olympic Organizers to 
change the start times of some competitions so that more events could be transmitted 
live in US prime time (Rivenburgh, 2003: 37)., Real (1999: 105, quoted in Rivenburgh, 
2003: 36) also points out that the major media corporations, not only in North 
America but in Europe and elsewhere, and other Olympic corporate sponsors are so 
powerful that they can affect not only the Olympic schedule but also the design of 
stadiums and sites, the style of the opening and closing ceremonies, and the dates of 
the games. From this perspective, people living in poor countries who do not have 
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national broadcasts at the Olympic Games receive a version of the event edited to suit 
the interests of more powerful countries. For example, those countries which rely on 
NBC or CNN will receive extensive coverage of US athletes and the countries 
favoured by the US. Viewers in many countries watch the Olympics through 
American eyes. Under these circumstances, governments in those countries have little 
ability to challenge the global culture, produced, by the major American media 
compames 
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Chapter Three: Chinese Sport Development 
On 1 October 1949, Mao Zedong proclaimed the foundation of the People's Republic 
of China from Tiananmen Square in the heart of Beijing. Since then policy-making in 
China has been shaped, not only by the ideology of the Communist Party elite, but 
also by the pattern of international relations especially with the two superpowers 
America and the USSR. Bruce Cumings (1983: 6) argues that each path in domestic 
policy carries with it a logic for foreign policy: alliance with the USSR in the 1950s, 
self-reliance in the 1960s, a developing relationship with world capitalism in the 
1970s. With Cumings' important insight in mind we will discuss in this chapter how 
domestic policy was affected by the interplay of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
ideology and international relations especially in the area of sport. 
3.1 The establishment of the PRC (1949-1965) 
3.1.1 Social-Political-Economic context 
When the PRC was founded in 1949, the former Soviet Union was a model in 
virtually every field of policy because it was the first powerful communist state in the 
world. Mao Zedong put forth the policy of "leaning to one side," ~ooperating with the 
socialist countries against the imperialists. (Dong, 2003a: 35; Ness & Raichur, 1983: 
83) The policy was reinforced by the Korean War (1950-53), in which China fought 
against American-led United Nations forces because the American reaction to the 
outbreak ofthe Korean War included efforts to impose a global embargo on trade 
with the People's Republic and to isolate it diplomatically. The CCP had little choice 
after 1950 but to rely on its Soviet and East European comrades (Ness & Raichur, 
1983: 83). The Soviet Union provided approximately $1.5 billion in credits to China 
during the 19505, and thousands of Russians and East Europeans worked in China as 
technical advisors in positions critical to China's economic modernization. Soviet 
planning concepts, patterns of industrial and scientific organisation, and a wide 
variety of technologies had an important influence in China during these years (Ness 
& Raichur, 1983: 83; Cumings, 1983: 7; Dong, 2003a: 35). 
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To develop the economy, the PRC formulated the First Five Year Plan (1953-57), 
borrowed from Soviet theory and the USSR's development experience. The ideal was 
to build a centralized command economy under the political regime of a "dictatorship 
of the proletariat" (Ness & Raichur, 1983: 85). Due to Soviet economic support and 
technological assistance, the plan was successful in several fields, such as: (i) 
establishing an infrastructure for industrial development; (ii) achieving high rates of 
economic growth, especially in heavy industry; and (iii) bringing about significant 
social change, principally the nationalization of industry and the collectivization of 
agriculture (Ness & Raichur, 1983: 85). Indeed, during the five years from 1953 
through 1957, industrial production increased by 128.6% and agricultural production 
by 24.8%. Heavy industry increased at an annual average of 25.4% during these years, 
and light industry at an annual average of 12.9% (Ness & Raichur, 1983: 83). 
Roderick MacFarquhar (1997:1) argues that by the mid-1950s China was widely 
respected abroad for its relative success in tackling the problems of nation building 
and economic backwardness. 
Although the Soviet-style First Five Year Plan greatly improved the national economy, 
the differences between mental and manuallabor, city and countryside, and workers 
and peasant were growing greater (Ness & Raichur, 1983: 84). It was not until 1956 
that Mao questioned the validity of the Soviet model as a guide to Chinese 
development. In a speech entitled, 'On the Ten Great Relationships', Mao emphasized 
the importance of light industry and agriculture, industrialization of the countryside, 
decentralization of planning, labour-intensive projects, the development of inland 
areas, and the use of moral incentives rather than material ones in stimulating 
revolutionary commitment (Mao, Volume V, 1977: 284-307, quoted in Hwang, 2002: 
125). This collection of strategies, in Mao's view, would lead to rapid economic 
development and allow China to overtake the capitalist West. The Great Leap 
Forward campaign was launched in 1958 to realize this aim but it also represented 
Mao's Utopian vision of creating a specifically Chinese fonn of socialism, which 
entailed a renewed emphasis on the key role of the peasantry (Hwang, 2002: 125; 
MacFarquhar 1997:1). The Great Leap Forward, 1958-60, which was designed to 
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achieve qualitative leaps, partly through the establishment of people's communes I 
created by merging existing agricultural cooperatives, constituted Mao's design for 
shortening the road to communism (Ness & Raichur, 1983: 79-81; Hwang, 2002: 132; 
K wan, 1980: 5; Dong, 2003a: 48). The impracticality of their utopian communist 
strategy was demonstrated by three years of natural disasters (1959-61). These caused 
at least 20 million deaths attributable indirectly and directly to famine (Hwang, 2002: 
134), and the abrupt cessations of Soviet aid and the withdrawal of all Soviet 
technicians in the summer of 1960 (Ness & Raichur, 1983: 81), the combination of 
which brought China to the brink of economic collapse (Dong, 2003a: 15-16). 
In order to solve the crisis arising from the Great Leap Forward, the CCP launched a 
new policy of recovery and readjustment from the end of 1960 (Hwang, 2002: 129). 
Generally, the policy of readjustment during 1961-65 was successful, and economic 
recovery and growth of output ensued. During the 1960s trade grew at an average real 
rate of 0.7% pa. This low rate was due to the slump (1961-1963) following the 
collapse of the Great Leap Forward and the Sino-Soviet split in 1960 (Oke, 1986: 
238). Generally, from 1963 to 1966 trade grew at an average real rate of 7.4% pa 
(Oke, 1986: 238). However, the consensus with the Party leadership that expedient 
policies should be taken in the short run to deal with the economic decline began to 
break down once a pattern of substantial economic growth had again been restored 
(Ness & Raichur, 1983: 81). 
Relations between China and the USSR were by no means hannonious. First, Stalin 
finnly believed in the Marxist-Leninist concept of a revolution based on the urban 
proletariat, while Mao believed that in a country like China the revolution should be 
based on the peasantry. Moreover, the Chinese leadership resented Khrushchev's 
attempts at de-Stalinization following Stalin's death in 1953. Differences intensified 
throughout the 1950s and led to the split between the two states in the early 1960s 
(Dong, 2003a: 36). Nevertheless, uncritical copying was not abandoned until 1958 by 
I A new kind of social organization, the people's commune, designed as the vehicle for resolving the 
contradiction between China's two economies (the collective agricultural economy and state-owned 
industry) served as the institutional basis for the transition from socialism to communism. (Ness & 
Raichur, 1983: 80-81) 
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which time the relationship between the USSR and China had deteriorated, 
significantly Soviet experts withdrew from China in 1960 (Dong, 2003a: 36). 
In the 1950s and 1960s China refrained from establishing diplomatic relations with 
countries with different social systems. However, gradually China had broken out of 
the American-imposed diplomatic isolation, especially after the successful Bandung 
summit conference of Afro-Asian states in 1955 (Ness & Raichur, 1983: 83). Despite 
the PRC's highly selective strategy for establishing diplomatic relations, the militant 
support for revolution and national liberation movements was never allowed to 
disturb China's relations with the Third World. In fact, much of this militancy was 
due to the ideological dispute with the Soviet Union, the hostility of the United States, 
and later, the Vietnamese War and the Cultural Revolution (Cheng, 1976: 163). 
Indeed, the pre-Cultural Revolution period, from 1963 to 1966, was recognized as 
Mao's socialist education mov;ment of ' Red and Expert,2 which called for mass 
mobilization to attack capitalist-roaders who were supporters of Liu Shaoqi and Deng 
Xiapoing during the Cultural Revolution and were accused of foHowing the capitalist 
road (Hwang, 2002: 132). 
3.1.2 Sport within China 
Since the PRC adopted the policy of "leaning to one side" (Xiang Sulian Xuexi), the 
Soviet influence was evident in the creation of sports institutes, the government 
financing and control of sports and trade union sports societies, the national ranking 
for individual sports, armed forces and clubs and in the provision of sponsorship to 
enable talented athletes to train full time (Hwang, 2002: 121). In order to learn from 
its neighbors, China sent its sports officials, coaches and students to the Soviet Union 
after 1950. They inspected Soviet sports administration, training systems and school 
sports. These visits undoubtedly helped the Chinese to construct their own sports 
system. Simultaneously, in the early 1950s the Soviet government sent teams and 
experts to help China develop its sport (Dong, 2003a: 35). A Soviet youth delegation 
visited China in August 1950 and introduced the Soviet model of sport development. 
2 Red referred to the political criterion for socialism and serving the people while Expert referred to the 
vocational level for working hard and making contributions to society. (Su, 1983: 39, quoted in Hwang, 
2002: 130) 
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At the same time, the first Chinese sports delegation visited the Soviet Union and 
observed its sport development system in operation (Gu, 1997:343, quoted in Hwang, 
2002: 119). 
The first sports delegation from the Soviet Union to visit China on the 20lh December 
1950 returned on 31th January 1951. It visited eight cities in China and played 33 
basketball games with local teams. The Soviet sports experts also gave talks and held 
14 meetings with Chinese sports officials. They described the current methods of 
sports development in the Soviet Union, basketball organisation and functions, the 
principles and steps of basic training, basketball refereeing and the organisation and 
duties of sports personnel. It was seen as an essential first step for the Chinese to learn 
from Soviet sport during the early days of the People's Republic (New Physical 
Culture, 25 February 1951: 3, quoted in Hwang, 2002: 118-19; Dong, 2003a: 35). 
After these visits, in 1951 the People's Liberation Army began to run elite sports 
teams which were the basis for national teams in China (Dong, 2003a: 29). Teams 
modelled on the 'sports team of the 8th Route Army' (led by He Long, the commander) 
were also established at national and provincial levels (Fan, 2001: 156-157). 
In June 1952, at the inaugural meeting of the All-China Sports Federation, Mao 
Zedong called on the Chinese people to 'Develop physical culture and sport, and 
strengthen the physique of the people' (New Physical Culture, 25 July 1952:2, quoted 
in Hwang, 2002: 114). Although the initial intention of Mao was to develop mass 
sport to strengthen the forces of labour and the military due to the Korean War and 
economic ~econstruction, his policy was also affected by the American-led attempt to 
isolate the PRC diplomatically which encouraged him to use elite sporting success, 
especially in the Olympic Games to seek international diplomatic recognition. Dong 
Jinxia (2003: 32) argues that the 1952 Helsinki Olympics clearly indicated that 
Chinese political strategy had begun to shift from mass sport to elite sport. To develop 
elite sport, the National Sports Commission (NSC) was established at the end of 1952 
under the leadership of the State Council. At the same time, sports administration 
committees were established at every provincial and county level. A centralized sports 
system, therefore, was constructed (Dong, 2003a: 22; Fan, 200 I: 156-157). Since then, 
elite sport has been a state-sponsored activity, part of the centralized planning system 
in Communist China (Dong, 2003a: 14). 
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To quicken and deepen the policy learning process from Soviet sports, He Long, who 
was the vice-premier of the state and the first Sports Minister of the People's Republic, 
led a Chinese delegation to the Soviet Union in 1954 (Hwang, 2002: 120). In the mid-
1950s Soviet coaches were invited to China to run coaching courses on volleyball and 
athletics, and supervise Chinese gymnasts, swimmers and basketball players. To help 
regularize the teaching programmes and to improve teaching standards in sports 
institutes, Soviet experts were invited to sports colleges to teach (Dong, 2003a: 35). 
With the assistance of Soviet experts, teaching material including teaching plans, 
programmes, textbooks, rules and methods of management were all produced in 
China during this period (Dong, 2003a: 35). 
As in other spheres, 'The Labour Defence System') borrowed from the Soviet Union 
as a national fitness programme, had an essential influence on Chinese sport and 
physical education in schools (Hwang, 2002: 122). A study of Soviet experience in 
physical education began in the early 1950s. The Soviet guidelines for physical 
education for grades 1-4,5-7 and 8-10 were translated into Chinese as a PE teacher's 
guide. Soviet manuals on physical education were studied to aid China in setting up 
its own PE system (Hwang, 2002: 123). 
After the visit of He Long to the Soviet Union, a competitive sports system was set up. 
The National Sports Commission (NSC) issued 'The Competitive Sports System of 
the PRC' in 1956 and 43 sports were recognized as competitive sports (Fan, 
200 I: 156). In order to train and develop talented athletes from a young age, the Soviet 
Union's spare-time sports school model was copied (Fan, 2001:156; Dong, 2003a: 35). 
In 1956 the NSC issued 'The Regulations of the Youth Spare-time Sports Schools'. 
By September 1958, there were 16,000 "spare-time,,4 sports schools with 770,000 
students throughout the country (Fan, 2001: 156-157). By 1956, national tearns for 
volleyball, basketball, football, table tennis, badminton, gymnastics, athletics and 
swimming had been established (Dong, 2003a: 29). In the same year, the Chinese had 
] The Labour Defence System was called 'Ready for Labour and Defence' in the Soviet Union. 
4 Spare-time sports schools were established and granted by the Chinese government for training young 
athletes at an early age. Young athletes joined the training course after ending their day's classes from 
primary or secondary schools. Generally speaking, these young athletes could be subsidized for free 
training, free food and some pocket money. 
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participated in a total of 185 international competitions and tournaments, and had 
joined 14 international sports organisations, such as the International Volleyball 
Federation (Dong, 2003a: 32-33). 
Following the establishment ofNSC a sports Great Leap Forward campaign was 
initiated from 1957 to 1960. 'The Ten-Year Guidelines for Sports Development' was 
issued in early 1958 (Hwang, 2002: 127; Fan, 2001: 157). In international competition 
the 1968 Olympic Games were set as a target (Hwang, 2002: (27). The PRC's 
ambition was to catch up with the world's best competitive sports countries in ten 
years. According to the guidelines, by 1967, China's basketball, volleyball, football, 
table tennis, athletics, gymnastics, weight-lifting, swimming, shooting and skating 
performers were to be among the very best in the world. China would produce 15,000 
professional athletes. The number of spare-time sports schools would expand to 1,200 
with 360,000 students. In factories, the 40 million workers would establish 1.7 million 
sports teams. In the countryside, there would be 3 million sports teams (Fan, 2001: 
. 157; Hwang, 2002: 128). And the First National Games in 1959 were viewed as an 
instrument for eventual international challenge, and a stimulus to motivate athletes 
and coaches. Since then, the National Games have become and remain, the yardstick 
of China's elite sport. (Dong, 2003a: IS) However, these high targets for sports 
development were almost impossible to achieve because of the tendency for 
untruthful reporting exaggeration and formalisms (Gu, 1997: 350, quoted in Hwang, 
2002: 127). This tendency ceased in 1960 when the CCP and Mao admitted the errors 
of the Great Leap Forward (Hwang, 2002: 129). 
Following the failure of the Great Leap Forward and the great famine in 1962-63 with 
its associated shortage of finance and food, the government reduced the number of 
sports teams, sports schools and elite athletes (Fan, 2001: 157; Hwang, 2002: 130; 
Dong, 2003a: 15-16). The split with the Soviet Union in 1960 caused Soviet experts 
to withdraw from China, stopped China from deferential copying (Dong, 2003a: 36) 
and brought 'The Labour Defence System' to an end (Fan, 2001: 157; Hwang, 2002: 
125). Similarly, the sports budget dropped markedly when China was economically 
S Formalism means that people participated in elite sport or mass sport without any benefit but 
following the tide or command of the political movement. The reason for them to do so was because 
they were forced to join in these activities to match the political rhetoric goals for strengthening 
people's fitness and for training people to be world-class athletes. 
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and politically unstable as was the case during the Great Leap Forward (1958-60) and 
the series of natural disasters which also occurred during this period (Dong, 2003a: 
14-15). From 1963 to 1966 the policy was to concentrate resources on a few elite 
athletes in order to produce high perfonnances on the international sports stage. It was 
a turning point from mass to elite sport in China (Fan, 2001: 157; Hwang, 2002: 132). 
To sum up, China's imitation of Soviet experience in elite sport development was one 
of options open to it in the early year of the PRC. However, Mao questioned the 
Soviet model and was ambitious to overtake the capitalist West in a short time as part 
of the radical Great Leap Forward in 1957. During the Great Leap Forward, progress 
in elite sport development was eroded on account of the tendency to report 
untruthfully and to be over-ambitions. In addition, the disaster of famine caused by 
the Great Leap Forward also influenced sports development (Hwang, 2002:142). 
Generally, the Soviet sports influence on China was quite substantial until the late 
1950s (Hwang, 2002: 121). For all the unrest and even open animosity that existed 
between the USSR and China in the 1960s, the· essential features of the two systems 
were virtually identical, inasmuch as they were both "centralized" and based upon a 
sporting hierarchy that operated from government down to country and district level 
(Jones, 1999: 3; Dong, 2003a: 36). 
3.1.3 China and international Sport 
In order to break through the diplomatic isolation imposed by the United States and its 
allies, China attempted to win international recognition through success in elite sports. 
In particular, the PRC's involvement with the Olympic Movement was full of 
political and diplomatic meaning, illustrated by the cases of the 'two Chinas' dispute 
in the Olympics and the promotion of the Games of the New Emerging Forces 
(GANEFO I). 
China's involvement in the Olympic Movement can be traced back to the 1920s when 
Mr. Wang Zhenting, a high ranking diplomat and sports leader under the government 
of the ROC, was selected as the first Chinese IDC member in 1922 (Ren, 2002:7). 
China's National Amateur Athletic Federation (CNAAF) was recognized by the IOC 
as the Chinese Olympic Committee. Before 1949, China under the ROC participated 
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in the 1932 Los Angeles, 1936 Berlin and 1948 London Olympics. In 1949 most of 
the Chinese Olympic Committee members fled to Taiwan with the ROC govemment6, 
but maintained contract with the IOC and claimed jurisdiction over Olympic affairs 
both for the mainland and Taiwan. However, the ROC's claim was challenged by the 
PRC, since the CNAFF was still based in Nanjing. It was recognized by the PRC 
government, and renamed in October 1949 as All-China Sports Federation (ACSF) 
(Zhonghu quanguo liyu zonghui); and claimed jurisdiction over all Chinese Olympic 
activities. However, both federations were affiliated to the corresponding international 
federation and both consequently sought recognition from the IOC (Hwang, 2002: 
155; Fan & Xiong, 2003: 320). 
At the beginning of 1952 the Soviet ambassador in Beijing paid an official visit to the 
Sports Federation. He informed the PRC that the Soviet Union was going to 
participate in the summer Olympics for the first time. He wanted to know if the PRC 
would also participate so that the Soviet Union would be able to construct a suitable 
policy towards the IOC. The Soviet ambassador's visit clearly conveyed the message 
that participation in the Olympic Games was not a sporting issue but a political matter. 
It was another manifestation of the Cold War (Fan & Xiong, 2003: 320-321). 
Promoted by these political and diplomatic purposes, the PRC initiated contact with 
the IOC in February 1952 and the ACSF sent a message to the IOC expressing its 
wish to participate in the 1952 Helsinki Olympics. This approach put the IOC in a 
difficult position since Taiwan had also indicated its intention to take part in the 
Games. After much internal debate, the IOC adopted a proposal permitting both 
Committees to participate in those events in which they had been recognized by the 
respective international sport federations. Taiwan was disappointed by the IOC 
resolution and withdrew from the 1952 Helsinki Olympics to demonstrate its 
opposition. 1952 was the first time athletes from mainland China participated in the 
Olympics under the PRC government (Hwang, 2002: 155). 
In 1954, the IOC finally made a decision by a vote of 23 to 21 and recognized two 
separate NOeS: Beijing-China and Taiwan-China (Fan & Xiong, 2003: 323-324; 
6 During that time, there were 26 members in the Chinese Olympic Committee and 19 of them fled to 
Taiwan with the ROC government. There were also three Chinese IOC members, Mr. WANG Zhenling 
living in Hong Kong, KONG Xiang Xi residing in the US and Dong Shouyi staying in mainland China. 
Wang and Kong were representing Taiwan with the ROe government (Hill, 1996: 44). 
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Hwang, 2002: 156; Hai, 2002: 8; Hill, 1996: 45), thus creating the issue of ' two 
Chinas' for the Olympic Movement. Beijing refused to accept the IOC solution. In 
June 1955, at the IOC session in Paris, Beijing pointed out that it was against the 
Olympic Charter and illegal to incorporate Taiwan, a regional sport organisation, into 
the IOC, and requested that Taiwan's membership be annulled. Avery Brundage, then 
the president of IOC, rejected the request of Beijing and argued: 'Sport has nothing to 
do with politics' (Espy, 1979: 104-105). In the eyes of the IOC, the PRC always 
exploited political issues rather than involve itself in apolitical sport. Brundage, later 
recalled that he 'had not yet met a sportsman from Red China with whom I could 
discuss athletic matters, but only diplomatic representatives' (Fan & Xiong, 2003: 
324). 
At the 1956 Melbourne Olympics, both the PRC and Taiwan were invited to take part. 
The PRC quit the games in protest against Taiwan's participation and continued to 
demand the expulsion of Taiwan (Hwang, 2002: 156). Due to the determination of the 
PRC to have Taiwan expelled from the IOC Brundage, in a letter dated 8th January 
1958 to Beijing stated that "Everyone knows that there is a separate government in 
Taiwan which is recognized internationally and specially by the United Nations, 
consisting of the governments of the world. Your government is not recognized by the 
United Nations" (Olympic Review, No. 145, November 1979: 628, quoted in Hwang, 
2002: 156). Brundage was consistent in his efforts to keep the Olympic Movement 
distanced from the political dispute between China (PRC) and Taiwan (ROC), but his 
efforts only led to greater PRC dissatisfaction. 
The sole IOC member in the PRC, Tung Shao-yi (Dong Shouyi), demanded Taiwan's 
expUlsion and strongly criticized Brundage's position and policy and stated that it was 
Brundage who had introduced politics into the matter by his continued insistence on 
two Committees. Then, in a letter dated 19 August 1958, Tung accused Brundage of 
being a 'faithful menial of US imperialists .... A man like you ... has no 
qualifications whatsoever to be IOC President. ... I will no longer cooperate with you 
or have any connection with the IOC while it is under your domination' (Espy, 1919: 
62-63; Hill, 1996: 45). With this brutal statement the PRC withdrew from 
membership of the IOC (Fan & Xiong, 2003: 326; Espy, 1979: 63; Hill, 1996: 46). 
The PRC, disappointed over the representation issues, withdrew its membership from 
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the IOC and nine other international sporting organisations, including those for 
football, athletics, weightlifting, swimming, basketball, shooting, cycling, wrestling 
and table tennis in protest against the IOC's 'two Chinas' policy in 1958 (Hwang, 
2002: 156; Fan & Xiong, 2003: 326; Dong, 2003a: 15). During the 1960s there was 
hardly any contact between the PRC and IOC or with other sporting organisations 
(Hwang,2002: 156). 
However, Communist China paid a high price for its political action and it was 
excluded from most sports organizations and its athletes were restricted to 
competition against Eastern European countries. The situation worsened when the 
PRC split with the Soviet Union in the early 1960s and sports exchanges between the 
PRC and East European countries ceased (Fan & Xiong, 200)": 327). Before 1960 
Constantin Andrianov, the Soviet IOC member, had consistently referred to the 
Chinese question in order to pressure the IOC to expel Taiwan, but after the PRC split 
with the Soviet Union he was conspicuously silent over Chinese involvement (Fan & 
Xiong, 2003: 332; Espy, 1979: 109). Lacking support from the Soviet Union, 
Communist China was now isolated, politically, economically and culturally, from 
both the capitalist and communist blocs and consequently sought new friends among 
the countries of the Third World. The opportunity came in 1962 during the Asian 
Games (Fan & Xiong, 2003: 327). 
The inaugural Asian Games was in 1951 under the leadership of the Asian Games 
Federation, which was recognized by the IOC. The games took place every four years. 
While Taiwan was a member of the federation and participated in the Asian Games 
three times between 1951 and 1958, the PRC was excluded. The situation changed at 
the fourth Asian Games in Jakarta, Indonesia, in the summer of 1962, when President 
Sukarno ofIndonesia looked on the Games as a means to strengthen his own position 
among the New Emerging Forces of Asia, Africa and Latin America that were 
struggling against capitalism and trying to create a new world order. Communist 
China was a useful ally in this endeavour. The PRC was made welcome at the Jakarta 
Games and used this opportunity to attempt to establish its position as a leader of the 
'New Emerging Forces' of the world (Fan & Xiong, 2003: 327). But, again, the PRC 
had to face the "two Chinas" issue. To participate in the 1962 Asian Games based on 
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the one China stance, the PRC persuaded the Sukarno government to block Taiwan's 
participation in the Games. 
In the light of pressure from the PRC and some Arab countries, Indonesia decided not 
to allow Taiwan or Israel to attend the games and refused to issue visas to athletes 
from these two countries. The 10C and the international federations for weightlifting 
and athletics regarded this as a political action. They claimed that the Games would 
face the sanction by the 10C of not being recognized. The Indonesian government 
discussed this with Beijing and prepared three options: to offer delayed visas to 
Taiwan and Israeli athletes so as to hinder their participation; to hold a successful 
fourth Asian Games to impress the 10C and international sport federations so that 
they would recognize the Games; to create a new games called the Games of the New 
Emerging Forces (GANEFO), based on the support of the PRC and other Asian, 
African and Latin American countries, if the 10C still would not recognize the Games. 
On 24 August 1962 the Foreign Minister of Indonesia formally announced that it 
would eject Taiwan and Israel from the fourth Games. The 10C and the international 
federations immediately stated that they would not recognize the fourth Games, as 
they could not tolerate a sports movement whose aim was political (Fan & Xiong, 
2003: 328). 
Prompted by diplomatic and political ambitions, the PRC made an announcement on 
2nd September 1962 that it would give GANEFO its full support (Fan & Xiong, 2003: 
329) which meant giving the Indonesians a gift of $18 million for the Games and 
paying the transportation costs of all the delegations at GANEFO (Fan & Xiong, 2003: 
329). However, during this period, sport in the PRC had suffered a serious setback 
due to the failure of the Great Leap Forward, the great famine and the associated 
shortage of finance and food (Fan, 2001: 157; Hwang, 2002: 130; Dong, 2003a: 15-
(6). In spite of the famine causing at least 20 million deaths (Hwang, 2002: 134) and 
the decline of domestic sport, the diplomatic battle conducted through sport was, in 
the eyes of Communist China, far more important than many domestic issues. 
According to Fan & Xiong, the PRC's objective in 1962 was to use GANEFO to help 
develop sport in Asia and Africa and combat the 'forces of imperialism and sports 
organisations manipulated by imperialist countries' (Fan & Xiong, 2003: 330). 
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By the time of GANEFO, the Sino-Soviet split had taken place, halving the 
Communist camp and creating three power blocs - the United States and Western 
Europe, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and the PRC - each striving for the 
support of the non-aligned emerging states. The Soviet Union provided some financial 
support and participated in GANEFO but did not provide a level of support which 
would jeopardize its stature in the Olympic Movement. The PRC was GANEFO's 
main supporter (Fan & Xiong, 2003: 332). 
In 1963 China sent 229 athletes to the Games of the New Emerging Forces 
in which over 2,000 athletes from 48 countries, including the Soviet Union, Japan, 
Brazil, France, East Germany and others, participated. China came first with 65 gold, 
56 silver and 47 bronze medals (the Soviet Union and its satellite countries sent only 
small teams) (Dong, 2003a: 62). 
It is hard to accept that during a time of internal crisis the Chinese government was 
still willing to invest such large amount of money on sports diplomacy. The strategy 
also raises questions about the impact of diplomacy through sports. Did China benefit 
substantially from the policy of sports diplomacy? Did it break through the block of 
diplomacy from America and its allies? Was it successful in its challenge to the 
authority of IOC by supporting the Games of the New Emerging Forces? These 
questions will be discussed in more detail in a later section. 
3.2 The era of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) 
3.2.1 Social-Political-Economic Context 
The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution known as the 'Cultural Revolution' began 
in 1966 and ended with the death of Chairman Mao Zedong in 1976. It represented 
Mao Zedong's attempt to prevent the Chinese Revolution from degenerating in the 
same way that Mao believed the Soviet revolution had done, illustrated by 
Khrushchev's alleged appeasement of America and the process of de-Stalinization 
(Hwang,2002: 135; Cumings, 1983: 7). In addition, its main goal was to re-establish 
the ideological purity of Communism threatened by revisionists and capitalists, and to 
establish an unpolluted version of Mao Zedong's thought (Fan & Xiong, 2003: 333; 
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MacFarquhar, 1997:2; Dong, 2003a: 75; Ness & Raichur, 1983: 81). In practice, the 
outcome of the Cultural Revolution was a chaotic and violent political upheaval (Fan 
& Xiong, 2003: 333). 
In June 1966, Mao Zedong and Lin Biao, frustrated by Party obstruction and sabotage 
of their initiatives, turned the Cultural Revolution into a mass movement to remove 
their opponents from power. "Bombard the Headquarters" (People's Daily, 5 August 
1966: 1, quoted in Hwang, 2002: 135) was their motto as student Red Guards besieged 
government and party offices (Ness & Raichur, 1983: 82; MacFarquhar 1997:2). Mao, 
Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, had gone to the streets to recapture 
control of his own party organisation. Cadres at all levels were thrown out of office 
between 1966 and 1969, and President Liu Shaoqi, the Party Secretary Deng Xiaoping, 
Sports Minister He Long and their followers who disregarded Mao's policy after the 
Great Leap Forward were singled out as the most prominent "persons in authority 
taking the capitalist road" (Ness & Raichur, 1983: 82; Hwang, 2002:137; Cumings, 
1983: 26). 
During the height of the Cultural Revolution in the late 1960s, almost every urban 
Chinese was caught up in the violence and terror unleashed by Mao (Miles, 1996: 235; 
Hwang, 2002:137) when he encouraged the young Red Guards to overthrow authority 
and take over the running of the country from those he saw as hidebound bureaucrats 
who had lost their revolutionary fervor (Miles, 1996: 235). Due to the internecine 
warfare and urban chaos the Red Guard movement had spawned, Mao, in the summer 
of 1968, authorized the armed forces to move into schools, universities, factories and 
many other institutions to reimpose order (Dong, 2003a: 82; Miles, 1996: 235; Hwang, 
2002: 138) and launched the large-scale 'rustication campaign,7 to reduce the violence 
(MacFarquhar 1997:2) and at the same time to alleviate unemployment in the cities 
(Dong, 2003a: 82). During the Socialist Education Movement members of the PLA 
were sent into urban and rural work situation to cement ties with the proletariat and 
regain contact with the masses. In the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution the PLA 
would be a major disseminator of 'Mao Zedong Thought'. It was Lin Biao who 
7 This campaign lasted more than ten years. Most of the middle-school and college graduates between 
1966 and 1968 were sent to the countryside to reform themselves through manual labour (Dong, 2003: 
82). 
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compiled and published the 'Little Red Book' which became the banner of not only 
the Army but millions of revolutionaries (McEwen, 1987: 58). The Ninth Party 
Congress in April 1969 seemed to signal at least a limited victory for the cultural 
revolutionaries, but it was followed by further struggle - especially between Mao and 
Lin Biao who in addition to being vice-chairman of the Party was also a senior 
military figure (Ness & Raichur, 1983: 82; McEwen, 1987: 61). Ultimately, Lin died 
in a plane crash in September 1971 (Ness & Raichur, 1983: 82; MacFarquhar 1997:2). 
In 1972, following the demise of Lin Biao, Zhou Entai initiated a series of cautious 
policy changes in various sectors to lessen the impact of radicalism on the Cultural 
Revolution. When Zhou went further and suggested a direct attack on the ideological 
basis of ultra-leftism, Mao intervened to ward offth~ danger such a campaign would 
pose to the raison d 'etre ofthe Cultural Revolution and to the careers of its principal 
beneficiaries (Forster, 1987: 67). Most of the officials who returned to office under 
Zhou's aegis undoubtedly shared the view, based on their own personal experience, 
that the Cultural Revolution was like a 'dark night', 'ravaging flood and savage beast' 
(Forster, 1987: 67). 
The struggle between Mao and Zhou Enlai brought to a head again the continuing 
struggle over the correct road for China's future. With Mao's connivance, the 
prospect of a second Cultural Revolution was raised with the launch of the campaign 
'Criticize Lin Biao, criticize Confucius' (Pi Lin Pi Kong) in 1974 (Forster, 1987: 67). 
The campaign led by Jiang Qing, Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao and Yao 
Wenyuan who were referred to as the 'Gang of Four', had as its real purpose the 
undermining ofZhou Enlai (MacFarquhar, 1993: 286-287, quoted in Hwang, 
2002: 139). When Zhou Enlai entered hospital in June 1974 with terminal cancer, his 
protege, Deng Xiaoping, stepped into the breach. He had apparently obtained Mao's 
trust and confidence, but Deng could not await the departure of the infirm chairman 
before drawing up a programme of reform for the post-Mao era. Although it was 
deliberately and carefully dressed up in the appropriate rhetoric, in essence Deng's 
plans represented a direct rebuttal of all that the Cultural Revolution stood for. Finally, 
Mao dismissed Deng from office. However, it was Deng's vision that was to prevail 
after Mao's death (Forster, 1987: 67). 
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In September 1976, Chairman Mao died, and the final stage in the process of 
leadership succession began. In October, the Gang of Four was arrested, and during 
the following year, a new leadership was formed around Hua Guofeng, supposedly 
chosen by Mao to succeed him, Ye Jianying, a veteran cadre closely linked to the 
military, and Deng Xiaoping, once again rehabilitated to become the mainstay of the 
new regime. (Ness & Raichur, 1983: 82; MacFarquhar 1997: 2) 
Regarding economic development there were, between the 1966-1969, falls in the 
total output value in industry and agriculture in 1967 and 1968. A State budget deficit 
was recorded in 1967 (McEwen, 1987: 61) and the gross national product (GNP) 
reportedly dropped from 306.2 billion yuan in 1966 to 264.8 billion yuan in 1968 
(Dong, 2003a: 77). During the 1970s there was a rapid increase in inflation rates. For 
example, although China's total trade increased on average by 18.2% pa from 1970-
1977, this represented a mere 1.2 % pa in real terms. In fact, the average real rate of 
increase in total trade during the 1970s was considerably lower than that achieved in 
the 1950s (Oke, 1986: 239). The extent to which this economic decline can be directly 
attributed to the Cultural Revolution is debatable, but it is reasonable to assume some 
economic activity was directly and negatively affected (McEwen, 1987: 61), leading 
McEwen (1987: 62) to state that in 1976 China's national economy was in a desperate 
situation. 
In relation to foreign policy, Knight (2003: 318) argues that with the Sino-Soviet split 
and the Cultural Revolution, China's engagement with the world declined 
substantially, 'self reliance' and 'independence' became the watchwords of foreign 
and economic policy during China's late-Mao period. One of the greatest 
achievements of China's foreign policy in this period was the improvement in 
relations with America on the one hand, and Japan and West European countries on 
the other. Self-reliance, independence from power blocs, and according to Cheng the 
"deceptive nature of detente" were China's appeals to countries of the second 
intennediate zones in its attempt to 'neutralize' them and enticed them into a united 
front against the superpowers (Cheng, 1976: 164-165). 
• The countries of the second intermediate zone are those countries did not belong to the Superpowers 
and the "Third World". 
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In 1967 China successfully exploded its first nuclear bomb despite being in the throes 
of the Cultural Revolution, claiming for itself a de facto position as a third power 
centre to rival both the United States and the Soviet Union (Espy, 1979: 123). 
In 1968 the United States' involvement in Vietnam had become so unpopular and 
counterproductive that President 10hnson declined to stand for a second term and was 
compelled to initiate peace negotiations. The incoming Nixon administration 
announced the programme of 'Vietnamization' accompanied by troop withdrawals 
and rejected a United States role of world policeman (Espy, 1979: 123). Under the 
auspices of Henry Kissinger, Nixon's National Security Advisor and later Secretary of 
State, the United States embarked upon a programme of detente with the Soviet Union 
and China (Espy, 1979: 123). 
The change in American foreign policy toward China was partly promoted by a desire 
to provide a counterweight to the Soviet military threat evidenced by the Soviet 
occupation of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and the border clashes in March 1969 
with China (Cheng, 1976: 148-149; Fan & Xiong, 2003: 333; Kwan, 1980: 80). By 
1970 the idea of reopening some avenues of contact with the United States was in 
Mao's mind (Fan & Xiong, 2003: 333-334) and Premier Zhou Enlai called for 
peaceful coexistence and friendly relations between states with different social 
systems (Hwang, 2002: 157; Kwan, 1980: 7). Due to a change in the United States' 
stand, and President Nixon's visit to Beijing, in 1971 the United Nations recognized 
the PRC and expelled the ROC (Taiwan), giving Taiwan's seat on the Security 
Council to the PRC (Hill, 1996: 46; Cheng, 1976: 166; Hwang, 2002: 156; Espy, 
1979: 123). 
Although Sino-American relations improved considerably after President Nixon's 
visit to Beijing, it was still some time before America had a formal rapprochement 
with China. In the UN General Assembly on April 10, 1974, Deng Xiaoping made a 
speech aimed at building the broadest united front to struggle against the two 
superpowers (Cheng, 1976: 156). In the early 1970s China was more strongly 
committed to a policy of non-alignment among Third World countries (Cheng, 1976: 
163), and promoted the policy with substantial foreign aid to developing countries 
during the Cultural Revolution. In 1970 alone China distributed aid amounting to US$ 
1,034 million (Cheng, 1976: 163). According to Cheng (1976: 168), among the 
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developing countries in the Third World, China was still an attractive model of socio-
economic progress as well as being a generous aid donor. 
As regards western countries, China simply could not fail to notice and aim to exploit 
the mounting dissatisfaction among America's NATO allies over the Vietnamese war, 
their urge for greater independence from US diplomatic policy and their eagerness to 
trade with China. Indeed, Canada's Minister of External Affairs, announced on 
January 22, 1969, that Canada would shortly approach Beijing on the question of 
establishing diplomatic relations between the two countries (Cheng, 1976: 154). One 
year later, Canada adopted a one-China policy and recognized the PRC as the sole 
representative of all Chinese (Hill, 1996: 48). China's relations with Eastern Europe 
also underwent significant changes. After the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, 
China declared its strong support for the independence of Romania and Albania and 
more importantly, improved its relations with Yugoslavia (Cheng, 1976: 155). 
Joining the United Nations greatly helped China to restore its 'respectability' and 
'legitimacy' and led to the establishment of diplomatic relations with some one 
hundred countries between joining the UN in 1972 and 1976 (Cheng, 1976: 166). 
China was now much better placed to compete with the two superpowers, but as 
Cheng (1976: 168) argues, China's ability to deal with America and the Soviet Union 
as equals was hampered by its economic and military weakness. 
3.2.2 Sport within China 
In the Cultural Revolution, sport was discontinued twice - 1966-1969 and 1974-1976 
(Hwang,2002: 143) due to the activities of the Red Guard movement and later by the 
'Gang of Four'. During the period 1966-1969, sport development was damaged and 
sports officials suffered due to the condemnation of competitive games by Mao 
(Chang, 1993: 494, quoted in Hwang, 2002: 136). However, in order to end China's 
diplomatic isolation, sports were restored by Zhou Enlai in 1971 (Hwang, 2002:143; 
Fan, 2001: 158). During the campaign 'Criticize Lin Biao, criticize Confucius', the 
'Gang of Four' took over the sports system which set sports development back again. 
Generally, as the former Sport Minister Wu Shaozu claims, the entire sports system 
was at a standstill or near standstill during the Cultural Revolution (Wu, S.Z. 1999a: 
60 
Chapter 3 Chinese Sport Development 
171-200, quoted in Hwang, 2002: 140). "However, Fan (2001: 159) claims that this 
period was also one which contained the seeds of a new Chinese sports system, the 
analysis of which is discussed below. 
At the beginning of the Cultural Revolution (1966-69) elite sport was seriously 
damaged. The training system was disrupted, schools were closed, sports competition 
ceased, Chinese teams stopped touring abroad and many elite athletes, coaches and 
administrations were purged, persecuted and tortured (Fan, 200 I: 136, 158; Dong, 
2003a: 76, 96; Fan & Xiong, 2003: 333; Hwang, 2002: 131, 135). He Long, the first 
Sports Minister, provides a good example; he was attacked for supporting Liu 
Shaoqui's and Deng Xiaoping's revisionist sport policy and died injail due to 
suffering ill treatment on 9th June 1969 (Gu, 1997: 360-361, quoted in Hwang, 
2002: 135). The majority of his colleagues were also attacked as revisionists and 
counter-revolutionaries (Tan & Zhao, 1996: 403-404, quoted in Hwang, 2002: 135) 
and sent to the countryside to do physical labour, leading to the breakdo\\<TI of the 
training system (Fan & Xiong, 2003: 333). Further tragedies included three of the top 
table tennis players, Fu Qifang, jiang Yongning and Rong Guotuan, committing 
suicide during the "Clean Up the Class Ranks" campaign (Chang, 1993: 496, quoted 
in Hwang, 2002: 136; Li, X.M. 2001: 89). Therefore, the table tennis team that won 15 
medals at the 1965 world championships disappeared and missed the 1967 and 1969 
championships. The Chinese delegation that was preparing for GANEFO 11 in Cairo 
was disbanded without any explanation (Fan & Xiong, 2003: 333). According to 
Dong Jinxia (2003: 16) and Wu Shaozu (1999: 175), during the turbulent years 
between 1966 and 1969, elite sport virtually collapsed. 
After the demise of Lin Biao in 1971, Premier Zhou gradually restored sports training, 
competition, schools, organisations and administrative procedures which were all 
discontinued between 1966 and 1970. Sports officials were released and returned to 
the National Sports Commission which was dominated by the PLA between 1966 and 
1971 (Hwang, 2002:138; Dong, 2003a: 86; Fan & Xiong, 2003: 335-336). National 
countryside sports development meetings, national labour sports development 
meetings and the national spare-time sports schools conferences were held in 1972 
(Gu, 1997:361-362, quoted in Hwang, 2002:138; Fan & Xiong, 2003: 335-336). 
Increasing sports investment resulted in the expansion of sports teams (Dong, 2003a: 
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86) and in 1972 alone there were 17 national and 256 provincial or municipal 
competitions for all sports, including basketball, volleyball, football, table tennis, 
badminton ... (Dong, 2003a: 87; Fan & Xiong, 2003: 335-336). 
After 1972, China dominated world table tennis whose international success and 
diplomatic profile (Fan, 2001: 159} inspired the nation's enthusiasm for the sport. The 
game of the 'small white ball' was played by all, from girls and boys in school to 
high-level officials including Chairman Mao and Premier Chou (Dong, 2003a: 87). In 
1973, Deng Xiaoping, being Vice Premier and supported by Premier Chou, became 
heavily involved, helping to restore the quality of elite sport and therefore 
contributing to the good performance of the Chinese teams in the 1974 Asian Games 
and in the 1975 National Games (Wu, S.Z. 1999a: 178; Li, X.M. 2001: 93-94). By the 
end of 1974, 1,459 sports schools had been reopened and provincial and national 
teams started training schedules for national and international competitions (Fan & 
Xiong, 2003: 335-336). Unfortunately, affected by 'Gang of Four', Deng was 
dismissed in 1976 and sports entered a period of chaos (Hwang, 2002:143). 
On taking over the sports system, the 'Gang of Four' attacked the former Sports 
Minister as one of the 'third generation of revisionists' and responsible for promoting 
'bourgeois sports without capitalists' (Hwang, 2002:139, 143). As a result the 'Gang 
of Four' introduced a so-called 'sports revolution' and 'sports competition reform' 
aimed at the rejection of 'medalism', 'trophyism' and 'individualism' in sport (Dong, 
2003a: 90). Due to their total rebuttal of the value and achievement of competitive 
sports, the 'Gang of Four' did not attempt to evaluate the skill and talent of athletes 
but their political attitude and their loyalty to Mao and the Proletariat. According to 
Dong Jinxia (2003: 90, 96) and Hwang Dong-Jhy (2002: 139), this sports revolution 
ofleftists was promptly aborted following the death of Mao and the overthrow ofthe 
Gang of Four in September 1976. By 1970, after the clash with the Soviets at the 
border area, militant ethnic nationalism became a dominant force (Fan & Xiong, 2003: 
. 338). 'Be prepared for war', 'An entire nation in arms' and '800 million peasants are 
800 million athletes and soldiers' became prominent slogans (Fan & Xiong, 2003: 
338). Li Xiumei (2001: 86-87), criticized the forceful and formalistic mass sports 
being promoted in the countryside as a unique and unnatural phenomenon during that 
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time, but one which, to some extent, did broaden and embed sports in the rural 
districts. 
In the early 1970s, the Rustication Campaign was still under way and academic study 
was discouraged in society, offering a clear opportunity to develop spare-time sports 
schools and sports teams at provincial level which provided a haven for many young 
people who otherwise would have been sent to the countryside (Dong, 2003a: 83, 96). 
The attraction of sports teams was further reinforced by the limited job opportunities 
available in the 1970s and the real benefits of sports team membership, which 
included stable income, adequate food and free clothing, and even more importantly, 
a post-sport job in the city. All this did not, and could not, escape the notice of parents 
from various backgrounds who encouraged their children to take up sport (Dong, 
2003a: 83-84). The result was that sports schools prospered and the number of 
students in sports schools reached a record high (Dong, 2003a: 16). There were 
121,732 students in 1972, and by 1976 the figure soared to 305,516 (Dong, 2003a: 85), 
which laid down a foundation for their later rapid breakthrough in international 
contests (Dong, 2003a: 96). 
In short, the Cultural Revolution created further conflicts over sport between the ultra-
left radicals - Chairman Mao and the 'Gang of Four' and the pragmatists - Premier 
Chou, He Long and Deng Xiaoping (Hwang, 2002: 134; Dong, 2003a: 90) in which 
the former emphasized self-reliance and were highly ideological while the latter were 
more pragmatic and concerned to use sport for diplomatic purposes and develop 
China's relationship with world capitalism (discussed more fully in part 2-3 "China 
and international sport"). Although the conflicts between the two factions affected 
mature athletes, it, unexpectedly, paved the way in some respects for the next 
generation of athletes to produce unusually successful results in the 1980s. 
3.2.3. China and international sport 
Promoted by leftists during the early Cultural Revolution, the strategy of the PRC was 
to use sport in an attempt to unite the Third World through supporting GANEFO's 
challenge to the Olympic Movement. The challenge to the Olympic Movement and 
especially the potential boycott of the Olympic Games by African countries caused 
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deep concern in the IOC. The full use of sports diplomacy did not occur until the early 
1970s when China began to retreat from its selective diplomatic isolation. The 'ping-
pong diplomacy' episode not only contributed to China taking a seat on the Security 
Council in the UN, but it also paved the way for President Nixon to visit Beijing and 
generally improve diplomatic relations with non-Communist Countries. However, one 
consequence of China's diplomatic activism was to limit Taiwan's diplomatic activity. 
How China achieved these diplomatic successes through sports during these chaotic 
years and the implications for the 'two Chinas' issue in particular are discussed below. 
Since the PRC viewed itself as the champion for the Third World in the 1960s the 
Chinese government contributed a substantial amount of foreign aid to developing 
countries, including Indonesia and Cambodia which held GANEFO I and the Asian 
GANEFO. After GANEFO I, GANEFO 11 was scheduled to take place in Cairo in 
1967, with Beijing as an alternate site. In September 1965 the second session of the 
council of GANEFO was held in Beijing. Thirty-nine delegations were present at the 
meeting. The territory of GANEFO was extended with the formation of an Asian 
committee, which aimed to organize an Asian GANEFO from November 25 to 
December 6, 1966, in Cambodia. Like GANEFO itself, the Asian GANEFO was 
designed as an alternative Games and was strategically timed to take place at the same 
time as the Olympic sanctioned Asian Games (Espy, 1979: 109). 
The Asian GANEFO, chiefly patronized by the PRC, like GANEFO I, was acclaimed 
as a great success. As in GANEFO I, the majority of the delegations were not official 
bodies since certain international federations, such as the International Weightlifting 
Federation and IAAF, were equally opposed to Asian GANEFO and to GANEFO I 
(Espy, 1979: 109). GANEFO 11 failed because of lack of finance. Egypt announced 
that it could not hold GANEFO 11 in 1966 and, because of the turmoil of the Cultural 
Revolution, the PRC had no intention of supporting the Egyptian initiative (Dong, 
2003a: 76; Fan & Xiong, 2003: 332) and shut itself off from any international contact 
(Espy, 1979: 110). During the existence of GANEFO it attracted African countries 
alienated from the IOC due to the Committee's perceived failure to challenge South 
Africa's practice of apartheid (Espy, 1979: 110). For many African leaders the 
rejection ofthe Olympic Movement and participation in GANEFO would force the 
superpowers and their satellites to take action on the issue of apartheid commensurate 
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with their interests in Africa (Espy, 1979: 110). Although GANEFO finally perished, 
it had posed a real threat to the Olympic Movement (Espy, 1979: 110) and China had 
partly achieved its objective of challenging the authority of the IOC. 
China's diplomatic isolation began to change when it rejoined international table 
tennis competition at the Scandinavian Open Championship in Sweden on 26 
November 1970 - the first time a Chinese team had gone abroad for international 
competition since the Cultural Revolution (Hwang, 2002: 156). Later China was 
invited to join the 31 si World Table Tennis Championship in Japan in March-April 
1971 (Dong, 2003a: 86; Fan & Xiong, 2003: 334-335). Mao agreed with Premier 
Zhou Enlai's suggestion to send the Chinese table tennis team to Japan with the 
famous slogan 'Friendship First, Competition Second' and Mao said: 'We shall join 
this competition. We must not be afraid to bear hardship. We must not be nervous and 
scared' (Wu, S.Z. 1999a: 238, quoted in Hwang, 2002: 156; Fan & Xiong, 2003: 334-
335). It was the beginning of China's 'Ping Pong Diplomacy'. 
At these championships the Chinese invited the American delegation to a series of 
exhibition matches in China. These matches set the stage for the round of negotiations 
between the PRC and the United States, culminating in the visit of President Nixon 
the following year (Espy, 1979: 147; Dong, 2003a: 86-87; Cheng, 1976: 160). The 
improvement in the Sino-US bilateral relationship not only helped the PRC acquire a 
seat on the UN Security Council but also led to the establishment of full diplomatic 
relations between China and Japan in 1973. 
The carefully calculated 'Ping Pong Diplomatic initiative' , (Espy, 1979: 147) was 
directed not only toward the US and Japan, but also to the whole world except the 
USSR. During this period, China needed to make more friends to strengthen its 
international status in relation to its premier enemy- the Soviet Union. The slogan . 
'Friendship First, Competition Second' became the guideline for Chinese sport 
delegations. According to the Sports Minister, Wang Meng, in 1972, "Friendship 
means politics. Friendship first means politics first. We use competition to project our 
socialist country's new image, and to make and win friends in the world" (quoted in 
Fan & Xiong, 2003: 335-336). As a result of the success of the 'Ping Pong 
Diplomacy', China could rejoin the Olympic Movement with the "friendly assistance" 
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of other countries, such as Japan, Zambia, Iran and Canada ... and consequently 
undermine Taiwan's international diplomacy through sports. 
Early in 1973 the Japanese Olympic Committee showed its "friendship" to the PRC, 
in line with Japanese government policy, by writing to various international 
federations and national Olympic committees calling for the resumption of China's 
post in the IOC, and the expulsion of Taiwan from the Olympic Movement by 
unifying the federations and national committees (Espy, 1979: 147-148). Proposed by 
Japan and Iran just prior to the Olympic Congress in October 1973 the Asian Games 
Federation voted to admit the PRC to the Tehran Asian Games and to expel Taiwan 
(Hill, 1996: 47; Espy, 1979: 149). Building on this momentum Japan and Zambia's 
IOC representatives proposed to the Olympic Congress that China be admitted to the 
IOC with both countries arguing that 'it is a shame that a country with one-fourth of 
the world's population is excluded from the world of sports' (Espy, 1979: 149). 
During 1974 and 1975, more federations recognized the PRC and in April 1975, the 
PRC made a formal application to rejoin the IOC (Hwang, 2002: 156). Its condition of 
entry was that Taiwan must be expelled from the IOC and that the All-China Sports 
Federation must be affirmed as the sole sports organisation representing the whole of 
China. Beijing regarded the existing relationship between the PRC and IOC as 
abnormal and unjust after the PRC became a member of the United Nations (UN) 
while Taiwan was not (Hwang, 2002: 157; Espy, 1979: 151; Hill, 1996: 48). Although 
the IOC was naturally reluctant to admit that a sporting decision should be governed 
by political arguments (Hill, 1996: 48), it had to face the increasing pressure coming 
from countries who wished to improve their relationship with the PRC. 
At the 1976 Montreal Olympics, the PRC requested Canada to bar unconditionally the 
entry of the Taiwanese delegation to Montreal. Under the pressure of "friendship" the 
Canadian government required Taiwanese athletes to compete without any reference 
to the word ~China' or the 'Republic of China' (Espy, 1979: 155; Hill, 1996: 48). The 
IOC considered the Canadian action to be a breach of its promise, which was made in 
1970 when Montreal was chosen as the venue, that no recognized member country 
could be denied entrance (Espy, 1979: 152). To avoid further confrontation with the 
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Canadian government, the 10C submitted a plan that Taiwan should be allowed to 
march as 'Taiwan-ROC' behind a flag bearing the Olympic rings (Espy, 1979: 153). 
This solution drew opposition from both the PRC and Taiwan. The PRC indicated that 
ROC was only an abbreviation for the title 'Republic of China' and to adopt it would 
be to play the old trick of 'two Chinas'. On the other hand, Taiwan insisted on 
marching and competing under its own flag and name - Republic of China (Hwang, 
2002: 158) although it was not opposed to dual membership (Espy, 1979: 151). 
Finally, on the day before the Games were to begin, July 16, the Taiwanese delegation 
refused the compromise solution and boycotted the Olympic Games (Espy, 1979: 154; 
Hill, 1996: 50). 
In summary, during the Cultural Revolution, China dexterously and amply took 
advantage of the non-political image of sports first to defy the authority of the 10C 
which was dominated by Western countries, and second to build diplomatic relations 
with non-communist countries to raise its global influence, particularly in the UN, and 
rejoin the Olympic Movement. Although China did achieve a great deal through its 
sports diplomacy, the controversy of the 'two Chinas' issues was not resolved until 
Deng Xiaoping initiated "the open-door policy" and the compromise of 'One Country, 
Two System', which will be discussed in the next section. 
3.3 The era of Deng Xiaoping (1977-1992) 
3.3.1 Social-Political-Economic context 
After 1978, under Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) endorsed the 
pivotal policy of the 'Four Modernizations,9 derived from Premier Zhou's reports of 
National People's Congress in 1964 and 1975 (Ness & Raichur, 1983: 82; Oke, 1986: 
237), which legitimised the introduction of capitalist measures in the quest for rapid 
development of China's productive forces. Mondemization was to be achieved, in 
part at least, through the 'opening to the outside' (Duiwai kaifang) policy known as 
the 'open door' policy which implied not only an economic involvement with the 
capitalist world - through trade, investment and technology transfer - but also an 
9 The Four Modernizations are modernization of agriculture, industry, science and technology, and 
defence. 
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opening to ideas and cultural forms originating in the West (Knight, 2003: 318; Ness 
& Raichur, 1983: 85). Due to the struggle over how far a~d how fast to move toward 
market mechanisms between the reform wing led by Deng Xiaoping and conservative 
wing led by Chen Yun, the ~olicies of economic reform and "opening up" were not 
wholly implemented until Deng's south China remarks in 1992. 
In 1977 Hua Guofeng, the new chairman ofCCP, continued to use the radical rhetoric 
of the Cultural Revolution which was increasingly at odds with social reality (Forster, 
1987: 68) and he gradually lost power to Deng Xiaoping (McEwen, 1987: 62). Deng 
applied the Four Modernizations as an approach to socialist construction, which was 
endorsed by the 3 rd plenum of the 11 th Central Committee, held in December 1978 
(Zhang, B. 2002: 44; Zhu, 1991: 229,275-276; Ness & Raichur, 1983: 82; Dong, 
2003a: 97). To integrate the Four Modernizations into external economic policy, 
Deng Xiaoping made an 'open door policy' speech in February 1980 (Oke, 1986: 237) 
following which the Chinese government declared Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shantaou in 
Guandong Province and Xiamen in Fujian Province as SEZ's (special economic zones) 
(Oke, 1986: 240) which were designed to attract foreign capital investment, enterprise 
and technology. By the 12th Party Congress in 1982 reformists dominated the military, 
the CCP and the government being led by Deng Xiaoping in his role as Chairman of 
the Central Military Commission, Hu Yaobang, the General Secretary of CCP, and 
Zhao Ziyang, Premier ofthe State Council respectively. In the same year, the new 
Constitution stated: 'The People's Republic of China permits foreign enterprises, 
other foreign economic organisations and individual foreigners to invest in China and 
to enter various forms of economic cooperation with Chinese enterprises' (Oke, 1986: 
241). 
In 1984, the party decided that it should be a "planned commodity economy" with an 
undefined mix of both central planning and market forces. This was a clear rebuff to 
Chen Y un who had insisted in 1978, that "the planned economy should be the 
mainstay of socialism, with regulation by market forces playing a subsidiary role" 
(Miles, 1996: 117). After that, new price reform was introduced, decentralization was 
accelerated and guaranteed lifetime employment was abandoned, and the Party 
encouraged 'some areas and some people to get rich first' (Dong, 2003a: 99; McEwen, 
1987: 62; Baum, 1997: 361). Chinese society started to turn towards a more 
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materialistic and pragmatic disposition (Oong, 2003a: 99; Baum, 1997: 361; 
MacFarquhar 1997:3). In 1984, 14 coastal cities were empowered to practice the same 
policies as the SEZs to attract overseas investment (Oke, 1986: 240; Oong, 2003a: 
102; Zhu, 1991:382). The result was that China's trade and investment links with 
other countries rapidly expanded. More than 10,000 foreign joint ventures were 
established between 1978 and 1987, involving contracts of about $30 billion. Foreign 
loan contracts amounted to around $40 billion (Oong, 2003a: 102). 
The 13th Congress in 1987 marked a major push toward handing over power by the 
old guard to a younger generation of professionals and technocrats. Deng himself 
gave up his membership of the Central Committee and yielded leadership of the 
party's Central Military Commission (CMC) to Jiang Zemin in September 1989 
(Miles, 1996: 77). To preserve the power of reformists, the 13th Party Congress passed 
a secret resolution to refer all major decisions to Oeng Xiaoping as the 'helmsman' of 
the Party (Fewsmith, 1997: 498). The Congress formally agreed that China was only 
in "the initial stages of socialism," which gave reformists even more space to 
experiment with unorthodox policies. They pronounced "leftism" - or hard-line 
conservatism - to be the greatest danger to China's modernization (Miles, 1996: 77). 
However, following the Tiananmen incident in which students demanding more 
democracy and campaigning against corruption, bribery, inflation and other economic 
crimes (Oong, 2003a: 101; Jia, 2002:126; Baum, 1997: 342) were killed, Western 
countries and international aid agencies imposed a series of economic sanctions on 
China (Oong, 2003a: 102;Vogel, 2002: 9; Zhang T, 2002: 194). One consequence was 
that Oeng's prestige within the Party plummeted, weakening his ability to exercise 
informal authority (Fewsmith, 1997: 478, 498). In November 1989, Chen Yun's 
economic thought was restored as orthodoxy by the 5th plenum of the 13th Central 
Committee (Fewsmith, 1997: 478). The force of the conservative wing of the Party in 
the winter of 1989-90 led by Li Peng, the conservative protege of Ch en Yun, was 
seeking to define and defend a policy that would recentralize the economy and 
reimpose a significant degree of planning to re-control the economy, and perhaps 
increase political power over the provinces (Fewsmith, 1997: 482-3). However, in late 
July 1991, the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU) surrendered its monopoly on political 
power and moved its ideological stance toward democratic socialism. This shift 
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caused obvious anxieties in China and prompted conservatives to take an even harder 
line through a renewed emphasis on ideology and the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' 
(Fewsmith, 1997: 492, 523). 
Deng Xiaoping feared that the conservative agenda would undermine the impact of 
the economic reforms and would lead to lower growth rates (Fewsmith, 1997: 485). 
Thus, he elevated Zhu Rongji to the position of vice-premier in the spring of 1991 
(Fewsmith, 1997: 489) to insist on continued economic reform, and journeyed to 
south China on an inspection tour in the spring of 1992, talking about the importance 
of reform and strongly criticizing his opponents as he went (Fewsmith, 1997: 496-7; 
Beijing Review, February 1994, quoted in Miles, 1996: 75,88; Oong, 2003a: 121). 
Affected by Oeng's south China remarks, the meeting of the Politburo Standing 
Committee (PSC) on 12 February 1992, endorsed the 'necessity' of upholding the 
'one centre' of economic development and called on the Party to 'accelerate the pace 
of reform and opening to the outside world' (Fewsmith, 1997: 499-500). After that, 
the communique of the Politburo drafted under the auspices ofZhu Ronji in late May 
1992, declared that five major inland cities along the Yangtze and nine border trade 
cities would be opened and that thirty capitals of China's provinces and regions and 
municipalities would enjoy the same preferential treatment and policies as the SEZs 
(Fewsmith, 1997: 500-4). 
During the opening session of the 14th Congress, on October Ith, 1992, Jiang Zemin 
opened the meeting with a speech hailing Deng as the "chief architect" of China's 
reforms and modernization and called for the establishment of a 'socialist market 
economy," which he described as "a long and difficult task of social engineering" 
requiring "sustained effort, a sense of urgency, and a firm direction" (Miles, 1996: 
117). From now on, foreign investors could hardly get enough of China's new 
"socialist market economy." They poured into China in record numbers in 1992, 
signing contracts worth nearly $60 billion, twice the figure for the previous year. "Go 
gold-rush [sic]," were the words used by Zhu Rongji to encourage foreign investors to 
profit from China's boom (Miles, 1996: 124). 
In relation to foreign policy, to pave the way for its economic reform and open door 
policy to integrate into the world system, China took socialist rhetoric out of its 
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foreign policy orientation (K wan, 1980: 185-186) and urgently sought to nonnalize its 
relations with other countries, especially, America and Japan which were major 
economic powers particularly in relation to advanced technology and finance capital. 
On the eve of these political and economic reforms, Deng Xiaoping made two 
important foreign policy decisions: to sign the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and 
Friendship and to establish fonnal Sino-American relations (Zhang, B. 2002: 44). 
The Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship was formally implemented as 
representatives of both countries exchanged documents of ratification in Tokyo on 
October 23, 1978. The ceremonies were attended by Japanese Premier Fukuda and 
Chinese Deputy Premier Deng. During the ceremonies, Deng said that the accord 
would not only enhance Chinese-Japanese political, economic and scientific relations 
but would also contribute to peace and stability in Asia and the rest of the world 
(Kwan, 1980: 91). After signing the treaty, the Japanese government from 1979 to 
1992 offered loans and grants to China, totalling some 1,394.22 billion Japanese yuan. 
And the total volume of the export-import trade rose from $1.038 billion in 1972 to 
$25.38 billion in 1992, a twenty-fold increase in twenty years. According to Zhang 
Tuosheng, the mutually beneficial bilateral economic and trade cooperation, with 
strong complementarity, helped strengthen Sino-Japanese relations (2002: 193). 
Reinforced by successful economic co-operation Sino-Japanese relations reached a 
high point in 1992 when General Secretary Jiang Zemin visited Japan and Emperor 
Akihito visited China (Zhang T, 2002: 193; Vogel, 2002: 9). 
In early 1978 the Carter administration decided to deepen the relationship with China 
(Cumings, 1983: 7; Hill, 1996: 35) and accepted China's three conditions f<?r 
normalization, namely, to withdraw its troops from Taiwan, to abrogate its mutual 
security agreement with Taiwan, and to cut its official ties with Taiwan (Jia, 2002: 
120). On January 28, 1979, Deng Xiaoping began a historic visit to the United States. 
During his visit, Deng Xiaoping told the leaders of the Senate and the House that 
China had given up using the word 'liberation' to refer to the resolution of the Taiwan 
question and that as long as the Taiwan authorities acknowledged that it was part of 
China, Taiwan could maintain its current political and economic system and a 
separate military force indefinitely (Jia, 2002: 120-1) - thus was inaugurated the 
policy of "one country, two system". 
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The Sino-American relationship received a further boost from Premier Zhao Ziyang's 
visit to the United States in January 1984 and President Ronald Reagan's visit to 
China three months later (Jia, 2002: 125). However, relations took a significant 
backward step after the Tiananmen incident (Jia, 2002: 126) which Deng declared to 
be 'the inevitable result of the domestic microclimate and international macroclimate' 
(Fewsmith, 1997: 473) by which he meant that domestic upheavals were influenced 
by outside forces thus raising the issue of readjusting China's relations with the 
outside world, particularly with the United States. 
In the eye's Deng, despite being a pioneer of reform, the defence of China's· 
sovereignty and promotion of its national interests, especially the political power of 
the CCP, lay in actively engaging with this 'inter-national' world, and opening 
China - economically and, to a more limited extent, culturally - to that world (Knight, 
2003: 323; Cheng, 2003:256-257). This is why he insisted upon the open door policy 
on the one hand and upheld the 'four cardinal principles' 10 on the other during the 
reform. But as Zhang Baijia (2002: 51) and Van Ness & Raichur (1983: 87) argue, 
with greater integration into the world system, outside factors wield increasing 
influence in domestic policy-making and the market mechanism creates its own 
particular kind of social system, through reshaping both the social structure and 
people's way offife. 
3.3.2 Sports within China 
Following the radical process of China's modernization, Chinese sports development 
entered a new era (Hwang, 2002:139; Dong, 2003a: 97-100) in which the sports 
systems were gradually decentralized, rationalized and commercialized. The purposes 
of reforming the sport system were in line with Deng's 'four modemizations' of 
raising efficiency through introducing new idea, new knowledge and new systems 
from the outside world. Therefore, 'socialisation,ll (Shehuihua - relying more on 
10 The 'four cardinal principles' are as follow: (i) keeping to a socialist road; (ii) upholding the people's 
democratic dictatorship; (Hi) upholding leadership by the Communist Party and; (iv) upholding 
Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong thought (Deng, 1984: 339, quoted in Hwang, 2002:146). 
11 Socialisation means that the Chinese government attempted to encourage citizens to consume 
sporting goods and participate in physical activities by their own money on the one hand, and to 
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non-government support) was introduced, mostly for supporting elite sport; sports 
ranking and competition systems were established, sport and physical education 
provisional regulations in school system were drafted, and a variety of national sports 
games and tournaments were organized on a more regular basis. But, affected by the 
desire for Olympic success, sports reforms focused most on elite sport although the 
Chinese government repeatedly talked about the importance of mass sport 
participation. Essentially, during the era of Deng, 'sport for all' was, to some extent, 
an empty slogan in Chinese sport policy because of the overwhelming priority given 
to achieving Olympic glory. Below, we will discuss in more detail the role of 
domestic sports in supporting the drive for success at international level. 
After a long period of isolation China was eager to be recognized by the outside world. 
Sport was used as a shop window through which to display the progress and the 
'greatness' of China (Fan, 2001: 159). Thus Wang Meng was restored to his position 
as the sport minister in 1977 and a national sports meeting was held in 1978. 
According to Dong-Jhy Hwang (2002: 146), this meeting set the guidelines for 
Chinese sport policy which were: to persist with the CCP's leadership in sport; to 
persist with the combination of promotions and supporting both sport for all and elite 
sport; to develop sports competition; to move toward the top level of sports technique; 
to develop international diplomatic relations through sports; to insist on reasonable 
regulation of the sports system 12 and to establish a 'red and expert' line of sports 
teams13• Ironically, although the guidelines mentioned the need for a balance between 
elite sports and mass participation 4 of the 6 guidelines focused on elite sports. It was 
no surprise that the same meeting also set a goal of achieving sports "super power" 
status for China by the end of the 20th century (Wu, S.Z. 1999aa: 268). 
Following the meeting, three 'sports ranking systems' one each for coaches, athletes 
and referees; two sets of 'sports and physical education provisional regulations in 
encourage state-run and private enterprises to invest in professional sports or sponsorship for 
provisional or national squads on the other. Indeed, although this policy of socialisation was introduced, 
f:0vemment still held most of the power. 
2 During this period, China severely lacked an institutional system of sports law and regulation, thus, 
the national sport meeting in 1978 called for the establishment of a sport law system for guiding 
Chinese sport development 
J3 'Red' means that athletes have pure political thought towards the Chinese Communist Party. 'Expert' 
means that athletes have excellent performance in world-class competitive sport. 
73 
Chapter 3 Chinese Sport Development 
school system'; and one 'national sport competition system for students' were 
established to rationalize and standarize the sports system (Wu, S.Z. 1999a: 262) and 
to set the foundation for further development of elite sport. To achieve international 
success, 13 key sports, including table tennis, swimming, diving, soccer and 
basketball, were selected. In addition, in the 1983 National Games 20 of the 22 sports 
were the same as those in the Olympic programme and reflected the principle of 'all 
domestic competitions following the step of the Olympics' (Guonei lianbing, yizhi 
duiwei). Furthermore, the sport universities for training elite athletes were gradually 
restored with the target, for the end of the 20th century, to establish sport universities 
in every province and metropolises (Wu, S.Z. 1999a: 284-5). 
Sport had its own political function, namely to promote socialist thought and develop 
Olympic sporting events ('Promoting sport for the nation's pride' - Deng Xiaoping's 
words) (Hwang, 2002:147). Thus, the Olympic Strategy, promoting China to be a 
sports "super power" (Fan, 2001: 159; Dong, 2003a: 120), became the blueprint for 
elite sports programmes in China after the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic. The 
importance of Olympic success was further indicated by the allocation of six 
'departments' (Si) of the National Sport Commision to elite sport, and only one to 
mass sport (Quntisi) (Dong, 2003a: 105). In addition, the Chinese government 
approved two documents in 1984 and 1986 promoting sporting reform. The first 
document -'A notification about moving further ahead in sport development' not only 
confirmed the importance of elite sport for promoting Chinese national pride and self-
confidence (Dong, 2003a: 103; Wu, S.Z. 1999a: 288-92), but also indicated that the 
state should aim to develop the contribution of mass sport, focused particularly on 
youngsters, to high performance sports and the Olympic Games (Wu, S.Z. 1999a: 289; 
Ren, 2002:9). The dQcument also underscored the 'societization' or decentralization 
of sport by creating opportunities for public sector support of elite sports teams and 
competitions (Brownell, 1990:296-8; Wu, S.Z. 1999a: 288-92). Thus, the Chinese 
government attempted first, to gradually transfer their responsibilities to Chinese 
sporting associations, including budget, personnel, training and competition to enable 
the National Sport Commission to concentrate on promoting elite sport and mass sport 
at the same time. And second, to encourage state-run and private enterprises to invest 
in professional sports or provide sponsorship for provisional or national squads to 
raise more money to achieve Olympic glory. 
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Moreover, the document also mentioned that it was necessary to strengthen sport 
propaganda promoting the positive function of sport in socialist material and cultural 
civilization, popularizing sport knowledge and attracting the masses to join physical 
activities (I1wang, 2002:147; Wu, S.Z. 1999a: 290). In essence, the strategy of the 
Chinese government expressed in this document was to raise the standard of elite 
sport first, and through the achievement of elite sports to thereby promote mass sport. 
Following the expanding open door policy, the second document - 'A draft 
concerning decisions for reforming the sports system', in addition to underlining 
policy on sport and improving the sport prize system, mostly focused on reforms 
which would apply scientific methods in training, research, management and 
competition, and develop a flexible, open policy to international sports (Tiyu Bao, 17 
March 1986: I, quoted in Hwang, 2002:148; Wu, S.Z. 1999a: 292-94). Besides, in 
line with the above documents, the system of head coach responsibility, equivalent to 
'managerial responsibility' in industry, was progressively embraced (Dong, 2003a: 
101, 120; Wu, S.Z. 1999a: 302). The comprehensive national sporting events, 
including the National Games, the National Youth Games, the National City Games 
and the National Minority Games and a variety of formal government-financed 
national competitions, became regularized (Dong, 2003a: 10 I; Wu, S.Z. 1999a: 297). 
Sports management was decentralized (Dong, 2003a: 17; Wu, S.Z. 1999a: 298-9), 
foreign ideas and advanced technology were introduced (Dong, 2003a: 158 Wu, S.Z. 
1999a: 301-2), and most importantly, commercial and private sponsorship was 
permitted with the administrative structure of Chinese sport changing with additions 
to the structure having explicit customer focus, including a sport information centre, a 
sports equipment and sportswear department and sports service ~ompany and a 
National Olympic Centre that provided the freedom to develop sport commercialism, 
at every level in China (Fan, 1997: 344-6; Theodoraki, 2004: 202). Indeed, this 
showed that sports reform was moving forward in the way of Western countries 
through the open door policy and still had full support from the government. 
The 1987 National Games, held in Guangdong (Canton) province, provided an 
excellent example of the changing relationship between sport and the state in China 
under the economic reforms. These Games were significant because many new 
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policies were implemented specifically for the occasion. The Games imitated the 1984 
Los Angeles Olympic Games, in content, ceremony and the decision to hold them 
once every four years (Brownell, 1990: 295). In 1984 China sent representatives, such 
as the head of the Guangdong Sports Commission, Zhenlan Wei, to learn from the 
Los Angeles Organizing Committee about how to turn sports into a money-making 
proposition (Brownell, 1990: 295). The five key messages brought back to China 
were: corporate sponsorship and individual contributions; lottery tickets; tour groups; 
sale of advertising rights to the event mascot, emblem, and song; and business 
management of gymnasiums rather than traditional public sector administrative 
management (Brownell, 1990: 296). Indeed, according to Brownell, the Los Angeles 
Games not only achieved financial success, but also become the window which 
demonstrated to the CCP Leadership the political and economic potential of the open-
door policy before the 13th Party Congress (1990: 255-6). 
After 1988 even more radical reforms were on the agenda. Twelve sports were chosen 
to experiment with the 'enterprisation' 14 (Shitihua) of sporting associations - the 
transformation from government agencies to business organisations. The purpose was 
to help relieve the financial and administrative burden on central government, which 
could then concentrate its resources primarily on medal-oriented sports (Dong, 2003a: 
101). Unfortunately, following the poor showing of Chinese athletes at the Seoul 
Olympic Games in 1988, the sport minister, Li Menghua was removed from his 
position (Dong, 2003a: 149). Zhao Vu, a famous Chinese author of the book 'A 
Dream to Be a Sporting Superpower', critically argued that 'Olympic gold medals 
deprived most Chinese people of the opportunity of exercise for good health' (Dong, 
2003a: 106). However, the criticism had little impact on policy because Olympic gold 
medals were considered to be so important in showing the ideological superiority of 
Chinese socialism. As a result, the Olympic-directed policy continued after the 1988 
Olympics (Dong, 2003a: 106, 127; Theodoraki, 2004: 203; Baker, Cao et al. 1993). 
However, the Olyrnpic-directed policy caused some problems for the development of 
mass sports. Although the Chinese gov~rnment steadily increased investment in sports 
14 The 'enterprisation' means that the Chinese government attempted to gradually transfer its 
authorities to Chinese sporting associations, including budget, personnel, training and competition. 
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(Dong,2003a: 105) in which government sports funding soared from 253.86 million 
yuan in 1978 to 1,462.762 million yuan in 1990 (Dong, 2003a: 98), only 13 million 
yuan, in 1990, went to sports activities for the general public (Fan, 1998: 161). 
According to Wu Shaozu (1999: 310-2) during the 1980s, about 80-85 percent of the 
national sports budget was spent on elite sports to the disadvantage of mass sport 
participation in general and younger students in particular. According to statistics for 
1987, compared with 1979, the health of school pupils aged from 7 to 18 declined, 
mainly due to a lack of participation in exercise (Fan, 1998: 161). The main causes 
were insufficient and poorly trained! qualified PE teachers, scarce facilities 'and space 
for sports and limited funding (Wu, S.Z. 1999a: 319). Most schools invested less than 
1 percent of the total school budget in sports and most had a per capita sports fund of 
below I yuan (Wu, S.Z. 1999a: 318), and for each primary school pupil only 0.3 yuan 
(Fan, 1998: 161). The same picture was evident at the general level. The Chinese 
people have an average of only 0.22 square metres of spo.rting space per person. Only 
about one hundred or so of all the 2,566 county towns own stadiums, swimming pools 
or gymnasia and the per capita sports fund in China in 1990 was 0.4 yuan per person 
(Fan, 1998: 161). Although the Chinese government practised the 'National Criterion 
of Physical Fitness' in the school system and promoted the' National Advance 
Counties of Sports' to raise mass participation, those programmes, unfortunately, 
were closely linked to elite sports objectives. 
In short, during the era of Deng, national domestic sport was a tool to achieve 
international success. Although mention was made of the importance of mass sport 
participation, if we look the budget and the distribution of resources, it is clear that 
priority was consistently given to elite achievement and relatively little money went 
into promoting 'sport for all' or developing facilities for community use. 
3.3.3 China and international sport 
Following opening to the outside world, China made ideology less prominent in its 
foreign policy (Kwan, 1980: 185-186) and created the doctrine of 'One country, two 
systems' to release the tension between Taiwan and China, and between China and 
America as well. The doctrine was also quickly applied to the 'Two Chinas Issue' in 
the Olympic Movement, which not only helped China, cleverly and flexibly, to solve 
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the problems of the two Chinas but also created the so called 'Olympic Model' for the 
athletes of both countries to compete in the Olympic Games at the same time. After 
rejoining the Olympic Movement, China shifted its sports policy in the early 1980s, 
from an emphasis on friendship through sport to Olympic success (Dong, 2003a: 147), 
the main goal of which was to build China into a sporting superpower where the 
performance of Chinese athletes to arouse nationalism and patriotism and to turn the 
Olympic Movement into a money-making proposition in the economic sphere would 
also be achieved. In addition, after the Tiananmen Incident in 1989, the Chinese 
government attempted to dilute its negative image and to re-connect with the outside 
world through hosting the 1990 Asian Games and bidding for the 2000 Olympic ' 
Games. The following section considers how the doctrine of 'One country, two 
systems' helped the PRC solve the 'Two Chinas' Problem', how the Chinese 
government prepared for the Olympics in the era of Deng, whether the PRC was 
successful in these Games and, finally the impact on the PRC of its bids to host the 
1990 Asian Games and the bid for the 2000 Olympic Games. 
Two Chinas issue 
Inspired by the Deng's doctrine of ' One country, two systems', China changed its 
attitude to allow Taiwan to join the Olympic Movement on the condition that it used 
the name of a territory being part ofPRC (Wu, S.Z. 1999a: 252-256). After the 
Montevideo meeting of the IOC in April 1979 in which the plenary session passed a 
resolution to recognize the Chinese Olympic Committee located in Beijing and to 
maintain recognition of the Chinese Olympic Committee located in Taipei (Hwang, 
2002: 158) Mr Ho, for the mainland, made the crucial point that the PRC would only 
accept the title 'Chinese Olympic Committee' for itself, but would accept 'Chinese 
Taiwan Olympic Committee' for Taiwan, with the proviso that the Taiwanese 
committee would be regarded as a local body with delegated powers, and that the 
compromise would be temporary (Hill, 1996: 51). This was the first time that the PRC 
had shown any willingness to allow Taiwan's NOC to include the word 'China' in its 
title (Hill, 1996: 52). In June 1979, the IOC executive committee, meeting in Puerto 
Rico, confirmed China's Olympic Committee's title as the 'Chinese Olympic 
Committee' and recommended that Taiwan should stay in the IOC as the Chinese 
Taipei Olympic Committee' with a different national anthem and flag (Hwang, 2002: 
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159) which was accepted at the Nagoya meeting of the IOC (Hill, 1996: xiv, 52-3; 
Xinhua Yuebao, December 1979: 111, quoted in Hwang, 2002: 159; Ren, 2002:8). 
The new IOC President Juan Antonio Samaranch, who once said that the IOC must do 
everything in its power to allow the PRC to be recognized (Hill, 1996: 51), sent a 
letter dated 4 December 1980 to Henry Hsu, an IOC member from Taiwan, and 
guaranteed that Taipei's Olympic Committee would get the same treatment as any 
other national committee if Taiwan accepted the condition of the Nagoya resolution 
(Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee, 1981: 5-10, quoted in Hwang, 2002: 159). In 
these circumstances, in which Taiwan had lost its UN seat, its established relationship 
with America had changed, and it faced a new IOC President who favoured the PRC, 
Taiwan could do nothing, if it wanted to stay in the Olympic Movement. 
Consequently, Taiwan agreed to change its name to the 'Chinese Taipei Olympic 
Committee' and to adopt a new flag and emblem in April 1981 (Hwang, 2002: 159; 
Hill, 1996: 53). Since then, China successfully established the "Olympic Model" 
which not only provided athletes in Taiwan and PRC with opportunities to compete in 
the same Olympic arena but also helped the IOC and other international sportiQ.g 
organisations to solve the similar 'two Chinas' problem. According to Wu Shaozu 
(1999: 252-3) and Ren Hai (2002: 8) it was also, in a sense, the first symbol of the 
"One country, two systems" policy, proposed by Deng Xiaoping, and it once again 
embodied significantly the political function of sport after the 'Ping Pong Diplomacy'. 
Olympic Games (1984, 1988, 1992) 
Rejoining the Olympic Movement in 1979 had a significant impact on China's sport 
policies (Ren, 2002:8-9; Hwang, 2002: 160; Dong, 2003a: 52) which were summed 
up by the slogan 'Go beyond Asia and join the advanced world ranks' (Chongchu 
yazhou, zouxiang shijie) (Dong, 2003a: 103). Due to the Olympic Games playing an 
increasingly important role in modem nationhood and international relations 
(BrowneU, 1995: 313), China was eager to re-establish, through Olympic success, its 
national image and status and to spur the nation to modernize itself, after all the 
suffering and disgrace which it considered had been imposed by the foreign powers in 
the modern history of China (Ren, 2002:8; Dong, 2003a: 120; Hwang, 2002: 164). 
Although China wanted to participate and prepared for the 1980 Olympic Games in 
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Moscow (Wu, S.Z. 1999a: 269-73), the Chinese leadership for political reasons joined 
the boycott of the Games which was launched by the American President Carter in 
protest against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (Dong, 2003a: 16; Hill, 1996: xiv). 
However, the Chinese Olympic dream came true when the PRC participated in the 
Los Angeles Olympic Games in August 1984: the first time that the PRC had taken 
part in the Olympics since the 1952 Games in Helsinki (Hwang, 2002: 154; Dong, 
2003a: 32). At this Olympic Games, China came fourth. According to Fan Hong 
(2001: 159), Ren Hai (2002: 10) and Dong Jinxia (2003: 2003: 16), this success 
provoked an intense nationalism and patriotism among the Chinese and vitalized 
Chinese ambitions to become a world sporting power. 
However, in the 1988 Olympic Games, Chinese athletes won only five medals and 
China was placed 11 th, lagging behind even South Korea (Dong, 2003a: 106). Despite 
the poor performance at this Games, the President ofthe IOC, Juan Antonio 
Samaranch, claimed that sport in China had made great progress in terms of the 
number of sportsmen and women and the number of events in which they participated 
in Seoul and considered that China would become a world sports power in the near 
future (Rodichenko, 1990:285). To make the superpower dream come true, China 
adjusted its Olympic Strategy, giving the status of , key Olympic sport' to 16 sports 
including athletics, swimming and gymnastics which were given favourable treatment 
in virtually every aspect from budget to training arrangements (Dong, 2003a: 122). 
In addition, the National Sport Commission acknowledged that the National Games 
were the pivotal engine for the Olympic·s. Thu they postponed the 7'h National Games 
from 1991 to 1993 and announced that the results of the 1992 Olympic Games would 
be incorporated into the scoring system of the 1993 National Games (Dong, 2003a: 
122) in which performance was and is an exclusive prerequisite and criterion for 
budget and bonus allocation (Dong, 2003a: 148). Moreover, since the introduction of 
the prize system to motivate elite athletes, the winning bonus provided by the 
\ 
government has dramatically risen from 8,000 yuan in 1984 (average per capita 
income that year was 372.7 yuan) to 80,000 in 1992 (average per capita income that 
year was 1,020.9 yuan). And the total reward was topped up by various sponsorships 
from enterprises, businessmen and overseas Chinese (Dong, 2003a: 130). These 
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changes brought rapid results as China won 16 Olympic gold medals and came fourth 
in the medal count at the Barcelona Games in 1992. 
Although the Olympic-orientated policy produced positive results in terms of China's 
performances at the Olympic Games (see Table 3.1 to 3.3), it also produced, 
according to Ren Hai (2002: 9) and Wu Shaozu (1999: 301), certain negative impacts 
on non-Olympic events and Olympic team sports such as football, basketball and 
volleyball which have few medals on the Olympic programme but demand substantial 
resources. 
Table 3.1: Summary of China's Participation in the Olympic Games since 1952 
Year Venue Participants Events Medals Won Medal 
Competed Table 
Ranking 
1952 Helsinki 40 I 0 
July 29- (Finland) 
Aug. 7 
1984 Los Angeles 304 17 15 Golds 
July 28- (US) (224 Athletes) 8 Silvers 4 
Aug. 12 9 Bronzes 
1988 Seoul 445 23 5 Golds 
Sep. 17- (South Korea) (298 Athletes) 11 Silvers 11 
act. 2 12 Bronzes 
1992 Barcelona 380 20 16 Golds 
July 25- (Spain) (250 Athletes) 22 Silvers 4 
Aug. 9 16 Bronzes 
1996 Atlanta 495 22 16 Golds 
Aug. (US) (310 Athletes) 22 Silvers 4 
12 Bronzes 
2000 Sept. 15- . Sydney 452 23 28 Golds 
Oct. I (Australia) (284 Athletes) 16 Silvers 3 
15 Bronzes 
2004 Aug. 14- Athen 637 27 32 Golds 
Aug. 29 (Greece) (407 Athletes) 17 Silvers 2 
14 Bronzes 
Source: Adapted from Ren (2002). 
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Table 3.2: Summary of China's Participation in the Winter Olympic Games 
since 1980 
Year Venue Participants Medals Won Medal Table 
Ranking 
1980 Lake Pacid (28 Athletes) 0 
Feb 13-24 (US) 
1984 Sarajevo (37 Athletes) 0 
Feb 8-19 (Yugoslavia) 
1988 Calgary (20 Athletes) 
Feb 13-28 (Canada) 
1992 Albertville (34 Athletes) 3 Silvers 15 
Feb 8-23 (France) 
1994 Lillehahammer (27 Athletes) I Silver 19 
(Norway) 2 Bronzes 
1998 Nagano 6 Silvers 16 
Feb 7-22 (Japan) 2 Bronzes 
2002 Salt Lake City (72 Athletes) 2 Golds 13 
Feb 9-25 (US) 2 Silvers 
4 Bronzes 
2006 Turin (76 Athletes) 2 Golds 14 
Feb 10-26 (Italy) 4 Silvers 
5 Bronzes 
Source: COC, (2007). 
Table 3.3: Summary of China's Participation in the Paralympic Summer Games 
since 1984 
Year Venue Medals Won Medal Table 
Ranking 
2 Golds 
1984 June 16-30 Stoke Mandeville (UK) 12 Silvers 23 
July 22-Aug. I New York (US) 8 Bronzes 
17 Golds 
1988 Oct. 15-24 Seoul (South Korea) 17 Silvers 14 
9 Bronzes 
11 Golds 
1992 Sep 3-14 Barcelona (Spain) 7 Silvers 12 
7 Bronzes 
16 Golds 
1996 Aug. 16-25 Atlanta (US) 13 Silvers 9 
10 Bronzes 
34 Golds 
2000 Oct. 18-29 Sydney (Australia) 22 Silvers 6 
17 Bronzes 
63 Golds 
2004 Sep. 17-28 Athens (Greece) 46 Silvers 1 
32 Bronzes 
Source: eoc, (2007). 
Because the Chinese sport system was based on a combination of economic 
capitalism, through the provision of material rewards to win Olympic gold medals, 
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and political socialism, through winning Olympic gold medals to demonstrate the 
superiority of Chinese socialism, it generated a number of problems, such as the 
emigration of coaches in the 1980s, athletes being distracted by material rewards from 
the pursuit of Olympic glory, and drug abuse. In the 1980s the emigration coaches 
eventually produced 'overseas Chinese shock troops' (Haiwaijuntuan) who 
repeatedly challenged Chinese dominance in a number of sports such as table tennis, 
prompting calls for the Chinese government to tighten its control over the emigration 
of elite athletes and coaches. However, according to Dong Jinxia (2003: 17), the 
strength of the global sports market ensured the international mobility of both coaches 
and athletes and made it an irreversible trend which Chinese government action could 
no longer completely curtail. 
Although the provision of substantial material rewards was widely accepted and was 
regarded as an effective means to motivate athletes (Dong, 2003a: 99), it seriously 
challenged the spirit of Chinese socialism and, to some extent, jeopardized Chinese 
elite sports. Take, the 15-year-old Olympic gymnast medallist Lu Li, for example. She 
put an early end to her gymnastics career after winning Olympic gold and obtaining 
sponsorship estimated to be at least a million yuan, a vast sum compared to the 1992 
per-capita income of 1,020.9 yuan. The successful athletes'enormous financial gains 
provoked debate over the desirability of rewards, as athletes were already given 
training equipment and free board, transportation and other benefits, far beyond 
anything ordinary families could afford. Thus, market-driven reform by the policy of 
winning [for money] could be a double-edged sword, stimulating athletes financially 
to fulfil their athletic ambitions, and at the same time undermining a long-term 
commitment to their career. (Dong, 2003a: 130-1) 
In addition, the pressure to win, for prestige and financial awards and as well as jobs, 
has also led to an increase in the use of performance-enhancing drugs (Brownell, 
1990:300) which was essentially a by-product of the open-door policy (Dong, 2003a: 
142) and became endemic in Chinese sport in the 19808 and 1990s (Dong, 2003a: 141, 
158). Although several measures were taken by Chinese government, such as a three-
pronged anti-drug policy announced in 1989, drug tests introduced in major domestic 
competitions and a special Anti-Doping Commission set up in 1992, drug abuse was 
still rampant and in elite sport in the 1990s (Dong, 2003a: 143-145). In sum, as argued 
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by Fan Hong (1998: 156-160) the Olympic Movement in China during the era of 
Deng had gradually been transformed to become a vehicle for Chinese patriotism and 
commercialism. The bids to host the 2000 Olympic Games and the 2008 Beijing 
Olympic Games are good examples of this transformation and are discussed below in 
next section. 
The 11 th Asian Games and the 2000 Olympic Bids 
Partly to distract attention from the 1989 Tiananrnen incident and partly because the 
1990 Asian Games in Beijing were the first time that China had organised a large 
international sport meeting, substantial effort and resources were allocated in order to 
ensure that the Games were a success (Ren, 2002: 10; Brownell, 1990:295). According 
to Ren Hai (2002: 10), Hwang Dong-lhy (2002: 146, 149) and Dong linxia (2003: 
122), the 11 th Asian Games generated a great deal of interest in international sport 
issues, including the Olympics, among the general public particularly, because of the 
far better performance of Chinese athletes than other countries. The success in hosting 
the 1990 Asian Games not only inspired the Chinese public, but also added 
momentum to the 2000 Olympic Bid. Before the 1990 Asian Games, the Chinese 
Olympic Committee, in September 1989, announced that it would bid for the Games 
of2000 (Hill, 1996: 56). The key actor behind the 2000 Olympic Bid was Deng 
Xiaoping (Du, 2004: 62) who envisaged using the Beijing facilities prepared for the 
Asian Games for the Olympic Games (Theodoraki, 2004: 205; Du, 2004: 62). 
The reasons prompting China to bid for the 2000 Olympics are numerous but the core 
motivations were to promote Chinese nationalism and to generate benefit for the huge 
domestic and international market (Du, 2004: 62). The government recognized that 
hosting an Olympic Games was an opportunity to project a positive image of a city 
and a country to a global audience and advertise them to an increasingly accessible 
world market following the ending of the Cold War and the revolution in global 
telecommunications (Brownell, 1995: 313). As John MacAloon notes, "Being a 
nation, having a culture, are the chief requirements for claiming a rightful and 
autonomous place in the global system." and "To be a nation recognized by others 
and realistic to themselves, a people must march in the Olympic Games Opening 
Ceremonies procession" (quoted in Brownell, 1995: 313). Thus, hosting the Olympics 
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could be a great opportunity not only to demonstrate to the world China's increasing 
political and economic power but also to reinforce the ningiu li - the cohesive 
strength - of the Chinese people (Miles, 1996: 304; Hwang, 2002: 160). Furthermore, 
Beijing in its bid emphasized the tremendous market that would be opened to 
Olympic sponsors and the gigantic potential Chinese television audience, said to be 
one billion (BrownelI, 1995: 314). Thus, hosting an Olympic Games was seen as a 
powerful engine to promote Chinese economic development through shaping an 
image of itself for domestic and international consumption. 
Unfortunately, Beijing lost to Sydney, in a close competition (flai, 2002: 10) due, at 
least partly, to the issue of human rights raised by the western states led by the US and 
the UK (Miles, 1996: 304; Du, 2004: 75). Although the bid was a failure, the process 
informed the Chinese about the Olympic Movement, Olympism and the Olympic 
Games (Ren, 2002:10). Because of the perceived long term political and economic 
benefits of hosting the Olympic Games China renewed its bid to host the Games and 
was successful in winning the right to host the Games in 2008. The significance of the 
decision is discussed in section 4-3. 
3.4 The era of Jiang Zemin (1993-2004) 
3.4.1 Social-Political-Economic context 
Maintaining the political power of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and 
protecting China's national interests, through continuing opening to the outside world, 
were the primary concerns of the political elite during the era of Jiang Zemin. But the 
key question for the government was how could it handle the drastic socio-economic 
changes resulting from rapid economic growth and avoid the socio-economic chaos 
. and collapse of the political system that has occurred in many former communist and 
Third World countries? To respond to this question, this section focuses on how the 
Chinese leadership restructured the relations between the CCP, the government and 
the economy in order to cope with the huge pressure from the outside world and also 
at the domestic level. 
Dealing first with the relations between the government and the economy, after Jiang 
Zemin held concurrently the top three posts in the Party, military, and state apparatus 
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in March 1993 (Fewsmith, 1997: 510), Zhu Rongji was appointed to tackle the 
growing economic problems, such as over-heated investment, high inflation, 
speculation and corruption (Zheng, 1999: 1168; Fewsmith, 1997: 511) arising from 
the new wave of decentralisation that was introduced following Deng Xiaoping's 
southern tour in early 1992. According to Fewsmith (1997: 512), Zhu's approach to 
economic reform and political control appears modelled on that of Park Chung-Lee or 
Lee Kuan Yew, who both favoured strong state control combined with a marketised 
economy. 
On the one hand, he was inclined to use the 'visible hand' to try to manage this 
process from the top, such as taxation reform and central banking system reform 
(Fewsmith, 1997: 512; Zheng, 1999: 1168), the main goals of which were to 
recentralise economic power to the central government. While on the other hand, he 
favoured moving away from the old planned economy through the reform of state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) and joining the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Zhu 
attempted to separate the government from state-owned enterprise (SOE). On 2 March 
1998, sweeping changes to the structure of the Chinese government were announced 
at the 9th National People's Congress in Beijing, including the decision to reduce the 
number of employees in government offices by 50 percent by the end of 1998 (Zheng, 
1999: 1164; lones, 1999: 4). Six government ministries, which had a close operating 
guanxi (relationship) with SOEs were downgraded and stripped of many of their 
functions in relation to state-owned enterprises. 
Since opening to the outside world, China's real growth during 1978-97 was at an 
annual rate of9.8%, although growth slowed to 8.8% for 1997 and 7.8% for 1998. 
With a per capita GNP of US$860, by 1997 China had moved away from the category 
oflower middle-income countries and China's nominal GNP had grown to $1055 
billion, which was ranked as the world's seventh largest. In terms of purchasing 
power parity (PPP) the Chinese economy was the world's second largest, after the 
USA, in 1997 (Zheng, 1999: 1157). However, the Asian economic crisis of 1997 
prompted China to move more forcefully to integrate its economy with the global 
economy (Knight, 2003: 326). Indeed, Chinese leaders, such as liang Zemin, Zhu 
Ronji and Wen liabao (Former Chinese Vice-Premier), all appreciated that entry into 
the WTO would not only provide new momentum for China's economic reforms and 
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its policy of opening to the external world, but would also help them overcome 
resistance to reform from domestic vested interests (Cheng, 2003:262; Knight, 2003: 
327 -8). In order to join the WTO, besides continuing the policy of separation of 
functions of the government from enterprises, the Second Plenary Session of the 9th 
People's Congress in March 1999 passed a third constitutional amendment, which 
legitimated private economic activities and other forms of non-state ownership that 
had been practised for many years (Zheng, 1999: 1162). By mid-1999, more than one 
hundred of the world's top 500 trans national companies (TNCs) had invested in 
China, and by mid-2000, nearly 400 of them had established offices or branches in 
China. Indeed, by the end of 1999, nearly 10 per cent of China's urban employees 
worked for foreign-funded enterprises (Knight, 2003: 330). 
In short, the policies China's leaders deployed to deal with the relations between the 
government and the economy were twofold. First, the Chinese government weakened 
the political and economic power of local government as well as gradually and 
continually, reducing direct investment in enterprise management in favour of 
macroeconomic control. Second, since 1980, Deng Xiaoping had championed the 
separation of Party and state as a way of making state administration more efficient 
and the Party less prominent. These efforts culminated in Zhao Ziyang's proposal at 
the 13th Party Congress to establish a civil service system and to remove Party groups 
(Dangzu ) from government organisation. However, affected by the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, which Chinese analysts attributed in part to efforts to separate Party and 
state, Deng finally abandoned his former reform strategy and decided that only by 
having Party leaders manage leading government posts could the Party's leadership 
be guaranteed (Fewsmith, 1997: 510). The retreat from extensive political reform was 
confirmed on 18 December 1998 when Jiang Zemin proclaimed that his country 
would never copy Western political systems and argued for a Chinese-style 
democracy justified by the cep's concern to ensure future socio-political stability 
(Zheng, 1999: 1158; Cheng, 2003:270). Democracy in China, according to Jiang, 
would be the democracy of the Party-State in which the CCP would not allow any 
oppositional parties to be established (Zheng, 1999: 1158). In other words, the CCP 
will allow the existence of the other small parties but only if they follow and support 
the CCP leadership. 
87 
Chapter 3 Chinese Sport Development 
In order to maintain socio-political stability, Jiang did make some adjustment to the 
political structure, such as strengthening the CCP cadre management (Ganbu guanli) 
system at the provincial level and establishing the rural public election system at the 
grassroots level. To control provincial officials, the central government issued a 
document in 1995 entitled 'Temporary Regulations on the Selection and Appointment 
of Party and Government Leading Cadres' which emphasised the cadre transfer 
system or the cadre exchange system (Ganbujiaoliu zhidu). According to the 
regulations, the central government has such a dominant say over personnel decisions 
that it set up an effective institutional means for the centre to tighten control over 
local cadres (Zheng, 1999: 1167). 
The restructuring of rural governance was considered necessary because of the 
breakdown of the commune system due to the open door policy. In 1998 the National 
People's Congress adopted 'the Organisation Law of Village Committees' to 
restructure the governance system at the basic level (Zheng, 1999: 1171-3). The main 
purpose for the rural elections was to constrain local officials' and Party cadres' 
arbitrary behaviour. But the unforeseen result of the rural elections was the' lowering 
of the centre's political legitimacy' (Zheng, 1999: 1172) in which government 
officials at the grassroots levels being elected by local residents could, possibly, act 
against the will of higher authorities. It is still uncertain, however, that direct elections 
will be used to select government officials at higher levels in the near future. It is 
clear that any extension of democracy that threatens the CCP's leadership would not 
be accepted. In short, facing the drastic socio-economic changes resulting from 
opening to the outside world, the major leaders of the PRC were often forced to adjust 
their institutional arrangements in order to maintain the CCP's political legitimacy 
while enabling economic development. 
3.4.2 Sport within China 
During this period of time, the so-called sport development with a Chinese character 
was influenced by two major trends - commercialism and nationalism, which were 
combined with a marketised economy and strong state intervention. Thus, while 
speeding up the process of commercialisation of sport, the Chinese government still 
attempted to maintain its control and achieve its priority of Olympic success. But the 
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question is can the Chinese government deal with the marketised economy affecting 
the Chinese sport structure and maintains its socialist way of life at the same time? In 
order to answer this question it is important to focus on the major reforms in the 
Chinese sport system, namely the restructuring of the National Sport Commission 
(downgraded as the National General Administration of Sport in 1998), the 
establishment of the Sport Law, and the introduction of the club system. 
Restructuring the National Sport Commission 
Promoted by the transition to a market economy, the Chinese lcadership attempted to 
separate the government from the enterprises by gradually downsizing the mammoth 
bureaucracy. In 1993, the number of the staff in the National Sport Commission (NSC) 
was reduced from 470 to 371 (Chen,2004: 173) and sport administrative departments 
were gradually transformed from governmental sports agencies into quasi-
autonomous organisations, such as management centres and associations (Dong, 
2003a: 140; Ren 1999; Theodoraki, 2004: 202) in which a whole new system of 
national sport management was gradually created (Fan, 2001: 160). By 1997, the old 
departments (Si) responsible for elite sport under the NSC ceased to exist and 
transferred their responsibility to 20 management centres (Dong, 2003a: 126; Chen, 
2004: 113) which were encouraged to develop their own programmes and financial 
resources, and assume the roles of decision maker and coordinator, thus enabling the 
government to reduce its direct involvement (Ren 1999; Theodoraki, 2004: 202). 
On 6 April 1998 the NSC, established in 1952, was downgraded to the level of 
General Administration of Sport (GAOS) (seeing figure 3-1) with 9 departments and 
180 staff, although it still remained an independent institution under the State Council 
and its officials continued to enjoy the same social status and welfare benefits as 
before (lones, 1999: 5; Dong, 2003a: 226; Chen, 2004: 113, 174; Theodoraki, 2004: 
202). According to the new sport system, the directors of these sports associations and 
management centres had to spend time as fund-raising entrepreneurs in order to meet 
their financial needs. Government funding was determined in part by the Olympic 
medal winning potential of their athletes but there was the clear expectation that the 
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balance of funding would be attracted from sponsorship and ticket sales (Theodoraki, 
2004: 202, 204; Dong, 2003a: 126; Fan, 2001: 160). 
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Figure 3.1: General Structure of the General Administration of Sport 
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In addition to the jobs of fund raising, the other major mission for these top managers, 
who were mostly fonner officials of the NSC, was to help their elite athletes to 
achieve Olympic success which was the main criterion for keeping their present 
positions. For example, the former director of the football management centre, Van 
Shiduo, was dismissed from his job due to the poor performance of the men's national 
team in the early rounds of the 2006 World Cup qualifying and the women's team at 
the Athens Olympics (Saiget, 2005). Hence, in pursuit of Olympic success, some 
associations, such as the Chinese Athletics Association (CAA), negotiated new 
contracts with local sports commissions on training budgets and set performance 
quotas related to the Olympic and Asian Games as well as World Championship 
medals (Dong, 2003a: 126). However, the government, dominating the personnel 
arrangement of the NSC and embedding Party groups (Dangzu) within CAA, the 
Chinese government could ensure that the marketised economy in these organisations 
did not go so far as to jeopardize the interests of the Party-State focused on Olympic 
success and nationalism. 
Establishing Sport Law 
To set the framework for the development of sport within an increasingly marketised 
economy, China issued in 1995 the first 'Sport Law ofPRC' which featured the 
acceptance of a degree of market forces and commercialism; the retention of the 
state~s concern for nationalism, socialism, morality and discipline; and the concern for 
mass sport, leisure and free time (Jones, 1999: 6). In order to underpin the new law, 
three pivotal national projects were announced by the central government at China's 
State Council in the same year, which were 'The Development of Sport Industry and 
Commerce' project, 'The Olympic Glory' project, and 'The Fitness for All' project. 
These three major projects were designed, by interlinking with each other, to 
stimulate the domestic economy, to achieve Olympic success and to enhance the 
physical and health level of the whole Chinese population (Reekie, 1999: 249; 
Theodoraki,2004: 198). 
According to Reekie (1999: 251), the govenunent spent 90 per cent of its sport budget 
on competition related activities, and the National General Administration of Sport's 
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budget had risen by 15% to around £ 150m in 2004 (Wollaston, 2004). [n other words, 
the official sport budget for mass sport is limited and it relies heavily on the money 
from the sport lottery, established in 1994. According to the report from the People's 
Daily 27th December 2000,30% of the lottery's revenue was injected into public 
projects including holding major sports events and promoting mass sports 
programmes. But without substantial resources from the government, 'The Fitness for 
All' project is doomed to be inferior to 'The Olympic Glory' project because most of 
the money for promoting 'The Fitness for All' project is not from the government 
budget but from ordinary people's pockets through the purchase oflottery tickets 
(Theodoraki, 2004: 196). In these circumstances, most citizens can only participate in 
those physical activities which require a low skill level and few facilities (such as 
walks, running, traditional Chinese exercise and, disco dancing.) (Wang & Olson, 
1997: 69-85, quoted in Hwang, 2002: 152; Dong, 2003a: 127). 
Introducing the Club System 
To solve the financial problem arising from the limited government sport budget and 
also to revitalize the sport system, the 'enterprisation' (Shitihua) of sporting 
associations was gradually adopted. One major development was the introduction of 
the club system as a way of raising money. At first, the system was adopted in 
selected sports- first football, later basketball and then tennis, on an experimental 
basis. The reason for choosing these men's sports is that they were all low-level 
performance sport and the club system would not significantly affect the performance 
of Chinese sport in international competition ifit failed (Dong, 2003a: 125; 
Theodoraki, 2004: 204; Chen, 2004: 173-4). 
In 1992 the Chinese Football Association (named Football Management Centre after 
1996) took the lead to be a quasi-autonomous organisation from the First Competitive 
Sport Department (Di yi jinji yundong shi) of the NSC (Dong & Mangan, 2001: 85; 
Dong, 2003a: 125) with the support of Li Tieying, a member of Politburo Standing 
Committee (PSC), a State Councillor (1988-1998) with a second job as a director of 
the Government Reform Commission, who was a strong advocate of self-management 
through the club system. Due to Li Tieying's intervention, opposition voices were 
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withheld and the capitalist experiment was given a green light in the Chinese sport 
system (Wu, S.Z. 1999a: 365-8). In 19941MG (the International Management Group) 
signed a contract to assist the Chinese FA to set up a Chinese men's football league 
system (Jia A and Jia B, equivalent to the English Premiership and first division) (Wu, 
S.Z. 1999a: 371; Jones, 2004: 57-8) with initial seed money of US$ 1 million from 
Philip Morris Inc, which wanted the Chinese FA to publicize its Marlboro brand (Fan 
& Mangan, 2004: 60; Jones, 2004: 61). Since the introduction of the club system, 
football not only became more popular but also made enough money from the new 
system to enable it to reduce its financial dependence on government from 12 million 
yuan in 1993 to 6.3 millionyuan in 1997 (Wu, S.Z. 1999a: 371). Influenced by the 
model of the Chinese men's football league system, the Chinese Basketball 
Association, with the help oflMG and sponsored by the 555 tobacco company, set up 
a similar system named CBAL (Wu, S.Z. 1999a: 385-6). Similar developments 
happened in Chinese female football and basketball after 1996 (Fan & Mangan, 2004: 
56; Dong & Mangan, 2001: 92-3; Dong, 2003a: 140). 
Following the apparent success ofthe marketisation experiments in football and 
basketball, the Chinese sport system began searching for other ideas from the West 
(Dong & Mangan, 2001: 88), including the registration system of athletes (Dong, 
2003a: 125; Wu, S.Z. 1999a: 368; Dong & Mangan, 2001: 87), the "hiring and firing' 
system of accountability (Jones, 1999: 9; Wu, S.Z. 1999a: 370), the competition 
system of home and away matches (Dong & Mangan, 2001: 88; Wu, S.Z. 1999a: 368), 
the introduction of foreign coaches, players and referees (Wu, S.Z. 1999a: 368-85; 
Dong & Mangan, 2001: 88), a nationwide professional club networks; player transfer, 
player agents, sponsorship, television rights and merchandising (Fan & Mangan, 2004: 
60; Wu, S.Z. 1999a: 366). However, unlike the western market model (Dong & 
Mangan, 2001: 85), these associations remained controlled by the state who 
dominated major decisions (Fan & Mangan, 2004: 61) through its provincial and local 
commissions due to most of the 'professional' clubs being run by national enterprises 
or sponsored by regional capital investment organization (Dong & Mangan, 2001: 86; 
Wu, S.Z. 1999a: 381). Although these quasi-autonomous organisations introduced the 
club system to raise funds to support themselves and to offer jobs for staff who 
transferred from the former NSC (Jones, 1999: 9-10), the key mission was still 
Olympic success (Fan & Mangan, 2004: 61-2) because many Communist Party 
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members involved in sport management (lones, 2004: 58) ranked national interest (or 
their personal interest for keeping their jobs) above commercial interest. Basically, the 
Chinese club system is different from the West because the force directing its 
development is from government, not the free market. Despite this qualification sport 
development during the era of Jiang Zemin was deeply affected by the embrace of the 
market economy. In short, nationalism and commercialism were interwoven during 
the reform process of Chinese sport, but the former was superior to the latler due to 
the ideology of the Chinese Communists, who were still concerned to demonstrate the 
superiority of socialism over capitalism. The pursuit of 'The Olympic Glory' project 
and the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing which embodies these political objectives is 
discussed in the next section. 
4.4.3 China and International sport 
Following the acceptance of a market economy, Chinese sport increased its 
involvement in international sport, especially in the Olympic Movement. Taking 
advantage of participation in the Olympic Movement, especially its huge commercial 
potential, while also maintaining a distance from the Olympic spirit - freedom, 
democracy and fair play (Fan, 1998: 162) which might threaten the CCP's political 
legitimacy - the Chinese government has to manage its engagement with the Western 
movement with great care. How the Chinese government has attempted to manage the 
engagement is the central focus of this section. 
The increasing importance of Olympic success 
Why are Olympic gold medals so important for the PRC? The major reasons are 
related to political superiority and national pride. Wu Shaozu, Sports Minister from 
1989 to 2000, claimed: 'Athletes have shouldered heavy responsibilities. They are our 
political ambassadors' (Wu, 1998: 6-7, quoted in Fan & Xiong, 2003: 335). And in 
his opening address at the Congress of Olympic Movement Studies in Beijing, 1993, 
he also argues that 'The highest goal of Chinese sport is success in the Olympic 
Games. We must concentrate our resources on it because to raise the flag at the 
Olympics is our major responsibility' (Wu, 1993: 402-4, quoted in Fan, 1998: 159). 
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To achieve Olympic success, the Chinese government issued two "Olympic glory" 
projects, 'The Olympic Glory' project (1994-2000) and 'The Olympic Glory' project 
(2001-2010), which set guidelines for concentrating resources to achieve Olympic 
success. The combined impact of the two projects has been that China has gradually 
achieved its goal to become one of the world's sports powers. China's Olympic gold 
medal ranking has risen from fourth at Atlanta in 1996 to second at Athens in 2004. 
But what are the main strategies in the projects? And how did they help China to 
achieve Olympic success in'such a short time? 
The main strategies in the projects focused on the 18 previously selected sports in 
which the Chinese government had invested 70% of its elite sport budget (Chen, 
2004: 78). In addition, the two projects introduced Western training, competition and 
management models with particular emphasis on sport science and sport technology 
for elite sport performance (Chen, 2004: 194), an understanding of which was gained 
through intensive and extensive international exchange with the outside world. 
Before establishing the first Olympic glory project, the Chinese government 
attempted to concentrate its limited sport budget for Olympic success by highlighting 
selected Olympic sports according to the decisions made by the All States Sports 
Minister Conference in 1993 (Chen, 2004: 69). The outcome was that the NSC issued 
a directive in 1993 that the National Games would be adjusted in line with the 
Olympic programme and winning Olympic medals could be "double scored" into the 
total score of each province in the following the National Games (Jones, 1999: 11; 
NSC, 1996a: 33; Dong, 2003a: 123). This policy shift stimulated unprecedented 
enthusiasm for Olympic victory from local sports officials (Dong, 2003a: 123) who 
wished to invest more money and energy into achieving success in the National 
Games and Olympic glory for their provinces and cities. One consequence of the 
Olympic-oriented policy of the government was that, by 1995, non-Olympic athletes 
comprised only 7.34 percent of all elite athletes and the membership of elite sports 
squads was reduced in the number: from a total of 16,982 in 1990 to 13,374 in 1994 
(Dong,2003a: 123). A second consequence was that in preparation for the Olympics, 
between 1994 and 1996 China devoted most of its sport budget to the 960 top athletes 
being assembled across the country (Dong, 2003a: 128). 
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To make good the shortfall in the sport budget, the NSC held a conference in June 
1993 entitled, 'The Urgent Promotion and Development of Sports Business', which 
called for the development of commercial sports markets (Fan, 1997: 350). Following 
the conference there was a rapid expansion in sponsorship. Led by sports, such as 
soccer, basketball and volleyball (Jones, 1999: 5) at the provincial and national level 
almost every elite team in these three sports is sponsored by major companies, such as 
Adidas, Mizuno, Nike, Philip Morris, British American Tobacco, Coca-Cola and 
Ericsson (Hwang, 2002: 150; Fan, 1997: 346). 
A central element of the 'Olympic glory' projects was the investment in sport science 
and sport technology. In 1996, a special fund for Olympic-related sports facilities, 
nutrition and sports research reached 65 million yuan. Over 200 researchers were 
involved in 56 Olympic-related projects (Dong, 2003a: 128). In the same year, the 
Chinese government also issued 'the Olympic Glory through the Science and 
Technology' (Ao yun zhengguangjihua keji gongcheng) project to support its elite 
sport training system. In addition, many coaches and experts from Western countries 
were employed in the Chinese provincial and national teams (Fan, 1997: 349) 
including gymnastic, swimming, football and basketball. Finally, to maintain and 
strengthen China's status in international sport organisations, especially in the 18 
selected sports (Wu, S.Z. 1999a: 585-6), the Chinese government has systematically 
planned to take seats in those international federations. One example of the strategy is 
Lu Jingrong who became an IOC member by virtue of being the president of the 
International Badminton Federation. 
In short, after 1993, the Chinese government adopted western approaches (science 
and technology), western sport and western commercialism not only to achieve its 
Olympic success but also to promote its ideology of patriotism, collectivism and 
socialism with Chinese characteristics (Hwang, 2002: 167; Wu, S.Z. 1999a: 580-1). 
Thus, it appears that the Chinese leadership has been able to reinterpret the meaning 
of Olympic glory to make it less challenging to CCP ideology. 
Anti-doping issues 
According to Dong (2003: 17), the growth of commercialism and the growing 
emphasis on winning medals led to an increase in drug abuse which became a 
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recurring and increasingly wide-spread problem throughout Chinese sport in the 
1990s (Dong, 2003a: 145). By the late 1990s, the problem of doping had evolved into 
a complicated domestic and international political issue. Under huge pressure from 
the outside world, the Chinese government was forced to take several measures in 
response, including setting out tough penalties, issuing the Sports Law to fight against 
drug abuse, and declarations against drug abuse by top political leaders. 
In 1993, 31 Chinese athletes tested positive (Dong, 2003a: 143). At the Hiroshima 
Asian Games in October 1994, 11 Chinese athletes including seven swimmers, tested 
positive for anabolic steroids, which led to the whole Chinese swimming team being 
barred from the Pan-Pacific Swimming Championships by the International 
Swimming Federation (FINA). Further embarrassed by the international criticism and 
under escalating international pressure, in early 1995 China suspended for one year 
the nine coaches who were involved in the 31 cases of drug offences in 1994. In the 
same year, the Chinese Swimming Association issued 'Regulating the Use of 
Forbidden Drugs' (Guanyujinzhi shiyong weijinyaopin guiding), setting out tough 
penalties (Dong, 2003a: 144). To fight against drug abuse, the Sports Law issued in: 
1995 provided a legal basis for tackling drug abuse in sport (Jones, 1999: 7) and Wu 
Shao Zu, the head of the Sports Commission, emphasized that there should be a strict 
ban on drugs, with rigorous testing, management and enforcement of the laws (Jones, 
1999: 7; Fan, 1998: 161-2). However, even by adopting these measures, they could 
not stop the drug abuse. 
In January 1998, Chinese swimmers became the target of accusations over drug abuse. 
Growth hormone was found in the Chinese swimmer Yuan Yuan's luggage at Sydney 
Airport on 8 January, and one week later four other swimmers failed the pre-
competition drug tests at the World Swimming Championships in Perth. These events 
forced Shen Guofan, a spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, to respond to 
questions at a press conference in Beijing on 15 January 1998. Drug abuse thus 
became a political issue (Dong, 2003a: 141). Drug abuse even spread to junior 
athletes who participated in the preliminary phase of the 1999 National City Games 
(Dong, 2003a: 145). In response to huge international pressure in the late 1990s the 
Chinese started to seriously review, and then adjust, internal control over sports policy 
and management, and took firm action to crack down on drug abuse (Dong, 2003a: 17) 
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Since the 2004 Olympic Games in Athens, China has gradually begun to lose the 
stigma of drug abuse because all 150 urine tests carried out on Chinese athletes in 
Athens, were negative, and David Howman, director general of the World Anti-
Doping Agency, said that he was convinced that the Chinese government had done 
everything in its power to stop doping (Wollaston, 2004). In summary, it can be 
argued that the problem of drug abuse was only taken seriously by the Chinese 
government when it evolved into a political and international issue and threatened to 
harm Beijing's bid to host the 2008 Olympic Games. 
Hosting the Olympic Games 
The reasons for hosting the Olympic Games, from the perspective of the PRC's 
political elites, were highly political. As President Jiang Zemin stated "The bid was 
made to further China's domestic stability and economic prosperity. The quest for the 
Olympics was to raise national morale and strengthen the cohesion of the Chinese 
people both in the mainland and overseas" (quoted in Dong, 2003a: 122). To serve 
these political needs, it was not surprising that China decided to bid once again for the 
2008 Olympics after losing the bid to Sydney for the right to host of the 2000 
Olympic Summer Games (COC, 2004a). 
With the approval of the State Council, the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games Bid 
Committee (BOBICO) was established on September 6, 1999, with Liu Qi, a member 
of Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) and Mayor of Beijing, as the President and 
COC President Yuan Weimin as the Executive President. The motto of Beijing's bid 
was "New Beijing, Great Olympics", meaning that reform and opening up to the 
outside world have brought about great changes in Beijing, a city with a history of 
3,000 years (COC, 2004b). According to the results of a public opinion poll 
conducted by the Gallup Organisation in Beijing in November 2000,94.9% of Beijing 
residents strongly supported the city's bid to host the 2008 Olympics (COC, 2004b). 
Beijing's second attempt to host the Olympics was successful: China won the right to 
host the 2008 Olympic Games announced on 13th July 2000 at the IOC 112th Session 
in Moscow (Hai, 2002:11; COC, 2004b). 
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For the largest developing country with a strong Eastern cultural background, like 
China; to host the Olympics could be regarded as significant for spreading the 
Olympic spirit and expanding exchanges between East and West. Hosting the 2008 
Olympics also provides a good opportunity to show the current state of economic, 
cultural, social and political development in China in a comprehensive way (COC, 
2004b). According to the document, 'A proposal about moving further ahead in 
strengthening and improving sport development' issued by State Council in 2002, the 
Chinese government's ambition is to hold the greatest Olympic Games (Chen, 2004: 
78). Hence, the slogans for the Beijing Olympic organisers are, as they declared, to 
host a "Green Olympics", a "Hi-tech Olympics" and the "People's Olympics" (COC, 
2004b; Ren, 2002: 11). To achieve these goals, the Beij ing city government stated in 
2001 that over the next five years it would spend a total of nearly $22 billion in 
improving the environment and facilities (Costello, 200 I: 35; Theodoraki, 2004: 206) 
which has attracted international companies from the US, Europe and Australia to bid 
for contracts (French News Agency 2001, Theodoraki, 2004: 206). 
According to Fan (1998: 155), the foreign investment generated by the successful 
Olympic bid is part of the broad plan to link China to the international economic 
community. In other words, hosting the Olympic Games per se could be regarded as 
an introduction of modernity to integrate China into the world economic system, 
especially after China joined the WTO in late 200 I. But the challenge facing the 
Beijing government is to balance nationalism and commercialism and also, as noted 
in the IOC Evaluation Commission report, to host 'an unprecedented Olympics that 
would leave a unique legacy for both China and sport as a whole' (COC, 2004b; Hai, 
2002:11). 
In short, since accepting the market economy, the Chinese government has attempted 
to deal with the political and economic issues in a separate way, namely political 
socialism and economic capitalism. When it comes to economic capitalism, sport 
commercialism is regarded as a good way to support the elite sport system in its 
pursuit of Olympic glory. But when it comes to political socialism, the government 
hopes to present Olympic success, both in terms of participation and hosting the 
Olympics, as a political statement of the superiority of socialism. 
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3.5 Conclusion 
International sport is not just a reflection of social and political change over the four 
eras mentioned above, but also a diplomatic resource and more recently a symbol of 
change in China. Indeed, since Mao Zedong proclaimed the foundation of the 
People's Republic of China on I October 1949, the policy-making of Communist 
China has been strongly dependent on the ideology of the elite, and Chinese domestic 
sport policy very much reflected what was happening at the political level through the 
four eras of the pre-Cultural Revolution, the Cultural Revolution, the era of Deng 
Xiaoping and the period of Jiang Zemin. Firstly, during the pre-Cultural Revolution, 
Mao Zedong promoted the policy of 'leaning to one side', resulting in the systematic 
copying of the USSR's sport system, including a centralized sporting hierarchy and a 
systematic approach to training, competition and teaching. During the Cultural 
Revolution, the PRC isolated itself from the outside world to re-establish the 
ideological purity of Communism causing the sport system to crash. During the era of 
Deng Xiaoping, China practised the 'open door policy' in order to develop the 
relationship with world capitalism, which led not only to the gradual decentralization, 
rationalization and commercialisation of the Chinese sport system but also to sport 
policy emphasizing the value of Olympic success. Finally, during the period of Jiang 
Zemin, the PRC adopted a marketised economy and joined the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) to integrate itself into the world economic system, which 
brought about the establishment of 'the Sport Law of the PRC' in which sport 
commercialisation was encouraged to support Olympic success and to attract foreign 
inv'estment with a strong attempt at linking China to the outside world. 
However, if China was going to develop some tentative international diplomatic links 
through sport, starting with ping-pong diplomacy, and re':'engage with the Olympic 
Movement, it needed to have a strong domestic sport system, at least at the elite level. 
There had always been an interconnection between the domestic and the international 
level of sport in China, but it became much more intense after the 1984 Olympic 
Games. China, in the pre-Cultural Revolution period, did have international contacts, 
but they were almost oppositional contacts which were intended to counter what they 
considered to be the Western or capitalist dominated Olympic system. 
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It was far less important for them to do well in games such as GANEFO. However, 
once it was decided that its foreign policy objectives and its international relations lay 
outside the communist world and the Third World, then it had to have resources 
which could match those possessed by first world countries. Consequently, the 
importance of the nature, structure and efficiency of the domestic sport system 
became much more important. 
The examples of supporting the GANEFO and the series of boycotts of Olympic 
Games during the cold war era, illustrate not only that sport has long been used as a 
resource in international relations, but also that China was capable of effectively 
utilizing sport diplomacy. But the international politics of sport over the past 20 years 
have became much more sophisticated and it is not so much about using the Olympic 
Movement to further China's international relations, for example, in the dispute with 
Taiwan. It is much more about using sport as a way of promoting Chinese business, 
Chinese culture, Chinese society and alerting the rest of the world to the fact that 
China is soon to become the largest economy in the world and that it is not a Third 
World country in many ways, but a global power. 
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Chapter Four: Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
The chapter outlines the methodology for the investigation and includes a discussion 
of the chosen ontology and epistemology, research design and means of data analysis. 
First, it is worth providing a brief reminder of the aim of this study, which is to 
analyse the process of China's engagement in global sports through an examination of 
the cases of the Olympic Movement, elite football and elite basketball. To achieve 
this aim the following objectives have been identified: 
I. To analyse the impact of socio-economic and political change since 1949 on the 
development of sport within China and on the development of international 
sporting contests 
2. To examine the relationship between China and the Olympic Movement 
3. To examine the development, structure and organisation of elite football in China 
4. To examine the development, structure and organisation of elite basketball in 
China, and 
5. To explore the utility of globalisation theories for analysis of the development of 
sport policy in China 
According to Grix (2002: 179), it is our ontological and epistemological positions that 
shape the very questions we may ask in the first place, how we pose them and how we 
Set about answering them. Hence, to answer these questions a number of 
philosophical and methodological questions need to be considered. What follows is a 
discussion of the various approaches to research and a justification of those that were 
employed for this study. 
4.2 Ontology and Epistemology Assumptions 
Ontological assumptions are concerned with the nature of existence, that is, the very 
nature of the subject matter of the research - the social world. As Burrell and Morgan 
(I979: 1) note, ontological assumptions include a consideration of: 
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... whether the 'reality' to be investigated is external to the individual- imposing 
itself on individual consciousness from without - or the product of individual 
consciousness; whether 'reality' is of an 'objective' nature, or the product of 
individual cognition; whether 'reality' is a given 'out there' in the world, or the 
product of one's mind. 
The former may be classed as an external-realist view while the latter is an internal-
idealist position. And both of them are concerned with 'what we believe constitutes 
social reality' (Blaikie, 2000: 8) although their perspectives are quite different. 
Essentially, according to Grix (2002: 177) and Sparkes (1992: 14), ontological 
assumptions give rise to epistemological assumptions which have methodological 
implications for the choices made regarding particular techniques of data collection 
and the interpretation of these findings. Epistemology is concerned with the theory of 
knowledge, especially with regard to 'the possible ways of gaining knowledge of 
social reality, whatever it is understood to be' (Blaikie, 2000: 8). In other words, it is 
predicated upon a view of the nature of knowledge: whether, for example, it is 
possible to identify and communicate the nature of knowledge as being hard, real and 
capable of being transmitted in tangible form, or whether 'knowledge' is of a softer, 
Inore subjective, spiritual or even transcendental kind, based on experience and 
insight of a unique and essentially personal nature (Burrell & Morgan, 1979: 2). In 
short, the epistemological assumptions are related two questions, which are 'Can we 
identify "real" or "objective" relations between social phenomena? And if so, how?' 
(Marsh & Furlong, 2002: 23). 
Regarding the assumptions of ontology and epistemology, Sparkes (1992: 21) sets out 
two major research paradigms (see Table 4.1) which have impacted upon the fields of 
sport and physical education for many years. Sparkes reminds us that 'at a most 
fundamental level different paradigms provide particular sets of lenses for seeing the 
world and making sense of it in different ways' (1992: 12). This means that a 
researcher's ontological and epistemological positions influence the methodological 
approach adopted, and can lead to different views of the same social phenomena (Grix, 
2002: 178; Marsh & Furlong, 2002: 23; Sparkes, 1992: 14). 
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Table 4.1 Assumptions underlying the positivist and interpretive paradigms 
Assumptions Paradigm 
Positivist Interpretive 
Ontology External-Realist Internal-Idealist, 
Relativist 
Epistemology Objectivist, Interactive Subjectivist, Interactive 
Methodology Nomothetic, Experimental, Ideographic, Hermeneutical, 
Manipulative Dialectical 
Interests Prediction and Control Understanding and 
(Technical) Interpretation (Practical) 
Source: Adapted from Sparkes (1992: 21) 
According to Table 4.1, positivists adopt an external-realist ontology, an objectivist 
epistemology and prefer a nomothetic methodology. With regard to ontology, 
positivists, like Durkheim, claim that 'social facts' exist outside of men's (sic) 
consciousness and restrain men in their everyday activities (Burrell & Morgan, 2005: 
26). Thus positivists argue that the social scientist must study social phenomena 'in 
the same state of mind as the physicist, chemist or physiologist when he probes into a· 
still unexplored region of the scientific domain' (Durkheim, 1964: xiv). According to 
this view, the positivist definition of objectivity is the same as that adopted within the 
natural sciences and social life may therefore be explained in the same way as natural 
phenomena. Positivism as interpreted in the natural sciences is concerned with the 
prediction and explanation of the behaviour of phenomena and the pursuit of 
objectivity, which is defined as the researcher's 'detachment' from the topic under 
investigation (May, 1999: 10). Therefore, within the positivist framework a 
lllanipulative methodology is adopted which attempts to control both researcher bias 
and other external variables in the environment so that nature's secrets can be 
revealed. To achieve this objectivity positivists adhere to certain prescribed methods 
(techniques) within a formalized process of investigation often called the 'scientific 
lllethod' (Sparkes, 1992: 20-23), which is quite different to the interpretivist approach. 
The interpretive paradigm adopts an internal-idealist ontology, a subjectivist 
epistemology and prefers a hermeneutical methodology. With regard to ontology, 
interpretivists, such as Schutz, take reality to be mind-dependent and argue that the 
social world was 'essentially only something dependent upon and still within the 
operating intentionality of ego-consciousness' (1967: 44). Schutz's argument is 
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echoed by 10hnson et al. (1990: 4) who suggest that 'human activity is not behaviour 
(an adaption to material conditions), but an expression of meaning that humans give 
(via language) to their conduct'. This means that there are mUltiple realities and that 
the mind plays a central role, by its determining of categories, in their shaping or 
construction. This perspective is also shared by relativists, such as Bernstein, who 
claim that 'we can never escape from the predicament of speaking of "our" and 
"their" standards of rationality' (1983: 8). Foucault, considers knowledge and power 
to be constructed within a set of social practices and claims that 'each society has its 
region of truth, its 'general politics' of truth' (1980: 131). Therefore, from the 
interpretivists' perspective, we cannot hope to see the world outside of our place in 
it - all that we can ever have are various points of view that reflect the interests, 
values and purposes of various groups of people. Consequently, interpretivists focus 
on the interests and purposes of people (including the researcher), on their intentional 
and meaningful behaviour, and attempt to construe the world from the participant's 
point of view and thereby explain and understand how they construct and continue to 
reconstruct social reality, given their interests and purposes (Sparkes, 1992: 26-27). 
This viewpoint is partly accepted by critical realists whose position is somewhere 
between positivist and interpretive paradigms. 
In addition to Sparkes' useful and distinct description of the positivist and interpretive 
paradigms, a third paradigm - critical realist - holds the middle ground between those 
two separate paradigms. In terms of ontological and epistemological assumptions 
there appears to be two major strands running through the critical realist paradigm. 
One is closely associated with positivism while the other relates to interpretivism. 
With regard to the former, critical realism adopts an external-realist ontology, an 
objectivist epistemology, and holds a somewhat deterministic view of people that 
leads them to concentrate upon structural relationships within a realist social world 
through the analysis of deep-seated internal contradictions and the analysis of power 
relationships. With regard to the latter, critical realism has much in common with the 
interpretive paradigm because it adopts an internal-idealist ontology, a subjectivist 
epistemology, and a more voluntaristic view of people. Thus, reality is taken to be 
Socially constructed, knowledge is seen as being context-specific and value laden 
(Sparkes, 1992: 38-39). Although there are some tensions between external-realist and 
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internal-idealist ontology, Bhaskar attempts to use the relationship between structure 
and action to point to a critical realist position. He claims that 
The existence of social structure is a necessary condition for any human activity. 
Society provides the means, media, rules and resources for everything we do .... 
It is the unmotivated condition for all our motivated productions. We do not 
create society - the error ofvoluntarism. But these structures which pre-exist us 
are only reproduced or transformed in our everyday activities; thus society does 
not exist independently of human agency - the error of reification. The social 
world is reproduced and transformed in daily life. (1989a: 3-4) 
As indicated in the above quotation, structure and action are seen as distinct but 
interdependent. Their distinctness is grounded in temporal differences - the social 
structures in which individuals are located pre-exist those individuals. This is 
significant because it distinguishes critical realism from another influential conception 
of the relationship between structure and action - Giddens' (1984) theory of 
structuration. Giddens' project is similar to that of the critical realists, namely to 
Overcome the dichotomy between structuralism and interpretivism (Porter, 2002: 64). 
While positivists give reality an objective structure and interpretivists give it a 
SUbjective nature, critical realists stand somewhere in between and believe that 
although subjective meanings are relevant and important, objective relations cannot 
be denied (Sarantakos, 1998: 36). 
Regarding the critical realist paradigm, Marsh et al. (1999) provide a useful 
description (see Table 4.2) which is more directly applicable to social and political 
studies because the assumption contained in this table are concerned with social and 
political studies. 
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Table 4.2 Core assumptions of, and differences between, Positivism, Relativism 
and Critical Realism 
Positivism Relativism Critical Realism 
The world exists independently of our The world does not exist independently of The world exists independently of our 
knowledge of it our knowledge of it knowledge of it 
Regular relationships can be established The world is socially, or discursively, There are deep structures which cannot be 
between social phenomena, using theory construl;ted direl;tly observed 
to generate hypotheses whkh can be 
tested, and falsified, by direct observation 
There are no deep structures which cannot There is no extra-discursive social sphere, There is necessity in the world -
be observed no 'real' social world beyond discourse objects/structures do have causal powers, 
so we can make casual statements 
There is no dichotomy between Social phenomena do not exist While social phenomena exist 
appearance and reality; that the world is independently of our interpretation of independently of our interpretation, or 
real and not meditated by our senses or them and it is this interpretation I discursive construction, of them, 
socially constructed understanding of them which affects nevertheless that discursive construction 
outcomes - and it is the interpretation of affects outcomes 
the social phenomena which is crucial 
However, meanings can only be For this reason, structures do not 
established and understood within determine outcomes, rather they constrain 
discourses - objective analysis is therefore and facilitate; social science involves the 
impossible - knowledge is discursively study of reflexive agents who are capable 
laden of constructing, deconstructing and 
reconstructing structures 
Source: Adapted from Marsh et al. (1999: 11-14) 
According to Table 4.2, positivism assumes that the world exists independently of our 
knowledge of it so regular relationships can be established between social phenomena, 
using theory to generate hypotheses which can be tested, and falsified, by direct 
observation. It also supposes that there are no deep structures which cannot be 
observed. Thus there is no dichotomy between appearance and reality and the world is 
conceptualized as real and not meditated by our senses or socially constructed. Unlike 
positivism, relativism denies the possibility of objective social science, or objective 
historical analysis, and privileges discourse. Relativists argue that social phenomena 
do not exist independently of our interpretation of them and it is this interpretation / 
understanding of them which affects outcomes - and it is the interpretation of the 
social phenomena which is crucial. 
Regarding the assumptions of critical realism, critical realists, like positivists and 
against relativists, argue that the world exists independently of our knowledge of it. 
To the critical realist, unlike the positivist, there are deep structures which cannot be 
directly observed. And unlike relativists but like positivists, critical realists argue that 
there is necessity in the world - objects/structures do have an impact in 
constraining/enabling behaviour of human agents. In addition, from the critical 
realists' perspective, while social phenomena exist independently of our interpretation, 
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or discursive construction, of them, nevertheless that discursive construction affects 
outcomes. For this reason, structures do not determine outcomes, rather they constrain 
and facilitate; social science involves the study of reflexive agents who are capable of 
constructing, deconstructing and reconstructing structures. In short, critical realism 
attempts to balance the two extreme assumptions between positivism and relativism. 
Critical realists argue that structures, although not always directly observable, have an 
influence on outcomes but also that the world is socially constructed, to the extent that 
ideational factors, which are constrained but not determined by the material world, 
have a crucial effect on outcomes (Marsh et al., 1999: 12). 
In addition to clarifying the concepts of ontology and epistemology, it is also 
important to identify the key assumptions upon which decisions about 
methodology/methods for this study are employed. Taking positivism as a starting 
point, positivists advocate the application of the methods of the natural sciences to the 
study of social reality and beyond (Durkheim, 1964: xiv, Pareto, 1970: 291), which 
means that the researcher can gain a pure and objective view by studying the social 
world from a detached vantage point outside of it rather than from a place within it. In 
addition, positivists believe that the world is structured, not just with physical 
structures but also with tangible social structures, such as social class, status and 
gender, with the consequence that all our interpersonal relationships are structured for 
us and these structures are almost unchangeable. Unfortunately, this point of view is 
not wholly convincing. First, we cannot take for granted or assume that all structures 
can be observed. For example, patriarchy as a structure cannot be directly observed 
but it did/does exist and must be taken account of for any full explanation of 
outcomes (Marsh & Smith, 2001: 529). Secondly, positivists assume that social 
structures are almost unchangeable but from Chapter 3 is analysis of the Chinese 
historical context, it is clear that certain structures have been significantly modified 
since the Chinese Communist Party gained power, as indicated by the change from 
the alliance with the USSR in the 1950s, to self-reliance in the 1960s and to the 
opening to the outside world in the late 1970s. Thirdly, for positivists, the world is 
real and not meditated by our senses or socially constructed yet, in China, we can see 
evidence of considerable political/ideological struggles between those political or 
party elites, such as Mao Zedong and Lin Biao, Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, 
Chen Yun and Deng Xiaoping, Li Peng and Zhu Rongji and so on. The results of 
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these politicaVideological struggles have had a major impact on Chinese domestic and 
foreign policies, as manifest in the Cultural Revolution, the open door policy and the 
decision to join the World Trade Organisation (WTO). This suggests that it is 
plausible to argue that the world might or could be constructed by the discourses of 
these elites. Based on the above evaluation, this study will consider the other 
ontological assumptions. 
In contrast to the positivist approach, interpretivists assert that social phenomena and 
their meanings are continually being accomplished by social actors (Foucault, 1980: 
131). Social phenomena and categories are not only produced through social 
interaction but are also in a constant state of revision. Hence, meanings can only be 
established and understood within discourses and objective analysis is therefore 
impossible (Schutz, 1967: 44, 10hnson et al. 1990: 4). In other words, "social reality is 
the interpretation" (Sparkes, 1992: 27). This perspective has resonance for this study. 
For example, in the globalisation theories or approaches, the hyperglobalists, the 
transformationalists and the sceptics, are all looking at the same phenomena but 
interpret them in different ways, which provides an opportunity for a more open 
approach to collect a variety of evidence to compare those competing interpretations. 
However, the interpretivists' approach can be criticized for not paying enough 
attention to the deep structures that either facilitate or constrain actions (Marsh et aI., 
1999: 11-14). For interpretivists, social structures are constantly being re-established 
through day-to-day interactions which flow around us thus, it is argued, social 
structures have little influence on actions. But that is not the case in this study. For 
example, as discussed in Chapter 3, sport has a close relationship with the broader 
social-economic-political circumstances in China. And the impact of these 
circumstances is evident both internally on domestic sport policy, and externally, on 
international sport policy. 
In contrast to both the positivist and interpretivist approaches, critical realists attempt 
to balance the two schools' extreme assumptions. For critical realists, the outcomes of 
a social phenomenon are determined by the constant interplay between agency and 
structures. Critical realists recognise that the relationship between structure and 
agency is dialectical (Cassell, 1993; Giddens, 1984; Marsh, 1999; Bhaskar, 1989a). In 
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addition, critical realists also argue that structures can be changed because of the 
outcomes of the actions of agents operating within the structures. In short, it is 'agents 
who bring structure into being, and it is structure, which produces the possibility of 
agency' (Cassel, 1993: (2). Furthermore, for critical realists, the relationship between 
structures and an agent's actions is impossible to be 'wholly' explained in terms of 
time and space which is changing continuously, but they are interpreted and the 
researcher, in explaining the social phenomenon, must be sceptical and critical 
regarding appearance, that is, what people say and do (Marsh & Smith, 2001). This 
means, to be a critical realist, a researcher has to distinguish between appearance and 
reality; what 'appears to be' is not reality, for it often does not reflect the conflicts, 
tensions and contradictions evident in society, and appearance is based on illusion and 
distortion (Sarantakos, 1998: 36). Thus, the purpose of social research for the critical 
realist is determined by the research-oriented critical and activist nature of the theory 
(Sarantakos, 1998: 39; Bhaskar, 1989b: 46). 
In essence, this study analyses the process of China's engagement in global sports as 
exemplified by the cases of the Olympic Movement, football and basketball and, as 
such, the study focuses on the relationship between structure (globalisation) and 
agency (organizations and individuals) to examine the attitude of the Chinese 
government towards global sport utilizing the theoretical frameworks of Held et a1. 
(1999) and Houlihan (1994, 2003). As indicated above, not only can we not take for 
granted or assume that all structures can be observed and are unchanging - the 
positivists' perspective, but also we are not convinced that social structures have little 
or minimal influences on actions - the interpretivists' viewpoint. Thus, so far we 
believe that the assumptions of the critical realists are the most suitable paradigm for 
this study because of the critical realist acknowledgement of the influence of the deep 
structures within which sport policy is located and the recognition of the capacity of 
individuals to affect sport development. However, we do not adopt the 'hard' version 
of critical realism which suggests that structures 'cause' behaviour. On the contrary, 
we are more in sympathy with the 'soft' version of critical realism which interprets 
structures as helping to explain, but not causing, behaviour. Essentially, we found that 
the heuristic and simplified framework of Linda Weiss (2003: 6) can, to some extent, 
help us understand the action of the PRC (sport policy) within the globalizing 
structures in our three case studies. According to Weiss (2003: 2-15), the structures 
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constraining and enabling (facilitating) state agencies in the global context could be 
regarded as possessing two dimensions: 'economic logic of exit' and 'political logic 
of insecurity and competition'. For 'economic logic of exit', globalisation is seen to 
be intrinsically constraining because openness involves the fall of national barriers to 
trade, investment, and financial flows, exposure to increasing capital mobility (via the 
multinationalisation of production and growth of global financial markets), and also 
conformity with intergovernmental agreements requiring, for example, that 
governments open their markets to foreign trade and financial institutions as well as 
eliminating certain subsidies to industry. Unlike the constraining aspect reflected in 
the economic logic of exit, the enabling dimension of globalisation reveals a political 
logic of competition and insecurity, which generates incentives for governments to 
take initiatives that will strengthen the national system of innovation and social 
protection. By adopting Weiss's concept in which globalisation (structures) 
'constrains' and 'enables' (facilitates) the actions of state agencies to shape certain 
outcomes, we attempt to explain part of the interaction between globalisation 
(structure) and the Chinese state (agency) in our three case studies (see more detail in 
the section on methodological reflections in the Chapter 8). 
4.3 Methodological considerations 
The above account regarding ontological and epistemological assumptions raises 
methodological considerations which translate the principles of a paradigm into 
research language, and shows how the world can be explained, handled, approached 
or studied (Sarantakos, 1998: 32). In other words, the choice of research method flows 
from an allegiance to a distinctive position in relation to how social reality ought to be 
studied (Bryman, 1988: 118), and how the data arising from the research ought to be 
collected and interpreted (Grix 2002: 175; Sparkes 1992: 14). According to Bryman 
(1988: 94) and Sarantakos (1998: 54), divergent epistemological positions have 
developed quite distinct research techniques and modes of operation (see Table 4.3). 
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Table 4.3 Perceived differences between quantitative and qualitative metbodology 
lFeature !Quantitative joualitative 
I) Image of social reality ~tatic and external to actor IProcessual and socially constructed 
Ibyactor 
2) ~ature of data lard, reliable !Rich, deep 
3) jrhe role of values lValue neutral; value-free inquiry 1N0rmativism; value-bound inquiry 
4) ~ethods !Quantitative, mathematical; lQualitative, with less emphasis on 
!extensive use of statistics ~tatistics; more use of verbal and 
Iqualitative analysis 
5) lResearcher's role lRather passive; is the 'knower'; is IActive; 'knower' and 'what is to be 
~eparate from subject - the known: IIcnown' are interactive and 
~ualism inseparable 
6) iGeneralisations nductive generalizations; V\nalytical or conceptual 
~lOmothetic statements generalizations; time-and-context 
specific 
7) lNatural and social lDeductive; model of natural nductive; rejection of the natural 
~ciences ~ciences; nomothetic; based on sciences model; ideographic; no strict 
~trict rules ules: interpretations 
Source: (Adapted from Bryman, 1988: 94 and Sarantakos, 1998: 54) 
Quantitative researchers employ highly structured techniques of data collection that 
allow quantification, hypotheses, measurement as well as the use of quantitative 
methods of data analysis including statistics and computers. Qualitative researchers 
on the 'other hand use less structured techniques of data collection and analysis. 
Indeed, qualitative research relies largely on the interpretive and critical approaches to 
social science, emphasising the significance of social context for understanding the 
social world. For example, qualitative researchers tend to empathise with their 
subjects, to attempt to view the world through their eyes. The data derived from 
ethnographic work is often described as 'rich' and 'deep', generally indicative of the 
attention to detail and their sustained contact with the subject area. 
The researcher in quantitative research is thought to assume a rather 'passive' role 
during data collection. In qualitative research the investigator is taken to be actively 
involved in the process of data collection and analysis and to be more aware of the 
flow of the process than the quantitative researcher (Sarantakos, 1998: 54). 
Quantitative researchers, finally, are thought to be interested in inductive 
generalisations of the research findings. Qualitative researchers on the other hand are 
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primarily interested in exploration and in making analytical or conceptual 
generalisations only. 
Bryman (1988) emphasizes the differences between qualitative and quantitative 
research and Sarantakos (1998) argues that qualitative methodology remains 
fundamentally different from quantitative, not only in theory but also with regard to 
the way it extracts information and analyses it. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily 
mean that one type of research is better than the other; on the contrary, it means that 
both types of research are important, although suitable for different types of inquiry. 
Bryman (1988: 108-9), Denzin and Lincoln (1998: 3) and Sarantakos (1998: 58) all 
agree that the choice between quantitative and qualitative research is to do with their 
suitability in answering particular research questions. 
The key research questions in this study are: i) to what extent did or does the Chinese 
government have a choice in its relationship with sport globalisation?; ii) to what 
extent can the Chinese government manage its interaction with sport globalisation?; 
and Hi) in what ways does the Chinese government seek to manage its relationship 
with sport globalisation? In order to answer these questions, this study draws on 
Houlihan's framework of patterns of globalisation (1994,2003) and Held et ai's 
framework of the theorization of globalisation (1999). Houlihan's and Held et al.'s 
work enable our analysis of globalisation processes which not only aims to explore 
the cultural phenomena of the changing attitudes and values within China but which 
also aims to examine the economic phenomena of the changing way in which elite 
football and elite basketball are organised in China. In addition, both quantitative and 
qualitative indicators of engagement with globalisation are used to help to identify 
tensions and also analyse the relationship of the Chinese state to globalisation, which 
enable us to map the Chinese sport policy response to globalisation. Regarding the 
concept of "choice" or "making the choice" raised in the first key research question, it 
is often very difficult to be able to identify that an agent is completely unconstrained 
by the structures due to "free will" or "free choice" of agent. On completion of the 
historical literature review in Chapter 3, we found that both Chinese domestic 
structures (such as political and social ideology and Party-state administrations) and 
international structures (such as United Nations, WTO and global economic system) 
had substantial influence in shaping Chinese domestic and foreign policies. These 
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structures constantly "limited" or "facilitated" the choice of state agency. We utilize 
the concept of choice to take account of these institutional and structural constraints 
or facilitations and see what the room for the Chinese government to manoeuvre is. 
As Lewis notes, "pre-existing social structure makes a difference to the course of 
events in the social world by influencing the actions that people choose to undertake" 
(2000: 258). Marsh et al share a similar view, arguing that "Agents are, in a sense, 
'bearers' of structural positions, but they interpret those structures. At the same time, 
structures are not unchanging; they change in part because of the strategic decisions 
of the actors operating within the structure"( 1999: 15). 
Comparing the research questions, the most important data are opinions, beliefs and 
values. The quantitative approach is not suited to this study because the data produced 
is likely to lack much by way of detail or depth on the topic under examination. This 
leads us to consider qualitative methods that may secure in-depth and rich information 
on a limited number of cases. It is argued that the qualitative researcher is in a better 
position to view the linkages between events and activities and to explore people's 
interpretations of the factors which produce such linkages (Bryman, 1988: 102). As 
argued, the methods used by qualitative researchers exemplify a common assumption 
that they can provide a 'deeper' understanding of social phenomena than would be 
obtained from purely quantitative data. In other words, qualitative research seeks to 
interpret social phenomena, to produce a rich understanding of the complex meaning 
structures that social actors construct in their specific social environments (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 1998: 3-4). 
Although it is argued that qualitative methods are more suitable for this study, we still 
have to deal with the 'weaknesses' of this type of research re,ated to its very nature 
and raised by the positivistic criticisms. These weaknesses are i) problems of 
reliability caused by extreme subjectivity; ii) risk of collecting meaningless and 
useless infonnation; Hi) it is very time-consuming; iv) problems of representativeness 
and generalisability of findings; v) problems of objectivity and detachment; vi) 
problems of ethics (entering the personal sphere of subjects) (Sarantakos, 1998: 52-3). 
These weaknesses will be discussed separately in the sections on validity and 
reliability, the use of a case study approach and the use of particular research methods. 
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Case Study approach 
As a research strategy, the case study is used in many situations to contribute to our 
knowledge of individual, group, organizational, social, political, and related 
phenomena (Yin, 2003: 2). Case study research involves studying individual cases, 
often in their natural environment, and for a long period of time (Sarantakos, 1998: 
191; Stake, 1998: 99) and employs a number of methods of data collection and 
analysis. A typical definition of a case study is "an empirical inquiry that investigates 
a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of 
evidence are used" (Yin, 1991: 23). 
According to Sarantakos (1998: 192), the case-study analysis is a type of research that 
is different from other forms of investigation, and demonstrates the following 
distinguishing characteristics: I. It studies whole units in their totality and not aspects 
or variables of these units. 2. It employs several methods primarily to avoid or prevent 
errors and distortions. 3. It often studies a single unit: one unit is one study. 4. It 
perceives the respondent as an expert not just as a source of data. 5. It studies a typical 
case. In addition, case studies are also employed for the purpose of exploration, and 
for the following reasons 1. to gain more information about the structure, process and 
complexity of the research object when relevant information is not available or 
sufficient; 2. to facilitate conceptualisation; 3. to guide the process of 
operationalisation; 4. to illustrate, explain, offer more detail or expand quantitative 
findings (Sarantakos, 1998: 192). In other words, the case study as a research strategy 
comprises an all-encompassing method - covering the logic of design, data collection 
techniques, and specific approaches to data analysis (Yin, 2003: 14). Nowadays, case 
studies are considered to be valid forms of inquiry in the context of descriptive as well 
as evaluative and causal studies, particularly when the research context is too complex 
for survey studies or experimental strategies, and when the researcher is interested in 
the structure, process and outcomes of a single unit (Sarantakos, 1998: 192). 
Although case study is a suitable approach for this study, there are still some concerns 
that need to be addressed, such as the lack of rigour of case study research, the 
problem of generalizing from a single case, and the very time-consuming nature of the 
116 
Chapter 4 Methodology 
process which runs the risk of collecting meaningless and useless information (Yin, 
2003: 10). For the first concern, the researcher attempts to follow systematic 
procedures, such as using the theoretical frameworks of Houlihan (1994, 2003) and 
Held et al. (1999) to analyse Chinese sport development through three case studies in 
which the criteria used to choose the case study will be specified as will the indicators 
for the collection and analysis of data in order to help avoid equivocal evidence or 
biased views influencing the findings and conclusions. The second common concern 
about case studies, it is that they provide little basis for scientific generalization. Yin 
(2003: 10) argues that case studies, like experiments, are generalizable to theoretical 
propositions and not to populations or universes. In this sense, the case study, like the 
experiment, does not represent a 'sample', and in conducting a case study, our goal 
will be to develop and refine theories (analytical generalization) and not to enumerate 
frequencies (statistical generalization). So, this study is attempting to explore and 
analyse the response of the Chinese government to global pressure, especially in the 
dimension of global sport. 
The third frequent criticism about case studies is that they take too long and result in 
massive, unreadable documents. Yin (2003: 10) suggests that the best general advice 
is to compose portions of the case study early (e.g. the bibliography and the 
methodology section), rather than waiting until the end of the data analysis process. 
Consequently, we are completing the literature review first which generates the 
indicators which will be important in the fieldwork, thereby limiting the accumulation 
of extraneous data. In addition, in many cases, when dealing with organisations, 
especially under the structure of the Chinese Communist Party, access to key 
information may be problematic. This problem is discussed below. 
After discussing the strengths and limitations of the case study method, we move on 
to examine the criteria for the selection of the case study. According to Miles and 
Huberman (1984) and Stake (1998: 100), understanding the critical phenomena may 
depend on choosing the case well. 
Criteria for the selection of the case study 
According to Hammersley (1992: 184), 'the concept of the case study captures an 
important aspect of the decisions we face in research. It highlights, in particular, the 
117 
Chapter 4 Methodology 
choices that we have to make about how many cases to investigate and how these are 
to be selected'. Regarding the first choice, Yin (2003: 19,53) contends that most 
multiple-case designs are likely to be stronger than single-case designs because the 
analytic benefits from having two or more cases may be substantial. Indeed, a 
researcher may study a number of cases jointly in order to inquire into the 
phenomenon and population. We might call this a collective case study. Individual 
cases in the collection mayor may not be known in advance to manifest the common 
characteristic. They are chosen because it is believed that understanding them as 
individual cases will lead to better understanding, perhaps better theorizing, about a 
still larger collection of cases (Stake, 1998: 89). Based on the reasons above, we 
believe that to achieve the aim and objectives of this study which examines the 
relationship between the Chinese government and globalisation we should focus on 
the major global sport arena, in our case, the Olympic Movement, elite football and 
elite basketball. 
In the case of the Olympic Movement, it is responsible for the world's leading global 
sporting event which is heavily involved with global commercial interests (Houlihan, 
2004: 52; Wilson, 1994: 356). It is also arguably a major impetus for the globalisation 
of sport and, with an awareness of China's history ('cold' toward the Olympics during 
late 1950s to early 1970s and only enthusiastic after the open-door policy in the 1978), 
We wish to explore how the Chinese government manages its relationship with 
powerful commercial interests, especially in the lead-up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics. 
Regarding the case of elite football, engagement with global football was selected due 
to the status of the World Cup, the close involvement of elite football and host cities 
with global commercial interests, and the acknowledged role of FIFA in the 
globalisation of sport (Jarvie, 2006: 97). In China, football was the first sport where 
the introduction of the club system was permitted on an experimental basis. However, 
football has beco~e increasingly popular in China. Consequently, we would like to 
explore how the Chinese government dealt with the various problems that arose 
including that of reconciling national interest and commercial benefits. As for the case 
of elite basketball, involvement with global basketball was selected due to i) its status 
as a mega sport in Europe, Japan and United States; ii) being a major commercial 
sport, especially in the United States in which NBA is one of the big four sport brands 
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with global commercial interests; and iii) recognizing the role ofthe International 
Basketball Federation (FIBA) in the globalisation of sport following its decision to 
allow professionals, most significantly NBA players, to play in international 
competitions, including the FIBA World Championship and Olympic Games 
(Andrews, 1997: 87). In essence, the IOC, FIBA and NBA worked closely with each 
other to promote global basketball at the 2008 Olympic Games (Xinhuanet News, 
2007). NBA Commissioner David Stem saw the Beijing Olympics as having as 
significant an impact on global basketball as the 1992 gold medal-winning US 
"Dream Team." He highlights that "It's going to be an awesome tournament. Beijing 
is going to be to the globalisation game what the (Michael Jordan-led) Dream Team 
was to the beginning of globalisation (of basketball)" (quoted in Xinhuanet News, 
2006). In China, after football, basketball is the most popular professional sport and 
the Chinese Basketball Association League (CBAL) has many ofthe characteristics 
found in the West, especially in the American NBA model, including the "hiring and 
firing" system of accountability, the competition system of home and away and the 
introduction of foreign coaches, players and referees. As with football, we would like 
to examine the attitudes and values of the Chinese government toward the commercial 
products of basketball. To sum up, all three cases are not only strong global products 
Or events but also attract substantial attention in the Chinese domestic context. 
If we are examining the interaction between global sport phenomena and the Chinese 
government, we have to address the question of which parts of the complex 
government infrastructure we consider to be the authentic voice of the government. 
Which part of the collected network of people and organisations reflect the 
government's view? The way in which we handle that is to identify initially the 
organisations that have a clear interest in sport and sport development. From this point 
of view, the General Administration of Sport (GAOS) is the key organisation and the 
role of the Chinese Olympic Committee (COC) would be crucial. But one thing we 
need to bear in mind is that the key members in these two organisations are almost the 
same. In addition, the GAOS also has strong link with these Autonomous Non-
Governmental Organizations (quangos), including the Chinese Football Association 
(CF A) and the Chinese Basketball Association (CBA). Unlike in many western 
democracies, these target organisations are likely to be much more tightly centrally 
Controlled in China even if they appear nominally relatively autonomous. It is 
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possible therefore that the organisations we are targeting will give us the 'government 
view' due to the overlapping membership in these organisations and the existence of a 
very tight core of decision makers. 
The criteria for choosing the cases of the Olympic Movement, elite football and elite 
basketball are summarised in Table 4.4. However, according to Yin (1994: 137) 'case 
studies have been done about decisions, about programmes, about the implementation 
process, and about organisational change. Between these types of topic, none is easily 
defined in terms of the beginning or end point of the 'case" _ He also argues that 'the 
more a study contains specific propositions, the more it will stay within reasonable 
limits' _ 
Table 4.4 A summary of the criteria for choosing the three case studies 
Common features of the three case studies 
iclobal sport iolympics, elite football and elite basketball are all major sports events highlighted 
IUnder the Chinese sport policy. 
lCommercial IAII of them have huge commercial potential behind them, especially sponsorship 
potential Ifrom MNCs. 
lRelated agencies lGeneral Administration of Sport (GAOS), Chinese Olympic Committee (COC), 
under the trhe Beijing Organizing Committee for the Games of the XX[X Olympiad 
eadership of BOCOG), Chinese Football Association (CF A) and Chinese Basketball 
[chinese state \Association (CB A). 
4.4 Research methods 
This section considers the two key research methods employed for this study: semi-
structured interviews and document analysis. These methods are discussed in turn. 
Semi-structured interview 
There are clear methodological reasons why interviews are a valid tool for this study_ 
The most important of which concerns the type of information we wish to glean -
either because it simply does not exist in official published documents or 
Contemporary media accounts or because we require greater elaboration and 
120 
Chapter 4 Methodology 
explanation. We wish to know a person's beliefs, opinions and attitudes from their 
perspective: 
Extended conversational interviews of this character provide an opportunity for 
contextual analysis. An opinion, belief, or attitude is best understood in the 
context of other opinions, beliefs, and attitudes, for they illuminate its meaning, 
mark its boundaries, modify and qualify its force. (Lane, 1962: 9) 
The reason why we employ semi-structured interviews is because this type of 
interview allows people to answer more on their own terms than the standardized 
interview permits, but still provides a structure for comparability by comparison with 
the focused interview (May, 1993: 93). As Fielding notes 'They were semi-structured 
by a thematic guide with probes and invitations to expand on the issues raised' (1988: 
212). Thus, qualitative information about the topic can then be recorded by the 
interviewer who can seek both clarification and elaboration on the answers given. 
This enables the interviewer to have more latitude to probe beyond the answers (May, 
1993: 93). 
Empirical work involved interviews with actors within the elite sport system from five 
governmental and related agencies, namely, the General Administration of Sport 
(GAOS), the Chinese Olympic Committee (COC), the Beijing Organizing Committee 
for the Games of the XXIX Olympiad (BOCOG), the Chinese Football Association 
(CFA) and the Chinese Basketball Association (CBA). As noted, these five 
organisations are probably in a much more tightly centralized system in China than 
their western counterparts which are less homogenous, often more fragmented even 
When they are located within the machinery of government. These organisations gave 
us the government perspective on Chinese sport policy regarding globalisation. As 
regard the selection of interviewees within these organizations, ideally, our preferred 
interviewees would be those as senior as possible, who have been in the organisations 
for 5-10 years, and can thus offer a historical perspective, and those involved in 
strategic decision-making rather than operational matters. But given the reality of 
researching in China, it may be that we have to be much more pragmatic and 
interview officials who are at a more junior level, or maybe only partly involved in 
strategy but who have been part ofthe organisation for a reasonable length oftime. 
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Although, under these particular political circumstances in Communist China, we may 
. be not able to interview all the senior officials related to our research and may instead 
interview more junior officials, according to Taylor, these actors may still share 
valuable intersubjective meanings which are constitutive of the social matrix in which 
individuals find themselves and act. He notes: 
The actor may have all sorts of beliefs and attitudes which may be rightly 
thought of as their individual beliefs and attitudes, even if others share them; 
they may subscribe to certain policy goals or certain fonns of theory about the 
policy, or feel resentment about certain things and so on. They bring these with 
them into negotiations, and strive to satisfy them. (Taylor, 1987: 57-8) 
Taylor's argument is echoed by other authors, such as Richardson (1990: 25-6) and 
Elliott (2005: 28), both of whom agree that the analysis of narratives produced by the 
individual response to the well-told collective story within a category of people may 
produce evidence that is considered to provide an understanding of the intersubjective 
meanings shared by the whole of a community. 
In addition to interviewing officials in these five key organisations, we intended to 
conduct interviews with staff in other organisations as well as academic scholars for 
purposes of triangulation and also the generation of further data. For the first part, we 
talked to administrators in 1-2 professional football and basketball clubs to obtain a 
different perspective because they are experiencing professionalisation from the 
receiving end rather than the policy end. With the Olympic case study, we also talked 
to officials in track and field, swimming and volleyball governing bodies in order to 
elicit a wide range of views. For the second part, we interviewed scholars who have 
conducted research related to these three case studies in order to provide us with a 
non-official but critical point of view. These, more detached perspectives, drawn from 
Chinese academics who are working in China and other countries, including Taiwan 
and in the West, would be contrasted with the Chinese official line to obtain a more 
accurate picture for this research (see Appendix 1 for a list of interviewees). 
Where possible, the interviews were tape-recorded, which will enable a more 
systematic analysis of data than would be possible by relying only on field notes. 
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However, thc tape-recordings comprised only part of the intcrview data as notes were 
also made on the course of the interview and any significant non-verbal gestures 
employed, in order to assist the researcher to become familiar with the data and the 
particular nuances of each interview. According to Manion (2003: 62), conducting 
interviews in relation to Chinese politics presents two challenges. One is finding 
suitable Chinese official interviewees and the other is that Party and government 
officials are normally reluctant to interpret official policy due to the political 
monitoring of their comments. 
In order to meet the challenge of identifying relevant officials, I employed three 
strategies. The first strategy was a "direct approach". I directly contacted some of the 
Chinese sport officials working in the General Administration of Sport (GAOS) when 
they were visiting Loughborough University in October of2004. Among these 
officials, Mr Jiang, vice director of the personnel department of the GAOS, has 
special responsibilities for academic activities between Taiwan and China. With his 
permission, I could continue contacting other junior sport officials in his department. 
After several contacts with other officials in the personnel department of the GAOS, I 
asked one of them whether he could help me make contact with the group of sport 
officials responsible for the Olympic Movement, elite football and elite basketball and 
Who might be willing to be interviewed. He kept his promise and helped me arrange 
interviews with his GAOS colleagues. But the risk here is, of course, that such a hand-
picked sample could end up being highly biased toward the more "respectable" end of 
party politics - in other words, the party/government could 'choose' the way it wanted 
to represent itself to me. Fortunately, the person in charge of selecting suitable 
candidates made his choices, as far as I could tell, on the basis of personal relations, 
rather than with the Party's or government image in mind. In fact, most of his 
suggested GAOS interviewees were originally on my interview list, although some of 
them were unavailable due to their busy schedules and high-ranking positions (such as 
Director and Vice Directors of GAOS). 
The second strategy was an 'indirect approach'. By contacting academics, in China, 
Taiwan and the UK, I asked those scholars who had 'private' friendships with 
Chinese sport officials, to introduce me to their friends and support my request for an 
interview. Nowadays, some Chinese sport officials are or used to study at the Beijing 
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Sport University for a Master's or PhD degree so it gave me an opportunity to identify 
several respondents in the CF A, CBA and GAOS for my research by this indirect 
approach. 
The third strategy for selecting suitable interviewees was by snowball sampling. [ 
made a point of asking each of my respondents at the end of the interview whether 
they knew of somebody else who might be willing to be interviewed. According to 
May (1993: 100), this form of non-probability sampling is very useful in gaining 
access to certain groups. However, this technique is not without its limitations. 
Interviewees may nominate other respondents with whom they have close links and 
share similar views, with the result that the researcher would possibly be omitting the 
voices and opinions of others who are not part of this network of friends and 
acquaintances. An awareness of this problem sharpened our concern to seek 
interviewees from a wide range of organizations within the Chinese sport 
infrastructure. 
The other challenge for our interviews was how to elicit useful data from these sport 
officials who were cautious about expressing their opinions about sport policies 
because of the very hierarchical system in China. To try to overcome this problem 
close attention was paid to the design of questions. The questions were 'open-ended' 
since it was recognised as desirable to give the interviewees the opportunity to reveal 
their perceptions of the development of sport policy. So we started from factual 
questions and then we tried to move toward more opinion-based and value-based 
questions where we were just creating opportunities for them to tell us something 
more substantial in terms of opinions for analysis (see Appendix 1 for examples of 
interview schedule). 
The second element of the interview strategy was to assure interviewees that we 
would not use their names in anything we made public but would draw on what we 
had learned from them to shape the research and analysis. In so doing, we hoped that 
We could elicit frank responses and explore further unexpected perceptions from these 
interviewees. To obtain more information from respondents, the third element of the 
strategy was to make the interview situation more propitious. From sociological 
observers' point of view (Finch, 1993: 166; Seldon, 1988), the ideal would have been 
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to conduct the interview in a location where the interviewees felt more comfortable 
and at ease. Accordingly, we let the interviewees choose a place they felt comfortable 
with - but as quiet as possible. Essentially, most interviewees chose to be interviewed 
in their own offices or quiet meeting rooms due to their busy schedules. 
In addition, we were aware of a possible drawback of interviewing with these elites 
because they are usually very aware of their expert status and the fact that they were 
speaking 'as party/government representatives'. Thus, we knew that it was vital that 
We did some background research beforehand and, where possible, cross-check the 
information conveyed for factual accuracy after the interview. Although we did what 
we could to collect reliable and valid data, we knew this was the 'tough area' of the 
research and consequently we needed to be sceptical of the interview data collected. 
In addition, Taiwan has a unique relationship with China, which could lead me, as a 
critical realist and a Taiwanese to be more likely to be sceptical about accounts from 
the Chinese Communist Party officials/government officers. But having been away 
from Taiwan studying in the UK for almost four years, this has given me an 
opportunity to look at my own country from a different point of view which may help 
me to take a more detached and balanced view of collecting and analyzing the data 
collected in China. 
Document analysis 
In this section, we discuss several issues in relation to document analysis, such as 
What types of documents should we collect? their various strengths and weaknesses 
and how they might be evaluated and analyzed? The term 'documents' includes a vast 
range of materials found in all sorts of places (MacDonald, 2001: 197). However, the 
three main categories we would mostly rely on are government documents, 
newspapers and academic resources .. 
A.ccording to Scott, official documents which are shaped by the structure and 
activities of the state, both directly and indirectly, are often the by-products of policy 
and administration and, as the creations of public bodies, they reflect the organization 
and interests of state agencies (1990: 59). From this point of view, the policy 
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orientation of nation states was expressed in the attention given to the calculation of 
the effects of official action in relation to policy goals. Thus, MacDonald (2001: (97) 
reminds us that we not only need to understand the conventions which surround the 
compilation of official reports and statistics, but must be aware of the distortions that 
can arise as a result of the actions of the people to whom the statistics refer. Due to 
the systems of surveillance and social control that are responsible for official rccord-
keeping in China, it is almost impossible for us to collect all the documents related to 
this study. Thus, we attempt to compensate partly for this limitation with journalist 
sources. 
A vast amount of political information is presented via media formats, particularly 
newspapers. According to Harrison (2001: 108), media resources can provide a 
valuable understanding of the context of political behaviour, particularly when we 
might not have direct access to the event we wish to analyze. But Negrine (1989: 4) 
and Scott (1990: 146-152) remind us of the biases and distortions resulting from the 
pattern of ownership and control of the media with newspapers in particular tending 
to be politically partisan and likely to present 'news values' rather than "plain facts". 
This kind of situation is more serious in China than in western counterparts because 
the Chinese Communist Party dominates or perhaps directly controls all the Chinese 
newspapers with direct censorship. Consequently, the Chinese newspapers could be 
regarded as tools of political propaganda in which the speech or agenda of these 
political elites would be highlighted or aIU10unced literally. As Mannheim and Rich 
comment, "Newspapers are an excellent source of current and historical information 
including the texts of important speeches" (1995: 53), which offers us a unique 
opportunity to collect data related to important policies, including elite sport, 
commercial sport and global issues. For balancing and triangulating the data from 
Chinese newspapers, we also collected data from Taiwanese and western newspapers 
and news agencies. But we were very sensitive to the possible subtext to Taiwanese 
and western journalism in relation to mainland China due to the tensions between 
these two countries and the perception of China in the western media. 
In addition, we collected data from academic resources, which may be regarded as 
less value-laden and more focused on the issues of reliability and validity than 
government documents and newspapers (Harrison, 200 I: 107-8). Although they are 
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more reliable and valid than the other two resources, Chinese academic materials still 
need to be treated critically due to the system of Chinese academic censorship which 
does not permit some articles or books which touch on sensitive issues to be published. 
In some cases, academic scholars have been asked to revise their conclusions to echo 
government policy if they want their papers to be published. Thus we need to be very 
aware of these kinds of materials even though they are 'academic' works. Although 
we knew what kind of documents we should collect, we still face several challenges 
regarding how to evaluate and analyse the materials collected. Indeed, these 
challenges can be grouped under four headings: authenticity, credibility, 
representativeness and meaning (cf. Harrison, 2001; MacDonald 2001, May, 1997; 
Scott, 1990). 
According to Harrison, when we decide to use documentary evidence in political 
research, we make assumptions about the quality of the document (2001: 130-1). That 
means we hope that the document is 'genuine', or what is termed authentic. But the 
question is how to make sure of a document's 'authenticity'? A useful checklist for 
deciding on the authenticity of documents is provided by Platt (1981: 34) who asked: i) 
does the document contain obvious errors and/or inconsistencies?; ii) do different 
versions of the same document exist?; iii) is there consistency of literary style, content, 
handwriting or typeface?; iv) has the document been transcribed with more than one 
copy?; v) has the document been circulated by someone with a vested interest in a 
particular reading of its content?; and vi) does the version derive from a reliable 
source? 
A second challenge in relation to documentary analysis is credibility. Credibility 
'refers to the extent to which the evidence is undistorted and sincere, free from error 
and evasion' (Scott, 1990: 7). In order to make sure whether the document is credible 
or not, a useful guideline is provided by Duffy. (2005: 130-1) Regarding this 
guideline, seven elements are highlighted as follows. 1) What kind of document is it? 
2) What does it actually say? 3) Who produced it? What is known about the author? 4) 
What was its purpose? 5) When and in what circumstances was it produced? 6) Is it 
typical or exceptional of its type? 7) Is it complete? Has it been altered or edited? In 
addition, Duffy (2005: 133) also reminds us that the guiding principle in document 
analysis is nevertheless that everything should be questioned. In so doing, it can 
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provide an important context for understanding its content, and we must attempt, 
when possible, to ferret out this infonnation (Mannheim & Rich, 1995: 194). 
Third, we need to ask whether the document is representative - this centres around the 
idea of 'typicality' (May, 1997: 170). So, whether the document is available which 
can be said to comprise a representative sample of the totality of documents as they 
originally existed (MacDonald, 200 I: 205). This is not to say that good research 
cannot be carried out with an unrepresentative selection; but the user must know to 
what extent and in what respects those documents are unrespresentative (Scott, 1990: 
24). Furthennore, Scott reminds us that it should not be assumed that the researcher 
always desires 'typical' evidence: what is important is that the scientists should know 
how typical it is in order to be able to assign limits to the application of any 
conclusions drawn (ScoU, 1990: 7). 
Finally, we need to pay attention to the meaning of the document. This can involve 
understanding at two levels: that is, the surface or literal meaning and the deeper 
meaning through some fonn of interpretive understanding or structural analysis 
(MacDonald, 2001: 205). To be a critical realist, we need not only to understand both 
literal and deeper meanings of the production of the text, but move beyond the 
documents themselves to encompass a critical analysis of the institutional and social 
structure within which such documents are produced (Jupp, 1996: 298). In so doing, it 
helps us pick out what is relevant for analysis and piece all the evidence together to 
map out 'the whole picture' of the relationship between Chinese sport policy and 
globalisation. 
4.5 Validity and Reliability 
A central methodological issue that needs to be considered by the researcher is the 
validity and reliability of data collected and conclusions drawn through the various 
methods used. The first concern for this study is validity. According to Maxwell 
(1996: 87), validity is a way to 'refer to the correctness or credibility of description, 
conclusion, explanation, interpretation, or other sort of account'. He also offers three 
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types of validity threats of which we need to be aware, namely description, 
interpretation and theory (Maxwell, 1996: 89-90). In order to raise the validity of our 
research, we attempt to clarify how to reduce these threats. Firstly, we face the 
challenge of valid description, which is how we make sure that the description of 
what we saw and heard is accurate or complete. For this part, our strategies to reduce 
this threat are the audio recording of interviews whenever possible, verbatim 
transcription of these recordings, translation of verbatim transcription from Chinese to 
English with the translation checked by an expert. By doing so, we hope that we can 
minimize this problem. 
The second threat to valid interpretation is 'imposing one's framework of meaning, 
rather than understanding the perspective of the people studied and the meaning they 
attach to their words and actions' (Maxwell, 1996: 89-90). In order to solve this 
problem, we attempted to seek an understanding of the whole context under which the 
texts of documents or interview data were generated. This means that we do not 
assume that the participants' pronouncements are necessarily valid before they are 
triangulated by checks with other interviewees (including academics and non-officials) 
and with relevant documents (academic research, newspapers and government 
documents). Thus, the idea here is not only to get the literal meaning of the texts but 
go further to 'makes sense' of the author's situation and intention from the 
researcher's judgment (Scott, 1990: 31) which relies on understanding the political, 
economic and social structure. 
Thirdly, the most serious threat to the theoretical validity of an account is not 
collecting or paying attention to contradictory data, or not considering alternative 
explanations or understandings of the phenomena we are studying (Maxwell, 1996: 
90). The strategy we used to deal with these problems was to generate the indicators 
to guide the collection of data on completion of the theoretical literature reviews. 
Generally speaking, these indicators (see Appendix 2-6) are quite generic and flexible 
because they do not privilege or prejudice any particular school of globalisation 
theory, nor do they eliminate the possibility of alternative explanations or 
understanding of the phenomenon of globalisation. In addition, how do we make sure 
that these indicators can guide us to collect useful or appropriate data? In other words, 
Can we justify the validity of these indicators? According to Rose and Sullivan, as a 
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political [or policy] researcher we are looking for patterns and regularities in attitude 
and behaviour in order to provide explanations, which we couch in terms of 'theories' 
(Rose & Sullivan, 1993: 9). But what we are often interested in understanding is not a 
physical entity - that is, we cannot 'touch' government values and attitudes toward 
sport globalisation, we have to make use of 'concepts' (Harrison, 2001: 14) in which 
we put our data into both quantifiable and qualitative indicators (see Appendix 2 and 
Appendix 3) to work as measurement in the analysis of values and attitudes. 
Although we attempt to use both quantifiable and qualitative indicators to explore the 
phenomenon of globalisation, we still have to face the main challenge - 'Are they 
appropriate to the topic of globalisation?' One suggested indicator of change in 
China's acceptance of globalisation is the increasing size of the Chinese Olympic 
team over the last six Olympic Games (see Ih in Appendix 4). However, it might be 
argued that this is not a valid indicator because we could still have a country which 
rejects contact with the global economy while still sending a large team to the 
Olympics. For example, Cuba is still, economically, a Communist country as well as 
politically and it is very successful in Olympic terms. In order to check the validity of 
that indicator, we look at other related indicators such as 'the number and position of 
Chinese officials involved in the IOC' (see 2h in Appendix 4) or 'the willingness of 
China to bid to host the Olympics' (see Ih in Appendix 4). In bidding to host the 
Olympic Games, China has had to accept all the Olympic sponsors, major capitalist 
countries, and China has accepted obligations to raise sponsorship money from 
Chinese corporations. This is much more significant and it is hard to say that it is not 
a valid indicator of the acceptance of the economic globalisation of sport. In addition, 
the same logic could be replicated in relation to the other indicators because all the 
indicators we generate are strongly linked with each other (see Appendix 4-6) which 
helped the development of consistency and logic between related variables, for 
example, to commercialisation and globalisation. In so doing, consistency of 
responses shows us that the sort of questions we are asking are focused on the 
important issues and telling us something worthwhile about the variables and 
Consequently to reduce the threat to the theoretical validity of the account. Although 
We make every effort to ensure the validity of this study, Maxwell still reminds us that 
"validity is a goal rather than a product; it is never something that can be proven or 
taken for granted" (1996: 86). 
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The second concern for this section is reliability. Reliability refers to the extent to 
which the same finding will be arrived at, if the same procedure is conducted by a 
different researcher or at a different time (Yin, 2003: 37, Kirk & Miller, 1986: 69). 
Yin reminds us that 'the emphasis is on doing the same case over again, not on 
"replicating" the results of one case by doing another case study' (2003: 37, original 
emphasis) because the obvious temporal changes implicit in social and political 
research, means that the sociaUpolicy researcher is not working under 'controlled' 
laboratory conditions, as, for example, in the natural scientific tradition. In short, the 
goal of reliability is to minimise errors and biases in a study. Three requirements for 
minimising errors and biases are: i) to use multiple sources of evidence (interviews 
and document analysis in this study) for triangulating data collected and for the 
development of converging lines of inquiry; ii) to create and maintain a case study 
database, which might include interview transcripts (and audio tape recordings if 
possible), observations on document analysis, and rigorous recording of references 
used; and iii) to maintain a chain of evidence - the principle here is that an external 
observer should be able to follow the derivation of any evidence, ranging from initial 
research questions to ultimate case study conclusions (Yin, 2003: 97-106). The third 
concern in this study is that case studies provide a poor basis for scientific 
generalisation (Yin, 2003: 37). Yin argues that, to some extent, the multiple-case 
design helps to overcome this problem because 'case studies, like experiments, are 
generalisable to theoretical propositions and not to populations and universes' (2003: 
10). 
The final concern in this study is ethical problems which, to some extent, could affect 
validity and reliability. But Maxwell reminds us that it is clearly impossible to deal 
with these problems by eliminating the researcher's theories, preconceptions, or 
values, but we can try to understand how a particular researcher's values influence the 
conduct and conclusions of the study (1996: 91). To some extent, on the one hand, I 
am an outsider who is conducting research in a Western context; on the other hand, I 
am an insider due to historical tensions between Taiwan and China and share the same 
culture and language. The author acknowledged that being a Taiwanese could 
POssibly affect the interpretation of documents but the researcher was aware of this 
and maintained as much objectivity as possible. In addition, the tension between 
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Taiwan and China, and the Chinese Communist structure is likely to affect data 
collection, especially with regard to confidential documents and sport budgets for 
which the researcher will rely on newspapers, SPORTINFO archive l , GAOS database, 
GAOS statistic book, academic sources and data from interviews. 
In addition, I know that Taiwan has a unique relationship with China, which could 
lead me to be more sceptical about accounts from Chinese Communist Party 
officials/government officers. I acknowledge that it is impossible for me to change the 
reality that I am a Taiwanese who was educated under the structure of the 
Kuomintang (KMT) government - a long rival Party of the Chinese Communist Party. 
However, as an academic researcher, I understand that it is a historical contingency 
between China and Taiwan which both have and will continue to pursue their own 
national interests. While there is nothing I can do to alter this historical contingency, I 
can from time to time, remind myself to be detached in analyzing the data collected. 
In fact, I have been staying in the UK for almost four years and not returned to 
Taiwan since early 2004. Although this is not the best way to detach myself from 
Taiwanese structures, at least I do whatever I can to take a reflective approach to 
avoid ethnic bias which might possibly affect the validity and reliability of my 
research. 
Indeed, for this study - globalisation and Chinese sport policy, I would like to be a 
bridge between people who are close to the 'reality' but were reluctant to expose it 
(Chinese scholars who were constrained by the academic and media censorship 
system under the structure of Chinese Communist Party) and people who wanted to 
be close to the 'reality' but were frustrated by Chinese culture and language (Western 
scholars who are limited by the language and Chinese culture to 'make sense' of the 
whole context). Being a Taiwanese and studying in the UK at the same time provided 
me with a unique opportunity not only to get involved in the Chinese context to make 
sense of 'what is going on there' but also to detach myself for analyzing the data 
collected while staying in UK. 
I SPORTINFO archive is a commercial database owned by the National Management Centre for Sport 
Information under the leadership ofGAOS. Some internal documents ofGAOS are available in this 
archive, particularly the policy document of GAOS. 
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4.6 Research Design 
According to Yin, • a research design is a logical plan for getting from here to there, 
where here may be defined as the initial set of questions to be answered, and there is 
some set of conclusions (answers) about these questions' (Yin, 2003: 20; original 
emphasis). To fill in the gap between "here" and "there" in this study, we identified 
six phases which are summarized in Table 4.5 and described below. 
133 
Chapter 4 Methodology 
Table 4.5 Summary of each research phase in tbe study 
Empirical Focus Theoretical Context 
Phase 1. The desk study for the Review of the literature on globalisation-
Chinese social, economic Generation of research questions (The 
and political context relationship between globalisation & 
Chinese sport policy) 
A. The desk study for Identification of indicators (Soft and hard 
background information indicators ~ values and attitudes) and 
Phase 2 about the Olympic Development of analytical frame work 
Movement, Basketball and (Houlihan 's framework of patterns of 
Football globalisation) 
B. Informal net-working with 
the Chinese study academic 
community and one or two 
Chinese administrator I met 
on occasion. 
Phase 3. Interview and Interview 
transcripts 
1. Collect and read the 
additional documents 
A. and literature. 
Phase 4 
2. Go into any document 
that I collect when I am 
doing my interview or 
any document that 
people mention to me 
that I have not already 
seen 
B. Any additional interviews 
Phase 5 Write individual case reports 
Phase 6 Draw cross-case Reconsideration of globalisation theories 
conclusions, modify (Three schools: hypoglobalists, sceptics, 
theoretical framework, transformalists) 
develop policy implications 
and write cross-case report 
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Phase 1. Literature review in relation to globalisation theories and the Chinese 
social, economic and political context 
The researcher drew on theories at the macro level (globalisation theories) to identify 
concepts and approaches, which would be helpful in guiding preliminary decisions 
including the selection of three case studies, the identification of interviewees, and the 
selection of relevant documents to review. In this phase, we conducted a literature 
review in relation to globalisation theories, which not only helped us to grasp the 
main debates among the three main schools of thought on globalisation, but also 
assisted us to deductively generate the indicators for the collection and analysis of 
relevant data. In the same phase, we also concluded a desk study of the literature on 
the Chinese social, economic and political context which was not only intended to 
make us sensitive to both the internal politics of the Chinese Communist Party and the 
changing patterns of international relations of China, but was also helpful in 
identifying the three key research questions and for the selection of the three case 
studies. 
Phase 2. The collection of background information about the Olympic Movement, 
elite basketball and elite football 
After we had gained sufficient initial knowledge to make more sense of Chinese sport 
development in the global context, we needed to look for materials which were more 
directly related to our three case study areas. Thus, we undertook another round of 
desk study, such as library and Internet research, to obtain more background 
information about the Olympic Movement, elite basketball and elite football. By 
doing so, we attempted to closely link and locate indicators within these key questions 
and case studies. The main purpose was to establish a strong theoretical framework 
for this study focused on sport policy developments/changes in the three cases 
because 'articulating "theory" about what is being studied helps to operationalise case 
study designs and make them more explicit' (Yin, 2003: 19; original emphasis). The 
link among research questions, research objectives and indicators was outlined in 
'fable 4.6. 
135 
Table 4.6 Summary of the relationship between the research questions, research objectives and indicators 
Ql 
To what extent 
did/does the Chinese 
government have a 
Olympic Movement 
Objective 2 
• To examine the relationship between 
China and the Olympic Movement 
Ih. Formal engagement with international 
sport as a participant country (including 
membership, joining competitions, ranking, 
biding for or hosting Olympic Games); 
Football 
Objective 3 
• To examine the development, structure 
and organisation of elite football in China 
th.Formal engagement with FIFA as a 
participant country (including membership, 
Woining competitions, ranking, biding for or 
hosting FIFA World Cup); 
Basketball 
Objective 4 
• To examine the development, structure and 
organisation of elite basketball in China 
Ih.Formal engagement with FIBA as a participant 
country (including membership, joining 
competitions, ranking, biding for or hosting FIBA 
World Championship); 
choice in its Is. The extent to which the Chinese Is. The extent to which the Chinese government Is. The extent to which the Chinese government 
relationship with sport government accepting the values and attitudes accepting the values and attitudes of commercial accepting the values and attitudes of commercial 
globalisation of the IOC football basketball 
2h.The number and position of Chinese sports 12h.The number and position of Chinese sports 
representatives in world sports governing representatives in FIFA; 
bodies; . 
2h. The number and position of Chinese sports 
representatives in the FIBA; 
4h.The distribution of national sports budget to 14h.The distribution of national sports budget to elite 
4h.The distribution of national sports budget lelite football; basketball; 
to elite sport; 
4s.The structure of the Chinese Football 
4s.The structure of sport governing bodies in IAssociation; 
the PRC; 
6h. The resource of coach development 
programmes for elite sport; 
6h. The resource of coach development 
programmes for elite football; 
5s.The values and attitudes of the government 
5s.The values and attitudes of the government Itowards commercial football 
towards commercial sport sponsorship 
136 
4s.The structure of the Chinese Basketball 
Association; 
6h. The resource of coach development programmes 
for elite basketball; 
5s.The values and attitudes of the government 
towards commercial basketball 
Ql 2s. The attitudes and values of the Chinese 2s. The attitudes and values of the Chinese 2s. The attitudes and values of the Chinese 
government in relation to the rights of elite government and Chinese professional football government and Chinese professional basketball 
To what extent can athletes (for example, the transfer & players); clubs in relation to the rights of elite athletes clubs in relation to the rights of elite athletes (for 
China manage its (for example, the transfer & players); example, the transfer & players); 
interaction with sport 3s.The attitudes and values of athletes 
globalisation towards material rewards; 4h.The distribution of national sports budget to 4h.The distribution of national sports budget to elite 
elite football; basketball; 
4h.The distribution of national sports budget 
to elite sport; 4s.The structure of the Chinese Football 4s.The structure of the Chinese Basketball 
Association; Association; 
4s.The structure of sport governing bodies in 
6h. The resource of coach development programmes I the PRC; 6h. The resource of coach development 
programmes for elite football; for elite basketball; . 
6h. The resource of coach development 
programmes for elite sport; 5s.The values and attitudes of the government 5s.The values and attitudes of the government 
towards commercial football; towards commercial basketball; 
5s.The values and attitudes of the government 
towards commercial sport sponsorship 9h. The tensions between the Chinese 9h.The tensions between the Chinese professional 
professional football clubs and government basketball clubs and government 
-- -- ----- -. 
137 
I Q3 3s. The attitudes and values of athletes 3s. The attitudes and values of football players 3s. The attitudes and values of basketball players 
towards material rewards; towards material rewards; towards material rewards; 
In what ways does the 
Chinese government 4h.The distribution of national sports budget 4h.The distribution of the national sports budget 4h. The distribution of national sports budget to elite 
seek to manage its to elite sport; to elite football; basketball; 
relationship with sport 
globalisation? 4s. The structure of sport governing bodies in 4s.The structure of the Chinese Football 4s.The structure of the Chinese Basketball 
the PRC; Association; Association; 
(Economic Level) 
6h. The resource of coach development 6h. The resource of coach development 6h. The resource of coach development programmes 
programmes for elite sport; programmes for elite football; for elite basketball; 
5s.The values and attitudes of the government 5s.The values and attitudes of the govemment 5s.The values and attitudes of the government 
towards commercial sport sponsorship; towards commercial football; towards commercial basketball; I 
I 
9h. The tensions between the national teams' 9h. The tensions between the Chinese 9h. The tensions between the Chinese professional 
I sponsors and government. professional football clubs and government. basketball clubs and government. ~ 
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Q3 Ih.Fonnal engagement with the Olympic Ih.Fonnal engagement with FIFA as a Ih.Fonnal engagement with FIBA as a participant 
Movement as a participant country (including participant country (including membership, country (including membership, joining 
In what ways does the membership, joining competitions, ranking, ~oining competitions, ranking biding for or competitions, ranking, biding for or hosting FIBA 
Chinese government biding for or hosting Olympic Games); hosting FIFA W orId Cup); World Championship); 
seek to manage its 
relationship with sport 2h~The number and position of Chinese sports 2h.The number and position of Chinese sports 2h.The number and position of Chinese sports 
globalisation? representatives in the IOC and other world representatives in FIFA and the Asia Football representatives in the FIBA and the Asia Basketball 
sports governing bodies; Confederation; Confederation; 
(politic Level) 
3h. The number and purpose of sport facilities 3h. The number and purpose of football 3h. The number and purpose of basketball facilities 
in China; facilities in China; in China; 
4h.The distribution of national sports budget 4h. The distribution of the national sports budget 4h.The distribution of the national sports budget to 
to elite sport; to elite football; elite basketball; 
4s.The structure of sport governing bodies in 4s.The structure of the Chinese Football 4s.The structure of the Chinese Basketball 
the PRC; Association; Association; 
Sh. The number and purpose of special elite Sh.The number and purpose of special elite Sh. The number and purpose of special elite 
universities or training centres for elite sport; universities or training centres for elite football; universities or training centres for elite basketball; 
7h.The ownership of special elite training 6h. The resource of coach development 6h. The resource of coach development programmes 
facilities for Olympic sport in China; programmes for elite football; for elite basketball; 
Sh.The number of athletes in the elite sport 7h.The ownership of special elite training 7h. The ownership of special elite training facilities 
system. facilities for football in China; for basketball in China; 
Sh.The number of people or local clubs that Sh.The number of people or local clubs that 
participate in elite football participate in elite basketball 
-------~----~ 
- ---- - ----- -----
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Q3 3s. The attitudes and values of athletes 3s. The attitudes and values of football players 3s. The attitudes and values of basketball players 
towards material rewards; towards material rewards; towards material rewards; 
In what ways does the 
Chinese government Ss. The values and attitudes of the government 5s.The values and attitudes of the government 5s.The values and attitudes of the government 
seek to manage its towards commercial sport sponsorship, towards commercial football, towards commercial basketball, 
relationship with sport 
globalisation? 
(Social Level) 
------------
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In order to obtain more original data and seek potential interviewees, we, almost in 
parallel with the second phase of desk research, attempted to have informal contact 
with either potential interviewees or other academics who could introduce us to new 
interviewees. Thus, after becoming more familiar with the literature through our desk 
research, we could generate a much clearer picture in order to recognise where our 
ideal interviewees were located and did whatever we could to contact them by formal 
and informal channels to pave the road for our next phase - the interviews. 
Phase 3. Interview and interview transcripts 
During this phase, we undertook preliminary contact with the interviewees through e-
mail or by telephone to explain the nature and aims of the research as well as the 
reasons why we wished to conduct interviews with them. After gaining their 
permission for interviews, we subsequently provided the interviewees with a list of 
themes to discuss in the interviews in advance and finally set up a specific time and 
place for conducting the interviews. As noted, the interviews were tape-recorded if 
possible. 
Phase 4. Collecting and reading data 
During the interviews, we made a point of asking each of our respondents at the end 
of the interview whether they knew of any materials that were related to our research 
topics. In this way we identified some additional documents that we needed to obtain. 
In this phase, our main work was continuing to collect and read additional documents 
and other literature. In addition to obtaining and reading data, the researcher also 
carried out additional telephone interviews (see Appendix I for examples of interview 
schedule) in an attempt to clarify inconsistent or contradictory infonnation. 
Phase 5. Writing individual case reports 
In this phase, we began writing individual case reports guided by the indicators and 
the framework of the patterns of globalisation (see Figure 2-1) developed by Houlihan 
(1994, 2003). Utilizing the indicators and Houlihan's theoretical framework, three 
main themes emerged from our three case studies. These three themes are: i) the 
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relationship between the Chinese government and the International Federations in 
sports (such as the IOC, FIFA and FIBA); ii) the strategies for elite development; and 
iii) The values and attitudes of the Chinese state regarding commercialisation. Indeed, 
Houlihan's framework is particularly useful in organizing and analyzing evidence in 
terms of three types of "response" (passive, participative and conflictual) and three 
levels of "reach" (economic, political and social). Using this framework, we are able 
to summarize China's response to global sport (Olympic Movement, global football 
and global basketball) at the end of each ofthese three empirical chapters. 
Phase 6. Drawing cross-case conclusions, modifying Houlihan's theoretical 
framework, developing policy implications and writing the cross-case report 
In this phase, the framework of the theorization of globalisation developed by Held et 
al. (1999) was used to focus on the debate over the state's role in the global process, 
which is very firmly focused on what the government did and the policy of the 
government regarding its relationship with globalisation. In addition, the indicators 
that were generated to measure the relationship between the Chinese state and global 
Sport were inspired by, and derived from, the works ofthe three main schools of 
globalisation theorists mentioned in the first phase. We would not treat each indicator 
individually but would combine these indicators in the analysis of the Olympic 
Movement, elite football and elite basketball in relation to each key research question. 
Through these phases nine subheadings would be produced (see Table 4.7). Through 
the three cases and three key research questions, the basis for the conclusions was 
generated. The conclusions would be separated into two parts, the first of which 
Would be organized according to the results of the final analysis of the nine 
subheadings which would allow us not only to answer the three main research 
qUestions, but also to set the foundation for modifying the framework of Houlihan 
(1994,2003) in order to help us grasp the complexity, trajectory and momentum of 
the relationship between China and global sport. The second part of the conclusion 
would be the analysis of China's relationship with globalisation as reflected in the 
three case studies. Jarvie's 'four useful values of theory to analyze sport phenomena' 
(2006: 19) are used in order to examine the usefulness of the frameworks of Held et al. 
(999) and Houlihan (1994, 2003). 
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Table 4.7 The nine subheadings of research result between three key research 
questions and three case studies 
Olympic Football Basketball 
Movement 
To what extent did/does the Chinese 
government have a choice in its A D G 
relationship with sport globalisation? 
To what extent can the Chinese 
government manage its interaction B E H 
with sport globalisation? 
In what ways does the Chinese 
government seek to manage its C F I 
relationship with sport globalisation? 
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Chapter Five: The Case of Olympic Movement 
5.1 Introduction 
The relationship between the PRC and the Olympic Movement appears to have 
moved through three quite distinct phases of involvement: withdrawal, manipulation 
and, currently, enthusiastic involvement although they overlap on one controversial 
subject - the "Two Chinas" issue. This is, to some extent, linked to the promotion of 
the Games of the Newly Emerging Forces (GANEFO), the 'Two Chinas' dispute in 
the Olympics, and participating in and hosting the Olympic Games. 
During the first phase, China both participated in and withdrew from the Olympic· 
Movement for strong ideological reasons which were influenced by the Cold War. At 
first the PRC followed the example of the USSR in participating in the Olympic 
Games to demonstrate the superiority of the socialist bloc, but later China withdrew 
from the Olympic Movement and supported the GANEFO instead. By strongly 
supporting the GANEFO, the PRC attempted to challenge the Olympic Movement, by 
expanding its influence and, to some extent, competing with the other two power 
blocs: the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and the United States and Western 
Europe, after splitting with the Soviet Union in the early 1960s 
The "Two Chinas" issue was part of the first phase, but it became much more 
prominent in the second phase. By this time, the PRC was becoming a more 
diplomatically powerful country, which allowed it to use the Olympic Movement and 
the IOC as a resource to prevent Taiwan's participation. There are three examples 
Which demonstrate how the PRC manipulated its relationship with the Olympic 
Movement. The first one was expelling Taiwan from the Asian Games Federation in 
1973 by uniting the representatives of Japan and Iran. The next was pressuring the 
~anadian government into withholding visas from the Taiwanese team at the 
Montreal Olympics. The final one was forcing Taiwan not only to change its name to 
the 'Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee', but also to adopt a new flag and emblem 
Under pressure from the IOC. From these cases we can see that the PRC appeared to 
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be less interested in sport and more interested in the leverage that the Olympic 
Movement could give it in relation to its dispute with Taiwan. 
In the final phase, the PRC was enthusiastically involved in the Olympic Movement, 
focusing especially on winning Olympic medals and hosting the games in Beijing 
following China's open-door policy. In 'joining' the Olympic Games, bidding twice 
for the 2000 and 2008 Olympic Games and preparing for the Beij ing Games, it would 
appear that China was determined to take advantage of the Olympic Games in order to 
demonstrate the superiority of socialism, to raise national pride, to reinforce the 
cohesion of the Chinese people both on the mainland and overseas, to project a 
modern image of China and to promote China's economic development at the same 
time. It is no wonder that the National Sport Commission (NSC) claimed that 
"participating in the Olympic Games is an urgent and important political mission" 
(NSC, 1993a: 225-7) and formulated the Olympic Strategy to enable its 'sport 
Superpower' dream to come to fruition. 
Furthermore, to achieve the above goals and become a sports superpower in a global 
age, China needed to face at least three challenges - from international organisations, 
the elite sport system and commercialism. This also raises a range of questions, 
namely: "What kind of strategies did the PRC apply to increase its profile in these 
international organizations, especially in the IOC, the IFs and WADA?", "How did 
the Chinese government maintain its elite sport system in order to achieve Olympic 
glory?", and "To what extent did China intro~uce and m~age the double-edged 
Sword of commercialism?" These questions will be addressed in this chapter. 
5.2 Formal engagement with the Olympic Movement 
It is difficult to define the boundaries of the Olympic Movement. For the IOC, the 
Olympic Movement seems to cover all elite sport. In this section, we focus on three 
important elements within or associated with the Olympic Movement which are: 
engagement with the IOC itself; engagement with the International Federations (IFs); 
and engagement with W ADA. Although W ADA is officially anindependent 
Organization, it was the idea of the IOC to create this agency and support for WADA 
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is a requirement for a successful bid to host the Olympic Games. According to the 
IQC President Jacqucs Rogge (Staff & Agencies, 2003), any government which 
refuses to sign up to the Anti-Doping Code cannot expect to host an Olympic Games 
and Federations who do not sign the World Anti-Doping Agency code cannot expect 
a sporting place in the Games. Due to strong support by the IOC, including financial 
and moral support, W ADA has become a leading international organization in global 
sport within which it possibly has the power to push FIFA, the largest and the 
strongest international Olympic Federation, to sign W ADA Code in the near future 
(CRIEnglish.com,2006a). 
Furthennore, although we are treating engagement with the IOC separately from 
engagement with the IFs, the two are linked. The one way in which the Chinese 
government sought to increase its membership within the IOC was by developing a 
strategy for increasing its representation within the main Olympic Federations. 
There was, as we see in section 2.2, a clear strategy to devote resources to increasing 
Chinese representation within Olympic Federations. 
5.2.1 Engagement with the IOC 
Under the influence of Deng Xiaoping, who was then Vice Premier and in charge of 
international sports affairs in 1974, the PRC attempted to restart active involvement in 
the Olympic Movement at a time when it was seeking to join the United Nations and 
take Taiwan's seat on the Security Council, moving to a rapprochement with Japan 
and by considerably improving Sino-American relations. For Deng, participating in 
the IOC and IFs would not only raise the international profile of the PRC, but also 
gather support from countries to expel Taiwan from the IOC and the IFs under the one 
China policy (Liang, 2005: 93). Therefore, in April 1975, the PRC made a fonnal 
application to rejoin the IOC on the condition of the removal of Taiwan. But due to 
Deng's open-door policy, China changed its attitude to allow Taiwan to join the 
Olympic Movement under the name of "Olympic Model", borrowing from Deng's 
ideal of "One country, two systems" which not only helped China to be accepted as an 
lac member in 1979, but also gave China a unique opportunity to continually 
Undennine Taiwan's international profile in the sports arena. 
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Following the PRC's re-engagement with the Olympic Movement, the Chinese 
government wanted to have its own voice in the IOC. Thus it tried to use three main 
approaches to encourage its sports officials to be selected as IOC committee members. 
These were appointing sports officials proficient in English or French to be involved 
in the IOC, taking an IOC seat through the Federations and nominating star athletes to 
join the IOC Athletes' Commission. 
The first and second approach, to some extent, overlapped because all Chinese IOC 
members so far are/were proficient at language skills through working experience in 
the department of international/external affairs in the National Sport Commission 
(NSC). The first Chinese IOC member, He Zhengliang, was not, in the beginning, the 
first choice among the list of three candidates recommended by the PRC for the IOC, 
because he was of junior status compared to the other two sports officials. But the 
Chinese government changed its mind and shifted Mr. He from third to first place on 
the list in consideration of his proficiency in French and competent knowledge of 
foreign policy and foreign sports affairs, which could contribute significantly to 
China's sport diplomacy (Liang, 2005: 134-5). Mr. He did not let the PRC down and 
Was elected as an IOC member in 1981, and then became a member of the IOC 
Executive Board three times (1985-1989, 1994-1998, 1999-2003) and Vice President 
for 1989-1993 (Liang, 2005: 261). With his rich diplomatic experience accumulated 
from being involved in the "Two Chinas" issue from 1952 and in the events of 
GANEFO from the 1960s, He Zhenliang skillfully used his IOC power, not only to 
help another Chinese sport official, Lu Shengrong to take an IOC seat, but to 
undermine the Taiwanese government's engagement with the Olympic Movement, 
which will be explained more fully later. 
Although the PRC was eager to expand its IOC membership, there was a significant 
gap before a second member was elected. In 1996, Lu Shengrong, then in her second 
term of being the president of the International Badminton Federation (IBF), became 
the first Chinese woman to hold the post of IOC member (Li, X. 2004) with the help 
of He Zhenliang, who endeavoured to have badminton included as one of the Olympic 
sports in 1992, and later took pains to persuade the then IOC president Juan Antonio 
Samaranch, to nominate Mme Lu as an IOC member (Liang, 2005: 265-9). In order to 
Secure more IOC seats, China encouraged junior sports officials to be adept in 
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language skills to become involved in the IFs and asked those officials who did not 
have any sport background to, at least, acquire mastery of one kind of Olympic sports 
knowledge, according to the former senior staff in the GAOS external affairs 
department (Interview, 30th December 2005). From the case of Mme Lu, we see that 
the approach of taking the IOC seat through the IFs was quite successful. But "it is 
quite unusual for China to send such a middle ranking official like Lu Shengrong to 
be an IOC member" (Interview, 24th December 2005) according to one comment from 
an expert in the Chinese Olympic Movement in the Beijing Sport University. It is to 
be expected that, with regard to the IOC, obtaining membership and representation on 
the IQC would be a high priority for the PRC. This is indicated by the fact that the 
first two Chinese representatives on the IQC were not, in fact, the most senior sport 
~dministrators, but their key skills were language and diplomacy. 
Following the rapid improvement of China's elite sports performance, and the bid for 
the 2008 Olympic Games, the PRC wanted to have one more seat on the IOC, the 
Chinese Olympic Committee (COC) therefore recommended Mr.Yu Zaiqing, the then 
vice sports minister with English and Japanese language skills, to be elected to an 
IOC seat. Benefiting from the 2008 bid and his language skills, Mr. Yu was not only 
elected as an IOC member in 2000, but also as a member of the IOC Executive Board 
in August 2004 (Li, X. 2004). 
Although the third Chinese IOC member, Mr.Yu Zaiqing was elected, China still had 
ambition to increase its representation of two seats in the IOC. The PRC attempted to 
use another way to increase its IOC representation, namely, the nomination of star 
athletes to join the IOC Athletes' Commission by election and thereby gain 
membership of the IOC by their peers (IOC, 2006). The first case in this respect was 
China's first-ever Winter Olympics gold medallist in 2002 - Yang Yang, nominated 
twice though unsuccessfully by the COC in the 2002 and 2006 Winter Olympics. The 
main barrier to Chinese athletes entering the Athletes' Commission was poor 
language skills. Indeed, China could not name a single top athlete who could 
participate in the election of the Athletes' Commission during the 2004 Athens Games 
(Shou.com, 2004). To remedy this weakness, the GAOS stipulated that English 
should be one of the core subjects for elite athletes' academic learning. One senior 
official in charge of the educational affairs of Chinese athletes in GAOS emphasized 
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that "this is a long-tenn project in which we need to exert great efforts to encourage 
our athletes to learn English, especially athletes in the provincial level" (Interview, 
16th January 2006). In addition, the Chinese government also offered several athletes 
a special budget to go abroad to study, as in the case of Deng Yaping, with four 
Olympic gold medals, who studied in the UK and was selected as an Athletes' 
Commission member by the fonner IOC President Juan Antonio Samaranch 
(Interview, 16th January 2006). The increase in Chinese membership on the IOC 
needs to be seen in relation to the next section which is concerned with the IFs, 
because the PRC needed to have strong representation among these Federations in 
order to pursue its IOC membership strategy. 
5.2.2 Engagement with international Olympic Federations 
Before 2001, the Chinese government was less confident in taking council 
membership in the International Sport Federations, due to the limited English ability 
of most sports officials, according to an expert on the Chinese Olympic Movement at 
Beijing Sport University (Interview, 24th December 2005). Consequently, China had 
few representatives on IFs. Furthennore, most Chinese representatives came from the 
department of external affairs in the NSC because of their language background, as 
with Lu Shengrong, Lou Dapeng and Wei Jizhong (Interview, 13th January 2006), 
according to a fonner senior staff member in the GAOS Policy and Regulation 
Department. The aim was "to help more sport officials become part of IFs, to actively 
participate in international sport affairs and to progressively increase China's power 
in the IFs." However, in the official document- "Olympic Glory Project 1994-2000" 
(Wu, S.Z. 1999: 575-6), according to Chinese sport officials, this project put more 
emphasis on the strategies of elite sport training (Interview, 24th December 2005), and 
there was no further action due to a limited budget (Interview, 13th January 2006). 
Up to 2001, there was some recognition by the government that English skills needed 
to be improved, but it was not systematic (Interview, 1 t h January 2006), according to 
one senior staff member in the GAOS Personnel Department. But after 2001, the 
drive to improve English language skills became much more a priority of the GAOS. 
An internal document claimed that, "it is an urgent mission to improve 
comprehensively English language skills for our cadre members" (GAOS, 2003g: 
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135-6). Since then, a systematic programme emerged from GAOS with substantial 
funding from central government (Jiang, et aI., 2005: 125). In parallel to this, or 
maybe as a result of this, was the desire to increase Chinese membership of the IFs, 
and between 2003 and 2005 this increased from 12 (Duan, 2003: 5) to 19. I Among 
these council members about 63 percent sports officials have a sport background and 
about 26 percent of them have a language background.2 Most of the new council 
members in the IFs are from high-ranking officials in Chinese sports management 
centres. But according to the Vice president of COC, most of these Chinese 
representatives still need to strengthen their language skills in order to take leadership 
position within the IFs (Yang, 2005: 278). 
To achieve greater representation or, to some extent, leadership positions in the IFs, 
the GAOS set a quota of 50 people, such as representatives in the IFs, sport 
administrators in charge of external affairs and top-level coaches and retired athletes 
to become involved with the IFs through the chance to host the 2008 Olympics 
(GAOS, 2003h). The first stage of their strategy was training courses for these 
representatives which involved language learning and skills and knowledge of foreign 
affairs, international relations and diplomacy (GAOS, 2003e: 132-4). Therefore, the 
Chinese government organized special seminars to teach these representatives 
diplomatic skills and strategies by inviting experienced diplomatic experts, such as the 
director of the external affairs department in the GAOS, and Chinese ambassadors 
and professors from diplomatic schools in Universities (Interview, lOth January 2006), 
according to one senior in GAGS Training Centre for the Cadre. Translators who did 
not have a sports background were sent to study in Beijing Sport University and to 
gain practical knowledge and skill in a range of National Sport Management Centres 
(GAOS,2003e: 132-4). For top-level coaches and retired athletes, some were urged to 
study for a degree or MBA and some were encouraged to go abroad to study with 
financial support from the Chinese government (GAOS, 2003h). 
While a major motivation is status, not only in IFs but also on the IOC, there were 
other more practical motives, for example, to influence rule changes and the selection 
I From analysis of the Websites of28 summer Olympic sports Federation in 2006 
2 Data offered by interviewee, 23rd December 2005, senior staff in the Personnel Department of the 
GAOS 
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of officials. The rule change in badminton, which increased the number of points per 
game from 15 to 21, initially caused concern among Chinese badminton coaches, such 
as Chinese head coach Li Y ongbo. He argued that the new scoring system, to be 
enforced by the IBF in 2006, would disadvantage the performance of Chinese national 
teams (Zou, 2005) and this added to their feeling that they are too weak to be involved 
in the decision-making. Li Y ongbo stated that: 
If the Chinese Badminton Association were powerful enough to be able to 
change the mind of IBF in relation to the new scoring system, I think we would 
make some suggestions. But if our suggestions mean nothing to IBF, it would be 
pointless for us to do so. (quoted in Zou, 2005 and translated by author) 
China also believed that the under-representations of Chinese judges and referees at 
major sports events damaged the chances of a medal for its athletes. China 
consequently dispatched a large team of 24 Chinese international referees to 
participate in the 2004 Athens Olympics (Shou.com, 2004). According to Deng 
Yaping, an Athletes' Commission member on the IOC, after the 2004 Olympics, 
"There are only two ways to avoid an unfair judgment in the sports arena. These are 
to raise athletes' skill and to increase the number of Chinese officials involved in the 
IFs" (quoted in Zou, 2005 and translated by author). Furthermore, the evidence for 
influencing rule changes and selection of officials is evident from comment, by the 
vice president of the COC, Yang Shuan, and the vice sports minister of GAOS, Duan 
Shijie .. 
We need to raise the profile in the IFs, which means not only to increase the 
number of Chinese officials involved in their internal affairs, but also to have 
the power to make decisions in the IFs. By doing so, we can understand more 
what is going on inside the IFs and take effective measures to preserve our own 
rights and interests. More importantly, we can create a beneficial arena for our 
athletes by taking advantage of the opportunities of amending the match rules 
and the constitution during the IFs' sessions .... During the era of sport 
globalisation, fighting for dominating the rules of a contest is part of the 
competition in the international sport arena. Although it is not seen very 
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obviously, it is closely bound up to the elite sport development in one country. 
This is a high-level competition. It needs sport officials with practised sports 
knowledge, skilled language ability and proficient diplomatic ability to win the 
battle. (Yang, S. 2005: 278-9) 
We need to take advantage of hosting the Beijing Games to train more officials' 
to be representatives in the IFs ........ For those sports whose results were 
strongly influenced by the referees, on the one hand we have to deliberately 
send more of our officials into these IFs. On the other hand, we urgently need to 
have our own representatives who can take vital positions in those IFs in order 
to stand up for our own rights and interests. (Duan, 2003: 5) 
5.2.3 Engagement with W ADA 
Following a series of doping scandals in the 1990s China took a more active approach 
to involvement in WADA, by cooperating with Western countries on doping issues 
and by doing more than W ADA expected. By doing so, the Chinese government was 
eager to show the world that China was an honorable country and, in the words of 
former president Jiang Zemin, was determined "to abstain from doping even if it 
meant failure to win a gold medal." This was echoed in the instructional document of 
GAOS by Li Lanqing (Li, L. 1999: 27), the vice-premier of the state between 1993 
and 2003, who was in charge of the GAOS's main decision-making. Jiang Zemin's 
word has become a political statement for China's anti-doping policy (GAOS, 2000b: 
19) and was repeated by the vice sport minister of GAOS, Wang Baoliang, during the 
National Conference for Anti-Doping in 2005 (Wang, B. 2005). 
China did not pay much attention to the doping issue until the first major doping 
scandal in 1988, when two female athletes tested positive at an international 
competition before the 15thWinter Olympic Games (Interview, 23rd December 2005), 
according to one senior staff member in the COC's Anti-Doping Commission. This 
scandal did not have too much impact on Chinese anti-doping policy until there was 
pressure from the Asian Olympic Committee (AOC). Under pressure from the AOC, 
China established a Doping Control Centre, announced the "Three S" principles for 
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anti-doping, and officially setting up its Anti-Doping Commission under the COC 
(COCADC). One senior staff member in the COCADC stated that: 
The establishment of a Doping Testing Division for the Asian Games ... was a 
new challenge for China because we had to build these new laboratories for 
doping tests. In addition to the establishment of the Doping Testing Division, 
the then National Sport Commission (NSC) also announced the "three S" 
principles: seriously banning, strictly testing and severely punishing those who 
use drugs in sport in 1989. In 1990 we officially initiated the doping test and 
announced an anti-doping code. In 1992, we set up the Anti-Doping 
Commission under the COC. (Interview, 23rd December 2005) 
A second major doping scandal occurred at the 1994 Hiroshima Asian Games, where 
11 Chinese athletes, including seven swimmers, tested positive for the steroid 
dihysrotestosterone (Fan: 2006: 317). After the scandal, in 1995 the PRC issued 'The 
Sports Law of the People's Republic of China' which included two clauses in relation 
to anti-doping. Unfortunately, these two clauses were just general provisions which 
did not have any specific sanction against those who use drugs in sport. The dramatic 
change for Chinese anti-doping policy came after the third and most serious doping 
scandal at the World Swimming Championships in Perth, Australia in 1998, in which 
one Chinese leading swimmer was found with a suitcase containing Human Growth 
Hormone and four more Chinese athletes later tested positive. Humiliated by this 
event, China took steps to improve the quality of its anti-doping policy. 
One senior staff member in the COCADC stated that: 
To be honest, the impact of the 1994 doping scandal was less than that in 1998 
because lots of Chinese citizens did not know the scandal in the 1994 Asian 
Games, due to less advanced media circumstances at that time. But the whole 
situation changed when the Perth scandal was broadcast. Facilitated by the 1998 
doping scandal, the legislation for anti-doping was speeded up. Basically, 'The 
Sports Law of the People's Republic of China' just set up anti-doping regulation 
in general provisions. In contrast, in the "Regulation on Strict Prohibition of 
Doping in Sports", issued by the GAOS in 1998, there was one chapter of 
detailed punishment provisions. After 1998, I think there was a new era for our 
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anti-doping policy. (Interview, 23rd December 2005) 
For China, the embarrassing scandal at the 1994 Asian Games paved the way to 
signing agreements with Western countries for bilateral cooperation and exchanges. 
One senior staff member in the COCADC stated that: 
Why did we want to sign agreements with them? It was because we did not have 
any idea how to tackle the doping problem. So the main motivation for us at that 
time was to gain experience, knowledge and technology from these advanced 
countries. (Interview, 23rd December 2005) 
In addition, affected by these doping scandals, China started taking more seriously its 
involvement in W ADA. According to one senior staff member in the COCADC, 
initially, in order to obtain more information and reduce its negative image in the eyes 
of Western countries (Interview, 23rd December 2005), the PRC took part as observer 
in the activities organized by the Monitoring Group of the Anti-Doping Convention of 
the European Council in 1997. To have its own voice in the establishment of the 
World Anti-Doping Agency in 1999, China nominated Mr.Yu Zaiqing, the then vice 
sport minister of GAOS, to become a council member in W ADA. One senior staff 
member in the COCADC stated that: 
Participating in W ADA is a way forward for us because all the major decision-
making in WADA has to be made by its council. For us, engagement with 
W ADA does not mean passively following what W ADA says. China has lots of 
opportunities to be involved in the decision-making because W ADA is a very 
open and democratic organization. (Interview, 23rd December 2005) 
To have more influence in WADA, the Chinese government also sought to send its 
staff to WADA to learn up-to-date technology and information on the one hand, and 
promote friendship between W ADA and China on the other hand. One senior staff 
member in the COCADC stated that: 
Furthermore, we are preparing to send some people to work in W ADA in 2006. 
It is possible that China is the first country to do so. I think that there are several 
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implications. Of course, while taking account of our own interest, we can in this 
way train our people in up-to-date technology and information from W ADA. In 
the meantime, we can understand and grasp more of the way of thinking and the 
working style of WADA's staff. By doing so, it could facilitate mutual 
understanding between China and W ADA. (Interview, 23rd December 2005) 
Not surprisingly, China's support for any world anti-doping policy is linked to the 
Beijing Games, where China is keen not to have a major embarrassment in the lead up 
to 2008. The evidence for this comes from the words of the sport minister ofGAOS, 
Liu Peng (Liu, P. 2005) at the National Conference for Anti-Doping in 2005. 
From the doping issue, we have learned some big lessons ... , when our sport 
development was not only disadvantaged but also gave a chance for rival 
nations to slander and humiliate our country. Therefore, we could not relax our 
vigilance on doping. In the forthcoming 2008 Beijing Games, we will have zero 
tolerance in any single doping scandal which might hurt the image of Chinese 
sports, endanger the image of the Beijing Olympics and ruin the image of China. 
(Liu, P. 2005) 
To repair its damaged reputation the Chinese government did more than WADA 
expected to illustrate China's modern, clean image. First, the PRC produced the 
"Code of Anti-doping" in China issued by the State Council on 1st March 2004. The 
Code contained not only a general policy for anti-doping, but also an overall 
framework in which doping control organizations, including customs control, medical 
supervision, legal systems and sports organizations, could work (Fan: 2006: 319). 
According to a senior staff member in the COCADC "It is very few countries that 
make a special law or regulation on doping, but we would like to make a code to 
totally control doping, especially customs control and medicinal supervision 
(Interview, 23rd December 2005). 
The second action was to show China's scientific ability to test doping. Actually, the 
PRC established its National Doping Control Quality System, received the 
international standard certification in 2004, and passed the IOC's level-A examination 
for 15 successive years in 2005 (Fan: 2006: 319). By doing so, the Chinese 
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government displayed its determination and capacity, not only in legislation, but at the 
practical level, in relation to doping. The third action was to invite high-ranking 
officials from WADA to inspect the 10th National Games to endorse China's 
achievements in doping. 
There are three main motives for us to do so. The first one is to let W ADA know 
what we have achieved so far in relation to our efforts in anti-doping. The 
second is that we would like to have more consolidated cooperation with them. 
The third is that we hope that W ADA can give us some feedback from their 
inspection. So far, it has been quite useful for us to communicate with W ADA 
in this way. (Interview: senior staff member in the COCADC, 23rd December 
2005) 
The strategy for actively inviting W ADA's officials to visit China has been quite 
successful. "We are very pleased with the support by the Chinese government," said 
W ADA director general, David Howman. "The quantity is increasing, the quality is 
improving, and their commitment is undoubted." (Xinhuanet News, 2005) Although 
WADA praised China's achievement in anti-doping, it still keeps pushing the Chinese 
government to do more in tenus of the total number of doping tests. 
W ADA keeps reminding us that in terms of doping tests, we have to compare 
with other sport counterparts, such as America and Australia .... In comparison 
with our counterparts with regard to the amount of doping test, America reached 
about 8000 cases and Australia has carried out about 7000 cases per year so far. 
As for ourselves, we examined 4009 cases last year and did about 5000 cases 
this year .... In tenus of China's medal ranking in 2004 Olympics, I think we 
should raise our doping tests to 7000 cases to match with our counterparts 
(Interview: senior staff member in the COCADC, 23rd December 2005). 
In conclusion, China has moved to a position of active engagement with the Olympic 
Movement and related organizations, although there is still uncertainty about the 
country's long-tenu motives or goals in relation to the Olympic Movement and 
W ADA. To date, China's engagement with the Olympic Games has been 
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substantially influenced by three factors. First, the tension between China and Taiwan 
was a constant contextual factor shaping China's engagement with the Olympic 
Movement especially in earlier years; second, China views the Olympic Movement 
and particularly the Olympic Games as an important diplomatic resource; and third, 
China wants to be influential within this movement to achieve its sports super power 
ambitions, and not just in the Olympics itself but also related organizations, such as 
the IOC, IFs and W ADA. However, if China is to utilize elite sport effectively in 
relation to these three objectives then it is essential that it has a successful elite squad. 
5.3 Elite development 
China's first engagement with international elite development practices was during 
the Stalin period under the policy of "leaning to one side". The original Chinese 
structure for elite sport development was borrowed from the Soviet Union, which 
shows that China was very willing to borrow ideas from the global community in the 
1950s. However, the PRC retreated during the Cultural Revolution in which the entire 
Chinese sports system was substantially dismantled. After Deng's open-door policy, 
the Chinese government attempted to rebuild its own domestic elite sport system to 
pave the way for achieving its superpower ambitions, especially its strong desire to do 
well in the Olympics. To fulfill its ambition, China not only gradually restored and 
modified its original model copied from the Soviet Union, but also introduced a 
market mechanism, the so-called "whole country supports elite sport system". To 
make this elite sport system more efficient in achieving Olympic success, China 
adopted three main approaches. These three approaches are: i) the strengthening of 
the athlete selection, training and competition system; ii) transforming the 
administrative structure for sport; and iii) generating multiple incomes for the 
Olympic Sport System. 
5.3.1 Strengthening athlete selection, training and competition system 
According to Xie Yalong (2000: 344), a former high-ranking sport official in GAOS, 
"The Chinese sport system was learning from the Soviet Union, which was a product 
of a highly centralized planned economy". With regard to the Chinese athlete 
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selection system, it is possible to divide the period between the end of the Cultural 
Revolution and the present day into periods. Economic liberalization was such a 
major decision that it had as significant an impact on sport as it did for the rest of 
society. Although the structure looked the same, the way in which it operated changed 
because of the introduction of market methods. For the athlete selection system, we 
will attempt, not only to understand what kinds of strategies the Chinese government 
applied to restore and strengthen its own selection model, but also to make sense of 
the economic liberalization so as to invigorate this system. During the Cultural 
Revolution, the elite sport development system was substantially dismantled and what 
remained was in chaos. From 1977 onward, there was a gradual rebuilding of the 
talent identification and development system. The strategies used by the Chinese 
government to restore and strengthen the selection system were: i) setting up a talent 
identification system at provincial level; ii) establishing sport colleges in each 
province; iii) requesting provincial governments, sport universities, the People's 
Liberation Army (PLA) and Trade Unions to take responsibility for developing 
several Olympic sports; and iv) bringing the Master's system and other ranking 
standards into line with international records and linking political benefit with the 
selection system. 
Selection system 
To establish the selection system, the NSC held a national sport meeting in 1978 in 
which the State Council not only claimed that developing sport was an important 
political mission, but also requested that each provincial government develop an 
integrated selection system between different levels from junior level. The detail was 
written in the "Contents of 1978 National Sport Meeting" (NSC, 1993b: 223): 
The drive to catch up and even overtake other sporting superpower countries, 
was based on ... the need for establishing a modern super power of socialism, 
and the need for striving in the international class struggle .... All our efforts 
must be devoted to producing our own world-class athletes quickly. We must 
build up teams of top elite sports personnel because they are the driving force 
for achieving sports glory in the world and for promoting sport for all at the 
domestic level. (NSC, 1993b: 223) 
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Each province, municipality and autonomous region (Zi zhi qu) had to ... set up 
a web of close linkage of training system for school teams in primary and 
secondary schools, for Spare Time Sport Schools, key spare time schools and 
provincial squads, to gradually establish an overall training system with 
centralization and consistency. In addition, the shires, medium-sized cities and 
some counties with enough resources had to cooperate with the education 
department to run key Spare Time Sport Schools to recruit more young, talented 
athletes. (NSC, 1993b: 224) 
. After the national sport meetings in 1978 and 1979, the State Council ratified, in 1980, 
the NSC's proposal (NSC, 1993c: 227-228) for dividing the Chinese sport selection 
system into three levels within an elaborate pyramid structure heavily dependent on a 
network of specialist schools (see Figure 5.1). 
Figure 5.1: Sport Selection System in tbe PRC in tbe Early 1990s 
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The system of Spare Time Sport Schools was copied from the Soviet Model. At the 
outset, the Chinese government tried out the Soviet Model- Children's and Young 
People's Sports Schools - in Beijing. Shanghai and Tianjin cities in 1955. Then they 
spread over the whole of China after the NSC issued the two documents - "The 
Regulation of Children's Spare Time Sport Schools" and "The Regulation of Young 
People's Spare Time Sport Schools" in 1956. To rescue the system of Spare Time 
Sport School from the chaos after the Cultural Revolution, the NSC issued "The 
Regulation of Children's and Young People's Spare Time Sport Schools" in 1979, in 
which every unit that wishing to set up a spare time sport school had to follow the 
training principle of "A determinative thought to make world class athletes, a vertical 
selection system from the base to the top level, and training consistency from young 
to adult athletes" (Zhan, 1990: 13) In addition, the NSC also encouraged different 
units, such as the sport system, education system, sport universities, universities, trade 
unions ... , to establish Spare Time Sport Schools in which students had to accept 
training courses of at least 2 hours per week (Zhan, 1990: 14). In Figure5.1, we can 
also find different kinds of Spare Time Sport Schools, such as Key Spare Time 
Schools, Middle Schools of Sport and Specialised Spare Time Sport Schools. The 
main difference between Key Spare Time Schools and General Spare Time Schools i~ 
that the former is a special sport boarding school with more sport training time than 
the latter. As for Middle Schools of Sport, they were almost the same as Key Spare 
Time Schools but they were schools subsidised jointly by the sport system which was 
in charge of training courses and the educational system which was in charge of 
academic learning (Zhan, 1990: 14). 
To strengthen this selection system, the Chinese government not only encouraged 
sport universities to establish "Elite Sport Colleges" but also required that provincial 
governments should set up some "Physical Culture and Sport Colleges" to produce 
more potential young athletes from which provincial squads and national teams could 
select more high quality talented athletes. These Elite Sport Colleges were the 
subsidiary academies of sport universities. In 1980 sport universities, such as 
Shanghai, Wuhan and Shenyang all established their own subsidiary "Elite Sport 
Colleges" that could be regarded as a talent reservoir for the sport university itself and 
as a training place to prepare for the Olympic Games (Zhan, 1990: 14). As for the 
«Physical Culture and Sport Colleges", their mission was not only to cultivate 
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prospective PE teachers for primary and secondary schools, but also to deliver 
talented athletes for provincial squads. This type of college, was, at first, tried out in 
several provinces, such as Jilin, Heilongjiang and Shanxi (Zhan, 1990: (4) ... and then 
spread across China after the decision of the NSC to issue "The Programme for 
Establishing Physical Culture and Sport Colleges" (NSC, 1990a: 103-106) and "The 
Instruction ofNSC for Training Reserve Corps of Elite Sport Teams Speedily" (NSC, 
1990b: 44-50) in 1986. Both the "Elite Sport Colleges" and the "Physical Culture and 
Sport Colleges" are full-time sport boarding schools combining a normal school 
curriculum with sport training, and are mostly subsidised by the provincial 
government. Under the instruction of the NSC, the number of sport colleges 
multiplied from 68 in 1985 to 156 in 1990 and then to 223 in 1995 (see Table 5.1). 
Table 5.1: Athletes in the Chinese Sport Selection System 1957-2001 (data for 
selected years) 
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 
Provincial Squads Sport Colleges Spare-time Sport School 
1957 1939 17902 
1965 11292 148788 
1970 
* * * 1975 10200 268511 
1980 15063 26 3981 218522 
1985 15669 68 9479 223856 
1990 15135 156 26197 259453 
1995 13265 223 31867 264769 
2000 14959 233 44002 331595 
#2005 18627 231 87176 306869 
* There was no record dUring the period of the Cultural RevolutIOn (1966-1976) 
# China Sport News (2005), "Focusing on 2008 to Refine the Project for Talented Young Athletes- the 
interview of the vice director of the department of sport competition in GAOS", available on 3rd Feb 
2005, http://www.sportsol.com.cnlnewslzglyb!2005-02-03/38874.shlm 
Source: NSC (Planning and Finance Department), Statistical Yearbook of Sport 1994-2002, (Internal 
document). 
As noted, the Chinese government also requested provincial governments, sport 
universities, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and Trade Unions to be in charge of 
developing several Olympic sports, which was recorded in "Contents of 1979 
National Sport Meeting" (NSC, 1993a: 226) and "The Instruction ofNSC for 
Training Reserve Corps of Elite Sport Teams Speedily" (NSC, 1993c: 227-228): 
We had to broaden the way for training more high-level athletes. To prepare for 
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participating in 1984 Olympic Games, each province, municipality, autonomous 
region and PLA had to take the responsibility for at least 4-5 Olympic sports .... 
(NSC: 1993a: 226) 
... In addition to these sport squads in the provinces, municipalities, autonomous 
regions and PLA, we had to actively support and help the system of Trade 
Unions to gradually revive their Elite Sport Teams. (NSC: 1993c: 228) 
In addition, after the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese government reintroduced the 
Soviet practice of giving titles, such as Master of sport to their successful elite athletes. 
This was introduced in 1956, disrupted during the Cultural Revolution, and restored in 
1978 (NSC, 1993d: 300). Importantly, for the sport selection system, the Chinese 
government not only restored and rebuilt the model borrowed from the Soviet Union 
but also introduced a market mechanism to energize the system. Figure 5.1 shows the 
sport system in the early 1990s and the 2004 system is summarized in Figure 5.2. 
Major changes include the introduction of grassroots clubs, upgrading the significance 
of sport colleges in the selection system and the introduction of two national-level 
squads - national squads and Olympic squads. 
Figure 5.2: China's Sport Selection System in 2004 
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To tackle the problem of the reduction of sport schools at county level, the Chinese 
government introduced the system of grassroots clubs in 2001. According to Cui 
Dalin, the vice sport minister in GAOS, about 1000 public sport schools closed at 
county level between 1999 and 2002 (Cui, 2004a), mainly due to insufficient financial 
support (Zhang, F.Q. 2002: 41). Grassroots clubs have not only been absorbed into 
the talent identification system, but have also been identified as a way of generating 
income from the market. In the words of high-ranking sport officials: 
I understand that all of you are worrying about the reduction of sport schools at 
different levels .... To solve this problem, GAOS has invested part of the lottery 
fund in setting up and supporting grassroots clubs to create a foundation for our 
selection system. (Yuan, W. 2001: 8) 
The comments were reinforced by Zhang: 
Grassroots clubs were the basic level among the organizations of children's and 
young people's physical activities .... According to statistics, of the 592 
grassroots clubs founded this year, 35.5 percent were located in various sport 
schools. Establishing grassroots clubs in sport schools not only extends the 
social function of sport schools, but also brings more resources into this system, 
which vitalizes the development of sport schools. (Zhang, F.Q. 2001: 41) 
After the establishment of these organizations [grassroots clubs] they can draw 
multiple incomes to support themselves by way of charging participants for 
joining the clubs .... The main mission for these grassroots clubs is promoting 
sport among children and young people, doing sport regularly, strengthening the 
physical fitness of children and young people, and searching out and training 
potential young athletes. (GAOS, 2001b: 202) 
Although the number of public sport schools was decreasing, it was gradually 
supplemented by private sport schools which were immersed in the sport selection 
system. From Table 5.1, we can see that the number of students in spare-time sport 
schools has steadily increased since 1980 and did not appear to be affected by the 
closure of the public sport schools. In other words, the Chinese government attempted 
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successfully to introduce a market economy, not only to replenish, but to broaden its 
pool of young talent at the basic level. According to Zhang: 
Spare-time training at county level had to actively explore new models for 
running the schools .... It needed to deliver potential athletes under the 
circumstances of promoting sport and offering sport service .... , we had to 
charge while providing sport training and a sport service". (Zhang, F.Q. 2001: 
38; see also Cui, 2004a) 
The impact of a market approach for revitalizing the selection system at the basic 
level was successful, but also raised several problems, such as arbitrary decisions on 
charging, the misuse of public funds for sport schools and the setting up of sport 
schools of poor quality. In an attempt to regulate the market, several official 
documents have been issued jointly by the GAOS and the Ministry of Education, such 
as "The Regulation for the Management of Children's and Young People's Sport 
Schools" and "The Regulation for the Management of Schools with Sport Tradition" 
(Zhang, F.Q. 2002: 40). 
To run this selection system more efficiently, the Chinese government not only 
emphasized the important role of sport colleges but also introduced further market 
mechanisms to energize the system. As seen from Table 5.1, the number of students 
in sport colleges increased substantially from 32,241 in 1996 to 46,758 in 200 l. 
Financial support from government for sport colleges increased from 39,457 thousand 
yuan in 1996 to 81,752.5 yuan in 200 I (see Table 5.2). Although the PRC invested 
more money and recruited more young athletes to this selection system, especially at 
the level of Sport Colleges, the poor efficiency of the Soviet model gradually became 
apparent. Yuan Weimin, former Sport Minister in the GAOS said, "The sport system 
has, to some extent, been following the Soviet model since the 1950s, which has 
affected and constrained the development of sport" (Yuan, W. 2000a: 187). Yuan's 
words were echoed by the vice minister of sport, Cui Dalin who stated that "the main 
point of [the training system] was not to increase the quantity of athletes ... , but to 
refine the quality and raise the performance of the present talented athletes" (Cui, 
2004a). As a result, the Chinese government, in 1996, began selecting a few sport 
colleges on the basis of their good practice and increased the level of subsidy (NSC, 
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1997e: 146-7). The introduction of an evaluation system for selecting good sport 
colleges not only improved their quality, but also motivated provincial governments 
to invest more money in their sport colleges. As Zhang notes: 
To compete for the honour titles of "national elite sport colleges" and "national 
training bases for high-level athletes", the total money for each province to 
. invest in improving sport construction and facilities was nearly 0.3 billion yuan. 
There were 15 schools awarded the title of "national elite sport colleges" and 43 
"physical culture and sport colleges" awarded the title of "national training bases 
for high-level athletes" by the evaluation system, which facilitated the 
development of sport colleges and raised the quality of training for these talented 
athletes. (Zhang, F.Q. 2002: 39) 
Table 5.2: Financial support in the Chinese sport selection system 1980-2001 
Unit· 10 thousand 
Level I Level 2 Level 3 
Provincial squads Sport colleges Spare-time sport Total 
schools 
1980 6140.1 824.8 
1985 17491.4 3230.2 
1990 34295.2 11013.9 
1995 77491.7 32471.5 31908.1 141811.3 
2000 (f)258241.7 68400.1 82378.6 409020.4 
2001 0194947.3 81752.5 88760.8 365460.6 
Note: 
<D The financial resource came from three parts composed of business income (14560,000 yuan), 
sponsorship (64802,000 yuan) and sport budget (1371813,000 yuan) 
® The financial resource coming from sport budget is 162744.4 yuan which is more than in 2000 
Source: NSC (Planning and Finance Department), Statistical Yearbook of Sport (Internal information), 
1994-2002. 
Due to the positive impact of introducing a competitive mechanism into the system of 
sport colleges, the Chinese government sought to extend it to all sport colleges, spare-
time sport schools and middle schools of sport and by doing so, concentrate its limited 
resources. 
The government will invest more of the national sport budget in preferential 
units, priority areas, potential schools and target athletes. Each unit must also 
concentrate their finance on these training bases by way of raising funds from 
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society and generating income from running the sport industry. By doing so, 
these limited resources can be scientifically distributed to the schools and 
athletes, which will make sure that top athletes are produced. (Cui, 2004a) 
To host the 2008 Olympics successfully, China not only enlarged its national teams 
substantially, but also divided these teams into two or even three levels by introducing 
a competitive mechanism. In 2003 the State Council decided to expand the national 
teams by adding 706 athletes to Team 1 and 1200 athletes to Team 2 (Dong, 2004). 
According to the former sport minister, Yuan Weimin, after more than doubling the 
size of the national teams, there were 3314 athletes3 in the national teams in 2003 
(Yuan, W. 2004a: 7). To produce more Olympic gold medallists, the Chinese 
government refined the China Team selection system so that the best athletes would 
be selected into Team 1 and the best potential athletes would stay in Team 2. In 
addition, China also organized training camps for Team 3 each year, in which the best 
young potential athletes at the provincial level would join these training camps with 
Team 2. After a series of evaluations and competitions, some winners in Team 3 who 
overtook their counterparts in Team 2 would be promoted to Team 2 and receive a 
higher salary and rewards. For some losers in Team 2, they would be downgraded to 
provincial level and lose the privileges of the national teams. Similar approaches were 
adopted be,tween Team 1 and Team 2 to make sure that athletes in Team 1 were 
motivated to stay at the top. 
According to the GAOS Research Group report (2002), as a result of the system of 
promotion and demotion the athletes' motivation for winning could intensify and also 
raise their sense of risk for keeping their own position. This was a useful way to make 
these top athletes progress continuously (Research Group of GAOS, 2002: 10). 
Although the best athletes in Team 1 were selected, it did not mean they would 
receive the same salary and resources. According to a GAOS's document issued in 
2003, athletes and coaches in Team 1 would receive different training funding before 
the 2008 Olympics linked to the chance of winning Olympic gold medals (GAOS, 
3 The exact size of the China 1 Team and China 2 Team was not clear. According to the vice dire~tor of 
Personnel Department in GAOS, Jiang, Zhixue, there were 1604 athletes in Team 1 and 988 athletes in 
Team 2 (Jiang et al. 2005: 125). But according to Cui, Dalin - the vice sport minister, there were about 
2000 elite athletes in Team 2 (Cui, 2004b). 
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2006a: 277-8). In the words of the director of the Chinese Athletics Management 
Centre: 
We always focused on the key teams and key athletes who had the potential to 
get Olympic medals. We invested most of our resources in 9 - 11 elite athletes 
specializing in 7 different disciplines in order to prepare for the Games. This 
strategy was completely successful as shown by the results of the 2004 
Olympics in which we not only won 2 gold medals in two disciplines, but also 
qualified for the final among the other 5 disciplines. (Luo, 2005) 
In summary, the sport selection system became a combination of the Soviet model 
and a market model. The Chinese government was, by means of raising the money 
from the market, paying more attention to accountability and achievement. However, 
the system still had problems. In reality, this system was still very expensive and 
heavily reliant on government subsidy, especially at the provincial level. The embrace 
of the market approach also raised tensions at both the national and provincial levels 
and raised issues about how different levels of government would be motivated. 
These issues are discussed in the next section. 
Competition system 
To motivate provincial governments to support the Olympic strategy, the Chinese 
government substantially refined the competition system particularly in relation to the 
National Games, which was the main driving force for achieving Olympic glory (see 
Figure 5.3). In addition, China attempted to introduce market mechanisms to energize 
this competition system. For instance, it introduced a transfer system between 
provinces with a market price, giving high rewards to individual provincial sport 
bureaus whose athletes achieved more Olympic medals than their counterparts, and 
also participated in and organized more international commercial competitions to 
enable greater experience for the athletes. 
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Figure 5.3: China's Sport Competition System for Olympic Glory 
Olympics 
International Games, 
including Asian Games 
National Games! National City Games! 
National Championships 
Provincial Games 
As with the talent development system in the early years after the Cultural Revolution, 
the competition system was very similar to the Soviet Model, but it gradually 
developed a distinctive Chinese character especially following the end of the Cultural 
Revolution when the clear objective was to maximize medal chances at the Olympic 
Games, Consequently, China not only mirrored the rules and regulations of the 
Olympics for its National City Games, National Games and most of the provincial 
games, but also regarded all the Games in this domestic system as opportunities for 
selecting, training and preparing Chinese athletes to compete in international games, 
especially the 2008 Olympics. According to vice sport minister Duan Shijie, "all the 
games should be a tool for serving the 2008 Beijing Games" (Duan, 2004), To 
implement this policy, the rules and regulations of the National Games and National 
City Games were rewritten to be almost identical to those for the Olympics (see also 
GAOS, 2005a and 2006b). 
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In addition to the domestic games, international games and world championships also 
offered opportunities for Chinese athletes to prepare for the Beijing Games. This 
strategy was outlined by Liu Peng at the 2006 All States Sports Minister Conference: 
The 15th Asian Games was the most important international competition 
before 2008 Beijing Olympics. There were two missions for the Chinese teams. 
One was to remain in first place in terms of the list of gold medals in these 
Games. The other was to prepare our young athletes to get more experience 
for the 2008 Beijing Olympics .... In order to get more quotas for more 
Chinese athletes to qualify for participation in the Olympic Games, we had to 
highlight and prepare for the World Championships and the World Cup. (Liu, 
P.2006) 
Furthermore, to ensure that Chinese athletes could achieve 'great success in their 
homeland in 2008, many young athletes were sent to participate in the 2004 Olympics. 
The importance of maximizing medals in 2008 is reflected in words of the director of 
Chinese Athletics Management Centre- Luo Zhuanyi: 
According to the policy of "participating in the 2004 Olympics but polishing 
for the 2008 Olympics" of the GAOS, we made a final decision on who may 
participate in the Games in Athens. According to my rough estimate, there 
were about 80 percent of our young athletes participating in these Games. 
(China Sport News, 2004) 
The ways in which China sought to maintain the motivations of athletes was to 
introduce more market values into the ageing Soviet model. First, China introduced a 
transfer system to encourage more athletes confined by the system of household 
registration4 to participate in National City Games, National Games and national 
championships in the mid-1990s. Two documents (NSC, 1997b: 147-8; NSC, 1997c: 
148-9) issued by the NSC in 1996 reported that "to fit in with the requirements of the 
4 Household registration is required by law in the PRC. A household registration record officially 
identifies a person as a resident ofa work unit (danwel). The influence ofa work unit on the life of an 
individual was substantial and permission had to be obtained from the work units before undertaking 
everyday events such as travel, marriage, or having children. After introducing a transfer system, 
athletes have their own right to ask for transfer to other work units (such as the other provincial teams, 
Sport Universities and sport colleges) as long as their term-contracts with original work units expire. 
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market economy of socialism, ... to fulfil the aim of Olympic Glory, ... the NSC 
promoted and encouraged athletes to be transferred". According to the latter 
document (NSC, 1997c), new employers had to pay the transfer fee to athletes' 
former employers and the price could be evaluated by several criteria, namely the 
period of training, the level of skill (similar to Master's ranking standards of the 
Soviet Union) and results in competitions. In the case of archery in 2003, for example, 
the transfer fee for an Olympic gold medallist was half a million yuan (GAOS, 2004a: 
150-4). To promote the transfer system, the Chinese government changed the 
regulations for the National Games in 1996 to allow both the new and former 
employers to share the medals and scores that their traded athletes won (NSC, 1997d: 
151-52). This new policy motivated rich provinces to pay transfer fees and offer high 
salaries in order to buy these medallists. Shanghai city for example, which hosted the 
8th National Games bought most of the athletes among the 150 transferees. The city 
government not only paid the transfer fee for the Olympic medallist - Gao Dawei, 
Who used to belong to the provincial female wrestling team in Liaoning province 
(famous for producing Olympic medallists in wrestling and weightlifting), but also 
offered Miss Gao a flat with 3 bedrooms and 0.4 million yuan. Miss Gao defeated 
former Olympic gold medallist - Sun Fuming and won a gold medal for Shanghai city 
in the National Games in 1997 (Dong, 2003: 34). 
China also used financial rewards, not only to motivate athletes and coaches, but also 
to encourage provincial sport bureaus to contribute towards the effort to win more 
Olympic medals. In 1996 the NSC issued a policy document - "The Regulations for 
Awarding Coaches and Athletes" which allowed one Olympic gold medallist to be 
awarded between 50 thousand and 80 thousand yuan. From then on the Chinese 
government continued raising the financial rewards available to its Olympic squad. 
A.ccording to one GAOS interviewee, "The amount of money used to motivate 
Chinese Olympic gold medallists is increasing, and it will certainly not be less than 
200 thousand in 2008 (Interview, 12th January 2006). And according to Duan Shijie 
(Chinese vice Sport Mminister): 
The Government gave huge financial rewards to those Olympic medallists 
whose sport achievement had special meaning for China .... For athletes, such 
as Luo Xuejuan (swimmer), Li Ting and Sun Tiantian (tennis players), they 
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had to be granted great rewards. It was not too much to reward Liu Xiang with 
one million yuan if he could win an Olympic gold medal in the men's 11 Om 
hurdles. (Sina Sport News, 2004) 
Almost all China's provinces is copied this high-reward policy as a strategy for 
motivating their athletes to win gold medals in the Olympics and National Games. 
Although the NSC's reward document emphasised that the payment granted to 
athletes at provincial level could not exceed that granted by central government, not 
many provinces complied. According to China Sport News, provinces, such as Tianjin, 
Jiangxi, Fujian and Yunnan, all offered their own Olympic medallists and coaches 
about 0.5 million yuan which was much higher than the central government reward 
(Sportinfo.net.cn, 2004). The total reward that a Chinese Olympic medallist could 
receive from government (including central, provincial and county level), from 
Chinese enterprises and from the Hong Kong tycoon, Huo Yindong, could be between 
1- 3 rriillion yuan, which excludes other commercial income. (Sina Sport News, 2004) 
For sport officials at provincial level, China adopted a similar strategy to motivate 
these members of staff to support the national sport policy objectives. According to a 
document issued by the Financial Ministry and GAOS in 1999, the Chinese 
government would allocate financial rewards to the eight provinces that won the most 
Olympic medals in the Summer and Winter Olympic Games (Financial Ministry & 
GAOS: 2000: 134-5). In addition, the National Sport Management Centres also 
played an important role by organizing an increased number of national and 
international championships in order to provide more opportunities for Chinese 
athletes to gain experience of high level competitions. According to the vice sport 
minister,'Duan Shijie (2004), "National Sport Management Centres ... continually 
devised and promoted new competitions .... From 2001 to 2004, the national 
competitions were increasing from 491 to 836 of which 74 percent were Olympic 
sports". He went on to argue that "the excellent performance of our athletes 
participating in the Athens Olympics was due largely to domestic sport competitions". 
In short, the competition system was designed to select, train and hone athletes to win 
Olympic medals and, according to Liang Xiaolong of the GAOS, "the material 
rewards have become an important element for motivating Chinese athletes to achieve 
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excellent performance" (GAOS, 2006a: 134). However, the refinement of China's 
selection and competition system and the introduction of material rewards was not a 
guarantee of success at the Olympic Games. In the fierce global competition, China 
also introduced more world-class sports resources, such as equipment, coaches and 
technology, to support its training system. This raises several issues, including how 
the Chinese government used these resources and how they were integrated into its 
training system. These issues will be discussed more fully in the next section on the 
training system. 
Training system 
To set up its own training system, especially at the national level, China required 
training camps with high-standard equipment, and world-class coaches, scientists and 
doctors in order to overtake countries, such as USA, Russia, Germany and Australia. 
First, the Chinese government located its best stadiums and equipment in the elite 
sport training camps. One sport official in charge of the stadiums and equipment in 
GAOS emphasized that "most stadiums located in the sport system were up to 
standard ... and their main purpose was to offer training and competition for 
provincial and national squads" (Interview, 16th January 2006). In addition, another 
sport official also underlined the importance of importing high-standard equipment 
and facilities, and noted that "sport science has a huge impact on Chinese elite 
development and that is why we imported so much top training equipment and 
facilities from abroad, especially from the USA" (Interview: former senior staff 
member in the GAOS External Affairs Department, 30th December 2005). Generally 
speaking, the Sport Apparatus Centre in GAOS is in charge of selecting and buying 
this high-tech equipment and facilities for provincial and national squads (Interview: 
former staff member in the GAOS Sport Apparatus Centre, 3rd March 2006). 
The need to put greater resources into these training camps was highlighted in two 
key documents "The Outline Strategy for Winning Olympic Medals 2001 - 2010" and 
"The Project for the Development of Elite Sport 2006 - 2010". The former stated that 
"to fully guarantee and satisfy the requirements for sport training, we have to increase 
the investment in these training camps, to enhance these stadiums and facilities for 
training purposes, and to fit advanced training apparatus and scientific devices" 
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(GAOS, 2003a: 200). The latter proclaimed that one of the government's main goals 
Was "to establish 4 - 8 world class comprehensive training camps and to set up 10-
15 specialized training camps for Olympic sports" (GAOS, 2006c). 
Second, although China maintained a large number of coaches since 1979 (see Table 
5.3), most ofthe coaches, according to a GAOS report, in the disciplines of track and 
field, basketball and swimming, were below world-class standard (Xiao et aI, 2006: 
186). 
Table 5.3: The statistic of full-time coaches in Chinese sport training system 
1966-2001 (Unit: 1 people) 
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Total 
Provincial squads Sport schools Spare-time sport 
schools 
1966 7597 
1970 4743 
1975 11123 
1980 18534 
1985 21374 
1990 25670 
1995 4351 3788 17021 25160 
2000 3989 4069 83611 91669 
2001 4182 3989 96508 104679 
Source: NSC (Plannmg and Fmance Department), StatIstIcal Yearbook of Sport (Internal mformatlon), 
1994-2002; 
This report also emphasized that "it was because of a severe shortage of high-class 
coaches that our track and field events were prevented from making further progress" 
(Xiao et aI, 2006: 186). Another official report, with which the director of the 
department of sport competition in GAOS was involved, claimed that "for modem 
competition in elite sport, there is, to some extent, another kind of competition going 
on between the capacities of the coaches .... Therefore, the coaches producing gold 
medallists are a crucial element for raising the standard of the elite sports" (Li et ai, 
2006: 206). To increase the number of Chinese world-class coaches, China issued a 
document in 1997 - "The Notice for Speeding Up the Training to Produce Young 
Academic and Technical Sports Experts" - in which the government planned to 
produce more elite coaches in 3-5 years (NSC, 1998a: 61-3). After issuing this 
document, the GAOS initiated "The millennium training project for young talent 
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coaches" in 1999 and sent national coaches abroad to learn from the West. One of the 
participants in this project said that they all benefited from this project: 
In 1999 GAOS initiated ... [an] exchange programme between the Chinese 
Olympic Committee and the American Olympic Committee. There were 11 
national coaches from different sports, such as badminton, table tennis, judo, 
swimming, track and field etc .... After this project ... the GAOS organized 
several similar projects to gain new knowledge from western countries. 
(Interview, 23rd November 2005) 
In 2004, the PRC issued another document - "The notice for strengthening the training 
of sport human resources" in which the government set a quota to produce 100 elite 
coaches to prepare for the 2008 Olympics· and highlighted "the need for sending more 
coaches to be trained in other countries to raise the quality of sport training" (GAOS, 
2005b: 73). The attitude of the Chinese government toward foreign coaches appeared 
quite positive and it wanted to introduce more foreign coaches to raise the quality of 
training. One of the sport officials in charge of training affairs for all the national 
teams in GAOS also emphasized that these foreign coaches had an important role in 
national teams and the government had an extra budget for hiring them. He also noted 
that "About one third of those who are taking the position of head coaches in Chinese 
national squads are foreign coaches at this moment" (Interview, 13 January 2006). 
Although the Chinese government fully supported the introduction of foreign coaches, 
they were also aware of the importance of Chinese coaches learning and gathering 
knowledge from them. According to official documents and sport officials in GAOS, 
the Chinese government had its own strategy to manage these foreign coaches: 
We had to carry out "the regulations for managing the foreign coaches in 
national teams" ... and pay more attention to absorbing and adapting the 
advanced knowledge and skill in coaching and managing from these foreign 
coaches. We also needed to link the good practice from foreign coaches, and 
Chinese coaches being trained in other countries, to raise the quality of our 
training system. (GAOS, 2005b: 76) 
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When we signed contracts with these foreign coaches, part of the deal was that 
they had to help us train Chinese coaches. (Interview: senior staff member in 
the GADS Competition and Training Department, 13 January 2006) 
To achieve technical transformation, each sport management centre would 
nominate several Chinese elite coaches not only to help foreign coaches but 
also to learn strategies and tactics from foreign coaches. (Interview: former 
senior staff member in the Training Centre for Sport Officials and Coaches, 
23rd December 2005) 
In addition to fully participating in all 28 disciplines and winning more gold medals in 
the 2008 Olympics, in its official document China set a quota to produce 1000 top 
elite athletes (GAOS, 2005b: 76). To fulfil this quota, China also has a special budget 
to send more athletes to be trained in foreign countries, especially in the West. The 
words of senior staff member and the media can be regarded as evidence: 
In recent years, the Chinese Athletics Management Centre has had a 
cooperation project with America and we have sent 4 athletes to be trained 
there. We will send more athletes there this year. (Interview: senior staff 
member from Competition Department in the Chinese Athletics Management 
Centre, 10 January 2006) 
Chinese Olympic champion Xing Huina is going to the United States to 
advance her training. She will join the Chinese national long-distance running 
team for three to five months of training in the US, starting next month. 
(CRIENGLISH.com, 2006b) 
The Chinese national female wrestling team, including the coach and two 
Olympic silver medallists, went to Japan to be trained for 1 year. (China Sport 
News, 2005) 
'fhird, China needed more skilled sports scientists and doctors to ass it their athletes. 
In a document - "Strengthening and Progressing Sport in the New Era" - issued in 
JUly 2002 by the Communist Party and the central government, it was emphasized 
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that China "had to continuously raise the quality of scientific training for elite sport" 
(GAOS, 2003b: 5). Chinese sport minister, Liu Peng, also underlined that "sport 
technology had to match the need for preparing for the Olympics and do whatever it 
could to fulfil the requirements of the national squads" (Liu, P. 2006). To speed up the 
development of China's sport technology, the government set a quota of generating a 
world-class team of 20 top Chinese sport scientists in the document - "The Project for 
Developing Sport Technology 2001-2010" - issued by GAOS in 2002 (GAOS, 2005c). 
According to a senior staff member in the national training centre for Chinese sport 
officials: 
Under the instruction of GAOS, we were organising different kinds of 
scientific teams, composed of sport scientists, doctors of national teams and 
technicians, to go abroad to learn new knowledge to prepare for the Olympics. 
Generally speaking, they would go abroad for 2-3 weeks. (Interview, 10 
January 2006) 
The Chinese government's effort paid off when Olympic champion Liu Xiang 
achieved a time of 12.91 seconds at the 2004 Athens Olympics, levelling the world 
mark held by Briton, Colin Jackson. According to vice sport minister, Cui Dalin 
(2005), "It was the technology that helps us to win the gold medals". He went on to 
argue that, "The reason Liu Xiang win an Olympic gold medal was not only to due to 
his head coach, Sun Haiping, but also due to the support from a team composed of 
more than 20 scientists" (Cui, 2005). 
In short, to strengthen China's elite development the government first borrowed and 
rebuilt the Soviet model, then gradually revitalized its selection and competition 
system through competitive mechanism and the free market, and finally introduced 
global sport resources, such as high quality sport equipment and facilities and world· 
class coaches and scientists. However, the adoption of this strategy raised several 
issues particularly, how China handled such a complicated elite system with its 
administrative structure and how the government generated such a huge amount of 
money to support elite development. These issues will be explored in the next section. 
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5.3.2 Transforming the administrative structure and generating multiple 
incomes for the Olympic Sport System 
The elite athlete development strategy involved a radical reform of the administrative 
structure. The National Sport Commission (NSC) was downsizcd into the GAOS to 
reduce the financial burden on central government and the National Sport 
Management Centres were established to share the role of the GAOS and to manage 
and develop Olympic sport more professionally and scientifically. In addition, in 
order to subsidise the costly elite development system the PRC not only increased its 
national sport budget, but also sought to generate additional income from society and 
the market by introducing a lottery system and by involvement in commercial 
activities. 
Transforming administrative structures 
Under the leadership of Jiang Zemin, the Chinese leadership attempted to reduce the 
cost and increase the efficiency of the Chinese government. The NSC (see section 
3.4.2 Sport within China in chapter 3) was required to increase the efficiency of its 
administrative structures. Li Tieying, a member of the Politburo Standing Committee 
(PSC) and a State Councillor (1988-1998) with a second job as a director of the Sport 
Refonn Commission, emphasised that "to compete and win the battle in the fiercely 
competitive world of international sport competitions, we had to strengthen sport 
reform .... The structure and mechanism of sport management must follow the steps of 
economic reform ... including training, competition and organisational structure" (Li, 
T.Y. 1993: 4). One official document - "The Suggestion of the NSC About 
Deepening the Reform of Sport", issued by the NSC in 1993, emphasized that "elite 
development faced deep structural problems which were shortage of budget, lack of 
high level human resources in sport, ... low efficiency and effectiveness of sport 
tnanagement" (NSC, 1996d: 146). An appendix to that document - "Some 
Suggestions About Establishing the System of Sport Associations" also highlighted 
that "establishing a system of sport associations could promote professionalism in 
sport management, and scientifically and systematically shape the management 
system in order to raise elite sport skills ... " (NSC, 1996f: 153). 
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To speed up sport reform, in 1994 the State Council issued "The Notice about the 
Regulations for the Organisational Function, Structure and Human Resource of 
GAOS" which highlighted that GAOS should delegate its authority in relation to 
national elite sport selection, training and competition to the National Sport 
Management Centres and should focus on policy-making for macro' control of sport 
development. (GAOS, 1999a: 69-75) Under the requirements of the Chinese 
Communist Party and State Council, five elite sport departments and one training 
bureau in NSC (Zhan, 1990: 247) were gradually transformed from governmental 
sports agencies into 23 quasi-autonomous organizations - National Sport Management 
Centres - in which there were 16 Olympic sport management centres in charge of25 
national Olympic sport associations. Although the NSC was downgraded to the level 
of General Administration of Sport (GAOS) with 9 departments and 180 staff, the 
GAOS, with robust support from Chinese leaders, still dominated the decision-making 
of all National Sport Management Centres, and exerted control over the sports and 
their development, organizations and financing. In the words of a sport official from 
the Personnel Department in the GAOS: 
All the projects, budget and foreign affairs of [the] management centres required 
liaison and co-ordination with the GAOS .... The GAOS was very concerned 
about the projects in which government put a lot of money .... These associations 
could be refused support if the government did not have any prospect of gold 
medals from them. (Interview, 16th January 2006) 
In essence, National Sport Management Centres and national sport associations are 
two sides of the same coin. According to one senior official in the GAOS who was 
involved in the design of the sport management centres, in order to strengthen the 
administration of national sport associations, the Chinese government devised sport 
management centres to take over the power of national sport associations. That means 
that the name "national sport association" was used to communicate with the outside 
world, due to its implied non-governmental status while the name "sport management 
centre" was used to govern the domestic sport regime because of its governmental 
Position which was directly under the leadership of GAOS. This kind of design 
allowed the government to wield its power more easily in both national and 
international sport organizations (Interview, 16th January 2006). According to the 
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document, "The Temporary Regulation for National Sport Management Centres", 
issued by the NSC in 1997, the main missions for National Sport Management 
Centres were ... "to promote sports at all levels and to raise sports skills". These 
centres "had to be under the leadership of the NSC (GAGS) and had to wholly carry 
out the policy and direction of the NSC (GAOS)" (NSC, 1997a). This document also 
underscored the fact that "all sections and cadre members in National Sport 
Management Centres had to be checked and ratified by NSC (GAGS)" and "all the 
salary, welfare and rewards of staff in these centres were under the administration of 
the Personnel Department in NSC (GAGS) (NSC, 1997a). 
Although the Chinese government subsidized 60 percent of the basic wage of staff in 
these management centres, according to an official in the Personnel Department in 
GAGS, "their total salary was much higher than ours in GAGS due to their high 
commercial income" and "their position was a lucrative appointment" (Interviewee, 
23rd December 2005). Due to the vital position of the directors in National Sport 
Management Centres, especially in Glympic sports centres, for carrying out Chinese 
government policy, "all the directors in these centres were controlled by the Party 
groups (Dangzu), the leading group of the NSC (GAGS)" (NSC, 1997a). In addition, 
the directors of the management centres and the department of the GAGS could be 
switched if the leadership group of the GAOS thought it was necessary. This was the 
Case with Li Hua, a former vice-director of the Personnel Department in the GAOS 
Who became the director of the Chinese Swimming Management Centre, and Cai 
Zhenhua, a former director of the Chinese Management Centre for Table Tennis and 
Badminton, who took a position as the associate sport minister in GAOS. In summary, 
the Chinese government could totally dominate elite policy through these National 
Sport Management Centres. 
According to a Chinese sport academic, the administrative structure of these national 
Sport associations was essentially copied from western sport associations. In other 
Words, "these national sport associations had a similar shell to their western 
counterparts, but the way they operated was manipulated by the Chinese government" 
(Interview, 24th December 2005). In addition, according to one sport official in charge 
of national teams in GAOS, a number of National Sport Management Centres were 
subdivided due to the need to concentrate resources to prepare for the Olympics in 
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2008 and to follow the global elite sport trend of subdividing and professionalizing 
the divisions and staff to increase their efficiency and effectiveness (lnterview, 13 
January 2006). Indeed, one official in the National Training Centre for Chinese Sport 
Officials emphasized that "to strengthen the capacity of high-ranking sport officials, 
the GAOS instructed us to organize a workshop each year so that the directors in the 
GAOS and National Sport Management Centres could go abroad to learn new 
knowledge and management skill and strategies from the West" (Interview, 10 
January 2006). 
To ensure high performance was effectively and efficiently achieved, sport minister, 
Liu Peng noted that the GAOS set up a special team led by him and his colleagues in 
2006 to regularly inspect 15 national Olympic management centres to ensure that they 
carried out 32 requirements to prepare for the Beijing Games (Liu, P. 2006). 
According to vice sport minister, Cui Dalin, the directors of the national Olympic 
management centres had to sign contracts with the Chinese government concerning 
the Olympic medal quota set by GAOS (Cui, 2004a). If these directors could not 
reach the quota, it could endanger their position or they might lose their jobs 
(Interview: staff member in the National Training Centre for Chinese Sport Officials, 
10 January 2006). Although these types of strategies put huge pressure on the leaders 
in management centres, they could also achieve high rewards from government if they 
successfully fulfilled the quota. Thus, in the words of one sport official in the GAOS, 
"the meaning of Olympic medals for these directors of National Sport Management 
Centres was the impact it had on their job and rewards" (Interview, 10 January 2006). 
The GAOS's strategies, which aimed to spur and stimulate these high-ranking 
managers, were adopted by provincial governments. Shandong province, for example, 
set up 12 provincial sport management centres and concentrated their resources on 
potential medallists in the National Games and the Olympics. In addition, the 
provincial government requested the directors of the regional sport management 
centres to sign protocols for achieving their National and Olympic medal quota as set 
by the provincial sport bureau. If these directors completed their mission, they could 
receive 200,000 yuan. If not, they would be dismissed from their position 
immediately and could not take similar duty for four years, according to the director 
ofthe sport bureau in Shandong province, Yu Xuetian (Yu, 2005). 
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Although provincial sport bureaus copied the structure and strategies from the GAOS 
to win gold medals in the National Games for their own provinces, there were 
tensions between provincial governments and National Sport Management Centres. 
According to one senior researcher in the Institute of Sport Science under GAOS, 
most provincial governments complained about the system of the National Sport 
Management Centres because the provincial sport bureaus could not handle so many 
requirements. This meant that the provincial sport bureau not only had to match up to 
the policy ofthe GAOS, but also had to co-operate with 22 national management 
centres whose main mission was the Olympics not the National Games (Interview, 
30th December 2005). According to the former director of the sport bureau in 
Zhejiang province, Chen Peide, their jobs were directly linked to the number of gold 
medals in the National Games (Chen, 2006). To reduce these tensions, the GAOS 
decided not only to introduce a double score system in which one Olympic gold 
medal could be regarded as equivalent to two National gold medals, but also to invite 
more provincial sport officials to take positions in national sport associations and the 
Chinese Olympic Committee and to offer them the chance to go abroad once a year to 
learn knowledge of management. 
Generating multiple incomes 
According to Zhang Hao, director of the Finance Department in GAOS, "The 
shortage of national budget available for funding sport deVelopment was getting more 
and more serious in 1992" (Zhang, H. 1997: 35). To solve this problem, vice secretary 
for the State Council, Xu Zhijian, during his speech at the 1993 All States Sports 
Minister Conference, underlined the fact that "For sport finance ... the main point was 
how we matched the requirements of a socialist market economy". He went on to 
argue that "only by completing this transformation and solving this problem could we 
locate a new way of generating more income from different channels in order to 
Vitalise our sport development" (Xu, Z. 1993: 16-7). From then on, the Chinese 
government developed different strategies to generate multiple incomes from the 
market and society. According to Zhang Hao, the three main incomes which 
Supported the Chinese sport system were the government sport budget (including 
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national and provincial level), commercial and sponsorship income, and lottery 
funding (Zhang, H. 1997: 35) (see Figure 5.4). 
Figure 5.4: The Income of the Chinese Sport System 
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The government sport budget, as Zhang Hao argued, "was still the main resource for 
subsidising the sport system" (Zhang, H. 1997: 44). According to the Statistical 
Yearbook of Sport issued by NSC and GAOS, the national sport budget temporarily 
decreased between 1998 and 1999 due to downsizing the NSC into GAOS, but when 
we look at the total sport budget, including national and provincial levels, it has 
almost doubled every 5 years since 1976 (see Table 5.4 Sport Budget in China 1953-
2001). 
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Table 5.4: Sport Budget in China 1953-2001 (Unit: 10 thousand yuan) 
GAOS Provincial GAOS + Provincial 
1953-1957 * 632.8 * 1286.8 * 1919.6 
1958-1962 * 2673.0 * 6365.2 * 9038.2 
1963-1965 * 1632.7 * 6055.3 * 7688.0 
1966-1970 * 767.6 * 4012.2 * 4479.8 
1971-1975 * 1111.6 * 11795.0 * 12906.6 
1976-1980 * 2712.4 * 21413.4 * 24125.8 
1981-1985 * 6106.4 * 45222.4 * 51328.8 
1986-1990 * 11325.0 * 108633.2 * 119958.2 
1991 13184.0 153392.0 166576.0 
1992 14100.0 172400.0 186500.0 
1993 112412.7 
1994 133515.4 
1995 153958.5 
1996 207652.9 
1997 47317.0 354043.0 401359.6 
1998 26251.0 379975.0 406226.0 
1999 31846.0 383739.0 415585.0 
2000 76791.0 428405.0 505196.0 
2001 103126.0 572266.0 675392.0 
Note: I. • indicates an average figure for the penod. 
2. Sport budget in this table does not include the cost for basic sport construction. 
Source: NSC (Planning and Finance Department), Statistical Yearbook of Sport (Internal information), 
1994-2002. 
The Chinese government invested most of its public funding for sport in" elite sport 
with the proportion of the government's sport budget spent on elite sport compared 
With sport for all becoming extremely skewed. Dong Xinguang, the key drafts man of 
the 'The Fitness for All' project issued by the NSC in 1995, pointed out that the 
proportion of the national and provincial sport budget invested in sport for all 
decreased from 2.38 percent in 1990 - 1994 to 1.39 percent in 1995 - 1999 (Dong, 
2005: 13). One former senior staff member from the Policy and Regulation 
Department in GAOS emphasized that "So far, we did not have the money to 
subsidise the development of mass sport" (Interview, 13th January 2006). 
The limited government budget allocated to sport for all is reflected in the words of 
Guo Min, a fonner director of the Sport for All Department in the GAOS when she 
'Was interviewed by China Sport News in 2004. She claimed that "we had 2 million 
Yuan for developing sport for all in our department per year .... There was less than 1 
lllillion yuan sport budget to invest in mass sport for each provincial government each 
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year. For county level, there was less than 0.1 million yuan" (Cai, 2004). However, 
according to one senior staff member in charge of sport policy in the GAOS "the 
money for developing sport for all did not rely on the government but on citizens 
themselves because they had to bear in mind one thing - it is their responsibility to 
invest their own money for maintaining their own health" (Interview, 4th January 
2006). The evidence provided above makes clear the concern of the Chinese 
government to concentrate more of its provincial and national sport budget on 
supporting elite development, despite the consequent reduction in the proportion of 
national and provincial sport budget invested in sport for all programmes. 
According to Zhang Hao, "the government encouraged every sport unit to exploit 
their resources not only to support themselves, but also to maintain the whole sport 
system" (Zhang, H. 1997: 55). He also highlighted that "the good image of Chinese 
elite sport was a very valuable intangible asset for the government and sport 
community. Therefore, adopting a market mechanism to exploit and market this 
intangible sports asset was a vital mission for our sport system at every level" (Zhang, 
H. 1997: 49). Under this policy, market promotion divisions were established at 
almost every level in the sport system, especially at national and provincial level. 
First, the government established the Sport Apparatus Centre in the ,GAOS (named 
Market Promotion Division in the COC) which, according to a former member of 
staff in the Sport Apparatus Centre, "was in charge of the exploitation of intangible 
Sports assets, especially in the mega events such as the Olympic Games, Asian Games, 
East Asian Games" (Interview, 3rd March 2006). According to one senior official in 
the Finance Department in GAOS, "The Chinese government was making efforts to 
Shape the brand of COC and promote the market value of the "Team China" after the 
2000 Olympics" (Interview, 4th January 2006). Therefore, all commercial rights 
related to athletes in Team China had to be under the control of the Sport Apparatus 
Centre (SAC) in GAOS and National Sport Management Centres had to obtain 
permission from SAC to make commercial deals for their elite athletes (Interview: 
former staff member in the SAC, 3rd March 2006). During the Athens Games for 
example, SAC gave its commercial media rights for broadcasting and interviewing 
learn China to its own internet company - China Interactive Sports by which it could 
monopolize the media's commercial activities for Team China. In other words, GAOS 
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centralized all Team China's commercial rights in the Sport Apparatus Centre in order 
to generate and maximize its multiple commercial incomes during the Olympic 
Games (Interview: former staff member in the SAC, 3rd March 2006). According to 
one senior staff member in the GAOS Financial Department, in order to legalize the 
role of the Sport Apparatus Centre "The GAOS asked every athlete to sign a 
Commercial contract with the Sport Apparatus Centre if he or she would like to stay in 
Team China for the international mega events". He went on to argue that" this kind 
of idea was copied from the IOC who asked all the participants to sign a contract 
Written on the opposite side of their application forms to give the IOC special 
commercial rights during the Olympic Games" (Interview, 4th January 2006). In 
addition, he also confirmed that "Basically, the way in which we were managing our 
Team China was the same as our counterpart in the UK who had special management 
regulations for their Team Great Britain" (Interview, 4th January 2006). "All the 
income of the Sport Apparatus Centre (SAC) would be redistributed by the GAOS to 
support elite sport training and competitions", according to one former SAC staff 
member (Interview, 3rd March 2006) . 
. Second, the NSMCs established market promotion divisions to work as general 
Commercial agents for their elite athletes, but they had to follow the rules and 
guidelines set by the GAOS (Interview: senior staff member in the GAOS Beijing 
Sport University, 3rd January 2006). Generally speaking, the authority for these 
market promotion divisions in the NSMCs was limited to the level of national and 
international championships to avoid overlapping with the commercial rights owned 
by the COC and the IOC. To rationalize the commercial relations between the NSMC 
and their athletes, an important document - "The Notice for Attempting to Manage 
Commercial Activities of National Squad Members by Contract" - issued by GAOS in 
2006 stated that "each NSMC '" must sign contracts with their national squad 
members to manage their athletes' commercial activities" and "each NSMC must pay 
attention to coordinating the commercial rights among national squad members, 
NSMC, COC and IOC" (GAOS, 2006d). In addition, following an increasing volume 
of sponsorship and commercial activities among national squad members, one senior 
Official in the Chinese Swimming Management Centre emphasized that "we would 
restructure the marketing division to generate more income to support and maintain 
the mission to prepare for the 2008 Olympics (Interview, 10th January 2006). China 
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Was attempting to adopt the western "commercial mechanism" contracted by law or 
by regulation to control its elite athletes so that they not only concentrated on training 
and competition, but also generated more income to support China's elite system. 
Third, provincial sport bureaus also copied the model from the GAOS to market their 
provincial squads for sponsorship and commercial income, as in the case of Sichuan 
and Beijing. According to the director of the Sichuan provincial sport bureau, Zhu 
Ling, what they were doing was to match the market economy whereby they were 
maximizing the value of their provincial squads to bring in more money to support 
themselves (Yuan, Z. 2005a). Indeed, the establishment of sport marketing divisions 
at national and provincial level was playing an important role in generating income 
from the market and society. The total amount of commercial and sponsorship income 
has increased dramatically (see Table 5.5) since the transformation of the sport 
administrative structure in 1998. In addition, the money generated from the market 
Was steadily increasing after 2001: 
According to the data we have so far for 2006, almost half our total income came 
from government and the other funds were raised by the market and society of 
which most was generated from commercial sponsorship. (Interview: senior staff 
member in GAOS, 16th January 2006) 
'fable 5.5 Income in the Chinese Sport System 1993-2001 (Unit: 10 thousand yuan) 
National & Provincial Sport Commercial & Sponsorship Total Income 
Budget Income 
1993 112412.7 53.6% 97391.6 46.4% 209804.3 
1994 133515.4 58.0% 96526.6 42.0% 230042.0 
1995 153958.5 54.5% 128416.5 45.5% 282375.0 
1996 207652.9 52.5% 187744.7 47.5% 395397.6 
1997 401359.6 
1998 406226.0 71.5% 161913.0 28.5% 568139.0 
1999 415585.0 65.8% 216123.0 34.2% 631708.0 
2000 505196.0 58.2% 363256.0 41.8% 868452.0 
2001 675392.0 56.7% 515695.0 43.3% 1191087.0 
.. Source: NSC (Planning and Finance Department), Statistical Yearbook of Sport (Internal mformatIon), 
1994-2002. 
With regard to lottery funding, at first, the lottery system was introduced to fund 
international and national mega events (NSC, 1994). In 1998, the Financial 
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Department and The People's Bank of China, announced that "the 0 fficial rights for 
distributing the lottery funding belonged to the GAOS", who decided that 60 percent 
of the income would be invested in the 'Fitness for All' project and 40 percent in the 
"Olympic Glory" project (NSC, 1998b). According to the GAOS's report on the 
distribution for lottery funding in 2004, there was 1190 million yuan for elite sport 
and 1750 million yuan for mass sport. In fact, most of money for mass sport came 
from lottery funding of which the average funding for each province in 2002 was 
about 9.63 million yuan, according to Dong Xinguang (Dong, 2005: 12). 
In short, due to pressure to find more resources to support its elite sport system, the 
Chinese government was, to some extent, under pressure to adopt the management 
practices and market mechanisms of their western counterparts. Although the new 
market practices could possibly help China produce more Olympic gold medallists, it 
could not guarantee that all Chinese elite athletes would continuously fight for China 
due to the strong financial attractions from the outside world. This raises several 
issues, including how the Chinese government retained their athletes and coaches in 
China. This and other related issues are considered in the next section. 
5.3.3 Preventing coaches and athletes from going abroad 
The strategies for discouraging Chinese athletes and coaches from going abroad were 
directly linked to the case of Chinese athletes who represented other countries in table 
tennis and badminton and seriously threatened Chinese Olympic success. According 
to NSC documents and a senior member in the GAOS Personnel Department: 
After table tennis became a Summer Olympic Sport [in 1988], it became popular 
in terms of increased professionalism which was encouraging table tennis players 
to transfer between clubs and countries .... Because going abroad meant earning 
a much higher salary than staying at home, it had a serious impact on some of 
our national squad members. (NSC, 1996g: 568) 
During the late 19805 and early 1990s, Chinese table tennis received a serious 
setback due to lots of.elite players going abroad. Some of them claimed to retire 
immediately and went abroad to play for another country after winning the title 
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of world champion. As a result of this situation, these "Chinese foreign troops" 
seriously endangered our chances of defending the Olympic title. (Interview, Ith 
January 2006) 
To reduce the threat of "Chinese foreign troops" and to persuade its top athletes to 
continue to compete for their homeland, the Chinese government introduced four 
changes to policy: i) setting an age limit in the domestic arena; ii) revising the 
competition regulations at IFs; iii) increasing athletes and coaches' income by 
introducing a club system, sponsorship and the Commercial Grand Prix circuit; and iv) 
inculcating patriotism and nationalism. 
First, in the domestic arena, The Chinese government set an age limit to prevent its 
top athletes going abroad. "All national athletes could not be dispatched to go abroad 
until male athletes were over the age of28 and female athletes over 26" (NSC, 1996b: 
1345-6). However, this regulation did not stop Chinese athletes leaving China as there 
was no specific penalty for violators. Consequently, in 1994, a new policy, "The 
Temporary Regulations for Chinese Players and Coaches of Table Tennis Who Work 
and Compete Abroad", was issued by the NSC, and which stated that "no Chinese 
players and coaches of table tennis can sign contracts with foreign clubs or 
organizations until males are over 28 and females are over 25." The penalty, was 
serious, not only for violators themselves, but in their provincial table tennis 
associations and their former clubs. The document highlighted the fact that "the 
players and coaches violating this regulation will lose their membership of the 
Chinese Table Tennis Association .... The provincial table tennis associations and 
clubs will be punished for being connected with these violators. The penalty for these 
associations and clubs will be the imposition of a fine, cutting down the quota for 
participating in the competitions and suspending club competitions etc." (NSC, 1996c: 
596) After Beijing won the bid for hosting the 2008 Olympics, another document was 
issued by the GAOS in 2001, "About the Regulations for Players and Coaches of 
Badminton Going Abroad", which stated that "all coaches and athletes who compete 
in the Olympics, Asian Games and world championship are prohibited from going 
abroad to join training and competition activities in relation to badminton unless they 
have permission from the Chinese Badminton Association", In addition, according to 
this document, "all contracts signed between athletes and foreign clubs or 
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organizations have to be double-checked by the Chinese Badminton Association, 
otherwise these contracts will be invalid. '" The teams associated with the violators 
will be suspended from participating in any games for one year" (GAOS, 2001 a). 
Second, at the international level, China revised the competition regulations of the IFs 
for table tennis and badminton. One of the senior personnel staff in the GAOS noted 
that "by revising the competition regulations at IFs, we can deter these retired Chinese 
athletes from representing other countries and competing against China for more than 
2 or 4 years. In other words, we could limit their chances of endangering our elite 
success" (Interview, lth January 2006). During the mid-1990s the Chinese 
government took advantage of their sports officials who held the president's position 
in the IFs, such as Lu Shengrong in the International Badminton Federation (IBF) and 
XuYinsheng in International Table Tennis Federation (ITIF), in order to revise the 
rules of competition. Under the leadership of these Chinese officials, in the late 1990s, 
the IBF and ITIF both revised their regulations such that "athletes must not have 
represented any other Member Association for the three years immediately preceding 
the date ofthe fixture" (IBF, 2006) and "a player is eligible to represent an 
Association only if he is a national of the country in which that Association has 
jurisdiction; and a player shall not represent different Associations within a period of 
3 years" (ITIF, 2006). Through these rule changes, China substantially reduced the 
threat from the retired athletes who represented other countries (GAOS, 2003c). 
Third, as regards income generation, China not only accepted sponsorship but also 
introduced a club system to increase athletes' and coaches' earnings. Since the 1980s 
Chinese national squads, such as those of table tennis, badminton and volleyball, have 
accepted sponsorship so as to raise the salary of athletes and coaches (Interview: 
senior staff member in GAOS Personnel Department, lth January 2006). But 
compared to their counterparts in the West, the total income was still lower than the 
Chinese athletes' and coaches' expectation, which affected their motivation to 
compete for China. To solve this problem, the Chinese government introduced a club 
system to subsidize athletes' and coaches' income. This club system was called the 
"double-track mechanism" by which national squad members could play for clubs 
which would not only pay for special training fees to national squads, but also provide 
substantial wages to the national squad members they recruited. According to the 
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Chinese government's perspective, this would not only stop elite athletes going 
abroad, but also change athlete's attitude from "being forced to participate in training 
and competition" towards "being eager to be involved in training and competition" 
(NSC, 1996g: 567-8). Since introducing the club system in table tennis and volleyball, 
the income for stars in these sports has increased substantially, especially in the case 
of table tennis players, such as Ma Lin, Wang Liqin, whose income was over I 
million yuan in 2005. Vice sport minister, Cai Zhenhua, who promoted the club 
system in Chinese table tennis, commented that "As national table tennis players 
devoted themselves to benefiting our country, they should earn more than several 
million yuan, as long as the market itself could pay for that" (quoted in Zhu, 2006). 
Although Chinese badminton did not introduce a club system, the income of coaches 
and players in national squads did increase significantly, due to generating profits 
from commercial sponsorship and the Commercial Grand Prix circuit, which was 
directly linked to their competition result (Hong, 2006). 
Finally, to make athletes compete wholeheartedly for China, patriotism and 
nationalism were inculcated in the athletes' minds. According to the vice president of 
the COC, Wu Shouzhang who was one of the architects of the Olympic Glory Project, 
"the fundamental mission for Chinese athletes is to actively participate in 
international competition for the sake of the nation's pride". He went on to argue that 
"our job was to help athletes to establish their highest value of life which was to be 
fervent patriots whose responsibility was to raise the national flag and to play the 
national anthem in the international sport arenas" (Wu, S. 200 I: 72). He also claimed 
that "the value of the lives of Chinese athletes would be nothing if it was not linked to 
the national pride" (Wu, S. 200 I: 239). Responsibility for political education was 
given to one of the top managers in each national squad (Interview: former staff 
member in GAOS Training Centre for Sport Officials and Coaches, 2rd December 
2005) with the emphasis on inculcating patriotism, collectivism and revolutionary 
heroism in order to dilute and reduce the allurements of materialism and money (Wu, 
S. 2001: 239). Therefore, banners such as "Put your Motherland in your heart as you 
cast your eyes on the world" and "Practice your skills and bring back something for 
your country" could be seen in many of China's national training camps to remind the 
Chinese athletes about what they were really playing for (Rice, 2006). Although 
China did whatever she could to educate her athletes to hold the value of "national 
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pride first and personal interest second", as argued by sport minister, Liu Peng (2006), 
the result seemed to go the opposite way in that "the inclination of Chinese athletes 
was towards fighting and competing for financial reward", as noted by several senior 
officials in the GAOS, COC and Chinese academics (Interview: senior staff member 
in the GAOS Beijing Sport University, 3rd January 2006). 
In short, as market mechanisms had been introduced into China's elite sport system, it 
is not surprising to see that commercialisation, to some extent, has pervaded and 
penetrated the sport community. This was seen in the introduction of a system of 
financial rewards for motivating athletes, coaches and people who contribute to 
producing Olympic gold medallists, accepting sponsorship and participating in 
commercial championships to raise athletes' and coaches' income, and allowing 
athletes at different levels to be transferred for a fee. Commercialism was not only 
changing the way the Chinese government ran its elite system in order to generate 
more income from the market and society, but also changing the values and attitudes 
of Chinese athletes, coaches and managers towards financial reward. This could 
possibly outweigh the importance of national interest set by the government and in 
particular the goal of Olympic success. The response of the government to the 
increasing commercialisation of sport is discussed in the next section. 
5.4 Commercialisation 
As mentioned in an earlier section, the Chinese elite system or so-called "whole 
country supports elite sport system" was borrowed and modified from its former 
socialist mentor - the USSR. However, to solve the financial problems and to 
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of this old system, the PRC, arguably, had 
little option but to adopt the same methods as its western counterparts. Although the 
way the Chinese government ran its elite system was quite different from the Soviet 
Union, its fundamental principle - "Olympic success first" never changed. Under 
these circumstances, anything that endangered this principle could not be accepted but 
had to be controlled by the Chinese government. As Wu Shouzhang, vice president of 
COC noted that "the professionalisation and commercialisation of elite development 
was like a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it facilitated and allured athletes and 
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coached to raise their performance by high salaries and soaring rewards; on the other 
hand, it also cast a shadow over elite development" (Wu, S. 2001: 175). This kind of 
concern was echoed by one of the GAOS' latest documents in which it stated that 
"under the structure of a socialist market economy, there are new problems and 
challenges for us in managing national squad members who are involved in 
commercial activities. It would not only affect the training and competitions of 
national squads, but also seriously interfere in the way we manage our teams if those 
problems can not be effectively solved in time" (GAOS, 2006d). To reduce the 
negative impact of commercialisation on Chinese elite development, The following 
four strategies were adopted: i) controlling the access by athletes to commercial 
activities; ii) redistributing a proportion of athletes' commercial income; iii) punishing 
athletes who are considered to be too heavily involved in commercial activities; and 
iv) requesting National Sport Management Centres (NSMCs) to refrain from 
involvement in commercial activities. 
4-1. Combating the attraction of foreign commercialisation 
To control the access of athletes to commercial activities, the NSC in an official 
document stated that "all intangible assets of in-service Chinese athletes belonged to 
the state .... Under no circumstance, can any in-service Chinese athlete be directly or 
indirectly involved in any commercial activities independently. [Furthermore] all the 
commercial activities have to be mediated by the national sport associations" (GAOS, 
2000a: 87). Another document issued by GAOS in 2006 observed that "the conditions 
for athletes who are involved in commercial activities ... must avoid interfering in the 
affairs of training and competitions, and the administration of national squads" 
(GAOS, 2006d). The priority of Olympic success over commercial income could be 
seen in all NSMCs, such as athletics, volleyball, swimming and table tennis. 
Comments from one of the senior staff member in the Chinese Athletics Management 
Centre emphasise this priority: 
Commercial income is less important than Olympic success because GAOS would 
guarantee the budget for training and competitions of national squad. Far more 
important is the athlete's performance in the Olympic Games. That is why GAOS 
has instructed us that we should limit the star athlete's commercial activities, 
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especially those of the Olympic gold medallist of 110 hurdle, Liu Xiang. 
(Interview, 10th January 2006) 
Second, to prevent athletes from moving toward "individualism" and "the pursuit of 
wealth", China insisted that a proportion of an athlete's income from competition and 
commercial activities be redistributed within sport (GAOS, 2003d: 60). According to 
a GAOS document, the principle for redistributing athletes' commercial profit is: 
athlete (50 percent); coaches and people who have performed meritorious service (I5 
percent); the sport foundation of National Sport Association (15 percent); and the 
local teams which contributed to producing this athlete (20 percent). As regards the 
athlete's income from Commercial Grand Prixs, redistribution is as follows: athletes, 
coaches and people who have performed meritorious service (50 percent); the sport 
foundation of National Sport Association (30 percent); the provinces from which the 
athlete and hislher coaches were recruited from (10 percent); and GAOS (10 percent) 
(GAOS, 2003d: 61). In order to ensure that athletes would follow the principle set by 
the GAOS, the PRC also requested each NSMC to sign a commercial contract with 
their athletes. This commercial contract was copied from a GAOS document - "The 
Commercial Contract of National Squads Members" - according to which the 
government could redistribute an athlete's commercial profit by law once they signed 
the contract (GAOS, 2006d). From the Chinese government perspective, the main 
purpose of allowing athletes to become involved in commercial activities was because 
it "was a useful tool for exploiting intangible sport assets and for generating more 
income for the elite system" (GAOS, 2003d:60). 
Third, to restrict athlete's commercial behaviour, the Chinese government removed 
the title of national squad member from athletes who were considered to be too 
heavily involved in commercial activities, as was the case with Tian Liang, an 
Olympic diving gold medallist, who was expelled from the national squad. According 
to one senior staff member in the Chinese Swimming Management Centre "We are 
following the regulations set by the GAOS by which athletes do not have a right to be 
involved in commercial advertisement. All commercial activities that athletes are 
involved in must be mediated by our centre. Besides, the number of advertisements 
has to be limited because the regular training schedule can not be interrupted by these 
social activities" (Interview, 10th January 2006). According to this senior staff 
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member, Tian Liang was deemed to have engaged in 'too many commercial 
activities' and was thrown out of the team. That meant Tian Liang did not have a 
chance to participate in any future international sport event. In the case ofTian Liang, 
a member of the senior personnel staff in GAOS argued that "this administration 
system of sport, is in some respects very strict with our athletes, but it works quite 
well". He went on to argue that "the reason why China's Olympic gold medals far 
outnumber the silver and bronze is that we can control any negative element. ... All 
these elements in relation to each athlete's training, dietary and even everyday 
thought have to be totally controlled" (Interview, 12'h January 2006). It is not 
unexpected that another Chinese Olympic gold star, diver Guo Jingjing, was given 
stem warnings that she, too, was expendable if she did not refrain from commercial 
activities. 
Finally, to reduce the rampant commercialism in National Sport Management Centres 
(NSMCs), the GAOS not only criticized the indulgently commercial behaviour of the 
directors ofNSMCs, but also gave instructions that all significant competitions and 
commercial contracts had to be approved by GAOS. In a speech preparing for the 
2004 Olympics, former sport minister, Yuan Weimin stated that "The first and most 
important mission for NSMCs is to promote elite sport. Therefore all the things 
NSMCs do are to serve and support this mission". He went on to remind NSMCs that 
"Some centres do not bear this in mind and even leaders in those centres are busy in 
sport competitions and commercial sponsorship .... this way of putting the cart before 
the horse will lead to low performance of our athletes although everybody's pocket 
will be full" (Yuan, W. 2004c: 16). In addition, in an official document - "The Notice 
for Standardizing the Code of Practice of National Sport Management Centres", the 
GAOS requested all NSMCs to submit their annual programme of competitions and 
key commercial contracts to the GAOS before making any agreement with sponsors 
(GAOS, 2003d:56-63). The priority of Olympic success is reflected in the words of 
one senior staff member in the Chinese Swimming Management Centre: 
We have an agreement with [Nike] until 2008 but the contract will be renewed 
each year. We want to make sure that commercial activities won't adversely affect 
our training programmes and our national squad's performance before signing a 
contract with commercial sponsors. We would reject the sponsorship if these 
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commercial contracts did not fit in our training and competition programmes. 
(Interview, loth January 2006). 
In short, to combat the attraction of foreign commercialism and to maintain Olympic 
success, the Chinese government not only centralized most the commercial rights in 
the hands of the GAOS by which it could make sure that most of commercial income 
could be redistributed within sport, but also disciplined or punished those who were 
involved too heavily in commercial activities and ignored their main mission-
Olympic success. Although the Chinese government has attempted, with reasonable 
success so far, to manage the impact of commercial interests on Chinese domestic 
sports practices and elite athletes, they still have to deal with tension among sport 
stars, clubs, sponsors and even NSMCs. from time to time. As is made clear by the 
comments of Lin Xianpeng, a senior researcher in GAOS during his interview with 
Nanfang Daily, "Our sport system was facing new problems whereby the sport system 
under the planned economy, which had dominated most sport resources for a long 
time, was challenged by market forces" (Huang, 2005). 
5.5 Conclusion 
As indicated by the hard and soft indicators mentioned in Chapter 4 and Appendix 2-6, 
we have generated useful and valid evidence which is mapped out in this Chapter. 
Benefiting from Houlihan's patterns of globalization (see Chapter 2), we are able to 
summarize China's response to the Olympic Movement after China's open-door 
policy in the late 1970s. Within this framework, the relationship between China and 
the Olympic Movement is located somewhere in between participative and conflictual. 
Most of China's responses are 'participative' (see Table 5-6). Indeed, China has 
significantly controlled the resources in a number of ways. It has gradually increased 
the number of influential Chinese officials in the IOC and IFs (see 1 h, 2h and 4s in 
Appendix 4), produced a huge elite sport squad (see 3h, 5h, 6h and 8h in Appendix 4), 
created a refined structure for producing world class athletes (see 4h, 6h, 7h and 4s in 
Appendix 4), set up a system of financial rewards to motivate all those involved in 
producing Olympic medallists (see 3s and 5s in Appendix 4) and channelled 
substantial multiple income, including over 97 percent of the national sport budget, 
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into the Olympic sport system (see 4h, 6h and 7h in Appendix 4). All of the resources 
mentioned above were to be used to produce Olympic gold medallists in order to raise 
national pride, to increase national cohesion and to demonstrate the superiority of 
Chinese socialism. As a 'conflictual' response, the Chinese government established a 
set of values, namely nationalism and patriotism (see Is, 2s and 5s in Appendix 4) 
that led to an attempt to reject aspects of global culture, and of individualistic 
commercialism (see 3s, 5s and 9h in Appendix 4). But one thing we need to bear in 
mind is that China's conflictual response did not totally reject global culture, as its 
former party leaders did during the Cultural Revolution. The PRC allowed Chinese 
athletes to be involved in commercial activities on the government's terms. In other 
words, the government not only became the biggest agent of Chinese athletes' 
commercial rights and interests but also set its own agenda in an attempt to reject the 
global culture that might endanger the government's main goal of Olympic success. 
Table 5.6: Summary of China's response to the Olympic Movement 
Participative Conflictual 
Sufficient control over resources to provide !Not only the possession of 
Meaning recipient cultures with leverage ~ufficient resources to 
A process of negotiation, bargaining and enable resistance but also a 
accommodation between global culture and set of values that leads to 
local cultures; ejection or attempted 
rejection of the global 
culture 
1. Setting a quota of 50 people to obtain l. Preventing coaches 
leadership positions in IFs and and athletes from 
having clear strategies for taking an going abroad 
Actions of IOC seat 2. Combating the 
he Chinese 2. Strengthening athlete selection, attraction of foreign 
government training and competition systems commercialisation 
leading toward the Olympic Games 
3. Transforming administrative 
structure and generating multiple 
incomes into the Olympic Sport 
System 
4. Introducing a system of financial 
rewards 
As regards the "reach" of global culture in the Chinese context, it appears that it has 
been a case of China reaching out to bring in global influences rather than global 
influences pushing their way in. This is seen especially in the slogan - "Sending 
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human capital out and bringing foreign resources in" by which athletes, coaches, 
managers and scientists were dispatched to learn new knowledge and skills from the 
outside world, and foreign experts, sponsors and companies were welcomed into 
China to bring new resources to promote the Chinese elite system. To a large extent, 
China has been enthusiastic about absorbing those international influences and, rather 
than seeing them as a threat, they have seen them as a resource. In the words of the 
central government document - "Strengthening and Progressing Sport in the New 
Era": "after winning the bid for hosting 2008 Beijing Olympics in 200 I, we will 
promote China's economic and social development in the new era, open China's 
doors more widely and deeply, and raise China's status on the international scene. All 
of these will have a huge impact on China's future." (GAOS, 2003b: 5). This kind of 
perspective further echoed Deng's active 'open door' policy which implied not only 
an economic involvement with the capitalist world - through trade, investment and 
technology transfer - but also an opening-up to ideas and cultural forms originating in 
the West (Knight, 2003: 318; Ness & Raichur, 1983: 85). 
From the Summary of China's response to the Olympic Movement, there are two 
main findings. First, the Chinese government has demonstrated a capacity to manage 
effectively the impact of the Olympic Movement and Olympic values on domestic 
sport practices, especially in relation to elite development; and second, the Chinese 
government has attempted, with reasonable success so far, to manage the impact of 
Olympic commercial interests on Chinese domestic sports practices and elite athletes. 
China demonstrated the capacity to exercise choice in its relationship with sport 
globalization, as illustrated most clearly by its withdrawal from the Olympic Games 
and most international sporting contact during the Cultural Revolution. However, the 
enthusiastic embrace of capitalism, following the 'open-door' policy introduced by 
Deng Xiaoping in 1978, has not only made a return to sporting (cultural) isolation less 
likely, but also much more difficult. As regards the management ofits relationship 
with sport globalisation the PRC faces increasing tension, between the individual 
interest of athletes and the collective interest emphasized by the Communist 
Government. This is seen in the case of Chinese sport stars Tiang Liang, an Olympic 
gold medallist in diving, Peng Shuai, a world class female tennis player, and Wang 
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Zhizhi, the first Chinese NBA player, all of whom have challenged the authority of 
the Communist Government. 
In this case study, we have largely dealt with individuals and with the international 
organizations. But is government interest still dominating the concern with profit? A 
conclusion cannot be reached without investigating the relationship between 
government and commercial clubs and leagues. So far, we have noted the tension 
between the objectives of commercial sports and national sports (especially in soccer, 
basketball, volleyball). With some limited exceptions, such as the income from gate 
money, the Chinese government took all the commercial rights of these Super 
Leagues and clubs and drafted key players from clubs into national squads for 
competition and training, without considering the interests of clubs. This led most 
clubs to attempt to organise new leagues to compete with those controlled by the 
Chinese government. As for the Chinese government's capacity to manage global 
culture, we clearly need to look at more evidence to balance our final interpretation 
and analysis. It is also clear that the part of an organizational challenge to the 
government is definitely crucial. Therefore, the final conclusion will not be apparent 
until we have looked at the case of elite football and basketball. 
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Chapter Six: Chinese Elite Football 
6.1 Introduction 
Although China was regarded as the birthplace of football, as acknowledged by the 
Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIr A) in 2004, it was not until the 
late nineteenth century that China was introduced to the modern version (CF A, 1993: 
39). Modern football was first introduced into Hong Kong and spread to coastal cities 
and some Church Universities as a result of colonialism in the mid-nineteenth century 
(CFA, 1993: 43). In the decades that followed, years of much political instability, its 
development was slow. Although a Chinese football team participated in the 1936 
Berlin and 1948 London Olympics with the support of China's National Amateur 
Athletic Federation (CNAAF), the Chinese team lost all its games. Generally 
speaking, before the mid-twentieth century, the popularity, playing and administration 
of Chinese football were far from mature (Dong and Mangan, 2001: 79). After the 
founding of the PRC in 1949, Communist China began building its elite football 
system, mostly learning from the USSR and Hungary. With the help of Soviet and 
Hungarian experts, the PRC gradually built up its own training and competition 
system. To prepare for the 1957 Asian football match to qualify for the football World 
Cup the Chinese government dispatched a football team of 25 players to Hungary for 
one and a half year's training (CFA, 1993: 123). Unfortunately, in 1954 the Chinese 
football team did not qualify this World Cup and lost in the quarter-final of the 'First 
New Emerging Forces Games' (GANEFO I) in Indonesia in 1963. 
Humiliated by a series of international defeats, the Vice Premier, He Long, 
summoned the "National Conference for Football Development" in 1964, in which 
the Central Communist League, the Educational Ministry, the National Sports 
Commission (NSC) and the All-China Trades Union were involved. Following this 
conference, the NSC issued an important document - "About the Decision for 
Promoting Football and for Raising International Performance" - with a focus on 
developing a training system for youth players and a national competition system 
(CFA, 1993: 132). Although this was a serious step towards raising international 
football performance and although the country was ranked second after Korea in the 
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'Asia Newly Emerging Forces Games' in 1965, China's ambition to make its mark on 
the world game was destroyed by the Cultural Revolution. Not only was the Vice 
Premier, lie Long, accused of 'taking the bourgeois road' (Zhou ziben zhuy daolu) 
and died in jail in 1969, but also numerous elite players, coaches and administrators 
were purified, persecuted and tortured, football facilities were widely ruined and 
international sports contacts virtually ended (CF A, 1993: 135). Following the 
successful 'Ping Pong Diplomacy' supported by Premier Chou and Deng Xiaoping 
(Wu, S.Z. 1999a: 178; Li, X.M. 200 I: 93-94), China re-established the national team 
in 1973 and began reintroducing the modern football system after the end of the 
Cultural Revolution in 1977. 
Following China's open door policy, the PRC was eager to promote itself on the 
world football stage but there were two main policy challenges facing the Chinese 
government. One was how to raise the profile of Chinese football on the world stage, 
which involved not just producing a successful team, but also being prominent within 
FIF A and AFC. The other challenge was how to establish an effective domestic 
league to support and contribute to the national objective. These two questions will be 
discussed in more detail in the section on formal engagement with FIFA and the 
section on elite development. In addition, after Deng Xiaoping boldly advocated a 
market economy in China in early 1992 the Western market model, involving the club 
and transfer system, was widely adopted throughout the country. The acceptance of 
market approach also raises the question of how the Chinese government handled the 
issue of commercialization in relation to the flow of players and the commercial 
interests of clubs and sponsors. This issue will be discussed further in the section on 
commercialization. 
6.2 Formal engagement with FIFA 
The relationship between the PRC and FIFA appears to have gone through three quite 
distinct phrases - withdrawal, manipUlation, and currently, enthusiastic involvement. 
During the first phase, Communist China was accepted by FIFA in 1952 but withdrew 
in 1958 due to the "Two Chinas" issue. In the second phase, the PRC not only sent a 
team to participate in GANEFO in the early 1960s but also attempted to expel and 
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replace Taiwanese membership in FIFA and the AFC. In the final phase, following 
China's open-door policy the PRC has become enthusiastically involved in 
international football, especially focusing on qualifying for the World Cup, hosting 
the Women's World Cup and the Olympic Games in Beijing and attempting to bid for 
the Men's World Cup. 
6.2.1 Engagement with FIFA 
In 1952 Communist China was accepted by FIFA as a member, with the name 
'All-China Sports Federation (ACSF), (Zhonghu quanguo tiyu zonghui). Three years 
later, the Chinese government set up the Chinese Football Association (CF A) which 
claimed jurisdiction over all Chinese football activities and required FIFA to revoke 
Taiwan's membership. Disappointed over representation issues, the PRC not only quit 
its membership of the IOC, but also withdrew from nine other international sporting 
organisations including football, in protest over the IOC's 'two Chinas' policy in 
1958. After withdrawing from FIFA, the PRC supported GANEFO to combat 
so-called western imperialism and capitalism, including FIFA. The PRC did not 
contact FIFA until after the success of China's 'Ping Pong Diplomacy' which made a 
contribution towards improving the Sino-US bilateral relationship. This, to some 
extent, helped the PRC acquire a seat on the UN Security Council in the early 19705. 
The PRC wanted to insist on its "One China" policy when rejoining FIFA, and the 
Chinese government needed someone who had power within FIFA to help them 
achieve this goal. A Hong Kong Tycoon, Fok Ying Tung, who was then the President 
of the Hong Kong Football Association and was one of the FIFA executive members 
(1978-1998), took the key role of helping the PRC to regain its membership of FIF A 
and also in forcing Taiwan to adopt a different national anthem and flag in 1979. 
Indeed, Fok Ying Tung was a very good friend of FIFA president, Joao Havelange 
Who visited Beijing twice, in 1974 and 1978, and helped the PRC resolve the "Two 
Chinas" problem within FIFA. Due to Fok Ying lung's extraordinary contribution to 
Chinese sport in the international regime, he was selected as a Standing Committee 
member of the 7th National People's Congress in 1988 and has been vice-chairman of 
the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference of 
PRC since March 1993. 
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Following the PRC's re-engagement with global football, the Chinese government 
aimed to have its own voice and more influence within FIFA, according to a CF A 
document in 1992 (CF A, 2000a: 5), but due to the weak performance of the Chinese 
national football squads, China could only take very limited steps towards raising its 
profile in FIFA. The first step was to take advantage 0 f hosting the 1991 and 2007 
Women's World Cup and the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games in order to impress FIFA, 
and Zhang Jilong, a CFA vice president, was selected as one of the members of the 
Organising Committee for the 2006 and 2010 World Cups and for the 2008 Olympic 
Football Tournaments. The next step was for the PRC to secure strong representation 
in the Asian Football Confederation CAFC) in order to gain membership and have its 
own representative in FIFA. This will be discussed in the following section. 
6.2.2 Engagement with the Asian Football Confederation (AFC) 
In order to participate in the football event at the Tehran Asian Games in 1974, the 
PRC started becoming involved in the AFC. According to FIFA regulations, only a 
FIFA member could become an AFC member, which was the requirement for 
participating in football events in the Asian Games. The problem was that the CF A 
was not accepted as a FIFA member in 1974 because the Chinese government's 
condition of entry was that Taiwan must be expelled from FIFA and that the CF A 
must be confirmed as the sole sporting organisation representing the whole of China. 
The only chance for the CF A to take part in the Tehran Asian Games was to be 
accepted as a member of AFC. Mr. He Zhengliang, a powerful official in the 
department of international/external affairs in the National Sport Commission (NSC) 
and an IOC member in 1981, asked Fok Ying Tung to help China solve this problem. 
With the help of Mr. Fok and his son, Fok Tsun Ting (an IOC member since 2001), 
China cooperated with 13 Asian countries, such as Kuwait, Pakistan, Myanmar and 
Afghanistan, to defeat Tunku Rahman, President of the AFC and former Prime 
Minister of Malaysia, who had rejected the Chinese government's condition of entry. 
During this conference of the AFC, the PRC was not only accepted as an AFC 
member, but there was also a revision of the AFC regulations to acknowledge that a 
non-FIF A member who was a member of the Olympic Council of Asia (OCA) could 
be an AFC member. In addition, Taiwan was successfully blocked by the AFC, with 
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the help of the Iran government, and Taiwanese participants were prevented from 
taking part in this Conference of the AFC (Liang, 2005: 82-83). 
After becoming an AFC member, the PRC took an active part in the organization, 
especially on the executive board. The Chinese government nominated Chen Chengda, 
the director of the football division in the NSC and the Secretary of the CF A, for 
selection as an executive member of the AFC in 1984. Two years later in 1993, Mr. 
Chen was selected as an AFC Vice President. His successor, Xu Fang, CF A vice 
president and one of the key architects of the Chinese professional football club 
system, became the second Chinese AFC Vice President. Unfortunately, Me. Xu died 
of a heart attack in 1996 and Zhang Jilong, who was a CF A vice president, became 
the third Chinese AFC Vice President. Taking advantage of Me. Zhang's diplomatic 
skill, China successfully won the right to host the 2003 Women's World Cup and the 
2004 Asian Cup. Furthermore, AFC President Mohamed Bin Hammam was 
persuaded first to reduce the penalties imposed on two Chinese football stars, An Qi 
and Zheng Zhi who had been banned from participating in any international 
competition for more than six months because of insulting referees during the AFC 
Club Championship in 2005, and second to design a competition schedule to help 
China qualify for the 2001 World Cup. According to FIFA's decision, the AFC 
should follow the rules set by the president of the Organising Committee for the 2001 
FIF A World Cup, Johansson Lennart, president of UEFA (since 1990), when 
arranging the competition schedule. If the AFC had accepted FIFA's rule, China 
would have had to compete with Iran and would have had a very limited chance to 
qualify for the World Cup. Zhang Jilong, then a CF A vice president and a chairman of 
the Competition Committee, rejected the idea of following FIFA's rule and 
proclaimed that FIFA had no right to interfere in the internal affairs of the AFC. 
Through his diplomatic ability, FIFA accepted the AFC's autonomy and did not force 
it to follow this competition rule. Benefiting from AFC's competition schedule, China 
avoided two of the strongest teams, Iran and Saudi Arabia and successfully qualified 
for the 2001 World Cup (Bo, 2001). Due to Mr. Zhang's diplomatic talent, he was 
promoted to director ofBOCOG sports department and was fully supported byGAOS 
and CF A in competing for the number one position of AFC Vice President again in 
2007 (Zhu, 2006). 
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The Chinese government had been reasonably successful in increasing its influence 
within the AFC. However, it was more difficult to improve the standard of the 
national team. In order to understand the strategy for improving the standard of the 
national team, it is necessary to explore how the Chinese government transformed the 
administrative structure of football in China first. and then, how the Chinese 
government took advantage of this administrative structure to reinforce its athlete 
selection, training and competition system leading to the Olympics and World Cup. 
6.3 Elite development 
6.3.1 Transforming the administrative structure and strengthening the athlete 
selection, training and competition system 
The administrative structure 
To achieve the goal of qualifying as one of the Top 12 teams in the football World 
Cup before 1985, in the document - "The Request Instruction for Raising China's 
Elite Football Performance from the NSC" - issued by the State Council in 1979 
(National Sports Commission Policy Research Centre, 1982a: 515), enabled the NSC 
to restore the football administrative structure to what it had been before the Cultural 
Revolution. At this time the whole football system was embedded in part of the 
NSC's administrative structure (see Figure 6.1) and the most important departments 
for promoting Chinese football were the Ball Games Department - for training and 
competition affairs, National Training Bureau - for national football squads, the Sport 
for All Department - for grassroots football and the External Affairs Department - for 
international football affairs. Unfortunately, under this administrative structure, the 
PRC was not only defeated by Hong Kong in Beijing on 19th May 1985 and excluded 
from the World Cup, but also suffered the so-called "519 football hooligan event" at 
which Chinese football fans could not accept the result which saw China defeated by 
Hong Kong and which resulted in a wave of football fan riots (CF A, 1993: 149). 
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Figure 6.1: The Chinese Football Administrative Structure 1955-1985 
Source: Yuan, W. (2002b: 35) 
In order to speed up the improvement in the Chinese football team's performance, the 
"Football Office" was upgraded from being the "Division of Football" to being 
directly led by the then vice Sport Minister, Yuan Weiming in 1986 (Yuan, W. 2002b: 
19). To reduce the tension between the Football Office and the Training Bureau, Nian 
Weigu, who became CFA's president after Yuan Weiming in 1988, was appointed as 
vice director of the Training Bureau. Dishearteningly, Team China was defeated by 
Team Thailand and did not qualify for the semi-finals in the Asian Games in 1990, 
which brought about Mr. Nian's resignation from his post as CFA president in 1991 
(Wang, J. 2002: 7). Before his resignation, Mr. Nian asked FIFA president, Joao 
Havelange to send an expert team to help inspect the Chinese football system in order 
to improve Chinese football performance. After a 10 day visit to China in April 1992, 
the FIFA team, which consisted of a director of FIF A's technical department, the 
Netherlands' national football coach and the general secretary of the Malaysia 
Football Association, gave a report and presentation to FIFA officials, including FIFA 
president, Joao Havelange and FIFA general secretary, Joseph S. Blatter. Both of 
these invited Wang Junsheng, CFA's new leader and Zhang Jilong, CFA's new 
director of External Affair Department to visit FIFA for the Seminar on Chinese 
Football Development (Wang, J. 2002: 30-31). Wang Junsheng, the number one vice 
director of CF A and the main designer and promoter of the Chinese professional 
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football system, agreed with the conclusion of FIFA's report which stated that China 
had to reform totally its football administrative structure and introduce a professional 
club system and sponsorship. He also emphasized that "one of the main reasons for 
reforming Chinese football is to solve the problems of Chinese football's poor 
performance" (Wang, 1. 2002: 36-37) 
Indeed, introducing a western club system prompted a very strong debate at the 1992 
National Football Conference and most officials rejected the idea of introducing this 
new system because they were worried about ceding power to these new clubs which 
were owned by capitalists (Wang, 1. 2002: 44-45). Due to intervention from Li 
Tieying, a member of the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), and a State 
Councillor (1988-1998) with a second job as a director of the Government Reform 
Commission opposition, voices were suppressed and the capitalist experiment was 
given the green light in the Chinese football system (Wang, 1. 2002: 45-47). China not 
only introduced a club system but also took a dramatic step towards reforming its 
administrative structure. From Figure 6.2, we can see that China adopted a western 
and especially European approach, when establishing this new structure. The three 
key transformations in contrast with the original structure in Figure 6.1 are: i) setting 
up a highly institutionalized and rationalized Chinese football system; ii) introducing 
the club system; and iii) establishing football companies as commercial agents. As 
regards the first point, GAOS not only established more specialized departments, such 
as the Technical Department, National Squad Department, Competition Department 
and Comprehensive Department but also recruited into the CF A staff with more 
varied backgrounds, such as sport science, finance, law and management, in order to 
run this system more effectively. As for the second point, China introduced a club 
system replacing the Soviet system, to create a more competitive and 
material-oriented framework. Regarding the final point, in order to survive without 
government financial support, two football companies, the Chinese Super League 
Company (for the super league) and the Chinese Football Company (for the rest of the 
professional football league ), were established, and one multi-national sport 
management company (Infront Sports & Media) was introduced. The Chinese 
Football Management Centre (CFMC) was created in 1994, but the leadership and the 
general function was exactly the same as the CFA. The title of the CFA was used to 
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connect with international organizations and the CFMC was used to interact with the 
domestic political system. 
Figure 6.2: Chinese Football Administrative Structure in 2006 
7 Non. OlympIc Sport Management Centres 
Sport 
M.anagcmenl 
Company 
(Infront Sports 
" MedII) 
16 Olympic Sport Management Centres 
Chinese Football Association! Chinese Football Management Cenue 
ProvinciaV City Foolball 
Associations 
Note: Progression rotes for athletes: ---+ Partnership between Sport Management Company 
and National Squads Department and National Squads: ..... . 
The selection system 
In order to "fulfil the emergent sport mission to speed up elite football development" 
(National Sports Commission Policy Research Centre, 1982a: 515), the NSC 
concentrated its limited football resources on 16 "significant cities and areas for 
football in China" (SCAAFF) which were identified in 1979. According to the 
requirements of the State Council, each SCAAFF had to not only promote grassroots 
football in primary and secondary schools but also establish 3-5 spare-time football 
schools to produce talented footballers. By 1989, there were 22 SCAAFFs in China. 
According to Yuan Weiming, former Sport Minister and former CFA president, "all 
the national squads (World Cup team, Olympic squad, U 16, U 19) were selected from 
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these SCAAFFs" (Yuan, W. 2002b: 212). In addition, the Chinese government also 
selected, in 1985, 8 significant provincial football squads as priorities for financial 
support, namely Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Shandong, Guangdong, Hubei, Liaoning 
& PLA (Yuan, W. 2002b: 212). Unfortunately, according to the vice president of 
eoc, Wu Shouzhang, affected by the Olympic strategy in the mid-1980s, the Chinese 
government focused on potential individual Olympic medal sports, such as table 
tennis, diving, gymnastics, swimming and track and field in preference to team sports 
such as football (Wu, S. 2001: 46). From Table 6.1 we can see that the number of 
provincial footballers decreased from 1977 in 1985 to 1000 in 1991 and the number of 
young footballers in Spare-time Sport Schools declined from 21539 in 1985 to 16311 
in 1991. 
Table 6.1: Football players in the Chinese sport selection system 1979-2005 
Levell Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 
Provincial Squads Sport Colleges Spare-time Sport Traditional Total 
School Schools 
1957 294 0 0 0 
1962 1202 0 0 0 
1965 1230 0 0 0 
1970 764 0 0 0 
1975 1028 0 0 0 
1979 1768 0 16923 0 
1980 1207 553 16868 0 
1985 1977 1157 21539 211005 235678 
1990 1245 1334 18092 221825 242496 
1991 1000 1293 16311 230443 249047 
1992 1169 1476 13531 284913 301089 
1993 867 1430 13036 228030 243363 
1994 911 1448 13642 226766 242767 
1995 975 1399 14007 207089 223470 
1996 979 1432 15821 218458 236690 
1997 994 1895 17456 215083 235428 
1998 863 2179 21026 245471 269539 
1999 763 2524 21956 258723 283966 
2000 762 2843 24417 323656 351678 
2001 765 4454 25453 294065 324737 
2005 595 4412 20770 0 
* There was no record during the period of Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) 
Source: NSC (Planning and Finance Department), Statistical Yearbook of Sport (Internal 
information), 1994-2005. 
Under these circumstances, unsurprisingly, the Chinese Team was again defeated and 
eliminated from the Olympic Games in 1992. After this defeat, According to CF A 
Vice president, Wang Junsheng, State Councilor, Li Tieying, instructed the NSC in an 
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official document that "we must raise Chinese football's performance in international 
competitions because it is not only the desire of all the Chinese people but also a 
challenging, honourable and historic mission for the NSC and the CFA" (Wang, 1. 
2002: 43). Under the direction ofthe powerful State Councillor, and Sport Minister, 
Wu Shaozu, football was proclaimed as the vanguard for experimentation with the 
club system. Due to the weak position of football the failure of the club's experiment 
would not have a serious impact on China's Olympic strategy. Furthermore, Mr. Wu 
emphasized that the fact "that Deng Xiaoping boldly advocated a market economy in 
China in early 1992 was strong ideological support for us to introduce the club 
system" (Wang, 1.2002: 43). With the full support of the State Council and the NSC, 
the CF A took a dramatic club approach; this is to say, a western European one, to 
transform its football selection system from a Soviet model (see Figure 6.3) to a 
Western model (see Figure 6.4). 
Figure 6.3: China's Football Selection System before 1992 
YOURe National Squads (UI6. Ul9) 
Provincial, PLA & City Squads 
Sport Colleges 
Spare-time Sport Schools for football 
Schools with Football Tradition & School Football Teams 
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Figure 6.4: China's Football Selection System in 2006 
I World CUP Team 
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Professional Clubs 
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Amateur Clubs (potential level) 
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To create a new football selection system, the CF A issued a document in 1992 titled 
"The 10-Year Development Project for Chinese Football (1993-2002)" which 
highlighted the establishment of a "Grassroots Club System" (Lu yin gong cheng) 
adapted to the market economy as a new way to develop Chinese football (CF A, 
2000a: 4). In order to set up this new selection system, the NSC convened a "National 
Conference for Developing Young Football" in 1994. At this conference, the 
president of the Chinese Football Management Centre (CFMC), Wang Junsheng, 
announced that the new selection system would consist of 4 sub-systems, namely, the 
school football system, amateur club system, professional club system, and social 
support system. 
As regards the school football system, the School Football Committee was established 
in the CF A in order to support similar committees in provincial and city football 
associations. These had the aim of promoting and organizing football activity in 
schools, especially the setting up of a system of weekend football competitions for 
primary, junior and senior high schools and universities. For the amateur club system, 
the CF A decided to create a trial "market for amateur young footballers" (Houbei 
rencai shchang) to transfer potential footballers to professional clubs in the 12 
210 
Chapter 6 - Chinese Elite Football 
"significant cities and areas for football in China" (SCAAFF). For the professional 
club system, the CF A set a requirement for each professional club to establish its own 
U23 and U 19 team. Unless they fulfilled these conditions, they could not participate 
in professional football competitions in 1996. For the social support system, the CF A 
encouraged provincial and city governments to promote football by attracting 
commercial resources from wider society to support football camps, weekend football 
cup, baby football cup and city football cup (CF A, 2000b: 541-2). In addition, to 
supplement and strengthen this new selection system, the CF A not only began 
introducing commercial football into the school system, but also set up in 1992 its 
own football school to produce potential footballers for the young national teams 
(UI6, U19) and for professional clubs (CFA, 2000c: 535). 
The CF A attempted to create this club selection system to replace the Soviet system 
but it has not so far fully succeeded due to the failure of the market system to generate 
the expected income which led to the reduction in the number of sport colleges and 
spare-time sport schools for football supported by the provincial and city government, 
and to the shrinking of school football activity supported by the education system. 
According to a CF A internal report - "The Survey and Analysis for the Development 
of Youth Football in China" - issued by the Youth Football Department of the CFA in 
2006, the main challenges for the CF A in its club selection system were: the 
inferiority of football in the "Olympic strategy"; the collapse of the school football 
system; the limited investment from the CF A; and the serious decline of the football 
academy system (CFA, 2006a). We will consider each of these challenges in turn. 
From a provincial government's perspective, football is a high investment but low 
output sport in National and Olympic Games therefore most resources were focused 
On their own key Olympic sports, which not only'pushed football into a marginal 
position among 28 Olympic sports but also led gradually to a decline in local 
government support (CFA, 2006b). 
Regarding school football, the school system gradually disappeared from the club 
selection system because local sport management centres focused on supporting the 
professional club competitions instead of promoting school football, and local 
education authorities ceased to set the requirement of promoting school football (CF A, 
2006a). From Table 6.2, we can see that the number of students who participated in 
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football activity was increasing steadily from 1985 to 1995, but plummeted 
dramatically from 610,000 in the late 1990s to 180,000 in 2005. A similar pattern is 
evident in the selection system. Table 6.3 shows that the number of registered 
footballers declined from 39,408 in 2000 to 28,632 in 2005, which is consistent with 
the account in the CF A's internal report, "The Survey and Analysis for the 
Development of Youth Football in China". 
Table 6.2: Students who participate in football activity 1985-2005 
Year Students 
\985-\990 460,000 
1990-\995 650,000 
\995-2000 6\0,000 
2000-2005 \80,000 
Source: CF A (Youth Football Department) (2006a). "The Survey and Analysis for the Development of 
Youth Football in China" (Internal Report), offered by the Chinese official in the CF A. 
Table 6.3: Chinese Football Players 1998-2005 
Year GAOS CF A Registration 
1998 24068 
1999 25243 
2000 28022 39408 
2001 30672 23792 
2002 32592 
2003 40213 
2004 23161 
2005 28632 
.. Source: NSC (Planning and Finance Department), Statistical Yearbook of Sport (Internal information), 
1994-2002; CFA (Competition Department) (2006e), The Presentation Slides for 2003 Conference of 
CFA offered by a Chinese official in the CFA; 1994-2002; CFA (Registration Office) (2006), "The 
Annual Summary for the Registration of Youth Football in China" (Internal Report), offered by a 
Chinese official in the CF A. 
The CF A budget for supporting youth football development relied heavily on the 
income of the Chinese Football Super League (CSL). The CFA had decided to invest 
9 million yuan in promoting youth football development, including organising 
competitions (U-15, U-17 and U-19), supporting training camps and rewarding local 
football associations which had strongly promoted youth football since 2002. 
Unfortunately, affected by the shortage of income from CSL, the CFA cancelled the 9 
million yuan financial support to local football associations, which had a huge impact 
on the development of youth football (CFA, 2006a). 
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As for the school football system, at first it flourished, having more than 4200 football 
schools which were mostly unregistered in the 1990s, but then suddenly declined such, 
that there were only 300 unregistered and registered football schools in the early 
20005 following the demise of the bubble-economy of CSL. From Table 6.4, we can 
see that registered football schools decreased from 84 in 2000 to 42 in 2005. 
Table 6.4: Chinese Clubs and Football Schools 2000-2005 
Year CSL (Jia A) & Semi-professional Amateur Clubs Football Schools 
Jia Ji (Jia 8) (Male & Female) 
2000 26 33 1674 84 
2002 27 21 
2003 29 35 1125 73 
2004 29 39 545 51 
2005 27 33 520 42 
.. Source: CFA (CompetItIon Department), The PresentatIon Slides for 2003 Conference of CF A offered 
by a Chinese official in the CF A; CF A (Registration Office) (2006), "The Annual Summary for the 
Registration of Youth Football in China" (Internal Report), offered by a Chinese official in the CFA. 
According to a senior staff member in the CFA's Registration Office, "the reason why 
they did not take action to enforce a ban on these unregistered football schools was 
because they thought these schools would naturally die out due to having less and less 
new students". This respondent went on to say that "it would be impossible for the 
Young National Teams (U 16, U 19) to recruit potential youth footballers under this 
kind of youth football development system" (Interview 181h January 2006). The same 
argument was echoed by the head coach of the Young National Teams (U16), Zheng 
Xiong, who complained that it was difficult for him to recruit potential youth 
footballers to his U16 national team due to the limited choice provided by the Chinese 
selection system (Meng, 2006). 
The competition system 
The Chinese government gradually rebuilt and refined its original competition system 
which had been established before the Cultural Revolution, namely, league matches 
with a promotion and relegation system. In 1980, one document issued by the NSC 
and the Ministry of Education focused on promoting national football competitions 
for young players in the education system (National Sports Commission Policy 
Research Centre, 1982b: 337-8). To unify and advance this competition system, the 
213 
Chapter 6 - Chinese Elite Football 
CF A divided domestic football competitions into three levels in 1985 (Yuan, W. 
2002b: 110) (see Figure 6.5). . 
Figure 6.5: China's Elite Football Competition System for Olympics and World' 
Cup before 1992 
International Championships, 
includinl! Asian Games & CUD 
Division lA & IB! eFA Cup! National Games 
Division 2! National City Games / National Young Cup 
National Early Young Cup (UIO, 12, 14 & 16)/ National Women's Cup 
Level C consisted of the National Early Youth Cup (UI2, 14 & (6) and the National 
Women's Cup and was supported by the provincial government, especially the 16 
"significant cities and areas for football" (SCAAFF) in China (CFA, 1993: 153). At 
Level n, there were Division 2, National City Games (U20) and National Youth Cup. 
Level A was composed of Division lA and IB, CFA Cup and National Games. In 
order to raise the chances of qualifying for the World Cup and Olympics, the national 
teams whose players were recruited from provincial and PLA teams were isolated in 
training camps and trained all year round. This policy seriously impacted on the Level 
A competition as key players from the stronger provincial teams were recruited into 
national teams thus increasing the likelihood that these teams would be defeated by 
other normally weaker provincial teams. According to the former head coach of the 
PLA football team, Liu Guojiang, the PLA used to be the national champions in 
Division 1 A in 1986, but his team had gradually lost their title and fallen back to 
number five in 1991 due to key players being withdrawn for the national squads (Liu, 
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G. 1993: 231-2). In addition, to raise the Olympic squad's chance to qualify for the 
Olympics, the Olympic squad began participating as a 'club team' in Division I A in 
1988 and became the champions in 1989. Due to heavy interference and manipulation 
of Division 1 A, which gradually became the arena for honing the skills of the 
Olympic squad, the provincial government and the PLA were hesitant to invest more 
resources in their own teams causing a crisis in the competition system with the result 
that in 1992, there were only 700 footballers in 20 men's teams and 8 women's teams 
with a 9 million yuan national budget (Yuan, W. 2002b: 233). 
In order to solve this crisis, Li Tieying, a member of Politburo Standing Committee 
(PSC) and, a State Councillor (1988-1998), required the NSC in an official document 
to take action to reform the Chinese football system in early 1992. In the then Sport 
Minister Wu Shaozu's lectures at the 1992 and 1993 National Football Conferences, 
he highlighted and repeated Li Tieying's official instruction that "In order to raise 
Team China's profile, the Chinese football system has to be reformed" (Wu, S.Z. 
2000a: 8) and "To find a way out for Chinese football, we have to adopt professional 
football and club approaches with the support of private enterprise and the wider 
society in order for football to develop" (Wu, S.Z. 2000c: 16). Mr Li's instruction was 
quickly followed and embodied in a CF A document in 1992 - "The Initial Thought 
On Reforming the National Football Competition" - which highlighted the view that 
"Football competition is not only a useful lever to raise the Chinese elite football 
profile ... , but also a basic tool to promote China's football market and the dynamic to 
bring about Chinese football professionalism" (CF A, 2000d: 56). 
According to a CF A document (2000d: 56), the new domestic competition system 
would begin in 1995. This system consisted of National Men's Leagues, the CFA Cup, 
National Women's Cup and National Youth Cup (male and female) (see Figure 6.6). 
As regards the .National Men's Leagues, these were divided into three levels, which 
were Division lA (known as Super League after 2003), Division IB (known as 
Division I after 2003) and Division 2. There was a promotion and relegation 
mechanism among these leagues in which the first two teams in Division 1 would be 
promoted to the Super League whose last two teams would be relegated to Division 1, 
and the first 4 teams in Division 2 would qualify to join Division 1 and whose last 4 
teams would be demoted to Division 2. The CF A Cup was similar to the English 
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Football Association Cup although only those teams in the Super League and Division 
I could qualify for knockout competition. The winning team in the CF A Cup could 
Figure 6.6: China's Elite Football Competition System for Olympics and World 
Cup in 2006 
International Championships, 
including Asian Games & CUD 
uper Leaguel Division II CFA Cupl Super Cup 
Division 21 Amateur Cupl Olympic Cup (U23)1 National Games 
(U20)1 National City Games (Ul6)1 Women Super League 
Young CFA Cup, Young National Adidas Cup (UI5, 17, 19), 
Young National Adidas Championship, 17-key-football-city Cup 
qualify to participate in the Asian Professional Club Cup. All teams in these three 
leagues could introduce three foreign players who, it was argued, would not only 
bring knowledge and skill to each team, but also raise the profile of the professional 
matches and thus stimulate the domestic football market. The National women's 
competitions had low commercial potential but were heavily supported by the CF A 
due to the female team's high medal potential in the Olympics and Women's World 
Cup (CFA, 2000d: 56-8). The National Youth Cup was also supported by the CF A 
which asked the clubs' reserve teams in the Super League and Division 1 to 
participate in these matches (Yuan, W. 2002b: 223). In addition, this document also 
underlined the CFA's commercial thinking, which was to promote football through 
marketing, and to generate income from gate receipts, broadcasting rights, 
commercial advertisement and the lottery in order to support this competition system. 
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When contrasting Figure 6.5 and Figure 6.6, we find substantial differences in these 
two competition systems. Firstly, according to a senior staff member directly involved 
in preparing the CFA's annual budget, commercial sponsorship dominated the 2006 
competition system at all levels. This was especially true of the national squad and 
Olympic squad whose financial budget for competing in international official 
tournaments and international friendly matches was mostly provided by commercial 
sponsorship run by the China Football Industry Development Corp. (CFIDC) from 
1994 to 2005 and was operated by a Sport Management Company (Infront Sports & 
Media) from 2006 (Interview 19th January 2006) (also see Figure 6.2 and section 3.2). 
Unfortunately, the National Early Youth Cup, which was supported primarily by the 
Ministry of Education under the previous competition system, died out and instead the 
National Youth Cup was established for reserve teams from the professional clubs. 
But due to the National Youth Cup's low commercial potential and unstable financial 
support from the CF A, provinciaVcity football associations and professional clubs, the 
attractiveness of these matches to spectators is gradually declining, according to a 
2006 CF A internal report (CF A, 2006a). 
Secondly, in order to create more matches for potential Olympic footballers, both 
competition systems set age limits for footballers who participated in National Games 
and National City Games. In the 2006 competition system, the CF A required each 
professional club to send their reserve team to participate in the Olympic Cup (U23) 
although this kind of match did not have high commercial potential (CF A, 2006c). 
Thirdly, the CFA paid more attention to women's football due to its high medal 
potential in the Olympics and Women's World Cup. Therefore, the CFA created a 
women's super league in 1997 to hone the female team's skills, despite this league 
losing money and relying heavily on subsidy by the CF A and provincial sport bureaus. 
According to a senior official in the CFA's Competition Department, the provision of 
the subsidy is the result of a decision by the GAOS (Interview, 1 t h January 2006). 
Fourthly, the main purposes of creating this new club competition system were, first 
to increase competition chances for current and potential Olympic and World Cup 
footballers (as stated in FIFA's report in 1992) and second, to generate income from 
commercial sponsorship, especially in Division 1 A (Male Super League). According 
to a former director of the Chinese Football Management Centre, Wang Junsheng, in 
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1997, "Chinese football entered a socialist-market-economy following the initiative of 
Division 1 leagues; ... clubs, especially professional clubs, should be transfonned by 
the new system and the new physical cultural organization solidly linked to elite sport 
and the economy" (Wang, J. 2000c: 99). Thus, it is not surprising that CF A leaders 
concentrated their minds on the National Squads Department. This Department was in 
charge of seven national teams and on the Competition Department which was in 
charge of the Super League. These two departments were directly linked, not only to 
the perfonnance of Team China in international competitions, but also to the financial 
income needed to support the national teams. The perfonnance of the national squads 
at Olympic Games and World Cup competition is closely linked to the prospects of 
CF A leaders keeping their jobs with the consequence that they all take a short-tenn 
strategy instead of a long-term strategy for producing potential footballers by, for 
example, promoting grassroots football. According to a senior official in CF A's 
Competition Department, "That is why CF A's leaders have to focus their minds on 
the Olympics and World Cup, because their future careers rely heavily on the 
performance of Team China" (Interview, 5th January 2006). As an illustration fonner 
CFA presidents Nian Weigu,Wang Junsheng and Yua Shiduo were all sacked from 
their positions because Team China was defeated or did not qualify for the Olympics 
and/or the World Cup. 
Training system 
In order to raise the performance of the national squads in a short period of time, the 
Chinese government attempted to bring in global football expertise. Two main 
approaches which have been adopted by the NSC (GAOS) since 1979 are "exporting 
human capital" (Song chuqu) and "bringing foreign resources in" (Qingjinlai) (see 
Table 6.5) set out in the document - "The Request Instruction from the NSC for 
Raising China's Elite Football Performance" - issued by the State Council in 1979 
{National Sports Commission Policy Research Centre, 1982a: 516-9). 
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Table 6.5: The Summary of the Chinese Approach to Bringing in Global 
Football Resources to its Football Training System 
Exporting (human capital) Bringing in (foreign resources) 
• youth national teams trained in Brazil, and • foreign coaches in national squads & 
Russia in 1994; and in Germany in 2004 professional clubs in the mid-1990s; 
• national teams (from youth to Olympic and • foreign players in professional clubs in the 
World Cup squads) to have more friendly mid-1990s; 
matches and official tournaments to hone 
Chinese footballers' skill and to accumulate 
experience in the early 19905; 
• Chinese coaches (especially national coaches), • experts from FIFA, AFC and foreign countries, 
referees, administrators and scientists to gain to raise the quality of Chinese coaches, referees, 
new knowledge in the late 1990s; administrators and scientists in the mid-1990s. 
• professional clubs trained by foreign clubs in 
the early 2000s 
• individual potential China Team footballers to 
play for European clubs (gain skill and 
knowledge) after 2003 
The first approach contained a number of distinct elements, the first of which was, in 
the early 1990s, the dispatch of national youth teams to be trained abroad, especially 
in Brazil, Germany and Russia. The official document of the State Council underlined 
the fact that "we have to send our national and strongest provincial teams, especially 
the new young national squads, in a planned way and in groups, to European and 
South American countries to be trained there for 6 - 12 months" (National Sports 
Commission Policy Research Centre, 1982a: 517-8). On 20th November 1981, one 
young Chinese national team led by head coach, Gao Fengwen, was dispatched to be 
trained in Argentina and Peru for over 2 months (CF A, 1993: 154). Due to a limited 
national budget, the policy for sending young national squads to be trained in foreign 
countries for over six months was not practised until the 1990s following the 
introduction of commercial sponsorship (Wang, 1. 2002: 33). In 1992, the CFA 
decided to dispatch two young national teams to be trained abroad to prepare for the 
2000 Olympics and the 2002 World Cup. The first young national team was sent to 
Brazil in 1994 to be trained for five years, sponsored by the lianlibao Drink Company 
with $ 2.46 million. The second young national team was sent to be trained in Russia 
for two periods of three months (Wang, 1. 2000a: 40) between 1994 and 1995, 
supported by Zhu Shuhao, CF A vice president and Hong Kong tycoon, with $ 0.6 
million (CF A, 2000e: 44). 
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Following China's qualification for the 2002 World Cup, the CFA began planning a 
new overseas youth project in which 5 million yuan would be invested per year, 
according to the CF A document - "The 1 0-Year Development Project for Chinese 
Football (2003-2012)" (GAOS, 2004b: 114). Supported by the German Football 
Association and the Bad Kissingen government, China's national youth team, was to 
be trained by the German coach, Eckhard Krautzun from 8th December 2004 to the 
end of 2006, with the aim of producing 2008 stars (FIFA, 2005). The then director of 
the Chinese Football Management Centre, Van Shiduo stated that setting up a 
European training camp at youth level was his strategic idea for the development of 
Chinese football over the next 10 years despite this being a highly controversial 
proposal within the CF A (Yan, S. 2006: 51). During the news conference for 08 Stars 
Project, he stated that "This is a platform from which we can set up long-term ties 
with footballing powers in Europe" and went on to say that "We are hoping to 
continue this cooperation with Germany after 2006, or even after 2008 as long as our 
football is benefiting and improving from such exchanges" (FIFA, 2005). According 
to a CF A official (Interview 19th January 2006), due to limited commercial 
sponsorship from the German Football Association and the Bad Kissingen 
government (Zhu and Wang, 2006), and the tension between the German coach and 
the CF A officials, this project was terminated earlier than planned in late 2005. 
Although the 08 Stars Project ended prematurely, it did not stop the CF A trying to 
send their national teams to be trained in Europe. According to China Xinhua News, 
Xie Yalong, vice president of the Chinese Football Association (CF A), stated that 
"the Chinese Olympic team will begin their two-week training on 1 st February 2007 at 
Chelsea's training ground. During that time the London club will send their coaching 
and medical staff to help the Chinese side" (Xinhua News, 2007). 
The second element was that after the 2002 World Cup the Chinese government, 
through the CF A, not only "encourages domestic professional clubs to be trained 
abroad instead of participating in the CF A winter training camp" (GAOS, 2004b: 
113-4), but also asks that "professional clubs should select and send their young 
potential players to be trained in foreign clubs" (GAOS, 2004b: 114). In addition, the 
CF A also ruled that "Professional clubs have to broaden international exchange to 
pave the way for their players to play abroad" (GAOS, 2004b: 113). Given that the 
CF A had banned its national team members from playing abroad during the 2002 
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World Cup campaign this change in policy was significant but was prompted by the 
humiliation of Team China at the 2002 World Cup where it lost all its matches and 
did not score any goals (People Daily, 2001). With the new belief that experience 
abroad will help Chinese players, it appears that more and more of the country's most 
prominent players will be going west. So far, not only have three Chinese stars sealed 
transfers to three of Europe's top leagues, with Dong Fangzhuo moving to 
Manchester United, Zheng Zhi joining Charlton Athletic and Sun Xiang going to 
Holland with a transfer to PSV Eindhoven (FIF A.com, 2007), but also more than 30 
young players have played in European clubs or their reserve teams, according to Sina 
Sport News (Sina Sport News, 2007). 
The third element was to create more international competition opportunities for the 
national teams. A former director of the Chinese Football Management Centre agreed 
with the conclusion of FIFA's report in 1992 that "The only way to speed up the 
performance of Chinese football is to create more high-level competition 
opportunities for Chinese teams. Adult teams need 40-50 matches and young teams 
need 20-25 matches every year" (Wang, 1. 2002: 32). Following FIFA's report, the 
NSC set up "The 10-Year Development Project for Chinese Football (1993-2002)" in 
which it highlighted that "We have to guarantee that national teams from youth to 
Olympic and World Cup squads have enough chances to compete with world-class 
football teams, especially with other strong Asian national teams and with European 
and American professional football clubs" (CF A, 2000a: 5). In 2003, "The 10-Year 
Development Project for Chinese Football (203-2012)" again underscored the 
importance of Chinese national teams having more opportunities to compete with the 
world's strongest teams (GAOS, 2004b: 115). In practice, Chinese national teams, 
including the women's team for the 2007 World Cup (Qiu, 2007), men's team for the 
2008 Olympics (Jia, 2007) and 2007 Asian Football Cup (Wang, S. 2007), all travel 
around the world with support from the GAOS so that they have more chance to 
compete with other national squads or foreign professional clubs. 
The fourth element was to send out Chinese coaches (especially national coaches), 
referees, administrators and scientists to gather new knowledge. In 1979 the State 
Council claimed that ''we have to select and dispatch Chinese coaches and referees to 
advanced football countries to be trained there for a short period of time and to 
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observe their training and competition system" (National Sports Commission Policy 
Research Centre, 1982a: 517-8). In 1992 the Chinese government proclaimed that the 
"CF A is working out a new method for selecting Chinese coaches to participate in the 
coaching seminars which are organized by the FIFA and AFC" (CF A, 2000a: 5). In 
1996 CFA sent national coaches to be trained in Germany (Wang, 1. 2000b: 94). In 
2003, CF A highlighted that "CF A will invest 0.5 million yuan in sending young 
football coaches to be trained abroad, ... and will dispatch Chinese coaches, referees 
and top administrators to go abroad to gain new knowledge" (GADS, 2004b: 115). 
Encouraged and supported by the CF A, the number of Chinese coaches going abroad 
has been gradually increasing (see Table 6.6). 
Table 6.6: Chinese Official Football Coaches Going Abroad 1998-2002 
Number of foreign Number of countries Number of people involved 
visits involved 
1998 5 3 20 
1999 6 3 10 
2000 6 4 14 
2001 8 5 II 
2002 7 5 20 
.. Source: CF A (CompetitIOn Department), The PresentatIOn Slides for 2003 Conference of CF A offered 
by a Chinese official in the CF A. 
Regards the second main approach adopted by the NSC, which was to bring in foreign 
resources, the Chinese government brought in coaches, players and experts from 
abroad to raise the quality of Chinese coaches, players, referees, administrators and 
scientists. In 1979 the State Council encouraged the CF A "to introduce foreign elite 
football coaches to coach domestic football teams or to lecture Chinese coaches" 
(National Sports Commission Policy Research Centre, 1982a: 517). In 1993 the then 
vice Sport Minister and the CFA president, Yuan Weiming, in his summary speech 
for the National Football Conference argued that "In addition to employing foreign 
coaches for the national team and Olympic squad, we encourage each domestic club 
to introd~ce foreign coaches and 3 foreign players to participate in national matches 
in order to facilitate our elite football development" (Yuan, W. 2000b: 83). From 
Table 6.7, we can see the number of foreign coaches and players was maintained at a 
steady level. In 2003 CF A not only set a requirement that "clubs in CSL must hire a 
foreign coach to be performance director for their reserve teams" but also "introduced 
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an elite foreign coach to be perfonnance director for the 2008 Olympic football 
reserve teams" (GAOS, 2004b: 115). 
Table 6.7: Foreign Football Players aDd Coaches Working in China 1995-2005 
Players Coaches 
1995 26 
1996 94 
1997 97 
1998 118 7 
1999 112 10 
2000 109 28 
2001 96 23 
2002 112 24 
2003 140 
2004 106 
2005 62 
.. Source: CFA (CompetItion Department), The Presentation Slides for 2003 Conference of CF A offered 
by a Chinese official in the CF A. 
To attract more international football resources, the Chinese government set up a 
"CF A training centre" for coaches, referees, administrators and scientists in its 
national Xiang He training camp and continued to invite various football experts from 
FIF A, the AFC and other advanced football countries to lecture in this centre with the 
aim of speeding up Chinese football development (GAOS, 2004b: 115). According to 
Xinhua News in 2007, the CF A attempted to introduce more global resources by 
cooperation with Chelsea Football Club which promised to help China in developing 
its soccer. Xie Yalong, vice president of the Chinese Football Association (CFA), 
during his interview, stated that "Chelsea is one of the world's best clubs. They have 
very good resources and experience. We hope to get stronger through the two sides' 
cooperation" (Xinhua News, 2007). 
In addition to bringing in foreign coaches China also established a coach development 
programme designed to steadily increase the number of qualified officials. As regards 
the number of full-time football coaches qualifying each year, this remained broadly 
static between 1980 and 2005 (see Table 6.8). In total, by 2003, there were 4,600 
registered coaches, 8,000 referees and 1,500 staff in CF A's affiliated associations and 
clubs (GAOS, 2004b: Ill). However, in the words ofXie Yalong, vice president of 
the CF A, "Chinese football is in its early stages but we are hoping to make a big 
improvement" (Xinhua News, 2007). But this 'big improvement' will be achieved by 
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China's own hand. As fonner Sport Minister, Wu Shaozu, stated, "Of course, we are 
learning from foreign coaches, but the resp.onsibility for winning the glory of the 
World Cup will be shouldered by our Chinese coaches" (Wu, S.Z. 2000b: 15). 
Table 6.8: Full-Time Football Coaches qualifying each year (1962-2005) 
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 
Provincial Squads Sport Colleges Spare-time Sport Total 
School 
1962 115 
1965 174 
1970 94 
1975 185 
1979 284 781 
1980 245 70 750 \065 
1985 423 140 935 1498 
1990 346 183 818 1347 
1991 284 196 832 1312 
1992 286 181 764 1231 
1993 256 178 687 1121 
1994 227 169 704 1100 
1995 238 169 676 \083 
1996 220 176 684 1080 
1997 231 179 716 1126 
1998 207 172 722 1101 
1999 192 175 718 1085 
2000 194 186 709 1089 
2001 209 201 699 1109 
2005 195 241 644 1080 
* There was no record during the period of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) 
Source: NSC (Planning and finance Department), Statistical Yearbook of Sport (Internal information), 
1994-2006. 
6.3.2 Generating multiple incomes for the elite football system 
In his speech in 1993 at the All States Sports Minister Conference, Li Tieying, a 
member of Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), and a State Councillor (1988-1998), 
stated that "Following the development of Chinese sport, the problem of investing 
more in the national sport budget and generating more extra sport income is a highly 
critical issue". He went on to argue that "the sport system has to transfonn the ideas, 
and ways of thinking and working which were fonned by the structure of the planned 
economy, into the objective requirements of a market economy in which we should 
reform boldly in order to explore new ways to facilitate Chinese sport development" 
(Li, T.Y. 1996: 5-6). Following Li Tieying's speech, an internal official document-
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"The Suggestions of the NSC On Deepening Sport Reform" - which was issued by 
the NSC in 1993 - highlighted that "We have to learn how they govern and run sport 
in other countries of the world, including advanced capitalist countries, so that we can 
go ahead and seek a variety of forms and ways to reform" (NSC, 1996d: 152). In its 
affiliated document - "Suggestions in Relation to Promoting Sport Marketing and 
Speeding Up the Process of Sport Industrialisation" - the NSC also emphasized that 
"National Sport Associations have to look for multiple channels to generate income 
and some associations with commercial potential should establish "economic bodies" 
(Jingji shiti) to generate income in order to subsidize the sport system" (NSC, 1996e: 
179). From then on, the Chinese government established two different "economic 
bodies" (companies) and signed contracts with international sport management 
companies to generate multiple incomes from the football market. 
Figure 6.7: Income of tbe Chinese Elite Football System in 2006 
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In Figure 6.7, we can see that there were three sources of income in the Chinese elite 
football system in 2006: the national sport budget, the provincial sport budget and 
commercial income/sponsorship. The national football budget was 9 million yuan in 
1992, but according to a senior staff member in CF A Comprehensive Department, 
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following the establishment of The Chinese Professional Soccer League (CPSL) in 
1994, the budget was reduced substantially. (Interview 19th January 2006) 
As regards the provincial budget, there was abput 2 million yuan for each key football 
province or city in 1993 (Wang, J. 2002: 118) and this decreased substantially after 
the formation of CPSL. According to staff in the CF A registration office, the salary of 
7-10 staff in each provincial! city football association was included in the provincial! 
city football budget, and therefore, "the provincial!city sport bureaus have more 
influence than the CF A in these CF A affiliated associations". For commercial 
income/sponsorship, there are three different types of companies, including the China 
Football Industry DeVelopment Corp. (CFIDC), Sport Management Company (Infront 
Sports & Media), and The China Football Association Super League Company 
(CSLC) which work as commercial agents to help CF A generate multiple incomes. 
From Table 6.9 we can see that the CF A earned 198.75 million yuan in 200 I, which is 
more than 50 times the national football budget in 2005. In contrast to the account 
from senior official in the CF A Comprehensive Department, the total expenditure of 
the CF A, including training, competition and human resources, was about 200 million 
yuan in early 2000 but was decreasing in 2004 and 2005 (Interview 5th January 2006). 
Deducting the CF A's expenses from its annual income, there was still a surplus which 
was used by GAOS to support other elite sport, according to a senior official in the 
CF A financial office (Interview 19th January 2006). This means that the "real" CF A 
income was possibly more than its income statement in Table 6.9. 
Table 6.9: The Annual Income of the CFA (1998-2002) 
Year Total 
1998 81.00 
1999 112.71 
2000 131.94 
2001 198.75 
2002 160.54 
Source: CFA (Competition Department), The Presentation Shdes for 2003 Conference ofCFA offered 
by a Chinese official in the CFA. 
Firstly, we discuss the case of China Football Industry Development Corp. (CFIDC). 
Following Li Tieying 's argument and NSC documents in early 1993, CFIDC, being a 
state-owned enterprise directly under the control of China Football Association (CF A), 
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was established with the authorization of the Economic and Trade Committee of the 
State Council in August 1993. It is also the exclusive agency (named Market 
Promotion Division in the CF A) authorized by the CF A for the exploitation of various 
football commercial operations (CFIDC, 2007). Although CFIDC was established and 
led directly by the CF A vice president, Xu Fang, the CF A did not have any 
experience of running a business. According to a former director ofCFMC, Wang 
Junsheng, the NSC asked him to start the new Chinese club competition system with 
I million yuan in 1994. With such limited resources, it was impossible for him to 
maintain the League Competition System. At the suggestion of the AFC General 
Secretary, Peter Velappan, he went to Japan in 1993 to see how the Japanese Football 
Association generated its income to support its Football League competition system. 
After his visit, he made an oral report to the NSC leaders who agreed that he should 
introduce foreign sponsorship to support the Chinese elite football system. From 
November 1993, CFIDC, led by the CF A vice president, XU Fang, began commercial 
negotiations with IMG Sports & Entertainment and Media Company and signed a 
five-year commercial contract with IMG worth $ 1.2 million per year. Eighty percent 
of the commercial income from IMG was distributed to professional clubs and 
affiliated associations and 20 percent to youth and female football development 
(Wang, J. 2002: 109-118). From Table 6.10, we can see that about 50 percent of the 
commercial income from the IMG contract was reinvested in the Chinese elite 
football system. Because the profits of IMG from running the business of Jia A were 
much higher than the Chinese government expected, CFIDC attempted to compete 
with IMG to win the next five-year commercial contract of Jia A in 1999. In the end, 
IMG won the second contract with CF A by offering a price ten times higher than 
CFIDC could afford (Zhou, 2005: 149). 
Table 6.10: The Distribution of CFA's Commercial Income from IMG's 
Contract (1994-2001) 
Professional Clubs 144 million yuan 
Affiliated Associations 76 million yuan 
Youth and Women Teams 70 million ~an 
Competition Cost 10 million yuan 
Total 300 million~an 
Source: Wang, J. (2002: 117). 
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Due to the tension between IMG and CF A during which the CF A rejected the request 
oflMG's largest commercial sponsor, Peps i-Cola, to shift the time of the 2002 annual 
award ceremony of Jia A (CSL) to cater for football stars' schedules, Pepsi-Cola 
withdrew sponsorship from the IMG. This led to the termination of commercial 
cooperation between CFA and IMG in early 2003. From then on, CFIDC took over 
the role oflMG in being the exclusive commercial agency of Jia A (Zhou, 2005: 151). 
From Table 6.11, we can see that the title sponsorship and other commercial 
sponsorship gradually increased from 1994 to 2003. Unfortunately, this kind of 
situation did not last after CFIDC took over IMG's role. Despite the CF A recruiting 
former IMG regional executive in China, Wang Yingquan, and the fonner vice 
executive of Shanghai Shenhua professional club in order to upgrade the marketing 
ability ofCFIDC, the commercial income/sponsorship of Jia A (renamed "The China 
Football Association Super League" (CSL) in May 2004) decreased substantially 
(Zhou,2005: 153). However, it also started the second season in 2005 with no title 
sponsor, and was simply called the Chinese Football Association Super League 
(Zhang, L. 2005). 
Table 6.11: The Income of Title Sponsorship and other Sponsorship of Jia A 
1994-2003 (Unit: $ 10 thousand) 
Year Title Sponsorship The other Sponsorship Total 
1994 230 230 
1995 253 253 
1996 279 279 
1997 307 307 
1998 338 338 
1999 450 640 1090 
2000 472 672 1144 
2001 496 705 1201 
2002 520 740 1260 
2003 546 777 1323 
Total 3891 3534 7425 
Source: CFA(quoted from Bao Mlngxlao (2005: 132), "The Report of Sport Industry Development In 
the PRC, Beijing: The Press of Sport and Physical Education) 
In addition to being the exclusive commercial agency of Jia A (CSL) before 2006, 
CFIDC also became the exclusive commercial agency of the Chinese Football 
Association's "Team China" in 2001 after bankruptcy of the ISL international sport 
management company, which signed a six-year commercial project with CFA for $ 
10 million to cover key aspects of marketing and technical development of the 
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national teams at all levels (Zhou, 2005: 153-4). According to a senior official in the 
CF A financial office, "ISL not only offered big sponsorship and hired world-class 
foreign coaches to help China qualify for the 2002 World Cup, but also set a good 
model for CFIDC" (Interview, 19th January 2006). Under the CFIDC commercial 
operation, the annual commercial income of "Team China" was about 50 million yuan, 
which was the main financial resource to support Chinese men's and women's national 
soccer teams, including the junior squads (Interview, 19th January 2006). Due to 
immature marketing skills and lack of international sport capital, CFIDC not only 
earned less commercial income, but also failed to organize home and away friendly 
matches which directly influenced the preparation for qualifying for the Asian Cup, 
World Cup and Olympic Games (Han, X. 2006). 
Unsurprisingly, in April 2006 the Chinese government made a critical decision to sign 
an agreement with Swiss company, Infront Sports & Media, for $ 10 million per year 
to replace CFIDC in dealing with the business aspects of Team China in preparation 
for the 2008 Beij ing Olympic Games and the 2010 FIFA World Cup. This agreement 
will involve recruiting experts in specialized areas, such as coaching, nutrition, 
scouting and mental conditioning. Furthermore, Infront will be responsible for 
organizing all home and away friendly matches, according to the requirements of the 
CF A (Xinhua News Agency, 2006). 
Finally, we turn to the case of The China Football Association Super League 
Company (CSLC). The name of CSLC was mentioned by a former director of CFMC, 
Yan Shiduo, in 2001 when he made a decision to use CSL to replace Jia A from 2004. 
CSLC did not really become established until 2006, and was set up as a result of the 
"G7 event" in which seven CSL football clubs asked the CF A to keep its promise to 
establish an independent commercial company for the CSL in 2004 (see next section 
for more details). Although the CFA registered CSLC (composed of 14 CSL clubs 
and the CFA) with The State Administration for Industry & Commerce (SAIC) in 
2006, it seemed reluctant to allow CSLC to be a really independent commercial 
agency for the CSL. According to regulations 1-4, 6-0 and 6-27 of CSLC, "The CSLC 
is authorized to exploit the various football commercial operations and business 
developments of CSL by the CF A, who is the initial owner of CSL" and "The CF A is 
the biggest stakeholder and owns 36 percent share in CSLC" and "The chairman of 
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CSLC is nominated by the CF A" (CF A, 2005). Indeed, according to a senior member 
of staff in charge of establishing CSLC, the real power of this company is still tightly 
held by the CF A because not only is the chairman of CSLC, Nan Yong, also the CF A 
vice president, but is also in charge of CFIDC. In addition, the decision-making 
regarding the distribution of surplus resources of CSLC is steered by The Commission 
of China Football Association Super League (CCSL) in which CFA and its affiliated 
associations and provincial sport bureaus have the dominant voice, in contrast to CSL 
clubs (Interview: a senior official in the CF A financial office, 19th January 2006,). In 
fact, most ofCSLC's staff come from CFIDC and the general manager ofCSLC, Qu 
Yuming, is the former vice general manager of CFIDC (Zhang, N. 2005). At present, 
it is still difficult to see the real connection between the CFlDC and the CSLC, but 
one thing is clear, is, that these two companies were dominated by the CF A and the 
GADS. 
6.3.3 Intervention in the transfer of footballers 
The attitude of the Chinese government towards the transfer of Chinese footballers 
was directly linked to the issue of Team China's international performance. To ensure 
that the PRC could take advantage of the introduction of global football resources to 
facilitate its elite football development and also to prevent an adverse impact from 
global football, several strategies were adopted by the CF A. 
First, the CF A set an age limit to prevent its top players going abroad. One document 
issued by the CF A in 1993 noted that "national athletes can not go abroad until either 
the male athletes are over the age of 28 or female athletes over 26 or the footballers 
are dispatched by the CFA" (Yuan, W. 2002c: 299). Constrained by CFA's 
regulations, very few Chinese footballers were able to play abroad unless they were 
sent by the Chinese government, as in the case of the youth national teams sent to be 
trained in Brazil and Russia in 1994. In 1996, the director of the CF A Competition 
Department, Ma Kejian, led a delegation with national coaches, Jia A club coaches, 
referees and CFA officials on a visit to England during the European Football 
Championship. In Mr. Ma's report to the CFA and the NSC, he stated that "exporting 
elite footballers to play in the European clubs (Jieji xiadan) is a very useful strategy 
for raising the performance of national teams in second division football countries and 
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African countries" (Wu, S.Z. 2000d: 558). Ma's words were echoed by the then CFA 
vice president, Wang Junsheng, who said that "sending potential footballers to play in 
European and South American football clubs will benefit us a lot by raising the profile 
of our national squads" (Wang, J. 2002: 220). In 1998, CF A transfer regulations were 
relaxed and the age limit reduced to 26 for male players (Wang, J. 2000c: 100). With 
the help of Greatgate (Beijing) Sports & Entertainment Co., Ltd, whose director was 
Han Jingmin, CFA vice president, not only did Team China get a unique chance to 
play a friendly match with Team England, but also two elite Chinese footballers, Sun 
Jihai and Fan Zhiyi were permitted by the CF A to be transferred to Crystal Palace 
Football Club in 1998 (Wang, J. 2002: 228-32). 
However, the strategy of "exporting elite footballers to play in the European clubs" 
was abandoned shortly after the power of the CFA vice president, Wang Junsheng, 
was taken away by the new director of Chinese Football Management Centre, Van 
Shiduo. Van made a decision in early 2002 that "no China National Soccer Team 
(CNST) footballers are allowed to transfer to clubs of other countries during World 
Cup 2002 preliminary matches", according to People Daily (Yin, 2002). After being 
badly defeated by various teams in the 2002 World Cup, the Chinese government 
realized that they needed to go abroad to improve because the quality of domestic 
coaching was not good enough. The CF A vice president, Nan Y ong, claimed that, "It 
will contribute a lot to Chinese soccer if more Chinese move to world top leagues and 
learn superb tactics and skills" (People Daily, 2001). Following Mr. Na's statement, 
Li Tie, a Chinese elite football player was transferred to Everton Football Club in 
2002. Although Mr. Nan also stressed that the CF A only supports Chinese players 
who are "above the level of the Chinese first division league" (People Daily, 2001) to 
move to overseas leagues, a young Chinese footballer, Dong Fangzhuo, was 
transferred to Manchester United F.C. when he was 19 years old in 2004 (see Table 
6.12). According to a senior staff official in the CF A Technical Department, the 
Chinese government has to become more liberal in order to see the positive side of the 
release of Chinese players, but he also emphasized the importance of signing a 
conditional contract before permitting Chinese players to go abroad: 
We set an age limit to prevent our top players going abroad in the past, but we 
have relaxed restrictions nowadays. We previously thought that to release 
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young Chinese footballers to go abroad would have an adverse effect on our 
elite football development in the past but when we permitted Dong Fangzhuo 
to play abroad, he came back to play for Team China. That means that these 
European clubs are helping us to train our potential footballers. We have to 
change our attitude and values regarding international football movement. 
Effective contracts between players and clubs must be permitted and signed by 
the CF A and the additional rule that players must come back to compete for 
Team China must be written into the contract to protect the national interest, 
as in the case of Sun Jihai and Dong Fangzhuo. (Interview, 16th January 2006) 
Table 6.12: Chinese Elite Footballers in European Clubs 
Footballer Transfer/On Transfer Fist Transfer/ On Latest Transfer/ National/Olympic 
Loan Year Age Loan Club On Loan Club Squads 
Yang Ch en 1998 25 Eintracht Frankfurt Xiamen Lanshi 1996 - 2002 
(Germany) (China) 
Sun Jihai 1998 21 Crystal Palace Manchester City 1996 - 2007 
(England) 
Fan Zhiyi 1998 29 Crystal Palace retired 1989 - 2004 
(England) 
Li Tie 2002 25 Everton Sheffield United 1995 - 2002 
(England) 
Dong 2004 19 Manchester United 2005 - 2007 
Fangzhuo (England) 
ShiJun 2005 23 Young Boys 2005 - 2007 
(Switzerland) 
DuWei 2005 23 Celtic (Scotland) Shanghai 2001 - 2007 
Shenhua (China) 
Hao 2005 35 Sheffield United 1992 - 2004 
Haidong (England) 
Shao 2006 26 TSV 1860 Energie Cottbus 2000 - 2007 
Jia-Yi Muenchen in the Bundesliga 
(Germany) 
Zheng Zhi 2006 26 Charlton Athletic 2002 - 2007 
(England) 
Sun Xiang 2007 25 PSV Eindhoven 2002 - 2007 
(Netherlands) 
The age limit regulation was replaced by a system of special pennission by which 
Chinese players could not play for any foreign club or other countries unless 
dispatched by the CF A or agreed by the CF A after 2002 (CF A, 2002a: 195; CFA, 
2006d). Under the new regulations, the CF A still appeared to hold the ultimate power 
to decide who could or could not play abroad. One example here is that a Chinese 
football superstar, Hao Haidong, could not play for any foreign football club until he 
Was 35 years old and had obtained pennission from the CF A to be transferred to 
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Sheffield United Football Club in the F.A. Premier League in 2005. However, in 2006 
the GAOS announced that "the government encourages and supports international 
transfers from Chinese professional clubs" - ("The Project for the Sport 
Industry"2006). Consequently, more and more elite Chinese footballers were 
permitted to transfer to European clubs to earn money and learn skills at the same 
time. From Table 6.12, we can see that since the 2002 World Cup, the number of 
Chinese elite footballers joining European football clubs has increased. But one thing 
we should be aware of is that the relaxed policy towards domestic players going 
abroad is not necessarily evidence that China is really becoming a more liberal 
country because this shift in sport policy had, as its main priority, the production ofa 
strong national team, and China was under strong pressure to show high performance 
on her own soil in the 2008 Beijing Games. As the former director of the Chinese 
Football Management Centre, Wang Junsheng said in his book in 2002, "I am sure 
that the dream of breaking out of Asia and advancing to become a World football 
power will come true when the young generation of Chinese elite footballers 
continuously and frequently appear in European and South American football matches. 
I am sure that we won't wait too long for that day" (Wang, 1. 2002: 220). 
In addition to setting an age limit, the CF A set quotas for introducing foreign players. 
The quotas were strongly influenced by the preparation for the Olympics and World 
Cup. Because most elite domestic play~rs in CSL clubs were recruited into the 
national team and Olympic squad by the Chinese government, to be trained for a long 
period of time to prepare for global events, and the CF A could do was to relax the 
quota for introducing foreign players in order to "compensate" clubs for the loss of 
their key Chinese players. One example here is that eight key players from the 
Shandong Luneng FC, a Chinese Super League football club, were recruited into the 
China 08 Stars Team training in Germany to prepare for the 2008 Olympics. CFA's 
decision was seriously damaging to Shandong Luneng FC's ability to maintain its 
leading position in the CSL. After a complaint by the owner of Shandong Luneng FC, 
Dong Gang, and after "private" negotiations with the CF A, the CF A agreed that 
Shandong Luneng FC had approval to allow its three foreign players play in CSL 
matches without limitation by the 2006 CF A regulations but other CSL football clubs 
had to follow the rules set by the CFA in 2006 (Peter, 2006). From Table 6.13, we can 
see that the CF A attempted to reduce its foreign quota in order to allow its domestic 
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players greater opportunities to hone their own skills, but was affected by the tension 
between the national interest of preparing for the World Cup and Olympics and the 
commercial interest of each CSL football club. The strategy adopted by the CF A, 
similar to the case of Shandong Luneng FC, was to allow more foreign players to fill 
the gaps left by the withdrawal of domestic elite players. 
Table 6.13: The quota set by the CFA for foreign players 
Year Maximum quota Number of foreign player al10wed Important issue 
for each club squad to play during each match at the 
same time 
1993 5 5 Introduction of the club system 
1996 5 3 
1997 3 3 
2002 4 3 Preparing for 2002 World Cup 
2006 3 2 
2007 4 3 Preparing for 2008 Beij ing Games 
Finally, in order to protect domestic goalkeepers, who, it was considered, would have 
more chance to be trained in their own clubs and in CSL competitions, the CF A not 
only prohibited clubs from introducing a foreign goalkeeper after 2000, but also 
required clubs to recruit a specialist goal keeping coach from 2003 (GAOS, 2004b: 
113). In short, the initial policy of the Chinese government toward footballer transfers 
was to seek to take advantage of international football resources, through bringing in 
foreign expertise, to raise the profile of Chinese elite football while at the same time 
keeping players in China. But due to poor coaching, low domestic professional 
competition, and the tension between national interest and commercial interest, the 
Chinese government was forced to alter its policy in an attempt to manage the 
relationship with globalization, but had as its main priority the building of a strong 
national team. 
6.4 Commercialisation 
6.4.1 Introducing a more commercial system 
As mentioned in section 3.2, under the encouragement ofLi Tieying China, adopted a 
western capitalist approach as part of the strategy to revitalise the Chinese elite 
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football system (NSC, 1996d: 152). Mr. Li's argument was echoed by the then Sport 
Minister, Wu Shaozu, who claimed in his lecture for the 1992 Opening Ceremony of 
the National Football Conference that "to ~atch up with these advanced football 
countries in a short period of time, we have to learn new things from these countries, 
including those capitalist advanced knowledge and systems" (Wu, S.Z. 2000a: 9). Mr. 
Wu went on to argue that "we should not be influenced by the political debate about 
the capitalist way and the socialist way to reform our system. We should have more 
liberal thought, and take a bolder way and much bigger step by learning from these 
capitalist countries." After the Chinese government's confirmation and support, the 
"The 10-Year Development Project for Chinese Football (1993-2002)" issued by the 
CF A in 1992, highlighted that "the club system has a highly competitive mechanism 
which can not only motivate and mobilize footballers and coaches, but also can raise 
the domestic football profile" (CF A, 2000a: 3). From then on, a more commercial 
system was introduced and became embedded in the new elite football system to 
activate and stimulate domestic players from amateur and professional clubs, and 
even national squads. 
The first aspect of increased commercialisation considered concerns the Chinese 
government allowing footballers at different levels to be transferred for a fee. An 
official document, "The Suggestions ofNSC About Deepening the Reform of Sport" 
issued by the NSC in 1993, highlighted that the NSC promoted and encouraged 
athletes to be transferred for a fee and "the former employers can receive the transfer 
fee from their athletes' new employers, and the price can be evaluated by the period 
of training and the level of skill of the athletes transferred. Some national sport 
associations and clubs can start trying to introduce a transfer fee system" (NSC, 
1996d: (48). From Table 6.14 we can see that the transfer fee for a Chinese amateur 
footballer to CSL clubs (named Jia A before 2004) was 50,000 yuan in 1993 and the 
price was six times higher in 2006. A similar situation was happening in the CSL club 
transfer market. From Table 6.15 we can see that the highest transfer fee for Chinese 
footballers in C~L clubs was 0.64 million yuan in 1995. By 2003 the price had 
increased dramatically to 13 million yuan. 
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Table 6.14: The transfer fee set by the CFA for Chinese amateur footballers 
(Unit: yuan) 
Year To amateur To reserve To reserve To Division To Division I CSL 
clubs teams in teams in 2 clubs clubs (Jia B clubs (Jia 
Division 2 Division I League) A) 
1993 5,000 5,000 5,000 30,000 50,000 50,000 
2002 3,000 10,000 10,000 50,000 100,000 150,000 
2006 5,000 20,000 50,000 100,000 200,000 300,000 
Source: Yuan, W. (2002c: 299), CFA (2002a: 195) and CFA (2006d). 
Table 6.15: The list of the highest transfer fee of Chinese footballers in domestic 
football c1ubs.l995-2007 (Unit: I million yuan) 
Year Footballers Transfer Fee 
1995 Li Bing 0.64 
1996 WangTao 0.66 
1997 Gao Hongbo 1.20 
1998 Hao Haidong 2.20 
1999 Peng Weiguo 2.35 
2000 Qu Chuliang 4.97 
2001 Qu Shengqing 5.50 
2002 Qi Hong 9.50 
2003 Wu Chengying 13.00 
2004 Li Jinyu 4.90 
2005 Zheng Zhi 8.50 
2006 Li Weifeng 4.90 
2007 Wang Liang 4.80 
Source: Shou.com (2006). 
Second, clubs offered extraordinary contracts (which included a high salary, house, 
and household registration shiftl) to lure elite footballers to play for their clubs. In 
1996, according to Wang Junsheng, former director of the Chinese Football 
Management Centre, "some footballers started asking for even more money and 
materials before agreeing to transfer to those clubs which attempted to bid for them" 
(Wang, J. 2000b: 96). In 1995, the CFA set the system of "relegation and promotion" 
(Shengjiangji) by which, at the end of each season, the top two teams in Jia B 
League are promoted to Jia A League and the two lowest placed teams from Jia A 
League are relegated to the Jia B League. To win the matches in each of their leagues, 
more and more clubs took a shortcut strategy to lure domestic players from other 
clubs to help them win matches instead of investing money in their own reserve teams 
and affiliated amateur clubs. This kind of situation was at its height in 1998, 
according to Wang Junsheng (2002: 320-3). Due to domestic professional players' 
I Household registration shift refers to the process of granting the footballer the right to live in a 
different region of China. 
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continuous demands for higher salaries and extra benefits from clubs, and the fierce 
competition between clubs to sign domestic star players, a large financial burden was 
placed on most domestic professional football clubs, according to Zhang Lu, the vice 
president of Beijing Guoan Football Club (a CSL football club) (Interview, 6th 
January 20(6). 
Third, clubs motivated their players by gifts of cash during the club competition. 
Since the Chinese professional club system was created, using high rewards to 
motivate players had prevailed in almost every club, especially in Jia A League 
(renamed as CSL in 2004). In 1995, according its former head coach, Xu Genbao, 
Shanghai Shenhua F.C., a Jia A League club, began giving rewards of 1 million yuan 
and seven houses to its coaches and players after winning the 1995 CF A Cup. This 
was supported by the then vice mayor of Shanghai city, Chen Liangyu, a member of 
the Politburo of the Communist Party of China (2003-2006) (Xu, G. 2000: 183-4). 
Clubs' lavish rewards to their players and coaches were causing concern to the CFA 
leader, Wang J unsheng. In the 1996 CF A Annual Report Wang stated that "in order to 
win the league matches, some clubs lavished rewards on their players, which led those 
footballers to become much greedier" (Wang, J. 2000b: 96). Nine years later, when a 
Chinese tycoon, Zhu Jun, became the owner of Shanghai United FC, he motivated his 
players by gifts of money during the club competition, which helped his team to win a 
series of critical matches. This type of activity forced rival clubs to adopt the same 
high rewards strategy in order to motivate their players to win league matches 
(www.sports.cn. 2006). Indeed, according to a CF A senior official in the 
Comprehensive Department, "As far as CSL clubs are concerned, the reward to each 
of their teams is about 0.2 - 0.4 million yuan, but the amount of bonus will increase if 
their teams win a series of matches" (Interview, 18th January 2006). From Table 6.16, 
we can see that the price clubs actually paid to motivate their own team was much 
higher than that stated by the Chinese football official. 
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Table 6.16: The rewards given by the top 6 CSL football clubs in each match in 
2006 (Unit: 1 million yuan) 
Ranking Club Reward 
I Shanghai United 4.0 
2 Shandong Luneng 3.0 
3 Tianjin Teda 2.0 
4 Beij ing Guoan 1.3 
5 Wuhan Guanggu 1.2 
6 Chongqing Liran 1.0 
Source: www.sports.cn (2006). 
Finally, the reward system of CSL clubs was adopted by the Chinese government to 
motivate national squads to win international competitions in the late 1990s. After 
winning second place in the 1999 Women's World Cup, the Chinese government 
(State Council) awarded I million yuan to the Chinese national women's team for the 
first time (Wang, 1. 2002: 319). In early 2000, GAOS and CFA set a reward policy in 
which Team China could be awarded 2 million yuan ifit won the championship of the 
Asian Cup (Li, H. 2006). The Chinese government's reward policy appeared to be a 
useful tool to motivate its national players, especially its women players. In the 2004 
Asian Cup the Chinese women's team won first place and the men's team took second 
place (www.sports.cn. 2004). 
In short, in order to maintain motivation and especially to prevent Chinese elite 
footballers from retiring early (Ma and Zhang, 1999), the capitalist reward system was 
adopted by, and embedded in, the Chinese elite football system. Due to the limited 
number of high potential Chinese players in the domestic football market and the 
limited member of foreign players allowed into the PRC, most CSL football clubs 
chose to lure and mobilize these Chinese "star" footballers by paying a high transfer 
fee and offering them extraordinary contracts and tremendous rewards. In the words 
ofWang Junsheng, former director of the Chinese Football Management Centre, 
some Chinese players were very mercenary and were asking for additional signing-on 
fees from the clubs (Wang, J. 2002: 323). In addition, some club managers and 
coaches were even losing control of their "star" players because their jobs relied on 
these players' "normal" performance (Wang, 1. 2000c: 100). Due to the heavy 
financial burden of paying the huge transfer fee, high salary and other rewards, clubs 
have made, and continue to make, significant annual losses. Some clubs were in 
financial crisis and found it extremely hard to survive in the domestic football leagues. 
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According to Yang Yimin, the CF A vice president, after experiencing the Chinese 
club system for 10 years, out of the 127 clubs in Jia A and Jia B, 32 clubs changed 
their ownership, seven clubs dc-registered after being relegated to Jia B and Division 
2, and 55 teams changed their sponsors. This kind of unstable situation in the 
domestic club system not only prevented the healthy development of Jia A and Jia B, 
but also endangered the development of grassroots clubs (China Sport News, 2003). 
Following the introduction of the club system, the commercial market did bring new 
resources and energy which revitalized the Chinese elite football system, but it also 
substantially influenced the attitudes and values of individual footballers, club owners 
and CFA officials toward a more materialistic view of the world and consequently 
raises a number of important issues. Among these issues are the response by the CF A 
to the mercenary behaviour of these highly paid domestic players and the viciously 
commercial competition of the clubs, and whether the Chinese government could 
balance its national interest (Olympic and World Cup success) with the interests of 
professional clubs. 
6.4.2 Managing the consequences of a more commercial system 
In the preceding sections we mentioned that, after adopting capitalist elements to 
energize the Chinese elite football system, the Chinese players have become more 
materially demanding and the domestic club owners have been forced towards being 
interest-driven and focused on match-winning in Division I (Jia A (CSL) and Jia B 
(Jia League». In 1998 the side-effects of a more commercial system came to the 
attention of the Chinese government and GAOS requested the CF A to "not only to 
investigate but also to take action on these problems" according to CF A executive 
vice president, Wang Junsheng (2002: 323). But there was a greater problem due to 
the corruption found in some national sport associations, which forced GAOS to 
regulate more tightly the financial and personnel powers of the CF A in 2002. In 
addition, in order to ensure that the national teams achieved success in the Olympics 
and World Cup, the CF A not only took most of the commercial rights from domestic 
football leagues in order to generate income to support national teams, but also 
shortened or rescheduled the domestic league matches to allow the national team and 
Olympic squad to draft key club players to be trained for five to six months each year. 
The way in which the Chinese government regarded the commercial income of 
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domestic leagues as its "money trees" and used the clubs as training and competition 
arena for potential Chinese players, caused serious tensions between the CF A and the 
owners of CSL clubs. These tensions reached their peak in 2004 when seven CSL 
clubs attempted to organize a new Chinese premier league to challenge the authority 
of the CFA. 
It may be argued that all the problems in relation to "star" players, clubs and even the 
CFA seem to be strongly linked to the consequences of introducing a more 
commercial system. To reduce the negative impact of commercialism on Chinese elite 
football development, four strategies were introduced by the PRC; i) setting, in 1997, 
limits on the salaries and transfer fees that professional clubs could offer their players 
and their buyers; ii) creating, in 1998, a special procedure for dealing with the 
domestic transfer market; iii) controlling, in 2002, the CF A and manipulating the 
Chinese Super league (CSL); and iv) in 2004, prevent the seven largest clubs from 
organizing a new super league. 
Firstly, the CF A set a limit on the salary and transfer fee that professional clubs could 
offer to their players and their buyers. In 1995, Li Tieying, reminded the NSC and 
CF A that "our players should become football stars but we must not let them become 
'peculiar men' .... All the regulations ofNSC, FIFA and CFA must be carried out 
seriously and we won't allow any footballer to become a 'peculiar man' who 
overrides these official rules" (Li, T.Y. 2000: 6-7). Mr. Li's words were followed by 
the vice Sport Minister and CF A president, Yuan Weiming at the 1995 National 
Football Conference. Yuan stated that "We should make suitable rules to regulate the 
material interests of clubs, coaches and players" (Yuan, W. 2000c; 87). Following the 
reminders from these two leaders, the director of the CFMC & the vice executive 
president of the CFA, Wang Junsheng, claimed that "the CFA will adopt a 
comprehensive measure to manage and oversee clubs' commercial activities and 
footballers' transfer affairs, including the clubs' budgeted revenue and expenditure; 
the distribution of footballers' base pay, training subsidies and rewards; footballers' 
income tax; the expenditure of transfer fees and the investment in reserve teams and 
affiliated amateur clubs" (Wang, J. 2000b: 93). This was announced at the 1996 
National Football Conference in which an official document, "The Club Salary 
System ofCFA", was discussed. This salary system was implemented in 1997 (Wang, 
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J. 2000b: 96). from Table 6.17, we can see that the Jia A club salary system was 
composed of reward (win bonus), training subsidy and base pay. The monthly salary 
of each player relied on the annual income of each Jia A club, of which at most 12.5 
percent of the annual income could be distributed to their 40 players as reward, and 20 
percent as training subsidy. The level of base pay was evaluated by the performance 
of each player, such as whether he was a member of the national team, a key player in 
his own team or a non-key player in his club. According to Wang Junshcng, the 
director of CFMC, the total salary and reward of players could not be more than 32.5 
percent of the annual income of each club although the total salary of Jia A players 
should be higher than that for Jia B players (Wang, 1. 2000b: 100) (s~e Table 6.17, 
6.18 and 6.(9). Unfortunately, the system was not successful and some clubs even 
spent as much as 63-65 percent of their annual income on salaries and rewards for 
players, due to the incapacity of the CFMC to oversee the clubs' finance and there 
being no substantial penalty from the CFA for violators, according to Wang Junsheng 
(2002: 327). 
Table 6.17: The Jia A Club Salary System of CFA in 1997 (Unit: yuan) 
The annual Monthly reward per player Monthly training subsidies 
income of per player Base pay 
each Jia A = 12.5% (X) 7 40 (players) 
club = (X) 7 12 (months) = 20% (X) 7 40 (players) 7 
12 (months) Level Monthly Pay 
10 million 2,600. 4,166 I 800 
8 million 2,083 3,333 2 700 
6 million 1,562 2,500 3 600 
4 500 
5 400 
Source: CFA (2000f: 188-9). 
Table 6.18: The Jia B Club Salary System of CFA in 1997 (Unit: yuan) 
Level Monthly reward Monthly training subsidies Monthly base pay 
1 1,000 1,800 800 
2 700 
3 600 
4 500 
5 400 
Source: CFA(2000f: 188-9). 
Table 6.19: The Division 2 Club Salary System ofCFA in 1997 (Unit: yuan) 
Monthl reward Monthl subsidies 
1,000 
Source: CF A (2000f: 188-9). 
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To solve this problem, in 1998 the CF A asked the 26 Jia A and Jia B clubs to make a 
"restricted salary" agreement with their players and coaches. According to this 
agreement, all the clubs would not only reject players' requests for additional 
signing-on fees but also set limits on salary and appearance money for their teams 
(CF A, 2002b: 47) (see Table 6.20). The way in which the CF A pressurised the 26 
clubs to suppress these domestic "star" players showed that the CF A attempts to deal 
with this difficult issue at the expense of players' interests. This kind of agreement 
was relatively fragile, especially for those Jia B League clubs who wanted to be 
promoted to Jia A League and the Jia A League clubs who were at the risk of being 
relegated to the Jia B League (Wang, J. 2002: 346-7). To manage this situation, the 
agreement became a regulation issued by the CF A in 2002, which stated that "the 
CF A has the right to do random financial inspections of clubs to make sure that clubs 
follow the agreement of restricted salary" and "any club that violates this agreement 
will lose its right to transfer any domestic or foreign player for one year" (CF A, 2002c: 
49-50). 
Table 6.20: The Agreement of Restricted Salary among 26 Jia A and Jia B Clubs 
in 1998 (Unit: yuan) 
JiaA JiaB 
Player (monthly pay) 12,000 10,000 
Coach (monthly pay) 18,000 16,000 
Team appearance money (per match) 400,000 250,000 
Source: CFA (2002b: 47). 
Secondly, the CF A created a special procedure for dealing with the domestic transfer 
market. According to a senior official in the CF A Technical Department, in order to 
deal with the issue of transfer fees, the CF A began borrowing the transfer model from 
Germany in 1993. With the CF A transfer model, some key elements which were 
linked to the player's age, former salary, player's performance (national or Olympic 
team member) and the club price index, were considered and converted into a 
reference price (CF A, 2000g: 152). According to a senior official in the CF A 
Technical Department, "If a c1up attempts to prevent its key players from transferring 
to the other clubs or asks for a transfer fee which is much higher than the CF A 
reference price, the other clubs can go to CF A arbitration" (Interview, 16th January 
2006). The problem was that "the real transfer fee is a commercial secret between 
seller club and buyer club", according to this senior CF A official. And it was difficult 
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for the CF A to become involved in transfer affairs if no club asked for arbitration. To 
tighten up the transfer market and to prevent domestic players from asking for 
additional signing-on fees from the clubs, the CF A set up a draft transfer system 
similar to the NBA in 1998, which allowed lower placed clubs priority in acquiring 
transfer-listed players who no longer had the right to choose their preferred club 
(Wang,1. 2002: 327). After implementing the draft system, "the unreasonable 
behaviour of these Chinese 'star' players in asking for additional signing-on fees, high 
salary, house and household registration change was initially under control" (Wang, 1. 
2002: 327). 
Although the CFA tackled the problem of these so- called 'peculiar men', it was 
forced to face more serious problems, such as game fixing and "black whistle" 
(corruption of match officials) which were the consequences of vicious competition 
between the 26 domestic professional clubs after the decision made by the CF A in 
1997 to enlarge the Jia A league from 12 to 14 clubs. According to Wang Junsheng, in 
order to prevent the problems of game fixing and black whistle, an official document, 
"The Notice of the Last Three Run Matches of Jia A League", was issued by the CFA 
in late 1997 to warn clubs and referees not to become involved in these immoral 
practices (Wang, J. 2002: 329). But the strategy adopted by the CF A to prohibit game 
fixing and black whistle seemed to have been in vain after the domestic media 
conducted and published a survey in early 1998 to reveal that at least 12 out of 16 Jia 
A and Jia B clubs admitted that they had bribed referees to favour their teams (Wang, 
1. 2002: 330). This media report caught the attention ofFlFA and the CFA was asked 
to investigate this issue and produce a report (Wang, 1. 2002: 330). Under huge 
pressure from both the rampant club commercialisation and these two international 
football organizations, Wang Junsheng, the director ofCFMC, attempted to 
temporarily terminate the system of "relegation and promotion". However, his 
proposal was rejected by most of the participants in the 1998 National Football 
Conference due to the possible adverse consequences for commercial income and 
sponsorship (Wang, J. 2002: 344-7). Mr. Wang's proposal was not accepted until the 
2001 National Football Conference and then only under pressure from the State 
Council (Wang, J. 2002: 347). 
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Thirdly, the Chinese government tightened up the financial and personnel power of 
the CF A in an effort to control, what was perceived to be, excessive 
commercialisation which penetrated into all NSMCs in early 2001. Sport Minister, 
¥uan Weiming, in his 2001 GAOS lecture, underlined that "After introducing a 
market economy into all NSMCs, most leaders in these NSMCs have more official 
power to make decisions on matters such as how to run sport marketing, who has the 
right to organize the national competition, who can be a referee, who can be selected 
into national teams, how to distribute the annual budget and who can be commercial 
sponsors for their NSMCs and their teams." He went on to say that "in order to 
prevent corruption from being rampant, we have to effectively oversee and control 
how these leaders ofNSMCs execute their power" (Yuan, W. 2002a: 18). Similar 
words were spoken in late 1997 by the vice Sport Minister, Zhang Faqiang, who was 
in charge of all the financial and marketing affairs of the NSC (GAOS). He 
highlighted that "All the CF A income belongs to the NSC .... As long as the CF A 
generates income in the name of 'sport', all of the money will belong to the Chinese 
government" (Zhang, F.Q. 1997: 16). Following these two sport leaders' arguments, 
two official documents, "The Notice for Standardizing the Codes of Practice of 
National Sport Management Centres" (GAOS, 2003d: 56-63) and "The Temporary 
Regulation for Centralizing Accounting and Finance Management of GAOS 
Affiliated Institutions" (GAOS, 2003f: 223-8), were issued by GAOS in 2001 and 
2002 respectively. According to these two documents, the financial and personnel 
power of the CFA was tightened up by the GAOS. The special measures taken by the 
Chinese government were: all training and competition programmes have to be 
examined and approved by the GAOS; all income and expenditure have to be 
examined and approved by the "Accounting and Finance Management Centre" of the 
GAOS, w~ich not only asked the CF A to cancel all its bank accounts but also only 
allowed the CF A to keep an assigned bank account; and all directors of the CF A 
department have to regularly alternate their jobs, especially for some key departments, 
in order to prevent corruption. After strong interference by the GAOS, the rampant 
commercialisation which penetrated the CF A was restricted, but the tighter regulation 
by GAOS "not only reduced CF A's flexibility and efficiency, but also increased the 
tension between the CFA and GAOS, intervened too much in the CFA's affairs", 
according one senior staff in the CF A comprehensive department (Interview, January 
2006). 
244 
Chapter 6 - Chinese Elite Football 
Fourthly, in order to reduce the vicious competition among the Jia A and Jia B clubs 
in which most would rather use short-term tactics of luring elite footballers with 
unusual fees and taking advantage of fixed games and black whistle to win club 
matches rather than invest more money in their reserve teams, the Chinese 
government chose two main strategies. These were to temporarily terminate the 
system of "relegation and promotion" in 200 I and to began carrying out the so-called 
"One Protocol & Two Licences" policy in 2002, which will be discussed in more 
detail below. 
Affected by the issues of 'game fixing' and 'black whistle', two owners of Jia A clubs, 
Wang Jianlin (Dalian Wanda F.C.) and Li Shilin (Beijing Guoan F.C.), who used to 
be key supporters ofWang Junsheng, the director of the CFMC, proclaimed that they 
were to withdraw their clubs from Jia A league to protest against the 'unfair matches' 
in 1998 and 2000 in which controversial referees were favouring the other teams. In 
addition, league matches were seriously troubled by a series of local football hooligan 
events which drew the attention of the leaders of the State Council, GAOS and the 
Public Security Department (Wang, J. 2002: 337-344). In order to tackle the problems 
of 'fixed games' and 'black whistle' and to rebuild the clean image of Jia A, the State 
Council issued an official document, "The Notice for Promoting the Clean Image and 
Maintaining the Order during Football Matches", to tighten up the management of Jia 
A and Jia B leagues in 2000 (State Council, 2002: 159-60). Moreover, in 200 I, the 
GAOS agreed that the CF A should temporarily terminate the system of "relegation 
and promotion" between 2001 and 2003 and rebuild its 'clean' image by renaming the 
Jia A League as the Chinese Football Association Super League (commonly known as 
Chinese Super League or CSL). According to Wang Junsheng, the director of CFMC, 
by temporarily terminating the system of "relegation and promotion", the CF A would, 
ideally, not only reduce the clubs' motivation to become involved in the issue of 
'fixed games' and 'black whistle', but also pay more attention to designing and 
organising a CSL in which clubs would be required to pass a series of requirements 
set by the CF A. These included strong and stable financial income (at least 30 million 
yuan per year), at least three reserve teams (UIS, U17, U19) owned by each club and 
at least 10 percent ofthe annual club income invested in reserve teams (Wang, J. 2002: 
398-9). 
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Unfortunately, the policy of temporarily terminating the system of "relegation and 
promotion" led to a series of 'fixed games' involving five Jia B clubs. According to 
Chen Peide, the former director of the sport bureau in Zhe Jiang Province, this was 
because of the CFA's misguided policy of "relegation and promotion", by which only 
the top two Jia B clubs could be promoted to Jia A without relegation from Jia A to 
Jia B in 2001 and this system was temporarily terminated in 2002. This policy put 
great pressure on Jia B league clubs because they had to wait until 2003 if they lost 
the chance to be promoted to Jia A in 200 I. Under this heavy pressure, five Jia B 
clubs took a risk by becoming involved in fixed games and there was a notorious 
scandal known as "Jia B Five Clubs Issue". Van Shiduo, who became the director of 
CFMC in 2000, states that he attempted to prevent the clubs from becoming involved 
in fixed games by having intensive meetings with the owners of clubs, by hiring 
foreign referees and even by warning some club owners, but it seemed to be in vain 
(Yan, S. 2002: 347-50). To deal with the "Jia B Five Clubs Issue", the Sport Minister, 
Yuan Weiming, asked Van Shiduo to "punish the clubs involved in fixed games with 
the utmost severity" (Yan, S. 2006: 85). Under instructions from the GAOS, the CFA 
made a critical decision in late 2001 to punish the clubs involved in game fixing with 
a grave penalty by which all the five clubs were banned from transferring any 
domestic players for two years, four out of these five clubs were deprived of their 
right to be promoted to Jia A and one of the clubs was kicked out of the Jia B league 
(CF A, 2002g: 353-4). 
The "One Protocol & Two Licences" policy was one approach the Chinese 
government adopted to attempt to force the Jia A and Jia B clubs to not only put more 
resources into their reserve teams instead of recruiting talent from other domestic 
clubs, but also to give up their leagues' main commercial rights, including 
broadcasting, advertising and sponsorship. According to Wang Junsheng, the then 
CF A vice president, the failure to qualify for participating in the World Cup and 
Olympic Games between 1992 to 2000 and the low profile of domestic football 
leagues were strongly influenced by the professional clubs seeking quick success and 
instant benefits, and ignoring the CF A regulation that each league club had to set up 
its three reserve teams. Indeed, most professional clubs tackled the CF A requirement 
by temporarily borrowing a whole young football team from the other football schools 
or amateur clubs to participate in the required matches organized by the CF A (Wang, 
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1. 2002: 320-1). In order to manage clubs' uncooperative behaviour, the CFA set up 
the "One Protocol & Two Licences" policy in which any club that would like to stay 
in Jia A and Iia B must receive two licences, a "club qualification licence" and a 
"match participation licence". They must also sign a contract (the "Protocol for Iia A 
and Iia B") with the CF A. For the "club qualification licence", the CF A set 
requirements for Iia A and Iia B clubs in which they had to prove their capability to 
be qualified in these two leagues. The main requirements were: to have 20-30 million 
yuan, to own at least 18 players, and to have at least three reserve teams, including 
U 19, U 17 and U 15. After satisfYing these requirements, a club could register to 
receive from the CF A the first licence to become a professional football club (CF A, 
2002f: 19-21). In order to hold the power to distribute the commercial income of 
domestic football leagues, in early 2000 a CF A document, "The Temporary 
Commercial Regulation of National Football Matches", highlighted that "The CF A 
not only owns the exclusive commercial rights, including broadcasting, advertising 
and sponsorship, but also has the right to distribute the commercial income" (CF A, 
2002d: 235). 
To prevent domestic professional football clubs from resisting this commercial 
regulation, all clubs had to register every year and sign a contract with the CF A (the 
"Protocol for Iia A and Jia B"). They also had to give a deposit of 1-2 million yuan to 
the CF A to make sure that each club accepted the eF A's conditional offer. The key 
points in the "Protocol for Jia A and Jia B" were: to agree that the CF A could recruit 
any club player unconditionally; to comply with "The Temporary Commercial 
Regulation of National Football Matches"; and to accept the CFA arbitration and 
promise that clubs would not take their case to the courts (CF A, 2002e: 23-8). Only 
after signing the unconditional agreement of the "Protocol for Jia A and Jia B" with 
the CF A, could clubs receive the second licence, the "match participation licence" and 
be accepted as a member of the Jia A or the Jia B (CF A, 2002f: 19-21). 
Finally, the Chinese government prevented the seven big clubs from organizing a new 
super league after carrying out a series of tough policies towards professional clubs. 
According to Zhang Lu, the vice president of the Beijing Guoan Football Club, "In 
the past, the CF A always made its own decisions and asked our clubs to follow its 
policy without listening to our voice, which made most clubs unhappy about CF A 
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policy". He went on to say that "We supposed that after the Jia A League was 
renamed the Chinese Football Association Super League (CSL), the CFA would keep 
its promise to establish an independent commercial company, The China Football 
Association Super League Company (CSLC) and an independent commission, "The 
Commission of China Football Association Super League" (CCSL), which could be in 
charge of the CSL from 2004. Unfortunately, the CFA breached its promise to do so." 
In fact, according to the "One Protocol & Two Licences" policy and the official 
document, "The Regulation of Commercial Management for Jia A League and the 
CF A Cup" issued by the CF A in 2002, the CF A not only controlled most of the 
commercial rights but also arbitrarily recruited any club player they wanted into seven 
national squads without any compensation (see Figure 6.8). 
Figure 6.8: The relationship between the Cbinese government and football clubs 
in the Cbinese Super League (CSL) 
National squads 
Including World Cup 
Team I, Olympic Team, 
& U21, UI9, UI? Team 14 Clubs 
Including Team I, Team 2 
& Team 3 
Broadcasting rights 
Advertising rights 
Sponsorship rights 
Partial advertisement rights 
Club title sponsorship rights 
Tickets rights 
Football schools. Sports colleges. Provincial teams 
Disappointed by the CFA's broken promise, some CSL clubs attempted to 'gang up' 
on the CF A. The opportune moment came in the controversial match between Beijing 
Guoan FC and Shenyang Ginde FC on 2nd October 2004. To protest against the unfair 
referee who favoured Shenyang Ginde FC, Beijing Guoan FC refused to carry on in 
the match. According to Van Shiduo, the director ofCFMC, on 10th October 2004, 
seven CSL clubs, including Beijing Guoan FC and Dalian Shide FC, asked the CF A 
to transfer its power over the CSL to the clubs so that they could organize a new 
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Super League, and to temporarily terminate the 2004 CSL season and publish the 
financial reports from 1994 to 2004. The CF A finally made a decision on 14th October 
2004 that not only did Beijing Guoan FC lose the match to Shenyang Ginde FC 0:3, 
but also Beijing Guoan FC should be penalized with a fine of300 thousand yuan and 
having its manager, Yang Zuwu, banned for six months (Peng, 2005: 551-2). This 
appeared to make Beijing Guoan FC even angrier about the dominating power of the 
CF A. At the request of the CSL clubs, the CF A convened a conference of all owners 
ofCSL clubs on 26th October 2004. Although the seven CSL clubs attempted to take 
advantage of this conference by drawing up and proposing 11 documents in relation 
to establishing a new Super League to force the CF A to cede all its CSL power, their 
scheme to challenge the CF A authority appeared to fail because it was under the 
autocratic government of the Chinese Communist Party, according to a senior official 
in the CF A Comprehensive Department (Interview, 18th January 2006). During the 
conference of 12 CSL clubs, the then director of the Chinese Football Management 
Center, Van Shiduo, fully supported by the GAOS and the leaders of provinces and 
municipalities, proclaimed that "the Chinese Super League is not run by a free market 
so it is impossible to let clubs decide the future of the CSL". He went on to emphasize 
that "The authority of CF A is unchallengeable and the status of CF A is unalterable 
because it is empowered by law" (Yan, S. 2006: 264). After his emphatic speech, Mr. 
Van heavily hit the table to show his anger and determination that it was out of the 
question to allow the clubs to organise another new Super League (Yan, S. 2006: 264). 
Without the support of GAOS and local political leaders, it would be impossible for 
clubs to set up any new football league, according to a senior official in the GAOS 
Personnel Department which is in charge of the examination of new national sport 
organizations (Interview, lOth January 2006). 
After this conference, the following agreements made were: to establish a "reform 
group" contained within the CF A, to include clubs and representatives from society; 
to relegate any club involved in a match strike;. and to publish the CSL financial 
report in November 2004 (Yan, S. 2006: 265). Although the CF A successfully 
prevented the big seven clubs from organizing a new super league, this issue alerted 
, 
Van Shiduo's successor, Xie Yalong, who became the director of the CFMC in early 
2005. According to Zhang Lu, the vice president of Beijing Guoan Football Club, the 
new director ofCFMC, Xie Yalong, with the permission of the GAOS agreed to 
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allocate a higher quota of the CSL's commercial income to each CSL club and was 
quite happy to see the CF A show a friendly attitude towards the clubs (Interview, 6th 
January 2006). The reason for the CF A and the GAOS agreeing to reduce the 
commercial interest of the CSL from 40-50 percent to 10 percent was because they 
wanted to dominate the decision-making of The China Football Association Super 
League Company (CSLC) which distributed commercial income to the clubs (Guo, L. 
2005). Under huge pressure from GAOS, the CFA decided not only to shorten the 
2007 timetable of the eSL but also to tenninate the CFA Cup for two years, in order 
to squeeze in 150 training days for the 2008 Olympic squad (Zhang, X.M. 2006). 
According to Zhang Lu, the vice president of the Beijing Guoan Football Club, "it is 
impossible for us to reject the decision if the CF A wants to shorten the timetable of 
the CSL to give more time for the Olympic squad to prepare for the Beijing Games". 
But he went on to say that "we will do whatever we can to persuade the CF A to adopt 
another way to avoid drafting club players to be trained for a long period of time". 
Regarding the Chinese government's point of view, Mr. Zhang's hopes seem not to 
have been realised, at least, for the 2008 Beijing Games. The vice Sport Minister, Cui 
Dalin, during his interview with Time Commercial News, stated that "we will do 
whatever we can to give our Olympic squad more time to prepare for the 2008 
Olympic Games" (Zhao, 2006). Mr. Cui's words were echoed by Ma Chengquan, the 
director of the CF A Competition Department. He said that "the premier mission of the 
2007 CSL season is to fully support 2008 Beijing games and the stabilising of the 
development of the eSL is secondary" (Wang, L. 2007». Moreover, according to 
GAOS's new policy (Teng, 2007), one to two weeks' military training with the 
People's Liberation Anny (PLA) has become a new form of training strategy to 
"discipline" and "inspire" these high-paid footballers to work harder like their PLA 
counterparts in order to fight wholeheartedly for the country in international matches, 
especially for the 2008 Olympic Games. 
6.S Conclusion 
Following the open-door policy, business people (investors) clearly saw sport, 
especially football, as a business opportunity. There were probably two kinds of 
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business opportunity involved in Chinese elite football development. One was to see 
football and football clubs as sources of profit in themselves, by selling tickets and 
merchandise. More commonly, however, it was seen as part of a broader commercial 
strategy - a networking opportunity to connect with local political leaders, and a 
chance for non-sport businesses to put their name on the clubs. By so doing, these 
investors could not only receive special treatment, such as tax exemption and other 
financial incentives from the municipality, but could also take the opportunity to 
market their non-sport products. So it was not surprising to see a rapid expansion of 
interest in investing in football. With the full support of a group of Chinese leaders, 
such as Li Tieying, Wu Shaozu, the Sport Minister (1988-2000) and the director of 
CFMC, Wang Junsheng (1991-2000), the club approach, particularly the European 
model supported by private and state-owned enterprise and wider society was adopted 
in order to develop a strong national football team (Wu, S.Z. 2000c: 16), has been 
adopted since 1992. But the ambition of the Chinese government, which attempted to 
maintain the socialist way and take advantage of capitalist elements at the same time 
when refonning its elite football system, turned out to be problematic. 
There are four identifiable issues which have arisen as a result of rapid 
commercialization. These not only set an agenda for the Chinese government, but also 
forced the Chinese government to respond to those issues. The issues were: corruption 
(match-fixing, black whistle); the emergence of stars in the transfer system (peculiar 
men); movement of players abroad, involving the import and export of players and 
coaches; and the priority of the national team. 
Looking at the development of football from the government's point of view, its 
concern was not so much with the development of professional football but the 
development of a strong national team. These agendas are in many ways quite 
different. For government, the constant problem was how to rapidly improve the 
quality of the national team~ The government strategy was always a short-term 
approach in which they continuously searched for rapid improvement of Chinese 
football in order to break away from Asia and reach world class level. In the 
beginning, professional clubs were regarded as a means to rapid development, but in 
the late 1990s, they were seen as a barrier to it. The public policy agenda the 
government was faced with was partly set by the clubs, for example, the corruption, 
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the high payment to players and the transfer of players, but was also set by itself by 
looking for quick solutions. With regard to each of the four proble~s, (club 
corruption, the star system, player transfer and the national teams), the government 
has demonstrated its capacity to intervene in these issues very forcibly, although 
sometimes its intervention was short term as a result of failing to tackle the problem, 
particularly with regard to the national team. As for the professional teams, there were 
some elements of negotiation, but it seems not a great deal, due to tight control by the 
CFA and the GAOS. 
With regard to the hard and soft indicators (see Chapter 4 and Appendix 2-6) for this 
case study, we have generated useful and valid evidence which is mapped out in this 
chapter. Using Houlihan's patterns of globalization (see Chapter 2 Patterns of 
Globalisation), we can summarize China's response to global football and answer our 
three research questions. Within this framework, the relationship between China and 
global football is located somewhere in between participative and conflictual, 
although it appears to be more conflictual than participative (see Table 6.21). Indeed, 
China has significantly controlled resources in a number of ways. It has gradually 
become more serious about obtaining a leadership position in the AFC and has 
desired more influence in FIFA (see lh, 2h and 4s in Appendix 5), strengthened 
athlete selection, training and competition systems for the Olympics and World Cup 
(see 4h, 5h, 6h, 7h, 8h and 4s in Appendix 5), transfonned the administrative structure 
and generated multiple incomes for the elite football system (see 4h, 4s and 5s in 
Appendix 5). It has also introduced the system of financial rewards to mobilize 
players and coaches to win domestic and international matches (see 3s and 5s in 
Appendix 5). All the resources mentioned above were to be used to "break out of Asia 
and enter World class level" in order to raise national pride, to increase national 
cohesion and to demonstrate the superiority of socialism. 
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Table 6.21: Summary of Cb in a's response to tbe Global Football 
Participative Conflictual 
Sufficient control over resources to provide A set of values that 
Meaning ecipient cultures with leverage eads to attempts to 
eject the global 
culture 
1. Taking more seriously the aim to obtain 1. Intervening in 
a leadership position in the AFC and footballers' 
desiring to have more influence in the transfer affairs 
Actions of FIFA 2. Preventing 7 big 
he Chinese 2. Strengthening athlete selection, training clubs from 
government and competition system for the organizing new 
Olympics and World Cup super league 
3. Transforming administrative structure 3. Controlling CF A 
and generating multiple incomes for the and manipulating 
Elite Football System Chinese Super 
4. Introducing the system of financial League (CSL) 
rewards 
As a conflictual response, the Chinese government established a set of values, namely 
nationalism and patriotism (see 1 s, 2s and 5s in Appendix 5) that led to an attempt to 
reject the global culture of commercialism (see 3s, 5s and 9h in Appendix 5). By the 
forceful actions of the Chinese government towards players, clubs, CSL and even the 
CFA, (such as interfering in footballers' transfer affairs, preventing seven big clubs 
from organizing a new super league, controlling the CF A and manipulating the 
Chinese Super League (CSL»), the PRC only allowed commercial football activities to 
be developed on the government's own terms. In other words, the government not 
only became the biggest agent of Chinese elite football commercial rights and 
interests, but also set its own agenda and values in an attempt to reject global culture 
that might endanger the government's main goal- "Olympic and World Cup 
success". 
Although the government has demonstrated its capacity to intervene in the issues 
listed in Table 6.21, a number of tensions still exist in China's elite football system 
are: first, that between the priorities of commercial clubs and the national team 
development; and second, that between the highly paid and internationally mobile 
sports 'stars' and the centrally controlled elite development system. 
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Regarding the tension between clubs' commercial interest and the country's priority 
of the Olympics and World Cup, there are many cases in which the government not 
only took most of the commercial rights from the domestic leagues and clubs but also 
drafted key players from the clubs to prepare for international games without any 
compensation. Although the plan for organizing a new super league finally died out 
due to Chinese government suppression, it could possibly reach another peak after the 
2008. Beijing Games, according to a top manager of one of the CSL clubs (Interview, 
6th January 2006). As for the tension between players and the government, only 
players who pass a fitness test, such as Coopers 12-min Run Test before 2003, and 
Yo-Yo Intermittent Recovery Test after 2003, set by the CF A can take part in the 
Super League and Division I championships. Several national footballers withdrew 
from national squads after failing the fitness test and challenged the authority of the 
Communist Government even though they had a second chance to pass this test. 
With regard to the tension between commercial sponsors and the government, one of 
the big commercial sponsors, Infront Sports & Media, attempted to become more 
involved in the decision-making process concerning the football head coach selection 
for the 2008 Olympic squad, and to put commercial interest above national interest 
when arranging international friendly matches (Xu and Zhang, 2006). As for the 
tension between GAOS and the Chinese Football Association (CFA), officials in the 
CF A complained that GAOS had control over football and its development, personnel 
and financing, which not only made the CF A staff become lethargic but also increased 
the tension, especially in communication between different departments of the CFA 
and the GAOS (Interview, 18th January 2006). As a result of the ongoing tensions 
identified above, it is difficult for us to answer the question, "what is the long term 
direction of the relationship between Chinese sport and globalization?", without 
completing the final case study (elite basketball) which will provide us with more 
evidence to continue investigating this issue in the final chapter. 
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Chapter Seven: The Case of Chinese Elite Basketball 
7.1 Introduction 
Basketball was invented in 1891 by Or. lames Naismith at the YMCA Training 
School (which later became Spring field College) in Springfield, Massachusetts, USA. 
Through its connection with YMCA missionaries and Church universities, basketball 
was introduced into China in 1895 and spread throughout the country (Yang and liang, 
1997: 34). During the early 20th century, China was, in fact, one of the countries that 
helped to globalize basketball through the YMCA (Veseth, 2005). One of Or. lames 
Naismith's students, Or. C. Saler, was dispatched to China by the YMCA in 1912 and 
became Chinese basketball coach for 1 st - 3rd Far East Games in the 1910s (Yang and 
liang, 1997: 34). Following the promotion of the YMCA and Church Universities, 
some Chinese students went to Springtield College to learn basketball and had a 
significant influence on the development of Chinese elite basketball in the early stages. 
Among these were Oong Shouyi, Song lunfu and Mou Zuoyun, who not only became 
national basketball coaches for Far East Games and Olympic Games between the 
1930s and 1950s, but also took senior positions in the Chinese Basketball Association 
between the 1950s and 1980s. Unfortunately, the coming of World War 11 and civil 
war between the Kuomintang Party (KMT) led by Chiang Kai-Shek and the Chinese 
Communist Party headed by Mao Zedong meant that the development of elite 
basketball was slow. Although the Chinese basketball team participated in the 1936 
Berlin and 1948 London Olympics with the support of China's National Amateur 
Athletic Federation (CNAAF), the Chinese team not only los~ most games, but lagged 
far behind their western counterparts. Generally speaking, before the mid-twentieth 
century the popularity, playing and administration of Chinese basketball were far 
from mature (CBA, 1991: 76-88). 
After the founding of the PRC in 1949, Communist China began building its elite 
basketball system, mostly learning from the USSR. With the help of Soviet experts, 
the PRC gradually built up its own initial training and competition system. To speed 
up the development of elite basketball, the Chinese government sent its best 
basketball team, the Bayi army team (the name "Bayi" representing the anniversary of 
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the founding of the People's Liberation Army) to have a series of friendly matches 
with Eastern Bloc countries, such as Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Romania in 1954, 
in order to improve their skills. It also dispatched its two national teams (men's and 
women's) to the USSR to be trained by Soviet coaches (CBA, 1991: 104). The Soviet 
model, with its competition system, ranking system of referees and basketball players 
and training system, was imitated by the PRC, and the Chinese men's and women's 
basketball teams were both ranked first in the 'Games of the New Emerging Forces' 
(GANEFO I) in 1963 (CBA, 1991: 124 - 145). Unfortunately, China's ambition to 
make its mark in the world basketball arena was destroyed by the Cultural Revolution. 
The Vice Premier, He Long was accused of 'taking the bourgeois road' (Zhou ziben 
zhuy daolu) and died in jail in 1969, numerous sports administrators, elite players, 
coaches, and referees were purified and persecuted, and basketball facilities along 
with many other sports facilities were widely ruined and international sports contacts 
virtually ended (CBA, 1991: 153-4). However, due to diplomatic motives, China 
re-established the national team in 1973 (CBA, 1991: 156) and began reintroducing 
the modem basketball system after the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1977. 
Following China's open door policy, the PRC was eager to project itself on the world 
basketball stage but there were two main policy challenges which lay ahead of the 
Chinese government. One was "how to raise the profile of Chinese basketball on the 
world stage", which involved not just producing a successful team, but also becoming 
prominent within FIB A and FIBA Asia (ABC). The other was "how to establish an 
effective domestic league to support and contribute to the national goal". These two 
questions will be discussed in more detail in the section on formal engagement with 
FIBA and the section on elite development. In addition, after Deng Xiaoping boldly 
advocated a market economy in China in early 1992, the Western market model, 
involving a club and transfer system, was widely adopted throughout the country. 
This also raises the question of how the Chinese government handled the issue of 
Commercialisation in relation to the flow of players and the commercial interest of 
clubs and sponsors. This issue will be discussed further in the section on 
commercialisation. 
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7.2 Formal engagement with FIBA 
The relationship between the PRC and FIBA seems to have gone through three quite 
distinct phases namely: withdrawal; manipulation; and currently, enthusiastic 
involvement. During the first phase, Communist China was accepted by FIBA in 1952, 
but withdrew in 1958, due to the "Two Chinas" issue. In the second phase, the PRC 
not only sent a team to participate in GANEFO in the early 1960s, but also attempted, 
during the 1970s, to exclude Taiwanese membership ofFIBA and FIBA-Asia with the 
support of many Third World countries, and with the support of the Hong Kong 
Tycoon, Fok Ying Tung and the president of the Hong Kong Basketball Association, 
Carl Men Ky Ching (Zhang, C. 2000: 28). Taiwan was still important as a key foreign 
policy issue, but the PRC adopted a broader set of objectives which included raising 
the profile of the PRC in global sport and seeing international sporting success as 
valuable for reasons of national prestige and identity. In the final phase, the PRC has 
been enthusiastically involved in international basketball, especially focusing on 
success at the World Championships and the Olympic Games. 
7.2.1 Engagement with the FIBA 
In 1952 Communist China was accepted as a member by FIBA using the name of 
All-China Sports Federation (ACSF) (Zhonghu quanguo /iyu zonghui). In 1956 the 
Chinese government set up the Chinese Basketball Association (CBA) which claimed 
jurisdiction over all Chinese basketball activities and required FIBA to terminate 
Taiwan's membership. Disappointed over representation issues, the PRC not only 
cancelled its membership of the IOC but also withdrew from nine other international 
sporting organizations, including that for basketball, in protest over the IOC's 'two 
Chinas' policy in 1958 (Wang, H. 2000: 35). After withdrawing from FIB A, the PRC 
supported GANEFO to combat so called western imperialism and capitalism, which 
included FIBA. The PRC did not contact FIBA until the success of China's 'Ping 
Pong Diplomacy' which contributed towards improving the Sino-US bilateral 
relationship and which, to some extent, helped the PRC acquire a seat on the UN 
Security Council in the early 1970s. 
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In order to rejoin FIBA, the Chinese government invited Sa Bo Er Te, who was then 
the FIBA Executive member and chairman of the International Affairs Commission, 
to visit China in 1974 and asked to renew its membership' of FIBA with the condition 
of an acceptance of its "One China" policy. After his visit, the central board of FIBA 
initially decided to accept the CBA's affiliation, but the finial decision had to be made 
by the FIBA World Congress in 1976. In order to successfully gain the FIBA scat, the 
then Secretary of FIBA, William lones, was invited to visit Beijing in 1975. 
Impressed by the enthusiasm of the Chinese government to promote basketball, Mr. 
lones not only endorsed the PRC's FIBA membership, but also supported Zhang 
Changlu, then CBA vice president and vice director of the Ball Game Department in 
the NSC, to become a FIBA Central Board member in 1976 (Zhang, C. 2000: 29). 
After taking the FIBA seat, the Chinese government did whatever it could to prevent 
Taiwan from participating in FIBA events. In 1987, the Taiwanese government, with 
the help of the FIBA-Asia Secretary, Lin YiZe, asked FIB A to acknowledge the 
international "William Jones Basketball Championship", supported and organized by 
the Taiwanese government, as one ofFIBA's annual events, but due to the influence 
of Chinese official, Zhang Changlu, this proposal was withdrawn (Zhang, C. 2000: 
30). Because of the PRC's insistence on a 'one China' policy, Taiwan could not join 
FIBA competitions until acceptance of the so-called "Olympic model" in 1988, by 
which Taiwan was forced to adopt a different national anthem and flag. According to 
Zhang Changlu, he was unable to accept the FIBA decision to allow Taiwan become 
involved in any FIBA activities until the final decision was confirmed by Wei lizhong, 
the then the Director of International Affairs in the NSC (Zhang, C. 2000: 30). 
Although the PRC gradually increased its influence in FIBA and began taking an 
executive seat after 1986 (see Table 7.1), it still had to grasp the really 'key' and 
'powerful' seats of the President or Secretary ofFIBA. During his interview with The 
Journal of Sport History and Culture, Wei Jizhong, former Director of International 
Affairs in the NSC, the vice president of the Federation International de Volleyball 
(FIVA) and an executive member of the World Taekwondo Federation (WTF) stated 
that "Theoretically, the executive committee is the highest executive authority, but in 
fact, the executive committee is manipulated by the president, the general secretary 
and a few key figures. The function of the executive committee just echoes the 
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decision made by these few vital actors". He went on to claim that "Although to take 
a seat on the executive committee is very important, a more important thing is to take 
over the decision-making power on some vital issues, such as the competition 
schedule, competition regulation and the dispatch of the referees" (Ding, 2003: (8). In 
addition, Mr. Wei also emphasized that "it is easier to be selected on to the executive 
committee if the power of the nation-state is strong enough in the world political 
regime and if its national team has a high profile in the world ranking" (Ding, 2003: 
19). 
Table 7.1: Chinese officials involved in FIBA's Central Board and Executive 
Committee 
year Name FlBA position Domestic position 
1976-1993 Zhang Changlu FIBA Central Board CBA vice president and vice 
(1976-93) director of the Ball Game 
FIBA Executive Department in NSC 
Committee (1986-93) 
\998- 2005 Ms. Liu Yumin FIBA Executive CBA vice president 
Committee 
2006- now Mr. Vu Zaiqing FIBA Executive Vice Sport Minister, 
Committee the IOC executive member 
On comparing Mr. Wei's words with Table 7.2 and Table 7.3, it is clear that the 
ranking of the Chinese Men's Basketball Team in the Olympic Games and the FIBA 
World Championship was not particularly impressive but that the PRC could still take 
a seat on the FIBA Executive Committee, which could be due to China's rising global 
political and economic status. Indeed, the Chinese government understood that it only 
needed to increase the performance of its national basketball squads in order to 
guarantee that Chinese officials had a better chance to dominate the decision-making 
ofFIBA. From Table 7.1, we can also see that Yu Zaiqing, the vice sport minister and 
the IOC executive member, was selected as a FIBA Executive Committee member, 
which to some extent, implied that China was taking its role within the sport more 
seriously. The increase in Chinese membership of FIBA needs to be seen in relation 
to the next section, which is concerned with FIB A-Asia. The PRC needed to have 
strong representation in this regional federation in order to increase its membership 
and have its own representatives in F~BA and to prevent Taiwan from raising any 
political issues in the international basketball arena. 
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Table 7.2: Ranking of the Chinese Men's Basketball Team in the Olympic 
Games (1936-2004) 
Year Olympic Games Ranking 
1936 11111 21 
1948 I 4 III IS 
1984 23 ra 10 
1988 24111 I1 
1992 I Sill 12 
1996 16111 8 
2000 l71l1 10 
2004 I Sill 8 
Source: CBA (2004t). 
Table 7.3: Ranking of the Chinese Men's Basketball Team in the FIBA World 
Championship (1936-2006) 
Year World Championship Ranking 
1978 8111 II 
1982 9111 12 
1986 tOlI1 9 
1990 11th 14 
1994 12U1 8 
2002 14th 12 
2006 15U\ II 
Source: CBA (2004g). 
7.2.2 Engagement with the Asian Basketball Confederation (ADC) 
In order to participate in the FIBA Asia Championship for Men (formerly Asian 
Basketball Confederation Championship) in Bangkok, Thailand in 1975, the PRC 
started becoming involved in the ABC. According to the FIBA Regulations, only a 
FIBA member could be an ABC member and this was the requirement for 
participating in the Asian Basketball Confederation Championship, which is the Asian 
qualifying tournament for the FIBA World Championship and the Olympic basketball 
tournament. The problem was that the CBA was not formally accepted as a FIBA 
member in 1975 because the Chinese government's condition of entry was that 
Taiwan must be expelled from FIBA and that the CBA must be confirmed as the sole 
sport organisation representing the whole of China. According to Mr. Zhang Changlu, 
the then CBA vice president and vice director of the Ball Game Department in the 
NSC, Hong Kong Tycoon, Fok Ying Tung and the president of the Hong Kong 
Basketball Association, Carl Men Ky Ching helped the PRC solve this problem. With 
the help of Mr. Fok and Mr. Ching (president of the executive committee in 1975 and 
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president of FlBA between 2002 and 2006), China cooperated with other Asian 
countries to undennine the position of Taiwan. During this Conference of the ABC, it 
not only accepted the PRC as an ABC member, but also successfully isolated Taiwan 
with the consequence that Taiwan was prevented from participating in this 
Conference of the ABC (Zhang, C. 2000: 30)~ 
After becoming an ABC member, the PRC took an active role, especially on the 
executive board. The Chinese government nominated, in 1979, Mou Zuoyun, the then 
CBA president and the vice director of the Ball Game Department in NSC for election 
as an executive member of the ABC (Gao et aI, 1989: 180). Four years later, Mr. Mou 
was selected as an ABC First Vice President. In Table 7.4, we can see that from 1979 
onwards, the PRC played a key role in the ABC (also named FlBA-Asia). In addition, 
according to Zhang Changlu, who was a FlBA Central Board member (1976-93), a 
FIBA Executive Committee member (1986-93) and the FIB A-Asia vice president 
(I 987-98), one of his missions in these two international organizations was to prevent 
the Taiwanese government using international basketball activities to achieve any 
Taiwanese political objectives in relation to the "Two Chinas" issue (Zhang, C. 2000: 
30). 
The Chinese government had been reasonably successful in increasing its influence 
within the ABC. However, it would be much more difficult to improve the standard of 
the national team. In order to understand the strategy for improving the national team, 
we need first to see how the Chinese government transformed the administrative 
structure of basketball in China, and then how the Chinese government took 
advantage of this administrative structure in order to reinforce its athlete selection, 
training and competition system with a view to the Olympic Games and FIBA World 
Championships. 
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Table 7.4: Chinese Officials Involved in FIBA-Asia Central Board 
Year Name FlBA-Asia position Domestic position 
1979-1987 Mou Zuoyun First Vice-President CBA president, deputy director of 
the Ball Game Department in NSC 
1987-1998 Zhang Changlu Board member and CBA Vice-President and deputy 
Vice-President director of the Ball Game 
Department in NSC 
1998-2006 Xin Lancheng First Vice-President Director of the Chinese Basketball 
Management Centre (1997-2002) 
1998-2006 Ms. Liu Yumin Board member CBA Vice-President 
2006-2010 Mr. Li Yuanwei Hon. Chairman Deputy Director of the Chinese 
and also a member in Basketball Management Centre 
FIB A-Asia Executive (1997-2000) 
Committee and FIB A-Asia Director of the Chinese Basketball 
Central Board Management Centre (2003-present) 
7.3 Elite development 
7.3.1 Transforming administrative structures and strengthening the athlete 
selection, training and competition system 
The administrative structure 
In order to achieve the goal set by the Chinese government of qualifying among the 
Top eight basketball teams in the World Championship and in the Olympic Games as 
set out in the document "The Four Years Training Project for Basketball, Football and 
Volleyball", produced after the All States Sports Ministers' Conference in 1972 (CBA, 
1991: (55), the NSC gradually restored the basketball administrative structure to what 
it had been before the Cultural Revolution. The whole basketball system became 
embedded in the NSC's administrative structure (see Figure 7.1) and the most 
important departments for promoting Chinese basketball were the Ball Games 
Department (for training and competition affairs), the National Training Bureau (for 
national basketball squads), the Sport for All Department (for grassroots basketball) 
and the External Affairs Department (for international basketball affairs) (Zhao, 2005: 
37). 
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Figure 7.1: Chinese Basketball Administrative Structure 1955-1996 
Although this administrative structure had previously helped the PRC dominate in 
Asian basketball matches and achieve its goal to be among the Top eight basketball 
teams in the World Championship and in the Olympic Games in the mid-1990s, it 
could not, according to the former director of Chinese Basketball Management Centre 
(1997-2002), Xin Lancheng (1998: 4), cover up the fact that this structure had 
difficulty in dealing with an increasingly commercialized and professionalized sport. 
After Team China (Men and Women) and young national squads were defeated by 
other Asian countries, such as Japan and South Korea in a series of international 
basketball competitions in 1997, the PRC failed to qualify for the FIBA World 
Championship for the first time since 1978 (Xu, 1. 1998). During a conference on 
basketball reform, Zhang Changlu, former vice director of the Ball Game Department 
in NSC, claimed that "There are only three members of staff in the Basketball 
Division in the NSC. It is difficult enough for them to deal with the multi-national 
companies, such as IMG and Hong Kong Jing-Ying Company, without having to 
supervise provincial governments to produce elite basketball players" (Basketball 
Magazine, 1997: 5). Indeed, following in the footsteps of football, Chinese elite 
basketball introduced a club system in 1995 which was sponsored primarily by IMG 
for Jia A League and by the Hong Kong Jing-Ying Company for the B League (Xue, 
1997). In order to deal with an increasingly complicated and commercial elite 
basketball structure, the Chinese Basketball Management Centre (CBMC) was 
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established in 1997, with 27 staff in charge of administrative work and 36 others 
(including 4 coaches, 4 managers and 28 members of national squads) (GADS, 2000d: 
119). 
According to Xin Lancheng, the director ofthe CBMC (1997-2002), his main mission 
was to focus on the training and monitoring of national teams and young national 
squads and to manage the Jia A Basketball League (Xin, 1998b: 5). Under the 
leadership of Mr Xin, the CBMC emphasized the development of elite basketball and 
paid less attention to the commercial benefits available to clubs, which led seven 
clubs to attempt to organize a new league in 1998 to challenge the authority of the 
CBMC (Xin, 1999a: 24). Although the plan for organizing a new basketball league 
was suppressed by the government, it had an impact on Mr Xin's successor, Li 
Yuanwei, who became director of the CBMC in 2003 and took a more westernized 
approach to reforming the administrative structure of the CBMC, although the final 
decision would lie with the GADS. From Figure 7.2, it is clear that China adopted a 
western approach, especially that of the NBA, to establish this new structure. 
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Figure 7.2: Chinese Basketball Administrative Structure in 
2006 
GAOS (COC. ACSF) I 
I 
I 
I I 
7 Non- Olympic Spon ~bnagemem Cenlers 16 Olympic Spon Management CeRlers 
(lO NlIional Spon Assoc .. toons' (28S +]W IIolio .. 1 Sport Associalions, 
I 
I ChInese S.sketball Association! Chinese Basketball Managemenl Cenlre 
I 
I I I 
I f Provinc .. 1 S pon I Bureaus 
I I NatIOnal I I Malkcting I I Compcl.ltion 1 1 T~n~1 11 So~1 1 comprehenSIve' Squads Depanmenl Departmenl Depanmenl Develop ....... Depanrnenl DerIIn Oenanmenc: 
I 
Spon Management Ch .. A Basketball 1 CBA's , Company (Infront Industry managins ProvinciaV City Basketball 
Spons Developmenl Corp "like Assocattons 
& Mcd .. , 
NattoRlI I I 
Squads 
--
China S.sketball& Infrom 
____ I Chinese Professional League 1 
Span Management 
Company 
I 
I Professio .. 1 Clubs I 
I I 
t 
I Amateur Clubs I 
I I 
Note: Progression rotes for athletes: --+ ; Partnership between Sport Management Company 
and Chinese Professional League and National Squads: ..... . 
The three key transformations from the original structure described in Figure 7.1 are: i) 
setting up a highly institutionalized and rationalized Chinese basketball system; ii) 
introducing a club system; and iii) establishing basketball companies as commercial 
agents. Regarding the first point, the GAOS not only established more specialized 
departments, such as a Marketing Department, Technical Department, National Squad 
Department, Competition Department and Comprehensive Department, but also 
recruited more staff with specialist backgrounds, such as sport science, finance, law 
and management, into the CBMC to run this system more effectively. As for the 
second point, China introduced a club system to replace the Soviet system and to 
create a more competitive and material-oriented mechanism. As regards the final 
point, in order to survive without government financial support the Chinese 
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Basketball Company was established, and a multi-national sport management 
company (Infront Sports & Media) was introduced. The Chinese Basketball 
Management Centre (CBMC) was created in 1997 but the leadership and the general 
function was exactly the same as the CBA. The title of the CBA was used to connect 
with international organizations and the CBMC was used to interact with the domestic 
political system (Bai, 2003: 50). 
The selection system 
In order to speed up elite basketball development, in 1973 the NSC announced a 
four-year basketball project (1973-1976) which requested provincial governments to 
set up provincial basketball teams to be a talent pool for national squads (CBA, 1991: 
155). From Table 7.5 we can see that the number of provincial players doubled from 
1,373 in 1975 to 2,549 in 1979. But the dramatic increase in provincial basketball 
players, as in football and volleyball, was disadvantaged by the government concern 
to maximize its Olympic medals. At the heart of the problem was that in order to win 
as many Olympic medals as it could as quickly as possible, the Chinese government 
had to reallocate its limited resources from team sports to individual sports. In 1980 
the State Council ratified the NSC's proposal (NSC, 1993c: 227-228) to pay more 
attention to developing individual sports which had a higher medal quota in the 
Olympic Games. It stated that "There are 203 gold medals in the Olympic Games and 
almost half of them come from 4 sports: Track and Field, Gymnastics, Swimming and 
Weightlifting. But there are less than 25 percent of Chinese elite athletes who are 
trained for these 4 sports. Compared to the team sports, there are only 4 Olympic gold 
medals in basketball, volleyball and football, but more than 35 percent of Chinese 
elite athletes are trained to achieve them. It is urgent for us to change this situation." 
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Table 7.5: Basketball players in the Chinese sport system 1957-2005 
Level I Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 
Provincial Squads Sport Colleges Spare-time Sport Traditional Total 
School Schools 
1957 593 0 0 0 
1962 2147 0 0 0 
1965 1860 0 0 0 
1970 1073 0 0 0 
1975 1373 0 0 0 
1979 2549 0 61289 0 
1980 1323 678 50529 0 
1985 1927 1194 42549 280907 326577 
1990 1250 2103 38520 505846 547719 
1995 553 2398 29653 473541 506145 
2000 526 3703 32657 649138 686024 
2005 696 7943 34321 0 
* There was no record durmg the period of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) 
Source: NSC (Planning and Finance Department), Statistical Yearbook of Sport (Internal information), . 
1994-2006. 
The policy of earning more Olympic medals had a significant influence on the 
selection system of Chinese basketball. The number of provincial basketball players 
declined from 2549 in 1979 to 1323 in 1980. In order to encourage the provincial 
governments into moving resources from team sports to individual sports another 
NSC proposal, ratified by the State Council in 1986, stated that "From now on, 
provincial teams have to focus on individual sports (such as track & field and 
swimming) and responsibility for team sports (such as basketball, volleyball and 
football) should be gradually transferred to cities, Trade Unions and Universities. By 
so doing, the performance of provincial teams in individual sports can be improved 
further" (NSC, 1993c: 104). Influenced by the Olympic strategy of the NSC in the 
1980s, many provincial governments dismantled their basketball teams (Guo, 2000: 
298), which led to a threefold decline in the number of players from 1927 in 1985 to 
598 in 1993. The dramatic diminution in the number of provincial basketball players 
caused a crisis in Chinese elite basketball. In order to solve this problem, in 1995 the 
Chinese government began to introduce a club system (following in the steps of 
Chinese football). Unfortunately, the club system itself could not solve this problem 
because the owners of clubs wanted to buy potential players rather than produce elite 
players themselves. After being seriously defeated in a series of international 
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basketball matches in 1997, the Chinese government began to refine its selection 
system. 
In 1980 the State Council ratified the NSC's proposal (NSC, 1993c: 227-228) for 
dividing the Chinese sport selection system into three levels. Following the National 
Conference of Basketball in 1981, the Chinese basketball selection system was 
gradually established (see Figure 7.3). 
Figure 7.3: China's Basketball Selection System in the 1980s 
Young National Squads (Ul6, U19) 
Provincial, PLA & City Squads 
Sport Colleges 
Spare-time Sport Schools for basketball 
Schools with Basketball Tradition & School Basketball Teams 
In order to support this selection system, 12 "significant cities and areas for basketball 
in China" (SCAAFB) were selected and established in 1981 namely: Beijing, Tianjin, 
Shanghai, Shandong, Guangdong, Hubei, Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Jiangsu, 
Sichuan and People's Liberation Army (PLA) (Gao et ai, 1989: 104). The conclusion 
of the National Conference of Basketball in 1981 highlighted that "in order to raise 
the profile of Chinese basketball in international competitions, we must not only set 
up National Team 1 and National Team 2 (UI9), but also establish Youth National 
Squads (U16) to be trained in training camps over a certain period oftime" (CBA, 
1991: 217). To strengthen the selection system, the NSC required the 12 SCAAFB to 
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build up second teams and to maintain or increase Spare-time Sport Schools for 
basketball, Schools .with Basketball Tradition and School Basketball Teams. It also 
signed, in 1985, a three- year-contract with the 12 SCAAFB in which each SCAAFB 
must produce at least one player for both the national basketball team and the Youth 
National Squad (UI9) (CBA, 1991: 224). 
Unfortunately, according to the director of the Competition Department in GAOS, 
Wu Shouzhang (200 I: 46), additional changes were needed to overcome the impact of 
the Olympic strategy of the mid-1980s which prioritised individual Olympic sports. 
Consequently, the Chinese government focused on potential individual Olympic 
medal sports, such as table tennis, diving, gymnastics, swimming and track and field, 
and team sports like basketball were seriously diminished. In order to solve this 
problem, the Chinese government gradually refined its selection system (see Figure 
7.4). 
Figure 7.4: China's Basketball Selection System in 2007 
I Olympic Squad 
i 
I National Team I 
i 
I Young National Teams (UlS, Ut7, Ul9) J 
1 
Professional Clubs 
(Division A & B league) 
i 
(Potential Level) 
(Professional club reserve teams, Sport college teams, 
Basketball school teams) 
1 
(Grassroots Level) I (General Spare Time Sport Schools, Schools with basketball tradition & School 
The new strategies adopted in the selection system were: initiating the project of small 
basketball backboards, establishing basketball schools, selecting cities of basketball, 
269 
Chapter 7 - Chinese Elite Basketball 
asking professional clubs to set up reserve teams, setting up two national teams and 
attempting to extend the talent pool to the basketball teams in the education system. 
In 1999, GAGS initiated the "Project of Small Basketball Backboards" which was 
aimed to "increase the basketball participation and produce potential young basketball 
players through the creation of more opportunities for informal play" (GAGS, 2000e: 
75). With this project, the GAGS would, by 2009, install 80,000 small basketball 
backboards in 100 cities to attract about 10 million young people to play basketball 
regularly (GAGS, 2000e: 76-9). With regard to selecting the 'basketball cities', 
GAOS set criteria to select some richer cities to produce basketball players. Three key 
criteria were: maintaining two basketball teams (Men's and Women's), having at least 
160 basketball players in sport schools (including basketball clubs and training 
centres) and producing five elite players for provincial level (GAGS, 2000e: 108-9). 
To date, there are 15 "National Basketball Cities" selected by the GAGS (Sun, 2004). 
Regarding the establishment of basketball schools, in the I 990s the GAOS 
encouraged local government to set up basketball schools to supplement the role of 
sport colleges. According to a senior official in the CBMC Comprehensive 
Department, although most basketball schools were supported by provincial and city 
governments, most of them did not run very efficiently. In order to improve the 
quality of basketball schools and motivate provincial and city governments to invest 
more money into their basketball schools, the GAGS began selecting a few basketball 
schools for their good practice and increased their level of subsidy in 1999. So far, six 
schools have been awarded the title of "CBA basketball schools" by the evaluation 
system, which facilitated the development of basketball schools and raised the quality 
of training for talented players (Interview: senior official in the CBA Comprehensive 
Department, 5th January 2006). A similar evaluation and competition mechanism was 
adopted to revitalize the sport colleges. There are 24 sport colleges which have been 
awarded the title of "National Key Training Units of Basketball" and into which 
CBMC invested more resources to improve their quality of training (Zhao, 2005: 37). 
Benefiting from the policies of "CB A basketball schools" and "National Key Training 
Units of Basketball", the number of basketball players in Sport Colleges (including 
basketball schools) increased from 3058 in 1998 to 7943 in 2005. Although the 
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quantity of potential basketball players in Sport Colleges is increasing, in terms of the 
quality of training and resources, professional clubs out-perform Sport Colleges. In 
order to take advantage of the rich resources of professional clubs the CBA set a 
requirement in 2005 for each professional club to establish its own U 19 team. Unless 
they fulfilled the conditions, they could not qualify for participating in professional 
basketball competitions in 2005. According to a top manager of one of the CBA clubs 
(Interview, t h January 2006), "under the requirement of the CBA, each CBA club 
must set up its own reserve team with a guaranteed investment of at least 0.6 million 
yuan per year". He went on to say that "we spend about 1.2 million yuan every year 
on our U 19s team and the investment is getting higher and higher". 
As for youth national squads and national teams, there are five national young squads, 
made up of three men's teams (UlS, U17 and U19) and two women's teams (UI6, 
U 18), and three national squads, consisting of one women's team and two national 
teams in the Chinese basketball selection system. In order to prepare for the 2008 
Olympic Games, the Chinese government selected 38 of the best male players from 
professional clubs to create two national teams (National Team and Olympic Squad) 
(Ren, 2007) and introduced a competitive mechanism and evaluation system into 
these two teams in 2007. After several public matches between the National Team 
(NT) and Olympic Squad (OS), the best players in the NT, such as Ding Jinhui, Liu 
Xiaoyu and Wang Lei, were promoted to OS, while the weakest players, such as 
Zhang Qingpeng, Li Xiaoxu and Huo Nan in the OS were relegated to the NT, U 19 or 
even to their own clubs (Zhang, J.Q. 2007). According to the vice director of CM BC, 
Hu Jiashi, "The impressive progress of our young players allowed us to consider 
introducing a competitive mechanism into our national teams". There was no 
guarantee that players in the OS could participate in the 2008 Beijing Games unless 
they could demonstrate that they could maintain their skill and ability all the time". 
He went on to say that "we have not only to set up the mechanism to motivate young 
players, but also to give senior players a sense of crisis. That means we will not 
exclude the possibility that the positions of key players in the OS will be taken over 
by the young players in the 2008 Olympic Games" (Shan, 2007). 
In addition, the Chinese government attempted to model the NCAA in creating a 
talent pool from its education system, especially at university and high school level. 
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Unfortunately, according to a senior official in C13MC Comprehensive Department 
(Interview, 5th January 2006), due to lack of good coaches and the unique entrance 
exam system in which students were requested to invest more time in academic 
learning than playing basketball, there appeared to be a long way to go to include 
university players in this selection system. But one thing worth noting is that the idea 
of learning from the experience of the NCAA had its influence on the Chinese 
basketball selection system. According to a top manager of onc of the C13A clubs 
(Interview, 7th January 2006), the education system was creating its own selection 
system which had led an increasing number of students in primary and secondary 
schools to prefer staying in their own school teams rather than joining the Spare Time 
Sport Schools, due to the better chance for these students to enter university to study. 
Thus, it raised the tension between the education system and the sport system in 
competing for young players: a tension which will be discussed in a later section. 
In short, the Chinese basketball selection system was rebuilt and refined from the 
Soviet model in the 1980s but, affected by the Olympic strategy after 1986, the 
provincial teams were seriously reduced, which cast a shadow over the development 
of Chinese elite basketball. In order to solve this problem, elements of the capitalist 
approach, such as the club system, competitive mechanism and evaluation system 
were introduced to revitalize and refine this aged Soviet model. In addition, 
professional clubs gradually replaced the role of provincial teams in producing elite 
players to be selected for national squads. Unlike players in the NCAA, who are a 
talent pool for the NBA, the quality of Chinese players in the education system was 
too immature to be a talent pool for Chinese professional clubs, due to poor quality of 
coaching and high academic pressure. 
The competitive system 
The Chinese government gradually rebuilt and refined its original competition system 
which had been established after the Cultural Revolution, namely, league matches 
with a promotion and relegation system in Division 1,2 and 3 (CB A, 1991: 155). 
Affected by the Olympic strategy, the promotion and relegation system was replaced 
by the system of regional and final matches. In 1983, one document issued by the 
State Council stated that "we have to reform the promotion and relegation system 
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within league matches in basketball, volleyball and football. This year the basketball 
league matches will be first to trial cancelling the promotion and relegation system 
between Division I and Division 2, and instead having regional matches first, then 
carrying on to final matches later" (NSC, 1993f: 240). In order to strengthen the 
Olympic strategy which was focused on the individual Olympic sports, the Chinese 
government reformed the basketball competition system and transferred its attention 
from provincial level to City, Trade Unions, PLA and University level. 
In 1987, the then Sport Minister, Li Menghua, argued that "we have to carry on the 
trial policy in order to select the champion teams from each provincial basketball 
championship to represent their own provinces in the National Basketball 
Championship". He went on to argue that "all kinds of competitions have to open 
their doors to the squads of City, Trade Unions, PLA and University". He also 
emphasized that "the purpose of doing so is to gradually transform the present 
competition structure which is based on the provincial squads" (NSC, 1993g: 118). 
Strongly influenced by the NSC's Olympic Strategy, the number of provincial 
basketball players shrank from the early 1980s to the mid-1990s (see Table 7.6) and 
the performance of champion provincial basketball teams in the National Young 
League and CBA League was gradually surpassed by the PLA. From Table 7.6 and 
Table 7.7 we can see that the PLA dominated these two leagues from the late 19805 to 
the mid-1990s. The same situation also occurred in the two counterpart women's 
leagues. 
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Table 7.6: Tbe Top 6 in tbe Men's National Young League Competition from 
1973 to 2007 
Year Teams PLA learns in Name of PLA teams 
participalin!t the To1' 6 
1973 2 Lanzhou Force (4), Guangzhou Force (5) 
1974 2 lanzhou Force (I), Guangzhou Force (3) 
1978 2 Nanjing Force (2), Shen)'ang Force (4) 
1979 3 Air Force (3), Shenyang Force (5), Bcijing Force (6) 
1980 I Shenyang Force (4) 
1981 I Bayi Force (3) 
1982 I Bayi Force (I) 
1983 I Bayi Force (I) 
1984 2 Bayi Force (3), linan Force (4) 
1986 I Bayi Force ( I ) 
1987 2 linan Force (1), Guangzhou Force (3) 
1988 2 Guangzhou Force (1), linan Force (2) 
1991 20 5 linan Force (I), Air Force (2), lanzhou Force (3), Guangzhou Force (4), 
Bayi Force (6) 
1992 18 3 Bayi Force (1), Air Force (2), linan Force (6) 
1993 14 3 Shenyang Force (I), Guangzhou Force (3), Air Force (5) 
1994 14 2 linan Force (5), Air Force (6) 
1995 19 3 Bayi Force (I), Air Force (5), linan Force (6) 
1996 16 3 Bayi Force (1), Air Force (5), linan Force (6) 
1997 16 4 Bayi Force (1), Air Force (4), linan Force (5), Nanjing Force (6) 
1998 24 Nanjing Force (2) (Only top 3 listed) 
1999 16 2 Bayi Force (3), Nanjing Force (5) 
2000 16 I Bayi Force (4) 
2001 16 I Bayi Force (3) 
2002 17 2 Bayi Force (I), linan Force (6) 
2003 18 2 Bayi Force (3). linan Force (4) 
2004 20 0 
2005 21 
2006 24 
2007 24 I Bayi Fubang (4) 
Source: Gao, et al. (1989); NSC (GAOS), The Yearbook of Sport and PhysIcal Education ofPRC 
(1949-2005); and CBA, (2007), http://www.cba.gov.cn/ 
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Table 7.7: The Top 6 in the Men's CRA League Competition from 1954 to 2006 
Year Teams PLA teams in Name of PLA teams 
participated the Top 6 
1954 6 0 
1955 14 2 Shenyang Force (I), Guangzhou Force (5) 
1956 12 2 Bayi Force (3), Shenyang Force (4) 
1957 12 3 Bayi Force (red) (I), Bayi Force (yellow) (4), Shenyang Force (5) 
1958 12 3 Bayi Force (I), Shenyang Force (4), Nanjing Force (6) 
1960 12 I Bayi Force ( 1 ) 
1961 11 I Bayi Force ( 1 ) 
1962 11 2 Bayi Force (I), Beijing Force (6) 
1963 9 2 Bayi Force (I), Air Force (3) 
1964 15 2 Bayi Force (I), Air Force (3) 
1973 12 3 Guangzhou Force (I), linan Force (3), Shenyang Force (5) 
1974 14 3 Bayi Force (I), Shenyang Force (4), Guangzhou Force (6) 
1977 1\ 4 Wuhan Force (I), Jinan Force (2), Shenyang Force (3), Beijing Force (4) 
1978 9 2 Wuhan Force (I), Shenyang Force (2) 
1980 14 2 Beijing Force (5), Shenyang Force (6) 
1981 15 2 Bayi Force (I), Beijing Force (4) 
1982 15 3 Bayi Force (I), Nanjing Force (2), linan Force (3) 
1984 24 3 Bayi Force (I), linan Force (3), Nanjing Force (5) 
1985 22 3 Bayi Force (I), Jinan Force (2), Nanjing Force (3) 
1986 20 2 Bayi Force (I), Nanjing Force (2) 
1988 28 3 Nanjing Force (3), Bayi Force (4), Beijing Force (5) 
1991 25 3 Bayi Force (2), Nanjing Force (3), Beijing Force (5) 
1992 16 3 Bayi Force (2), Beijing Force (4), linan Force (5) 
1993 8 3 Bayi Force (I), Jinan Force (4), Beijing Force (5) 
1994 12 4 Bayi Force (1), Jinan Force (3), Nanjing Force (5), Guangzhou Force (6) 
1995 8 4 Bayi Force (I), linan Force (5), Nanjing Force (6), Guangzhou Force (8) 
1996 12 1 Bayi Force (I ) 
1997 12 I Bayi Force ( 1 ) 
1998 12 1 Bayi Rockets (1) 
1999 12 I Bayi Rockets (I) 
2000 12 1 Bayi Rockets (I ) 
2001 12 1 Bayi Rockets (2) 
2002 13 1 Bayi Rockets (I ) 
2003 12 1 Bayi Rockets (2) 
2004 14 I Bayi Rockets (3) 
2005 15 I Bayi Rockets (2) 
2006 16 1 Bayi Rockets (I) 
Source: Gao, et al. (1989); NSC (GAOS), The Yearbook of Sport and Physical Education of PRC 
(1949-2005); and CB A, (2007), http://www.cba.gov.cn/ 
From 1975 onward, the Chinese domestic basketball competitions were driven by the 
PLA Games and the National Games, which led the PLA and provincial teams to 
hone their skills in the other national basketball competitions (Gao et ai, 1989: 100). 
Influenced by the Olympic Strategy, the role of the PLA in the development of 
Chinese elite basketball became more marked in the early 1990s. In 1992 the main 
designer of the Olympic Strategy, Wu Shouzhang, the director of the Competition 
Department in GAOS, stated that "the development of team sports should not be 
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limited to the provinces and PLA and we should request Trade Unions and 
Universities to establish more teams and should look for new initiatives from cities in 
the provinces" (Wu, S. 2001: 15). In 1994 Mr. Wu surprisingly raised the critical 
issue of Chinese team sport, including basketball. He claimed that "for the very 
popular sport of basketball, the number of provincial players has decreased from 1920 
in 1985 to 970 in 1993" and "we will make a tremendous mistake if we do not take 
action to prevent the number of players and teams from declining" (Wu, S. 2001: 47). 
In order to motivate provincial governments to maintain or increase their investment 
in team sports such as basketball, the NSC, in 1997, not only introduced a "double 
score system" in the National Games in which one medal in team sport was equal to 
two medals in individual sport, but also increased the number of teams from 8 to 12 
Who would be awarded points which would be used to calculate which province was 
the winner of the National Games (GAOS, 2000f: 149-51). 
Before 1995 the Chinese basketball competition system was quite similar to its 
football counterpart and the domestic basketball competitions were divided into three 
levels (see Figure 7.5). The main difference between the competition system of 
basketball and football in the 1980s was that the former introduced the system of 
"regional and final matches", which is similar to the NBA approach, and the latter 
maintained the "promotion and relegation" system which was borrowed from the 
Eastern Bloc before the Cultural Revolution. In 1987 the Sport Minister, Li Menghua 
highlighted that "the reform of basketball competition system is a new experiment and 
We have to carry on this reform persistently to set a model for the other team sports" 
(NSC, 1993g: 118). 
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Figure 7.5: China's Elite Basketball Competition System in the late 1980s 
International Championships (Asian 
GameslChamoionshios) 
CRA League! CRA Cup! National Games 
National Young League! National Young Cup! National City Games 
National Early Young Cup (Spare-time sport schools)/ National Sport College Cup 
From Figure 7.5, we can see that Level C consisted of the National Early Youth Cup 
(Spare-time sport schools) and the National Sport College Cup. This level, and 
particularly the 12 "significant cities and areas for basketball in China" (SCAAFB) 
was supported by the provincial government. In Level B, there were the National 
Young League, National City Games and National Young Cup. Level A was 
composed of the CBA League (Division lA), CBA Cup and the National Games. In 
order to raise the chances of qualifying for the World Cup and Olympics, the national 
teams whose players were recruited from provincial and PLA teams were isolated in 
training camps and trained all year round. Although the initial reform of the basketball 
competition system did help Chinese teams make a breakthrough in the international 
championships, the Chinese government still had to face the side effects following the 
initial refonn. In 1994, a CBA document claimed that "although the Women's team 
won the 2nd place in the 1992 Olympic Games and the Men's team dominated the 
Asia Games and Asia Championship, generally speaking, the performance of 
provincial and city teams is declining, the number of strong teams is shrinking, and it 
is becoming difficult for the national teams to find and recruit new elite players" 
(CBA, 1994: 4). It also underlined that "under the Olympic strategy, it is impossible 
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to ask the government to invest more resources in basketball .... We have to attract 
more resources from society to vitalize this system" (CBA, 1994: 4). In 1995, the 
Sport Minister, Wu Shaozu, emphasized that "the refonn of Chinese football has 
achieved its initial goal of raising the profile of Chinese elite football. Now sports, 
including basketball, are following in the steps of football" (GAOS, 1999b: 123). 
In order to gain experience of the assumed "successful" model the club system, with 
its promotion and relegation mechanism and "home and away" matches, was 
introduced in 1995 (Sina.com, 2005). In 1997, the director of the Ball Game 
Department in NSC, Zhong Tianfa reported that "the new club system had increased 
the enthusiasm of basketball players and coaches for participating in competitions, 
and this began to set fire to China's basketball market and positively promoted the 
development of Chinese elite basketball". He went on to say that "we will carry on 
attracting foreign investment and introducing foreign players to create a good 
environment for Chinese basketball to become more professional .... Under the 
leadership of the NSC and in cooperation with the leaders of provincial sport bureaus, 
we will exploit the Chinese basketball market to the full" (Zhong, 1997: I). Driven by 
commercialism, competition in Jia A (Division lA) League was fully sponsored by 
the IMG in 1995 and a special league championship named CNBA in Division B was 
organized by the Chinese government and supported by the Hong Kong Jing-Ying 
Company in 1996 (Xue, 1997). As it happened, not only were the rules of CNBA 
copied from NB A, but 32 American players and eight American coaches were also 
introduced to eight teams ofCNBA by the Jing-Ying Company (Liu, H. 2002: 414). 
According to the then director of the Ball Game Department in the NSC, Zhong 
Tianfa, "the CNBA is an experiment in Division 2. It does not matter if the CNBA is 
not successful. Once it does become successful we will have a model for the refonn of 
Chinese basketball" (Xue, 1997). Although the CNBA was very successful, it died out 
in the same year, due to the financial crisis of the Jing-Ying Company. 
A.s a result of paying more attention to developing the domestic basketball market, 
further refonn of the competition system did not occur until the loss of a series of 
international matches and the failure to qualify for the FIB A World Championship in 
1997 (Liu, H. 2002: 414). The director of the Chinese Basketball Management Centre 
(CBMC), Xin Lancheng, claimed that "the frustration of our Men's, Women's and 
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Youth national teams in international basketball matches is the real reflection of 
Chinese basketball"(l998: 5). In order to strengthen its basketball competition system, 
the Chinese government organized a National Basketball Conference in 1999 (Zhu, 
2005: 49) and emphasized that "the reform of the Competition system should carry 
on" (Xin, 2000b: 20). The director of CBMC confirmed that "we should strengthen 
the structure of talent identification in our sport system and set up a systematic 
training system for those in CBA Basketball Schools, Sport Colleges, National Key 
Training Units of Basketball, Spare-time Sport Schools and Schools with Basketball 
Tradition" (Xin, 2000b: 21). Mr. Xin also emphasized that "we should cooperate with 
the education system to establish a new talent identification system in Universities, 
Senior & Junior High Schools, and Primary Schools". After this conference, the 
Chinese basketball competition system gradually grew in strength by integrating the 
resources from both the sport and education systems. Table 7.8 illustrates that the 
number of basketball teams and competitions at almost all levels gradually increased 
after 1999. 
Table 7.8: The Men's Teams Participating in the Chinese Basketball 
Competition System from 1991 to 2007 
Year Division Division National National National National National Amateur 
lA IB& Young Young Early Early Key Early 
Division League Club Young Young Training Young 
B League Cup Cup Units of Club Cup Basketball CBAin CBLin (U17) (U15) Cup 
2004 2004 
1991 25 20 7 12 
1992 16 18 19 
1993 8 14 10 5 
1994 12 11 14 12 
1995 8 5 14 19 10 II 
1996 12 12 21 
1997 12 12 16 to 10 
1998 12 8 9 24 8 8 
1999 12 8 9 16 16 II 9 12 
2000 12 10 7 16 to 12 26 
2001 12 10 7 16 8 11 8 24 12 
2002 13 9 8 17 18 10 8 19 18 
2003 12 7 8 18 24 13 11 24 15 
2004 14 13 20 19 12 7 18 19 
2005 15 13 21 18 14 8 
2006 16 12 24 16 16 
2007 16 14 24 16 16 
Schools 
Witb 
Basketball 
Tradition 
(U 13·14) 
to 
4 
12 
9 
13 
13 
to 
Source: Gao, et al. (1989); NSC (GAOS), The Yearbook of Sport and PhYSical Education of PRC 
(1949-2005); and eBA, (2007), http://www.cba.gov.cn/ 
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Another key conclusion of the 1999 conference was to "recognize the need for 
separating off the management structure of professional basketball, while not 
breaking its links with non-professional basketball" (Xin, 2000b: 20). This conclusion 
was supported by the CBMC director, Xin Lancheng who claimed that "We should 
learn from other countries and transfer their experience of developing professional 
basketball to our own situation" (X in, 2000b: 20). 
Following this conference, the CBMC deputy director (1997-2000), Li Yuanwei, led a 
group of CBMC senior officials on a visit to Japan and South Korea to see how the 
Japanese Basketball League (JBL) and Korean Basketball League (KBL) ran and 
managed their professional basketball (CBA, 2000: 37). After returning to the CBMC 
and becoming a new director of the organisation in 2003, Mr. Li Yuanwei travelled to 
America to see how the NBA and NCAA ran their system. The experience Mr. Li 
gained from visiting the JBL, KBL, NBA and NCAA inspired him to put forward a 
"Northern Star Project" (the so-called CBA League 10-year Reform Project 
2005-2014) in 2004, the aims of which were to shape the CBA League to become the 
biggest global professional basketball league apart from the NBA and to win the top 
three for the Women's team and the top six for the Men's team in the 2008 Olympic 
Games (Li, Y. W. 2003). In order to achieve these two goals, the new domestic 
competition system began in 2004. This system set up a structure which consisted of 
the Chinese Basketball Associational League (CBAL), Chinese Basketball League 
(CBL), WCBA, National Young Club League, Chinese University Basketball 
Association (CUBA), and the Chinese University Basketball Super League (CUBSL) 
(see Figure 7.6). 
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Figure 7.6: China's Elite Basketball Competition System for Olympics and 
World Cup in 2007 
International Championships (Asian 
GameS/Championship) 
CBA! CBL! WCBAI National Games 
National Young League! National Young Club League! National 
City Games! CUBA! CUBSL 
National Early Young Cup! Amateur Early Young Club Cup! National Key Training 
Units of Basketball Cup! Basketball City Cup! CBA Basketball Schools Cupl Schools 
with basketball tradition! CUBA 
As regards the National Men's Leagues, in 1994 they were divided into two levels 
(see Table 7.8), which were Division I (Jia A) (known as the Chinese Basketball 
Association League - CBAL after 2004), Division 2 (Jia B) (known as Chinese 
Basketball League - CBL after 2004). In order to be in line with the NBA, the 
promotion and relegation rule, in which the first two teams in Division 2 would be 
promoted to Division 1 and the last two teams in Division 1 would be relegated to 
Division 2, was abandoned in favour of the NBA model of competition. Under that 
system highlighting the South and North Conferences, the 14-16 CBAL sides were to 
be divided into different groups for preliminary round-robin competitions based on 
their geographic locations. The top four teams of each group would qualify for the 
second phase where the final champions would be decided after knockout duels. 
According to the director of the CBMC, Li Yuanwei, "The purpose of terminating the 
relegation rule is not only to prevent clubs from [getting involved in] corrupt 
competition [in order] to maintain their position in Division 1, but also to pay more 
attention to attracting and servicing fans, media and sponsors because the 
survivability and development of our leagues relies on them" (Li, Y.W. 2004). He not 
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only acknowledged that "the way the NBA runs its professional basketball is far 
better than the CBA in tenns of serving fans, sponsors and media", but also raised the 
question, "should we consider adapting the NBA market way to refonn our 
professional basketball leagues?" (Li, Y. W. 2003) Indeed, the CBA attempted to learn 
from the NBA in running its CBAL and in 2003 it turned to ZOU Marketing Inc., one 
of NB A 's cooperating companies (Bi, X. 2005), for strategies to re-engineer the men's 
10-year-old professional league (Li, Y. W. 2003). With the help of ZOU Marketing 
Inc, in 2004 the CBA issued the "Northern Star Project" - a strategic planning process 
that resulted in a new CBAL business model (ZOU Marketing Inc, 2007). ;\.ll teams 
in CBAL could introduce two foreign players who would not only bring knowledge 
and skill to each team, but also raise the profile of the professional matches and thus 
promote the domestic basketball market. 
Although the director ofthe CBMC understood that they needed to pay more attention 
to the basketball market, especially to fans, sponsors and the media in order for the 
Chinese basketball market to compete with the NBA (Li, Y.W. 2003), he was also 
aware of the priority of the national teams and claimed that, "It is the primary mission 
for any director of the National Sport Management Centre in Olympic Sport to raise 
the profile of national teams in the international competitions and this is becoming 
even more vital under the huge pressure to prepare for the 2008 Beijing Games" (Li, 
Y.W. 2006b). This is why he argued that "the attitude and detennination of the 
CBMC to take whatever resources and costs it needs to support the national teams is 
unchallengeable" (Li, Y. W. 2005) and emphasized that "the CBAL is located in the 
centre of the pyramid of the competition structure, which produces elite players for 
Team China Basketball"(Li, Y.W. 2006a). Although China attempted to learn from 
the NBA in running its CBAL, the CBAL still plays by FIBA rules rather than by 
NBA rules l in order to prepare for the FIBA World Championship and Olympic 
Games. 
The women's counterpart to the CBAL, the Women's Chinese Basketball AssOCiation 
League (WCBAL), was established in 2002. It had low commercial potential but was 
heavily supported by the CBA, due to the female team's high medal potential in the 
I NBA rules differ slightly from FIBA rules in terms of size of the court. attack time and defence rules. 
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Olympics and Women's World Championship. According to the director of the 
CBMC, the WCBA was subsidized by more than 5 million yuan in 2003 and 6 
million yuan in 2004 by the CBMC (Li, Y.W. 2003). The Chinese University 
Basketball Association (CUBA) was established by the Federation of University 
Sports of China (FUSC) under the leadership of the Ministry of Education in 1998. 
The education system attempted to adapt the methods of the United States and build 
up a systematic selection and competition system right through from primary, 
secondary and high school to university level. During his interview by Xinhua News, 
the General Secretary of CUBA, Gong Peishan, highlighted that the CUBA learned 
some successful methods from the NBA and the aim of the CUBA was to produce 
elite players for CBAL, just like the NCAA did for NBA (Liu, N. 2006). In order to 
be distinct from the sport system, all players registered in the CBA or had joined the 
CBAL and CBL were prohibited from participating in CUBA (CUBA, 2007). 
Restricted by the CUBA regulations imposed by the Ministry of Education, CUBA 
could not recruit elite players from the sport system. As a result of this policy, 
according to a senior official in the CBMC Comprehensive Department (Interview, 5th 
January 2006), the performance of players in CUBA was so poor that it was 
impossible for CUBA basketball teams to win the competition in the Universiade (the 
World University Games). In order to win the the Universiade and to produce 
professional players, the Chinese University Basketball Super League (CUBSL) was 
created in 2004 with the support of the FUSC and CBMC in order to build up a 
Chinese NCAA which would bridge the gap between the competition structure of 
education and the sport system (Liu et aI, 2007: 270). During his interview with China 
Sport News, Zhang Xiong, director of the training and research department of the 
CB MC said "China is learning from American experience when organizing the 
CUBSL" (China Sport News, 2005). 
In addition, a senior official in the CBMC Comprehensive Department also 
highlighted that "although the Fuse dominated eUBSL decision-making, the eBA 
did not worry about commercial competition from the CUBSL. Just like NCAA in the 
United States, the CUBSL market is small." This official went on to state that "The 
reason for CBA to support the CUBSL is because this league can cooperate with the 
CBAL clubs' reserve teams and help these young club players solve the ... problems 
[oflow levels of educational achievement among players]" (Interview, 5th January 
283 
Chapter 7 - Chinese Elite Basketball 
2006). In essence, the Chinese government attempted to integrate the resources from 
the education and sport system to support CUBSL, on the one hand to gradually 
replace the National Young Club League, composed of the professional club reserve 
teams, and on the other hand to select elite players to join the Universiade and to be a 
talent pool for the CBAL and national squads (Liu et ai, 2007: 270). 
In summary, it had become harder for the basketball teams in the PLA system to 
survive under the market-oriented club system. The CBA had attempted to gain 
experience from the NBA regarding rules, the home and away model, regional and 
final matches system and "permitted entrance mechanism" in order to build up a 
global basketball league and to win Olympic glory. Finally, the Chinese government 
attempted to copy the NCAA by organizing CUBA and UBSL to extend the talent 
pool from the sport system to the education system. 
Training system 
In 2000 during the National Training Conference of Basketball, the then director of 
CBMC (1997-2002), Xin Lancheng, highlighted that the CBA was going to carry on 
the policy of "exporting human capital" (Song chuqu) and "bringing foreign resources 
in" (Qing JinZai) to fundamentally improve the quality of the Chinese elite basketball 
coaches and players (Xin, 2000a: 22-9). Indeed, the Chinese government had been 
adopting these two main approaches since the late 1970s in order to reach out to the 
wider world and bring in global basketball resources to raise the performance of the 
national squads (CBA, 1991: 204) (see Table 7.9). 
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Table 7.9 Summary of Chinese Approaches to Bringing Global Basketball 
Resource into its Basketball Training System 
Exporting (human capital) Bringing in (foreign resources) 
• national teams, including Men's, Women's and • foreign players and coaches in professional 
Junior teams, to be trained at the United States clubs in the mid-1990s 
Basketball Academy (USBA) in early 2000 
• CBA clubs to be trained at the United States • foreign coaches in national squads in 2004; 
Basketball Academy (USBA) in early 2000 
• individual potential Chinese basketball players • experts from NBA, FIBA, ABC and foreign 
to play for NBA (gain skill and knowledge) after countries, to raise the quality of Chinese coaches, 
2001 referees, administrators and scientists in the 
2004. 
• national teams (from youth to World 
Championship and Olympic squads) to have 
more friendly matches and official tournaments 
to hone Chinese basketball players' skills and to 
accumulate experience in the early 2000s; 
• Chinese coaches (especially national coaches), 
referees, administrators and scientists to gain 
new knowledge from other countries, 
'particularly the U.S. in early 2000; 
There were several elements to the first approach, i.e. 'exporting human capital'. The 
first was that the Chinese government began sending its national teams to be trained 
abroad, especially in the United States with NBA clubs in the early 1980s. This 
reached a peak in the early 2000s when national teams were trained at the United 
States Basketball Academy (USBA). In 1980, a Men's junior national team was 
dispatched to be trained by American coaches at the American Olympic Training 
Centre in Colorado, USA for five weeks (CBA, 1991: 206). In 1985, the Chinese 
National Basketball Team arrived in New York to begin a month of training and 
practice with NBA teams. Known as the NBA-China Friendship Tour, the Chinese 
team trained with the Boston Celtics assistant coach Ed Badger while receiving 
special instruction from NBA Legends Red Auerbach and Pete Newell (NB A, 2004). 
After the CBMC was established in 1997, the Chinese government began contact with 
the United States Basketball Academy (USBA), located in Eugene-Springfield, 
Oregon, USA, which is known for player and coach development and has a strong 
link with the NBA and the NCAA. In early 2000, the CMBC began to send their 
national teams, including Men's, Women's and junior teams, to be trained by the 
coaches from NBA and NCAA in the US BA (USBA, 2007a). 
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The second element was that after early 2000 the Chinese government encouraged 
domestic professional clubs to send their best players to play abroad, especially with 
the NBA, in order to improve their skills and knowledge. The then director of CBMC 
(1997-2002), Xin Lancheng, emphasized that "We have to dispatch our key players to 
be honed in the international basketball clubs in order to produce world-class star 
players" (Xin, 2000a: 28). To date, four Chinese players are playing or used to play in 
the NBA (see Table 7.10) and all of them were dispatched to be trained in USBA 
before being drawn by the NBA teams (US BA, 2007b). According to a senior official 
in the CBMC Training and Research Department, "after being honed by the NBA, 
Yao Ming and Wang Zhi-Zhi have proved their ability to be world-class players, 
which increases the chances for Team China Basketball to win glory in the World 
Championship and Olympic Games" (Interview, 13th January 2006). In addition, since 
the start of2007 three Chinese basketball players have been recruited into the NCAA 
to hone their skills (Wu, G. 2007). Moreover, one of the key decisions of the National 
Training Conference of Basketball in 2000 was to "send a group of high potential 
early young players to be trained in America or European countries" (Xin, 2000a: 28). 
From 2005, 40 of China's top junior players (around 12-17 years old and 2 metres 
high) were trained by American coaches in the US BA, which was the second group of 
tall teenage players sent by the Chinese government (Yang, 2007b). In addition, 
China's professional teams also train annually, using USBA's facilities in USBA 
(USBA, 2007c). 
Table 7.10: Chinese Elite Basketball Players in NBA Clubs 
Basketball Transfer Year Transfer Club Clubs Playing Now 
"player 
Wan~ Zhi-Zhi 2001 Dallas Mavericks (NBA) Bayi Rockets iCBAl 
Men~ke Bateer 2002 Denver Nuggets (NBA) BeiiinA Ji~ Duckss (CB A) 
Vao Mine 2002 Houston Rockets (NBA) Houston Rockets (NBA) 
Vi Jianlian 2007 Milwaukee Bucks (NBA) Milwaukee Bucks (NBA) 
The third element was to create more international competition opportunities for 
national teams. After the late 19705, the Chinese national teams became involved in 
more international friendly matches to learn skills and tactics from their foreign 
counterparts (eBA, 1991: 236), including NBA teams, such as the Washington 
Bullets (now Wizards) in 1979 and the Boston Celtics in 1985 (NBA, 2004). 
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Constrained by the limited budget for international contact, this type of systematic 
arrangement for Team China Basketball to engage in international friendly matches 
was not completed until the signing of a contract in 2006 with Infront Sport & Media, 
which became the exclusive global marketing partner for China's national basketball 
teams (Infront Sport & Media, 2006). According to vice director of the CBMC, Hu 
Jiashi, after the 2004 Olympic Games, CBMC began arranging 20-25 international 
friendly matches with world-class teams per year for the Chinese national teams in 
order to prepare for the 2008 Beijing Games (Hu, 2006). Indeed, with the help of 
Infront Sport & Media, the Men's Team China Basketball increased their competition 
opportunities to 30 international friendly matches per year against qualified opponents 
from American and European countries (Hu, 2006). In 2007, with the aid of global 
resources (Infront Sport & Media), seven Chinese national teams, including the Men's, 
Women's and junior teams, with GAOS's support, all travelled around the world 
competing with other national squads or foreign professional clubs (Du, 2007). 
The fourth element was to send out Chinese coaches (especially national coaches), 
referees, administrators and scientists to gather new knowledge. Although the Chinese 
government began to dispatch its coaches, referees and scientists to be retrained 
abroad in 1976 (CBA, 1991: 108), this policy was not applied consistently until the 
failure to qualify for the FIBA World Championship in 1997 and the humiliation of 
two Junior national teams (U17, U20) in the Asian Championship in 2000 (Liu, F. 
2000: 15). In 2000 the then director of CBMC, Xin Lancheng, initiated a new plan to 
select 10 Chinese candidates to go abroad and train to coach national basketball teams 
(Xin, 2000a: 27). According to a senior official in the CBMC Comprehensive 
Department, most Chinese coaches dispatched by the CBMC were trained in USBA 
or in NCAA Universities that had strong links with USBA (Interview, 5th January 
2006). One decision of the 2005 National Conference of Basketball was that, from 
2006, the CB MC would set up a group of national reserve coaches who were required 
not only to learn English, computerlIT and basketball knowledge in China for 18 
months, but also to be trained for five months in NCAA Universities and be involved 
in management and coaching affairs of NCAA basketball teams (Ma, 2005: 48). 
Indeed, the CBMC signed a five-year contract with the University of Memphis (one 
of the NCAA Universities) in 2007 to which 15 elite coaches were dispatched 
(CBMC, 2007). 
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The second main approach adopted by the NSC (GAOS) was to bring in foreign 
resources. After 1979 the Chinese government began to introduce foreign elite 
basketball coaches to lecture to Chinese coaches (Gao el ai, 1989: 109). During the 
1980s most invited coaches came from the NBA, NCAA and American national 
basketball teams (CBA, 1991: 210). After the club system was introduced in 1995, the 
Chinese government encouraged domestic clubs to introduce foreign coaches and 
foreign players to participate in national matches in order to facilitate Chinese elite 
basketball development. The classic case here was the CNBA where the Chinese 
government introduced 32 American players and eight American coaches to 
participate in the eight CNBA teams. 
From Table 7.11, we can see that the number of foreign coaches and players was 
maintained at a certain level. Although it is quite normal to see foreign coaches 
employed in Chinese basketball clubs, the Chinese government did not introduce any 
foreign coaches into its national teams until 2004. The director of the CBMC, Li 
Yuanwei, stated that "it was very difficult for me to make this decision during that 
period because this was a controversial issue which was strongly linked to national 
pride, honour and confidence" (Li, Y.W. 2003). But he also emphasized that 
"introducing foreign coaches to help Chinese national basketball teams speed up their 
performance is a vital choice that must be made because we are in unusual 
circumstances which let us to take this kind of unusual approach" (Li, Y.W. 2006a). 
Table 7.11: Foreign Basketball Players and Coaches Working in China 
1995-2005 
Players Coaches 
1995-1996 1 
1996-1997 It 0 
1997-1998 14 1 
1998-1999 20 
1999-2000 18 
2000-2001 18 
2001-2002 25 
2002-2003 23 6 
2003-2004 21 
2004-2005 22 
Source: Vin, T. (2006: 16). 
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Indeed, in order to win Olympic glory, the Chinese government began introducing 
foreign coaches to lead the Men's and Women's Team China Basketball from 2004. 
The first head coach of the Men's Team China Basketball was Del Harris, an assistant 
coach at the NBA club Dallas Mavericks (NBA, 2004). The second was Jonas 
Kazlauskas, a famous European coach who led the Lithuania national basketball team 
to third place in both the 1996 and 2000 Olympic Games. As part of the scheme, the 
best Chinese domestic coaches became assistants in order to learn from these world 
class coaches, whose responsibility was not only to train national squads but also to 
share their knowledge with local coaches. 
In addition to introducing foreign coaches and players, the Chinese government also 
understood that in terms of scientific training and support, Chinese basketball 
seriously lagged behind its counterparts in American and European countries. During 
the National Training Conference for Basketball in 2000, the vice director of CBMC, 
Liu Fengyan, claimed that "At this moment, scientific research and support for 
Chinese basketball lags far behind Western countries, which is a great obstacle to the 
development of the Chinese basketball training system". He claimed that "CBMC will 
organize a scientific team to service and support the Chinese national basketball 
teams" (Liu, F. 2000: 21). To achieve this objective the Chinese government, in 2006, 
cooperated with Infront Sport & Media to carry out a unique plan which included the 
implementation of a comprehensive teclmical development plan for the Chinese 
national teams. According to the agreement, Infront Sport & Media would recruit top 
foreign coaching staff, nutritionists, scouts, psychologists and fitness training experts 
to support these basketball teams (In front Sport & Media, 2006). Moreover, in order 
to attract more international basketball resources, the Chinese government set up a 
"CBA training centre" for coaches, referees, administrators and scientists in its 
national Beijing training camp and continued to invite various basketball experts from 
the NBA, FIBA, ABC and other advanced basketball countries to lecture in this centre 
with the aim of speeding up Chinese basketball development (CBA, 2002: 28). 
Since 1979 the number of coaches at level I and 3 has gradually declined (see Table 
7.12), a trend which led in 2005 to the introduction of a new four-stage coach 
qualification system in line with international, and especially American standards (Ma, 
2005: 48). By adopting the training approaches of "exporting human capital" (Song 
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Chuqu) and "bringing foreign resources in" (Qing Jinlai), China is attempting to 
improve the quality rather than just the quantity of coaches in its own training system. 
In the words ofLi Yuanwei, the director of the CBMC, "We are building up a new 
training system to prepare for the Olympic Games by introducing 'the exclusive 
global marketing partner for Team China Basketball' (Infront Sport & Media) to 
service and support our national teams and by carrying on our traditional and effective 
mechanism of ideological education and management" (Li, Y. W. 2006a). Moreover, 
according to CBMC's new policy (Yang, 2007a), short-term military training with the 
People's Liberation Army (PLA) has become a new form of training strategy to 
"discipline" and "inspire" these high-paid basketball players to work harder like their 
PLA counterparts in order to fight wholeheartedly for the country in international 
matches, especially for the 2008 Olympic Games. 
Table 7.12: Full-Time Basketball Coaches in the PRC 1962-2001 
Level I Level 2 Level 3 
Provincial Squads Sport Colleges Spare-time Sport Total 
School 
1962 257 0 0 
1965 290 0 0 
1970 164 0 0 
1975 282 0 0 
1979 463 0 3080 
1980 342 128 2794 3264 
1985 494 218 2516 3228 
1990 407 301 2076 2784 
1991 282 289 2135 2706 
1992 260 312 2124 2696 
1993 229 321 1992 2542 
1994 199 316 2026 2541 
1995 198 313 1998 2509 
1996 178 301 1880 2359 
1997 177 312 1882 2371 
1998 173 321 1934 2428 
1999 145 310 1830 2285 
2000 152 296 1728 2176 
2005 161 379 1350 1890 
* There was no record during the period of the Cultural RevolutIon (1966-1976) 
Source: NSC (Planning and Finance Department), Statistical Yearbook of Sport (Internal information), 
1994-2005. 
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7.3.2 Generating multiple sources of income for the elite basketball system 
Li Tieying, a member of Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) and a State Councillor 
(1988-1998), in his speech in 1993 at the All States Sports Ministers' Conference, 
argued that "Following the development of Chinese sport, the problem of investing 
more in the national sport budget and generating.extra sport income is a highly critical 
issue". He went on to argue that "the sport system has to transform the ideas, and 
ways of thinking ~nd working which were formed by the structure of the planned 
economy, into the objective requirements of a market economy in which we need to 
reform boldly in order to explore new ways to facilitate Chinese sport development" 
(Li, T.Y. 1996: 5-6). Following Li Tieying's speech, an internal official document-
"The Suggestions of the NSC On Deepening Sport Reform" - which was issued in 
1993 - highlighted that "We have to learn how they govern and run sport in other 
countries ofthe world, including advanced capitalist countries, so that we can go 
ahead and discover a variety of forms and ways to reform" (NSC, 1996d: 152). In its 
affiliated document - "Suggestions in Relation to Promoting Sport Marketing and 
Speeding Up the Process of Sport Industrialisation" - , it also emphasized that 
"National Sport Associations have to look for multiple channels to generate income 
and some associations with commercial potential should establish "economic bodies" 
(Jingji shiti) to generate income in order to subsidize the sport system" (NSC, 1996e: 
179). With the support of high-ranking political leaders, such as Li Tieying, Xu 
Zhijian (vice General Secretary for the State Council)(Xu, Z. 1993: 16-7), Wu 
Shaozu (then Sport Minister) (GAOS, 1999b: 123) and Zhong Tianfa (director of the 
Ball Game Department in NSC in 1997) (Zhong, 1997: 1), the Chinese government, 
followed the "successful" pattern of the Chinese Football Association and established 
two "economic bodies" (companies) and also signed contracts with international sport 
management companies to generate multiple sources of incomes from the basketball 
market. 
In Figure 7.7, it is clear that there were three sources of income in the Chinese elite 
basketball system in 2007: the national sport budget; the provincial sport budget; and 
commercial income/sponsorship. According to a senior official in the CBMC 
Comprehensive Department (Interview, 5th January 2006), after the establishment of 
the CBMC in 1997 which was in charge of the Chinese Professional Basketball 
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League, the national basketball budget was reduced to just a few million yuan with 
the money saved being diverted to subsidize the national teams and Olympic squads. 
Figure 7.7: Income of the Chinese Elite Basketball System in 2007 
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As regards the provincial budget, according to a senior manager of one of the CBA 
clubs (Interview, t h January 2006) which was strongly linked with local government, 
there was about 1 million yuan for female teams in each key basketball province or 
city in 2005, but there was no special budget for male teams after 2002, due to heavy 
reliance on commercial income. For commercial income/sponsorship, four key 
commercial agents (see Figure 7.7) were drafted in and put in charge of different 
levels of the basketball market. These were: i) the "China Basketball Industry 
Development Corp" (CBIDC) in 1998; ii) the "China Basketball & Infront Sport 
Management Company" (CBISMC) in 2005; iii) the Sport Management Company 
(Infront Sports & Media) in 2006; and iv) the "CBA Equipment Committee" (CBAEC) 
also in 2006. 
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We will firstly consider the case of the "China Basketball Industry Development 
Corp" (CBlDC). Following Li Tieying's statement and the NSC's documents, as well 
as the successful preliminarily commercial model of the CF A in the mid-1990s, the 
CBIDC, a state-owned enterprise directly under the control of the China Basketball 
Association (CBA), was established in 1998 with the authorization of the Economic 
and Trade Committee of the State Council. The CBIDC is the exclusive agency 
(named Market Promotion Division in the CBA) authorized by the CBA for the 
exploitation of various basketball commercial operations and business development 
(CBIDC, 2007). The CBIDC was led directly by the CBA General Secretary, Ms. Liu 
Yumin, a vice director of the basketball division in NSC before 1998. Despite not 
having any experience of running a business the CBA, according to Ms. Liu Yumin, 
began, in 1995, commercial negotiations with IMG Sports & Entertainment and 
Media Company (known as IMG) (Basketball Magazine, 1997: 4) and signed a 
six-year commercial contract with IMG worth $ 2.5 million for the first year and $ 3.0 
million for the remaining years (Bi et aI, 2007: 556). During the National Conference 
for Sport Marketing Management in 1999, the vice director of Finance Department in 
GADS, Li Dunhou, was proud to say "we earned more than 3 million US dollars per 
year by selling the commercial rights of the CBA League and clubs, including the 
league title, promotion rights, and 75 percent of the advertising rights of basketball 
courts, to the IMG" (Li, D.H. 1999: 29). 
In 2001, affected by the new government policy which prohibited commercial sport 
sponsorship by cigarette companies, IMG was somewhat reluctant to raise the price 
for the next three-year commercial contract with the CBIDC on behalf of the CBA 
(Chen and Yuan, 2005). A large Chinese News Group, Guangdong Jin Yang Network 
& Information Co.Ltd. (GDJYNIC), offering 35 million yuan per year, won the 
contract and took over the role of IMG. Ironically, the CBIDC forgot to sign a formal 
contract with GDJYNIC who refused to fulfil their previous oral agreement with . 
CBIDC when they realized that their commercial rights would be interfered with by 
the CBIDC (Chen and Yuan 2005). This caused a crisis over how the 2001-2002 
CBAL season could start within 45 days with insufficient financial support. In order 
to solve this problem, the CBIDC had no choice but to run CBAL itself (Wang, D. 
2002a). From 2001 to 2005, CBIDC totally controlled the commercial rights ofCBAL, 
CBL and Team China Basketball. Although CBIDC did maintain the basketball 
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market at a reasonable level (see Table 7.13), it still lagged far behind its American 
counterpart, NBA, which was making an effort to invade and conquer the giant 
Chinese basketball market. According to the director of the CBMC, Li Yuanwei, due 
to the pressure to compete with the NBA in attracting Chinese fans, especially the 
younger generation and the pressure to lure global commercial sponsorship, CM BC 
needed to take advantage of the 2008 Beijing Games to build up a strong professional 
brand for the CBA League, by introducing international management and marketing 
companies (U, Y.W. 2003). In these circumstances, a multinational company (MNC), 
Infront Sport & Media, was selected to cooperate with CBIOC to help China achieve 
its basketball ambitions. 
Table 7.13: Spectators for the CBA League 1995-2005 
Year 95-96 96-97 97-98 98-99 99-00 00-01 01-02 02-03 03-04 04-05 
Matches 154 168 162 162 163 164 194 212 162 307 
Spectators 500,000 600,000 630,000 643.950 536,107 565,964 746,500 765,000 610,000 1231,830 
(Total) 
Spectators 3,200 3,500 3,900 3,975 3,289 3,451 3,848 3,607 3,800 4,012 
(Average) 
Source: Wang, J and LIU, Z. (2006: 34). 
The second commercial agent is CBAISC. With the full support of GADS and the 
new director of CB MC, Li Yuanwei, the CBIDC's partnership with Infront was 
structured as a joint venture company in 2006, CBA & Infront Sports Company 
(CBAISC), owned by Infront (49 percent) and the CBIDC (51 percent), in which are 
vested all commercial rights of the CBA League and clubs (except club title and gate 
money) for seven years, with options for a further five years (lnfront Sport & Media, 
2007a). Benefiting from this new model of cooperation with MNCs, the CBA can not 
only eam $ 6.5 million per year, but can also share in the other profits from 
commercial incomes, with the condition that it must not interfere in the commercial 
activity ofInfront Sport & Media (Wang, Y. 2006: 49). According to a senior official 
in CBIDC (Interview, 10th January 2006), this design of cooperating with Infront 
(MNC) but with 51 percent shares of CBAISC was a lesson learnt from (nfront's 
predecessor, IMG, who heavily dominated the commercial rights of the CBA League 
and clubs. This official emphasized that "the reason for establishing the CBAISC is in 
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order to prevent Infront controlling the market of the CDA League and clubs". lIe 
also highlighted that "The Chinese domestic basketball leagues are not as privatized 
as NBA and these leagues have to shoulder the responsibility of national interests 
[national teams], so we still have to guide the direction of the CBAISC and its 
decision-making" . 
The third commercial agent is Infront Sports & Media. The priority given to national 
team interests affected CBA decision-making when choosing Infront Sports & Media 
as its exclusive global marketing partner for China's national basketball teams in 2006. 
According to a senior official in CBIDC (Interview, 10th January 2006), the domestic 
agency, Zhongding Sports, which used to be the exclusive commercial agent for Team 
China Basketball, lost the new contract with CBA not only due to the high price, but 
also due to the need to support the technical development of the national teams. The 
NBA and Infront Sports & Media both offered greater technical support for the 
national team. However, a CBIDC staff member observed that "our concerns are not 
just over the commercial income but, more importantly, over the performance of the 
national teams in the Olympic Games" (Interview, loth January 2006). Although the 
NBA agreed to offer substantial money and implement a comprehensive technical 
development plan for the national teams, it finally failed to win this contract, partly, 
due to the CBA's serious concerns over NBA colonization of Chinese basketball 
(Interview, 10th January 2006). 
The other possible reasons for the Chinese government choosing Infront Sports & 
Media rather than the NBA to run the Team China business were the money issues, in 
that Infront Sports & Media signed a three-year-contract for $ 15 million with CBA 
(Yan, Z. 2006), and also matters of the performance of national teams, as Infront 
Sports & Media promised to help raise China's position in the FIBA world rankings 
and honour China on its own soil in the 2008 Beijing Games. The way in which they 
planned to fulfil this commitment was by recruiting top foreign coaching staff, 
nutritionists, scouts, psychologists and other fitness training experts in support of the 
national teams, and by helping to arrange some high quality international basketball 
Partnerships for the CBA, including a collaboration agreement with Euroleague 
Basketball and cooperation with the NBA D-League in two exhibition games (Infront 
Sport & Media, 2007b). 
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By contrast with the predecessor of Infront Sport & Media, the domestic agency 
Zhongding Sports, who paid in total 20 million yuan (around $ 2.5 million) to the 
CBA for a five-year-contact (Yan, Z. 2006), Infront Sport & Media will offer more 
than 10 times that amount to help China develop its elite basketball, especially at the 
national level. According to the director of CBMC, "We did not include much 
technology and science in our training model before, but from now on we have to 
invest enormous amounts of money in preparing for the Olympic Games. The huge 
sums of money will not only be spent on the training of national teams, including 
fitness training, nutrition supplement, training monitoring, medical and recovery and 
psychological adjustment, but it will also contribute to hiring expertise and scientists, 
purchasing facilities and equipment, and supporting the training of young national 
squads and the project for data collection on rival teams" (China Interactive Sports, 
2006a). In order to deal with the mammoth expenditure of the elite basketball system, 
the system of the title sponsorship of the CBAL was abandoned and the "Top 
Programme" of sponsorship, which was modelled on the IOC marketing project, was 
created by the CBA in 2004 and continued by Infront Sport & Media after 2005 .. 
According to this programme, four Partnership Groupings were set up with different 
payments for different sponsorship. These groupings comprised three Presenting 
Partners (at least 20 million yuan per year), four Marketing Partners (4 million yuan 
per year), one Official Apparel and Footwear Partner (10 million yuan per year), and 
Some Official Suppliers (CBA, 2004b). In 2006, the CBA signed individual contracts 
with eight commercial partners whose real price for individual sponsorship was 
between $ 0.3 and 1.5 million per year (Lin, 2006: 86). 
The fourth CBA commercial agent is the "CBA Equipment Committee" (CBAEC). In 
order to separate sponsorship from Team China and the CBA league, which have 
responsibility for Infront Sport & Media, the CBAEC was set up to control the market 
of domestic basketball equipment and facilities. The director of Marketing 
Department in CBMC, Xiao Hongan, became the first President and General 
Secretary of CBAEC. The CBA can in fact generate substantial commercial in.come 
from recruiting a limited number of commercial partners into the CBAEC, which has 
the administrative power not only to set the standard of domestic basketball 
equipment and facilities, but also to promote the products of its commercial partners 
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(CBA, 2006c). In 2007 the CBA recruited 25 commercial partners into the CBAEC 
and each partner has to pay to the CBA at least 0.1 million yuan membership fee per 
year, plus extra activity fees (CBA, 2006a). By selling the CBAEC brand, the CBA 
can also collect substantial income to support Chinese basketball. 
In addition, from the mid-1990s the CBA began collecting money not only from 
exploiting the commercial image of Chinese star players, but also from imposing 
special taxes on the transfer fees and commercial income of these players (Liu, X. 
2006). Although it helped the Chinese government generate more income from its 
national property (Chinese players), it raised the tension between these star players 
and the CBA. Take the Chinese NBA player, Yao Ming for example. After being 
transferred to play for NBA's Houston Rockets in 2002, he signed a commercial 
contract with the Peps i-Cola Company whose rival was the Coca-Cola Company, the 
main sponsor of the CBA. In order to protect its commercial rights, the Pe ps i-Cola 
Company asked Yao Ming's commercial agent to file a lawsuit against Coca-Cola. 
During this period, the chief executive of CBIDC, Di Jirong quoted the government 
regulation that "all the commercial rights of the intangible property of the Chinese 
national athletes belongs to the state", from the official document "The Notice about 
Strengthening the Management of the National Athletes Who Are Involved in 
Commercial Activities" issued by the NSC in 1996 (NSC, 1996h). He proclaimed that 
"Yan Ming is part of the collective image of Team China Basketball. This collective 
image is owned by the GAOS because it is the intangible property of national sport" 
(Xinhua News, 2003). The case was finally settled out of court between Yao Ming's 
commercial agent and the CBA who promised to clarify the commercial rights 
between individual players and the national team under the new regulations of the 
GAOS (Han, Y. 2006: 170-1). After the case ofYao Ming, the GAOS and CBA were 
forced to revise their regulations in relation to the commercial rights of Chinese 
athletes in an attempt to prevent so-called 'national property' from leaking out of the 
circle of the elite sport system (see more detail in the section on "Managing the 
Consequence of a more commercial system"). Although, after much effort, it was not 
possible to find details of the annual budget of the CBA, interview data indicate that 
the proportion of commercial income in the CBA annual budget has dramatically 
increased since 2006, while "the national budget from GAOS has been stagnant at 
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several million yuan", according to a senior official in the CBA Comprehensive 
Department (Interview, 5th January 2006). 
In short, the Chinese government is attempting to adopt a new market-oriented 
approach to generate multiple sources of income from the market in order to nurture 
elite basketball. It is also attempting to dominate the decision-making on commercial 
issues to ensure that commercialisation does not adversely affect the performance of 
the national teams. According to one senior official in the GAOS Sport Industry 
Section, "Basically, we are attempting to generate multiple sources of income from 
foreign and domestic companies by exploiting the intangible property of Chinese 
basketball and then redistributing this income to support our elite basketball. By doing 
so, we can not only reduce the financial burden on the government, but also facilitate 
the development of Chinese elite basketball" (Interview, 4th January 2006). Moreover, 
this official emphasized that "GAOS was involved in the contract negotiations 
between CBA and Infront Sport & Media, and made the final decision. In this way, 
we can prevent our national property from leaking out of the elite sport system". 
Finally, he summed up by saying that "In order to serve and improve elite sport, we 
are shaping and refining the new mechanism of the market-oriented approach". 
7.3.3 Controlling the transfer of basketball players 
The attitude of the Chinese government towards controlling Chinese basketball 
players' foreign transfer affairs was directly linked to the matter of Team China's 
international performance. To ensure that the PRC could take advantage of global 
basketball resources to facilitate its elite basketball development and yet at the same 
time prevent any adverse effect of global basketball, several strategies were adopted 
by the CBA namely: i) setting an age limit to prevent top players going abroad; ii) 
setting the requirement of obtaining CBA permission before transferring Chinese 
players abroad; and iii) setting quotas for introducing foreign players. 
With the first strategy, the CBA set an age limit to prevent its top players going 
abroad. In 1989, the National Sport Commission (NSC) submitted a report to the State 
Council and claimed that "In order to prevent Chinese elite athletes from leaking out, 
the NSC will issue a regulation in which national athletes cannot be transferred to 
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other countries until the male athletes are over the age of28 and female athletes over 
26" (NSC, 1993h: 126). Players of these ages were considered to be too old to interest 
foreign clubs. This policy was embedded in the CBA's document in 1996 which noted 
that "Only Chinese players who conform to one of three conditions can go abroad. 
These conditions are that players: i) conform to the (age) regulations of the NSC and 
CBA; ii) recommended by the CBA to be trained abroad; or iii) are recommended by 
the provincial basketball association and permitted by the CBA" (CBA, 1996: 29). 
Constrained by the CBA's regulations, almost no one could go abroad to play for any 
basketball clubs or basketball teams except for Ma Jian, a famous star player in the 
Chinese national team in the 1990s. Ma was offered a scholarship to play college 
basketball at UCLA and used his personal connections to apply for a passport and 
attempted to join the NBA, although his application to play abroad was refused by the 
CBA and the National Sport Commission (NSC). Due to going abroad without the 
permission of the Chinese government, Ma was dropped from the Chinese National 
Team (Dustin, 2004: 145-6). After suffering heavy defeats in a series of international 
basketball matches in the late 1990s, the Chinese government began to change its 
attitude towards Chinese basketball players' foreign transfer affairs. The then director 
of the CBMC, Xin Lancheng, acknowledged in 2000 that they had to dispatch their 
key players to the international basketball clubs in order to raise the performance of 
the national teams (Xin, 2000a: 28). Following Mr. Xin's statement, Wang Zhi-Zhi, a 
Chinese elite basketball player was transferred to NBA Dallas Mavericks Club in 
2001. He was followed by Mengke Bateer and Yao Ming who signed separate 
contracts with NBA Denver Nuggets and NBA Houston Rockets in 2002. According 
to a senior official in CBIDC who was involved in the transfer of the Chinese players 
(Interview, 10th January 2006), "Only players, such as Wang Zhi-Zhi and Mengke 
Bateer, who received permission from the CBA, can play for the NBA. Besides which, 
the NBA would be unlikely to sign contracts with any Chinese player without the 
permission of the CBA". 
Unfortunately, the liberal thinking of the Chinese government towards international. 
transfers was, to some extent, frustrated by the case ofWang Zhi-Zhi, who failed to 
meet two CB A-imposed deadlines to return to China and practice with the National 
Team to prepare for the World Championships at the end of his 2001-2002 NBA 
season with the Dallas Mavericks (Dustin, 2004: 147). In 2003, another Chinese elite 
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player, Xue Yuyang was prohibited from entering the NBA. According to the director 
of the CBMC (quoted in Liu, 1. 2003), this decision was made partly because the 
CBA did not want the CBA League to become one of the NBA's global talent pools, 
(this was particularly problematic for young Chinese players who were 'creamed off 
by the NBA but who might later be rejected by them if they were not good enough) 
and partly, according to the official statement of the CBA in 2003 (enA, 2003), 
because Xue Yuyang entered the NBA draft without official permission. 
The second of the CBA's strategies was to set the requirement for obtaining CnA 
permission before transferring Chinese players abroad. After the case of Wang 
Zhi-Zhi and Xue Yuyang, special permission was required from the CBA for Chinese 
players to transfer abroad. Although the age limit regulation was loosened and 
conditions were set out in the CBA transfer regulations of 2004, allowing male 
athletes over the age of 22 and female athletes over 20 to apply for transfer to foreign 
clubs, they still had to become members of the National Team (not including V18 and 
U20) and serve their country by competing twice in the international championships 
(at least at Asian Level) and by signing a formal contract with the CBA guaranteeing 
that they would return to China to join the training and competitions of the National 
Team whenever called upon. In addition, these players must promise not to reveal 
confidential information in relation to the tactics and strategies of Team China, while 
playing abroad (CBA, 2004a). 
Indeed, in order to protect national interests, the CBA attempted to take advantage of 
its authority to monitor and manipulate foreign transfer affairs. According to a senior 
official in CBIDC, "in order to prevent MNCs (i.e. the NBA) from taking most of the 
domestic elite players, and to make sure that these transferred players will play for the 
Chinese national teams, the whole process of Chinese basketball players' foreign 
transfer affairs come~ under the control of the CBA and contracts to be signed by the 
receiving clubs, the transferring players and the CBA to ensure that these Chinese 
national team players play for their country whenever called upon" (Interview, 10th 
January 2006). In 2007, due to the huge pressure to prepare for the 2008 Beijing 
Games, two other Chinese players, Yi Jianlian and Sun Vue, were allowed by the 
CBA to be transferred to NBA Milwaukee Bucks Club and NBA Los Angeles Lakers 
Club respectively to improve their skills. According to the director of the CBMC, Li 
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Yuangwei, the main strategy of the Argentine Olympic Team (which was defeated by 
Team China in the 1996 Olympics but surprisingly won the gold medal in the 2004 
Olympic Games), was to send more Argentine players to join world-class basketball 
clubs. Mr. Li stated that "there were 12 players in the 2004 Argentine Olympic Team, 
of which 11 players had played in American and European basketball leagues". He 
also noted that "the NBA and Australian Basketball Leagues can offer better chances 
than the dome~tic CBA league to hone the skills of Chinese players .... We should 
take a more positive attitude towards foreign transfer affairs and send more Chinese 
players abroad" (Li, Y. W. 2004). 
Although attitudes towards Chinese players transferring abroad were increasingly 
positive in 2004, the CBA still attempted to control the transfer process. Take Yi 
Jianlian, the Chinese superstar in the CBA League, for example. Yi was not permitted 
to join the NBA's annual draft until 2007 because the CBA had to ensure that all the 
Chinese players who were transferred to the NBA, were strong enough to gain 
sufficient time in NBA matches to improve their skills. According to the director of 
COMC, "It would be meaningless to join the NBA if Chinese players did not get 
enough chances to compete in the NBA matches, because we hope they can be honed 
by high-level competition and raise the profile of Team China" (Yi, 2007). 
The CBA's third strategy is setting quota limits for introducing foreign players. In 
order to allow domestic players more chance to improve their skills the CBA set quota 
limits for introducing foreign players and also introduced playing quotas for each club. 
From Table 7.14, we can see that after introducing a western professional club system, 
the Chinese government also set limited quotas for introducing foreign players. In the 
1995-1996 season, the NSC permitted each CBA club to introduce two foreign 
players to their teams but did not allow these two players to play simultaneously 
(CBA, 1996: 29). In the 1999-2000 season, after the episode of the seven major clubs 
which attempted to organize a new super league in 1999, the CBMC allowed two 
foreign players in each club to play simultaneously but with a quota of five players in 
Regular Seasons and Playoffs (Xin, 2000c: 2). 
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Table 7.14: Quotas set by tbe eBA for introducing foreign players 
Year Introducing quota Setting Playing Quota Extra condition 
for each club during 4 periods in each 
match 
2 players X 4 periods 
(8 players. periods) 
1995-1996 2 4 Did not allow two foreign players 
to play simultaneously 
1999-2000 2 5 Started allowing two foreign 
players to play simultaneously but 
with a quota of 5 players in 
Regular Seasons and Playoffs. 
2003-2004 2 4 Reduced playing quotas from 5 to 
4 and did not allow two foreign 
players to play simultaneously in 
the Playoffs. 
2006-2007 2 5 Did not allow introduction of new 
foreign players to replace the 2 
original foreign players who were 
injured during the matches 
In 2004, the CBMC vice director, Wang Du stated that under this new policy, "the 
performance of the two foreign players in each club had become the key issue in 
winning the CBAL matches." He noted that "Not only did each club invest huge 
amounts of money in attempts to hire high-quality foreign players, but also the whole 
attention of clubs and coaches was cantered on their two foreign players. This 
situation seriously damaged club training, especially for young domestic players" 
(Wang, D. 2004). In order to manage the "two-foreign-player phenomenon", in the 
2003-2004 season the CBA reduced the playing quotas from five to four and also 
prohibited the two foreign players from playing simultaneously in the Playoffs (Wang, 
D. 2004). Although the playing quota was increased again in the 2006-2007 season, 
after signing a contract with Infront Sport & Media in 2005 to promote the Chinese 
basketball market, the CBA still prevented the introduction of new foreign players to 
replace the two original foreign players if they become injured during matches. The 
exception to this is the eight qualified teams in the CBA Playoffs in which each team 
can temporarily take on 1 foreign player from the teams which are disqualified to 
compete in the playoffs (CBA, 2006b). 
In short, the key reason for the Chinese government's intervention in basketball 
players' transfer affairs was to take advantage of international basketball resources in 
order to raise the profile of Chinese elite basketball development and avoid losing its 
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key players from home soil. But due to poor coaching, the low standard of domestic 
professional competition and the tension between national interests and commercial 
interests, the Chinese government was 'forced' to alter its policy in an attempt to 
manage its relationship with globalisation and still retain its main priority the building 
of a strong national team. 
7.4 Commercialisation 
7.4.1 Introducing a more commercial system 
As mentioned in section 3.2, under the encouragement of Politburo Standing 
Committee member Li Tieying, China adopted a western approach, namely capitalist 
ideas, to revitalise the Chinese elite basketball system (NSC, 1996d: 152). Mr. Li's 
argument was echoed by sport minister, Wu Shaozu (2000: 9), and vice sport minister, 
Yuan Weiming, (1994: 6-7) both of whom held that in order to improve standards and 
catch up with advanced basketball countries in a short period of time, China must 
learn from those countries, including an acceptance of some capitalist systems (Wu, 
S.Z. 2000: 9). With the confinnation and support of these high-ranking political actors, 
the director of the NSC Ball Games Department, Yang Boyong, who was then in 
charge of Chinese basketball refonn made a statement at the 1994 National Basketball 
Competition and Training Conference. He announced that "In order to refonn the 
Chinese basketball system, especially the structure of the competition system, we will 
be bolder and take a much bigger step to push the basketball competition system 
towards the market, and also actively transfonn the system in the direction of 
commercialism because it is a very important step for basketball refonn" (Yang, 1994: 
14). 
From then on, commercial principles were introduced and became embedded in the 
new elite basketball system to activate and stimulate domestic players from amateur 
and professional clubs, and even national squads. The increasingly commercial 
approach adopted by Chinese elite basketball allowed a number of changes. Players 
could be transferred for a fee; they could enjoy improved contracts with high salaries; 
elite basketball players could be lured to play for the clubs; club players could be 
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mobilized with financial incentives; and financial rewards could be used to motivate 
national squads to win international competitions. 
In 1993, the Chinese government began allowing basketball players at different levels 
to be transferred for a fee. An official document, "The Suggestions of the NSC About 
Deepening the Reform of Sport" issued by the NSC in 1993, highlighted that the NSC 
promoted and encouraged athletes to be transferred for a fee and that "the former 
employers can receive the transfer fee from their athletes' new owners, and the price 
can be evaluated according to the period of training and the level of skill of the 
athletes transferred. Some national sport associations and clubs can start trying to 
introduce a transfer fee system" (NSC, 1996d: 148). According to the then vice 
director of the CBMC, Xu Chuan, the Chinese government set a series of 
recommended prices to encourage clubs to transfer players from amateur to 
professional level after introducing western club systems in 1996 (Xu, C. 1998: 11), 
and the price for transferring domestic players was revised and raised by the CBA in 
2003 (see Table 7.15). In 2005, the lowest and highest limits for transfer fees in the 
CBA League were set by the CBA. From Table 7.16 we can see that the lowest limit 
of the transfer fee in the 2005-2006 season was to be increased from 50,000 yuan to 
150,000 yuan in three years. 
Table 7.15: Transfer fees set by the CBA for Chinese basketball players in 2003 
(Unit: yuan) 
Team China I Team China 2 or National level Other levels 
previously in 
Team China 1 
Men 250,000 200,000 150,000 100,000 
Women 200,000 150,000 100,000 80,000 
Source: Yu, Z. et al. (2003:50). 
Table 7.16: Transfer fees allowed the CBA for Chinese players in the CBA 
League 2005-2008 (Unit: yuan) 
Year Lowest fee limit Highest fee limit 
2005-2006 50,000 200,000 
2006-2007 100,000 250,000 
2007-2008 150,000 300,000 
Source: CBA, (2005: 8-23). 
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According to Xin Lancheng, former director of the CBMC, at the 1997-1998 CBA 
League Conference, some clubs offered extraordinary contracts (high salary) to lure 
elite basketball players to play for their clubs (Xin, 1998a: 25). In 2000, the then 
director of the CBMC Competition Department, Guo Jianjun, also highlighted that 
"the fierce competition between clubs to sign domestic and foreign star players has 
placed a big financial burden on most domestic professional basketball clubs" (Guo, 
2000: 300). In 1996 the CBA set up the system of "relegation and promotion" (Sheng 
jiangji) by which, at the end of each season, the top two teams in Jia B League were 
promoted to Jia A League and the two lowest placed teams from Jia A League were 
relegated to the Jia B League. 
To win matches in each of their leagues, more and more clubs took a shortcut strategy 
to lure domestic players from other clubs and introduce good foreign players instead 
of investing money in their own reserve teams and affiliated amateur clubs. This 
situation was at its height in 2003, according to the director of the CBMC Marketing 
Department, Zhang Xiong (2005: 15). Director Zhang, also stated that "according to 
the survey of the CBMC, some Jia A clubs spent over 0.7 million yuan for a coach, 
and also around 0.5 million yuan for each domestic player and 2 million yuan for each 
foreign player". He went on to say that "Generally speaking, for most of the 12 Jia A 
clubs, their annual budget is around 6 - 8 million yuan. But some special clubs spend 
over 10 million yuan each year and more than half of their spending is to hire coaches 
and players, both including domestic and foreign" (Zhang, X. 2005: 15). Due to the 
extremely high cost of competing for the hire of coaches and players for their Jia A 
teams, most clubs had no choice but to cut down the investment in their reserve teams, 
which seriously endangered the development of Chinese elite basketball (Zhang, X. 
2005: 15). 
In addition, the CBA mobilized club players with financial incentives during club 
competitions. After the Chinese professional club system was created, using rewards 
to motivate players had prevailed in the mind of the CBA officials. Zhong Tianfa (the 
director of the Ball Game Department in NSC in 1995), when interviewed by the 
CBA's Basketball magazine, stated that he would motivate players by using rewards 
of 1 million yuan and 0.5 million yuan for the top two teams in the 1995 professional 
basketball matches (Zhang, X. 1996: 3). In 1998, the vice director of CBMC, Xu 
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Chuan noted that "In order to animate players to fight harder in the matches, we will 
refine the reward system still further" (Xu, C. 1998: (0). In 2004, the director of the 
CBMC Competition Department, Wang Xuan, proclaimed the establishment of the 
CBAL's reward system and announced that more than 5.51 million yuan of the CBA 
League's annual budget would be directly awarded to the best teams and players in 
the 2004-2005 CBAL season. The best team could win 350,000 yuan while the lowest 
could only get 10,000 yuan (Wang, X. 2004). 
Finally, around 2004, the reward system of the CBAL was adopted by the Chinese 
government to motivate national squads to win international competitions. After 
wining 8th place in the 2004 Olympic Games, the Chinese government (GAOS) 
awarded 4,500 yuan to each basketball player in the Chinese Olympic national men's 
team (Xiao, W. 2005). In 2006, following the news that Team China had qualified for 
the top 16 teams in the FIBA World Championship, the director ofthe CBMC, Li 
Yuangwei immediately proclaimed that the CBMC would give rewards to Team 
China once they entered the semi-final for the top 8 teams (Xie, 2006). Although 
Team China failed to gain this reward, from the perspective of the Chinese 
government, the reward policy was regarded as a useful tool to motivate its national 
players. 
In short, in order to prevent Chinese elite basketball players from retiring early (Yang, 
1994: 12-(3) and to mobilize them to fight for their clubs and their country, the 
capitalist reward system was adopted and became embedded in the Chinese elite 
basketball system. Due to limited talent in the Chinese domestic basketball market 
and the limited number of foreign players allowed into the PRC, most CBAL clubs 
chose to lure and mobilize Chinese "stars" and foreign players by paying a high 
transfer fee and offering them extraordinary contracts. As a result of the heavy 
financial burden of paying large transfer fees and high salaries, most clubs were 
making significant annual losses by early 2004. Following the introduction ofthe club 
system, the commercial market certainly brought new resources and energy which 
revitalized the Chinese elite basketball system, but it also substantially influenced the 
attitudes and values of individual basketball players, club owners and CBA officials 
in the direction of a more materialistic view of the world. The adoption of the reward 
policy described above raises issues about the CBA's capacity to manage the income 
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maximising behaviour of these highly paid domestic and foreign players and whether 
it was possible for the Chinese government to strike a balance between its national 
interest (Olympic and World Championship success) and professional club interests 
(domestic basketball market success). These issues are discussed in the next section. 
7.4.2 Managing the consequence of a more commercial system 
In the preceding sections it was mentioned that, after adopting capitalist elements to 
energize the Chinese elite basketball system, domestic and foreign players became 
more materially demanding and d<?mestic club owners were forced to place greater 
emphasis on match-winning in Division 1 (Jia A (CBAL) and Jia B (CBL) ). At the 
1994 National Training and Competition Conference for Basketball, the Director of 
NSC Ball Game Department, Yang Baoyong, reminded the CBA officials that "As the 
Chinese basketball matches become commercialized, our strategies to manage and to 
educate these basketball teams have to be advanced - otherwise, these teams could be 
out of our control" (Yang, 1994: 17). In order to ensure that the national teams 
achieved success in the Olympics and World Championships, the CBA not only took 
control of most of the commercial rights of domestic basketball leagues in order to 
generate income to support national teams, but also shortened or rescheduled the 
season to allow the national team and Olympic squad to draft key club players to be 
trained for seven to eight months each year. The way in which the Chinese 
government regarded the commercial income of domestic leagues as its personal 
"money trees" and used clubs as training and competition arenas for potential Chinese 
national team players, raised serious tensions between the CBA and the owners of 
CBAL clubs. The tension reached breaking point in 1999 and again in 2000 when 
more than seven CBAL clubs attempted to organize a new Chinese premier league to 
challenge the authority ofthe CBA. After temporarily suppressing the issue of 
organizing a new premier league, the CBMC then attempted to manage the 
commercialisation of basketball. In 2000 the CB MC director, claimed that "We 
should take action to deal with these commercial issues in which the salaries, transfer 
fees and rewards of the players and coaches have risen far too high due to fierce 
market competition" (Xin, 2000b: 21). There was even more of a headache when the 
corruption of sport officials was found in some national sport associations such as 
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football, which led the GAOS to restrict the financial and personnel powers of all 
national sport associations, including the CBA in 2002. 
It may be argued that all the problems identified by the CBMC in relation to "star" 
players, clubs and even the CBA seem to be the consequence of introducing a more 
commercial system. To reduce the negative impact of commercialism on Chinese elite 
basketball development, five main strategies were adopted by the CBMC. These were: 
i) the imposition of special taxes and the setting of limits on salaries and transfer fees 
in the mid-1990s; ii) preventing the seven largest clubs from organizing a new super 
league in the late 1990s; iii) the creation of a special procedure for dealing with the 
domestic and foreign transfer market in early 2000; iv) the assertion of control on the 
CBA and manipulation of the Chinese Basketball Association league (CBAL) in 2002; 
and iv) the dismissal of a private professional club from the CBAL in 2004. 
The CBA not only imposed special taxes on Chinese players, but also set a limit on 
the salaries and transfer fees which professional clubs could offer to their players and 
fees they could charge their buyers. Regarding the taxation of transfer fees and 
salaries, the CBA issued an official document - "The CBA Regulation for the Transfer 
of Basketball Players in 1996". This required each Chinese player transferred to pay 
the transfer tax (see Table 7.17). This regulation was countered by a strong argument 
from the Director of the NSC Ball Games Department, Yang Baoyong, in 1994, who 
emphasized that "it is up to the government to make these players' dreams possible by 
covering all the players' fees including food, clothing, accommodation and 
transportation over the long tenn. We have to highlight this point otherwise we will 
be guilty of political blindness which will lead us the wrong way" (Yang, 1994: 17). 
Table 7.17: Tbe transfer tax imposed by tbe CBA on Cbinese basketball players 
in 1996 (Unit: yuan) . 
Players in international Players in national level Other levels 
level or in national 
teams 
transfer at domestic 5,000 3,000 1,000 
level 
temporary transfer 10,000 6,000 3,000 
in CBA Leagues 
transfer at 32,000 25,000 20,000 
....... international level ($4,000) ($3,400) J$2,5001 
Source: CBA. (1996: 29). 
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In 2001, after the case ofWang Zhizhi and before Yao Ming transferred to the NBA, 
the CBA issued a document to impose a salary tax on all players transferred abroad. 
According to this document, "The income earned by players of national teams ... 
from major games and commercial games has to be distributed in the following ways: 
the players, coaches, and other relevant personnel will get 50 percent; the relevant 
association's reward fund and development fund 30 percent; the province (region, 
municipality) where the athletes and coaches reside 10 percent; and the GAOS 10 
percent" (CBA, 2004c). In this way, the Chinese government could still retain half the 
salary of its domestic players who were transferred abroad within the financial circle 
of the Chinese elite basketball system. Although the PRC attempted to prevent its 
"national property" leaking abroad, the "Yao Ming's image" lawsuit, between Yao's 
commercial agent and the CBA's official sponsor, the Coca-Cola Company (see 
section 3-2), forced the GAOS and CBA to issue new regulations to manage the 
commercial activities of all Chinese players. In 2006, the GAOS issued an official 
document "The Commercial Contract of National Squad Members" - by which the 
government could redistribute athletes' commercial profit by law once athletes signed 
their names to this contract (GAOS, 2006d). Following GAOS's instruction, the CBA 
issued another document in the same year to manage Chinese players' commercial 
activities. This document, "The Regulation of the Commercial Rights of CBA 
Registered Players" (CBA, 2006d), on the one hand re-emphasized the legitimacy of 
CBA ownership of the exclusive "image rights" of all CBA Chinese registered players 
and that any commercial income would be redistributed by the CBA. The player and 
his agent would keep 70 percent, the club where the player resides 20 percent and the 
CBA IQ percent. On the other hand, it allowed two exceptions in that players like Yao 
Ming would not be affected by this regulation as long as their commercial contracts 
were signed before this document was issued, and Chinese players retained their own 
image rights as long as their commercial activities had nothing to do with the CBA, 
the national teams and their clubs. 
Regarding transfer fees and salaries of players, limits were set for the salary and 
transfer fee that professional clubs could offer to their players and for their transfer 
targets after 1998. From Table 7.15 and Table 7.16, we can see that the highest 
domestic transfer fees set by the CBA were 250,000 yuan for the 2003-2004 season 
and 300,000 yuan for the 2007-2008 season. Due to the dramatically increasing 
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salaries of foreign players, whose highest salary in 2003-2004 season was $ 38,000 
per month (76 times higher than that in the 1995-1996 season) (Li, H. 2005: 117), the 
CBA set a salary limit by which the highest salary that CHAL clubs could offer their 
foreign players was $ 20,000 per month (Zhu, 2005). In order to ensure this limited 
salary policy was achieved, the CBMC director, Xin Lancheng, claimed in 2003 that 
"We will gradually adopt South Korea's model to introduce foreign players in a 
collective way to control the abnormal price for hiring foreign players" (Xin, 2003: 
11). Under this new policy, CBAL clubs were not allowed to sign any contract with 
foreign players without permission from the CBA. By so doing, the CBA could not 
only prevent excessive competition between clubs, but also take advantage of 
collective bargaining to keep the salary of foreign players at a certain level. According 
to the CBMC Director of the Competition Department, Wang Xuan, who was in 
charge of introducing foreign players in 2005, this limited salary policy helped CBAL 
clubs save about 10 million yuan which could be invested in the reserve teams of the 
CBAL clubs (Zhu, 2005). Indeed, in 2005 the CBA, in a document, "The Action 
Project to Qualify for the 2005-2008 CBAL Clubs", required that "every CBAL club 
must invest at least 0.7 million yuan in their reserve teams after 2006" (CBA, 2005: 
18). In addition, the CBA attempted to narrow the salary gap between 'star' players, 
whose annual salary was about 1-3 million yuan, and 'normal' players, whose annual 
salary was about 17,000 - 48,000 yuan. This action project required each club to 
guarantee the minimum pay to newly transferred players, increasing it from 70 
percent of the average salary of their players in the 2005-2006 season to 90 percent in 
the 2007-2008 season (CBA, 2005: 8-23). Unfortunately, CBA's policy was 
challenged by one of the wealthier clubs, Xinjiang Guanghui, which spent 4.5 million 
yuan (about half ofCBAL club's annual budget) on buying a former Chinese NBA 
player, Mengke Bateer in 2007 (Kang, 2007). 
As regards the second strategy, the CBA created a special procedure for managing 
and regulating the domestic transfer market. In order to narrow the performance gap 
between strong and weak CBAL teams and to prevent Chinese players asking for high 
transfer fees and salaries, in 2002 the CBA set up a draft system similar to that of the 
NBA in the form of a "temporary transfer" market in which each club had to release 
its surplus players to be temporarily transferred to (or borrowed by) other clubs for 
One year. Through this NBA draft transfer system, the CBA allowed lower placed 
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clubs priority in acquiring transfer-listed players, the players themselves having no 
rights to choose their favourite club (Wang, D. 2002b: 9). Although the draft system 
substantially controlled the unreasonable behaviour of the Chinese 'star' players in 
asking for high salaries in the "temporary transfer" market, unfortunately this was not 
the situation in the "permanent transfer" market, as previously mentioned in the case 
ofMengke Bateer and his weathy new owner, the Xinjiang Guanghui club. 
Moreover, according to an interview with Sina Sport in 2007, the director of the 
CBAL office in the CBA, Hao Guohua, who was in charge of the domestic transfer 
affairs acknowledged that this "temporary transfer system" was not very successful in 
achieving a balance between rich and poor clubs due to the reluctance of the CBAL 
clubs to release their potential players who had been trained by their own clubs since 
an early age (Chen, X. 2007). Although the CBA set the maximum quota for the 
number of key players that each club could keep out of the temporary transfer market 
(namely, lOin the 2005-2007 season and 8 in the 2007-2008 season) (CllA, 2005: 18), 
the new policy, that attempted to force each CBAL club to release more players into 
the temporary transfer market, seems to have only succeeded in increasing the transfer 
figure, not the quality of players transferred. From Table 7.18, we can see that less 
than one third of the players in the temporary transfer market were drawn by the clubs. 
As a matter of interest, most players transferred were drawn by their own clubs (Su, Q. 
2005). 
Table 7.18: Players drawn by clubs in the temporary transfer market 2001-2007 
Year Players in the temporary Players drawn by the clubs 
transfer market 
2002-2003 46 11 
2003-2004 36 6 
2004-2005 34 8 
2007-2008 95 28 
Source: Su, Q. (2005). 
Although Hao Guohua declared that "the NBA transfer system is a perfect 
commercial model" (Hou, 2007), he conceded that "we can't achieve it at this 
moment due to our 'policy of whole country support for the elite sport system' in 
Which not only are one third of CBA clubs tightly linked to the provincial sport 
bureaus, but also we have to make sure that all clubs have their reserve teams" (Hou, 
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2007). He went on to say that "This is a structural conflict which exists within the 
Chinese basketball system itself. We still have to resolve the domestic transfer affair 
otherwise the whole CBA league will lose its vitality" (Hou, 2007). 
Regarding the third CBMC strategy, the Chinese government prevented the seven 
major clubs from organizing a new super league in the late 1990s. According to Yuan 
Chao, senior manager of the Beijing Ducks Basketball Club, "After the CBA 
introduced the professional club system, these club managers, most of whom came 
from outside the Chinese elite sport system but had a commercial background, 
realized quickly that running a basketball club could make money. They therefore 
attempted to follow the NBA model by organizing an independent Chinese basketball 
league" (Interview, 7th January 2006). In late 1998, seven major clubs which were led 
by Li Yaomin, a senior manager in Shanghai Dongfang Sharks basketball club, began 
making plans to host a preparatory meeting about organizing a "Chinese Basketball 
Clubs' League" (Lai, 1999). However, using the law as justification, the Director of 
CBMC, Xin Lancheng, claimed that "to organize such a league without any 
permission from the CBMC of GAOS in advance is illegal. ... Besides which, setting 
an agenda for organizing a 'Chinese Basketball Clubs' League' is far beyond the 
authority ofthese clubs" (Hao, 1999: 24). He also argued that "We are in the 
preliminary stage of socialist economic development and the American NBA is at a 
highly developed economic level under the capitalist system". He therefore went on to 
state that "The particular domestic situation of the PRC must be considered before 
establishing a new league" (Hao, 1999: 24). Without the CBMC's permission and 
support, this attempt to organize a new league died out early the following year (Lai, 
1999). 
In late 1999, the "Two Clubs' Merging Issue" between Qianwei and Aoshen gave 
clubs another chance to organize the new league. Due to Qianwei and Aoshen 
arbitrarily agreeing to merge without asking any other clubs, there was a strong 
reaction from the other 10 clubs. These clubs, led by the senior manager of Shanghai 
Dongfang Sharks, Li Yaomin, again threatened to withdraw from the Jia A League 
(Qi, 1999) and also attempted to organize a Shanghai Professional Basketball 
Company (CPBe) to take back all the commercial rights from the CBA with the 
exception of those of the Jia A League (Zhang, Y. 2000). Not surprisingly, due to 
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opposition from the CBMC and the GAOS, this new league again failed (Xu, J. 1999: 
18). According to the former director of Sport Marketing Department, Zgang Xion, 
although the clubs' ambition to organize an independent club league was ultimately 
unsuccessful, it drew the attention of the CBA and, to some extent, forced the CBA to 
organize the Chinese National Conference for Basketball in 1999 to speed up reform 
for Chinese basketball. According to Beijing Ducks manager, Yuan Chao, most of the 
conclusions from this 1999 National Conference became the blueprint for the 
"Northern Star Project" (the so-called CBA League 10-year Reform Project 
2005-2014) which was drafted and supported by the new director of the CBMC, Li 
Yuanwei in 2004. 
Regarding the fourth CBMC strategy, the Chinese government dismissed a private 
professional club from the CBAL in 2004. Although the "Northern Star Project" was 
set to allow clubs to become involved in some of the decision-making, it goes without 
saying that the Chinese government did not stop using its administrative authority to 
maintain and protect the interest of the Chinese state. One striking examples here is 
that of Beijing Aoshen, one of the few commercial clubs that links to a private rather 
than a state enterprise, which was dismissed from the CBAL in 2004 due to refusing 
to release its star players to join the U20 nation team. According to CBA's official 
announcement, Beijing Aoshen would not allow its key player, Sun Vue, to join the 
U20 nation team, stated that Sun Vue had a serious injury to his left foot. This reason 
Was not accepted by the CBA and they then asked this club to release the player to 
join the U20 national team by 7th May 2004 (CBA, 2004d). Due to Beijing Aoshen's 
insistence on keeping its own player, the CBA claimed that this club violated the 
"National Regulation for the Registration and Transfer of Chinese Players" (CBA, 
2004d) in which "All the registered clubs have the responsibility to make their players 
available for national teams at all levels. All registered clubs and players must fulfill 
the requirements of the national teams, or they will be punished [by suspension for 
1-5 years or by a large fine of up to 2 million yuans]"(CBA, 2004c). In order to 
maintain the authority of the CBA and to ensure that all clubs followed CBA orders to 
prepare for the 2008 Olympic Games, the CBA made an official announcement 
preventing Beijing Aoshen from registering as a member of the CBAL for one year 
(CBA, 2004d). Following the issue of Beijing Aoshen, the new director of CBMC, Li 
Yuanwei, when publicly announcing the "Northern Star Project" in 2004, underlined 
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that "The whole meaning of Chinese basketball is to enhance the profile of the 
national teams .... Every club has to support and serve the nation's teams without any 
conditions" (Li, Y.W. 2004). Although Aoshen was eager to rejoin the CBAL in 2007. 
its application was dismissed again by the CBA, who insisted that the home stadium 
of Aoshen must be located in mainland China instead of Macao (COA. 2007). 
The fifth CBMC strategy concerns the Chinese government's control of the CBA and 
its manipulation of CBAL. After the 'unruly' commercialism which penetrated all 
NSMCs in early 2001, the Chinese government again tightened up the financial and 
personnel power of the CBA. Sport Minister, Yuan Weiming, in his 2001 GAOS 
lecture, underlined that "After introducing a market economy into all NSMCs, most 
leaders in these NSMCs have more official power to make decisions on matters such 
as how to run sport marketing, who has the right to organize national competitions, 
who can be a referee, who can be selected into national teams, how to distribute the 
annual budget and who can be commercial sponsors for the NSMCs and their teams." 
He went on to say that "in order to prevent corruption from becoming rampant, we 
have to effectively oversee and control how these leaders of NSMCs execute their 
power" (Yuan, W. 2002a: 18). Following the sport minister's arguments, two official 
documents, "The Notice for Standardizing the Codes of Practice of National Sport 
Management Centers" (GAOS, 2003d: 56-63) and "The Temporary Regulation for 
Centralizing Accounting and Finance Management of GAOS Affiliated Institutions" 
(GAOS, 2003f: 223-8), were issued by GAOS in 200 I and 2002 respectively. 
According to these two documents, the financial and personnel power of the CBA was 
brought more tightly under the control of the GAOS. The special measures that the 
Chinese government took were that: i) all the training and competition programmes 
have to be examined and approved by the GAOS; ii) all the income and expenditure 
has to be examined and approved by the "Accounting and Finance Management 
Centre" of the GAOS, which requested the CBA to cancel all its bank accounts, and 
also only allowed the CBA to keep an assigned bank account; and Hi) all directors of 
the CBA department have to regularly alternate their jobs, especially in some key 
departments, in order to prevent corruption. After strong interference by the GAOS, 
the excessive commercialism which penetrated the CBA was restricted, but "it not 
only reduced CBA's flexibility and efficiency, but also increased the tension between 
the CBA and GAOS, which interfered too much in the CBA's affairs". according to 
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one senior official in the CBA Comprehensive Department (Interview, 51h January 
2006). 
Regarding the manipulation of the Chinese Basketball Association League (CBAL), 
the CBA learned from the experience of its domestic football counterpart, the CF A, 
and terminated the system of "relegation and promotion" in 2004, adopting the "Two 
Protocols & One Licence" policy which was included in the "Northern Star Project" 
(the so-called CBA League lO-year Reform Project 2005-2014) in 2005. This will be 
discussed in more detail below. In 1999 the director of the CBMC, claimed that 
"Under the brutal system of 'relegation and promotion', some clubs would rather use 
the short-term tactics of luring elite basketball players with unusual fees and using 
illegal methods (such as bribing referees and rival players) to win club matches rather 
than investing more money in their reserve teams. All these situations directly 
impacted on and endangered the existence of the CBA league" (Xin, I 999b: 18). In 
order to solve this problem, the director of the CBMC learned from the experience of 
his football counterpart, Wang Junsheng, the director ofCFMC, who suggested 
temporarily terminating the 'relegation and promotion' system at the 1998 National 
Football Conference (Wang, J. 2002: 344). During the "National Training Conference 
for Chinese Basketball" in 2000, Xin Lancheng raised the possibility of terminating 
the 'relegation and promotion' system (2000: 29). Affected by the notorious football 
scandal known as "Jia B Five Clubs Issue", which was the side effect of the GAOS's 
policy to temporarily terminate the 'relegation and promotion' system in early 2001, a 
similar policy was not carried out by the CBMC until the new director, Li Yuanwei 
officially announced in 2004 the termination of the 'relegation and promotion' system 
in favour of the NBA model. 
As mentioned in a previous section (7.3.1 The competitive system), Li Yuanwci not 
only wanted to prevent clubs from corrupt competition by ending the relegation rule, 
but also to let clubs have more time and energy to give to attracting and servicing fans, 
media and sponsors by adopting the NBA market model (Li, Y.W. 2004). According 
to Li Yuanwei, "The new CBA league is learning a negative lesson from the 
experience of Chinese Football, but also a positive lesson from these internationally 
successful professional leagues". He emphasized that he was reluctant to allow the 
media to call the new CBA league the 'Chinese Basketball Super League' (CBSL) 
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because he wanted his new league to steer clear of the negative image of the 'Chinese 
Football Super League' (CFSL) (Li, Y.W. 2004). 
The "Two Protocols & One Licence" policy was one approach the Chinese 
government adopted from the Chinese football case in an attempt to force the CBAL 
clubs to put more resources into their reserve teams instead of recruiting talent from 
other domestic clubs, and to give up their leagues' main commercial rights, including 
broadcasting, advertising and sponsorship. The first Protocol was in relation to 
organizing "home" matches in the CBAL competitions. Because most of the stadiums 
are owned by local government or provincial sport bureaus (China Interactive Sports, 
2006b), CBAL clubs were not allowed to organize their CBAL home matches (even 
though they were eager to do so). The senior manager of Shanghai Dongfang Sharks, 
Li Yaomin, who twice led other clubs to challenge the CBA's authority, complained 
that "It is very difficult for a club to survive if they do not have a right to organize 
their own 'home' matches" (Zhang, Y. 2000). 
Essentially, the provincial or municipal sport bureaus of these CBAL clubs are in 
charge of organizing their own clubs' home matches. In order to avoid corrupt 
competition, these sport bureaus are required to sign a contract with the CBA (the 
"Protocol for organizing CBAL matches") to promise that these matches will be run 
smoothly (CBA, 2006e: 77-82). In the second stage ofthe 'Northern Star Project' 
(2009-2012), "all CBAL clubs can totally own the right to organize their home 
matches" (CBMC, 2005), but the director of the CBMC, Li Yuanwei also reminded 
clubs in 2007 that "the ranking of the men's and women's national teams in the 2008 
Olympic Games will play a key role in deciding whether Chinese basketball will 
move towards a 'real' club system or not" (Lan, 2007a). 
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Table 7.19: eBA Jia A clubs' income in tbe 1998-1999 season (Unit: 0.1 million 
yuan) 
Clubs Local Income kept by Clubs Bonus from Total 
Gate Money Local Local TV right CBA 
Advertising 
Guangdong 20 2.0 0 11 33.0 
Hongyuan 
Jiangsu 19 1.5 5.0 11 36.5 
'Nangang 
Liaoning 18 1.5 1.5 11 32.0 
Lieren 
Shanghai 10 1.5 0 11 22.5 
Dongfang 
Shandong 16 1.0 0 1I 28.0 
Yongan 
Sichuan 10 0.8 0 11 2 \.8 
Lanjian 
Zhejiang 9 0.8 0 11 20.8 
Wanma 
Shangxing 9 0.6 0 11 20.6 
Jibu 
Jilin 17 1.5 0 11 29.5 
Dongbei Tiger 
Bayi Rocket 10 0.8 0 1I 2 \.8 
Beijing I I 0 11 13.0 
Shougang 
Jingshi 
Beijing 0 0 0 5.5 5.5 
Aoshen 
Source: Bat, X.L. et al. (2000: 3). 
The second Protocol is related to participation in CBAL matches. According to the 
senior manager of the Beijing Shou Gang Basketball Club, Yuan Chao, following two 
occasions when clubs attempted to organize a new independent league in the late 
1990s, the CBA began to ask clubs to sign a contract (the "Protocol for participating 
in the Jia A basketball matches") (Interview, 7th January 2006). As set out in the 
"Protocol for participating in the Jia A basketball matches in 2001-2002 season", all 
clubs who wanted to join the 2001-2002 Jia A basketball matches had to follow all 
regulations issued and set by the CBMC of GAOS (CBA, 2001: 114-5). From Table 
7.19 we can see that most commercial rights were in the hands of the CBA which 
only allocated 1.1 million yuan to each Jia A club per year. 
According to the Protocol for participating in the CBAL basketball matches in the 
2006-2007 season, all clubs that wished to take part in the 2006-2007 CBAL 
basketball matches had to agree that "The CBA not only owns the exclusive 
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commercial rights, including broadcasting, advertising and sponsorship, but also had 
the right to distribute the commercial income" (CRA, 2006f: 66). In order to prevent 
domestic professional basketball clubs from resisting this commercial regulation, all 
clubs had to register every year and sign this contract (the "Protocol for participating 
in the CBAL basketball matches") by which each club must provide a deposit of seven 
million yuan to the CRA to ensure that they totally accept the CRA's conditional offer. 
In addition, this protocol also not only asked clubs to follow the "National Regulation 
of the Registration and Transfer for Chinese Players" (CRA, 2004d) and agree that the 
eBA could recruit any club player unconditionally, but also to accept the Beijing 
Board of Arbitration (RRA) as the exclusive arbiter to solve the problems between the 
eRA and the clubs (CRA, 2006f: 76). Thus, from Figure 7.8 we can see that the CRA 
not only controlled most of the commercial rights but also arbitrarily recruited any 
club player they wanted into the seven national squads without any compensation. 
Figure 7.8: The relationship between the Chinese government and the basketball 
clubs in the Chinese Basketball Association League (CBAL) 
National squads 
Including National Team 
I, National Team 2, & 
U19, U17 Team 
Broadcasting rights 
Advertising rights 
Sponsorship rights 
Partial advertisement rights 
Including Team I, Team 2 
Club title sponsorship rights 
Ticket rights 
Basketball schools, Sports colleges. Provincial teams 
For the "club qualification licence", the CBA set requirements for CBAL clubs 
Whereby they had to prove their capability to be qualified for this league. The main 
requirements were: to have at least 20 million yuan for the club; to accept that the 
eBA would check clubs' accounts when necessary; to own at least 12 players; and to 
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have at least one reserve team with 12 players and an annual budget of at least 0.6 
million yuan (CBA, 2005: 18). After satisfying these requirements, a club could apply 
to the CBA to receive a licence to become a professional basketball club (CBA, 2005: 
18). Only after being accepted each year as a member of the CBAL club and after 
signing the unconditional agreement with the CBA, entitled "the Protocol for 
participating in the CBAL basketball matches", could clubs have a legal right to take 
part in CBAL basketball matches. 
7.5 Conclusion 
When attempting to sum up the relationship between the CBA and global basketball, 
we find that, in contrast to global football, where there is no single dominant country, 
the relationship with global basketball is strongly affected, if not determined, by the 
relationship with American basketball, namely the NBA. By carrying out the twin 
policies of "exporting human capital" (Song chuqu) and "bringing foreign resources 
in" (Qingjiniai), the Chinese government attempted to introduce global resources, 
particularly from American basketball, to fundamentally improve the quality of the 
Chinese elite basketball coaches and players. During the learning process, according 
to the director of the CBMC, Li Yuanwei, a unique opportunity was created for NBA 
to advance upon the Chinese basketball market, especially among the younger 
generation (Li, Y.W. 2004). In 2004 the NBA began its NBA China Games 
(NBA.com, 2007) and in 2006 generated about $ 50 million in revenue from China -
the league's largest market outside the United States - as part of the overall NBA 
revenue of almost four billion dollars (Su, Z. 2007). 
In 2007 it also announced the establishment of NBA China, which will be headed by 
the former boss of Microsoft's China operations, Tim Chen, and which will lead to an 
eventual NB A-managed Chinese domestic league (China Daily.com, 2007). In the 
"Northern Star Project", the Chinese government acknowledged that "there is huge 
pressure to compete with NBA for limited domestic basketball resources" (CBA, 
2004e). In order to deal with this pressure, the director of the CBMC, Li Yuanwei in 
2004 (Li, Y.W. 2004) and the first vice Director of the ~ompetition Department in 
319 
Chapter 7 - Chinese Elite Basketball 
GAOS, Guo Jianjun (Guo, 2005), travelled to America in 2005 to learn how to run the 
CBAL by adopting the NBA's marketing approaches. But, according to the "Northern 
Star Project", the Chinese government is also aware that "CBAL can learn much from 
the NBA but should not become a -'clone' of the NBA" (CBA, 2004e). In 2007 the 
CBA organized "The Summit of Chinese Basketball Development" and invited NBA 
Commissioner David Stem to speak. David Stem proclaimed that "the NBA is going 
to cooperate with the CBA and GAOS to organize a China-NI3A League" (Li, R., 
2007). After this summit, the director of the CBMC, Li Yuanwei, responded to the 
issue of the "China-NB A League" by stating that "the ranking of Team China 
Basketball in the 2008 Beijing Games will play a key role in deciding whether the 
NBA can establish a league in China or not" (Lan, 2007a). In addition, Mr. Li 
highlighted that "If the NBA wants to organize a China-NB A League, they must 
cooperate with the CBA" (Lan, 2007a). A similar argument can be found in the words 
of Guo Jianjun, the first Deputy Director of the Competition Department in GAOS, 
and fonner Director of the Competition Department of the CBMC. "It is necessary to 
set up a special organization to manage Chinese professional basketball". However, 
he highlighted that "we have to make sure that when it is established; this 
organization is led and dominated by the CBA without question" (Guo, 2000: 302). 
The club approach, in particular the American model, supported by private and 
state-owned enterprise and the wider society, has been adopted since 1995 in order to 
develop a strong national basketball team (Yang, 1994: 17). This has had the full 
support of a group of Chinese leaders, including Li Tieying, a member of the 
Politburo Standing Committee (pS C) and a State Councillor (1988-1998); Xu Zhijian 
(Vice General Secretary for State Council) (Xu, Z. 1993: 16-7); Wu Shaozu (then 
Sport Minister) (GAOS, 1999b: 123); and Zhong Tianfa (Director of the Ball Games 
Department in the NSC in 1997) (1997: 1). The Chinese government's attempts to 
reform the elite basketball system by trying to maintain the socialist pattern and at the 
same time take advantage of capitalist elements, turned out to be problematic. 
Looking at the development of basketball from the government's point of view, its 
concern was not so much with the development of professional basketball but the 
development of a strong national team. These agendas are in many ways quite 
different. For the government, the constant problem was how to rapidly improve the 
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quality of the national team. The government strategy was always a short-term 
approach in which they continuously strove for rapid improvement of Chinese 
basketball in order to break away from Asia and reach world class level. In the 
beginning, the professional clubs were regarded as a means to rapid development, but 
by the .late 1990s, they were seen as a barrier to it. The public policy agenda the 
government faced was partly set by the clubs (as a result of corruption, high payments 
to players and the transfer of players), but was also set by itself through looking for 
quick solutions. With regard to each of the four problems, (club corruption, the star 
system, player transfer and the national teams), the government demonstrated its 
capacity to intervene in these issues very forcibly, although sometimes its intervention 
was short term as a result of failing to fully tackle the problem, particularly with 
regard to the national team. As for the professional teams, there were some elements 
of negotiation, but not a great deal it seems due to the tight control of the CBA and 
theGAOS. 
With regard to the hard and soft indicators for this case study (see Chapter 4 and 
Appendix 2-6) we have generated useful and valid evidence which is mapped out in 
this chapter. Using Houlihan's patterns of globalisation (see Chapter 2 Patterns of 
Globalisation), we are able to summarize China's response to global basketball and 
answer our three research questions. Within this framework, the relationship between 
China and global basketball is located somewhere in between participative and 
conflictual. It is in fact quite similar to the case of football. There does not seem to be 
a uniform management style but instead there is very forceful intervention and, 
sometimes, more subtle negotiation. The response of the Chinese government toward 
global basketball appears to oscillate between participative and conflictual (see Table 
7.20). 
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Table 7.20: Summary of China's response to Global Basketball 
Participative Contlictual 
Sufficient control over resources to provide lA set of values that 
Meaning ecipient cultures with leverage leads to attempted 
ejection of the global 
~ulture 
I. Serious attempts to obtain a leadership 1. Intervening in 
position in the ADC and desiring to basketball players' 
have more influence in FIBA transfer affairs 
~ctions of 2. Strengthening the athlete selection, 2. Preventing 7 major 
he Chinese training and competition system for the clubs from 
~overnment World Cup and Olympics organizing a new 
3. Transforming the administrative super league 
structure and generating multiple 3. Dismissing a 
incomes for the elite basketball system private 
4. Introducing a system of financial professional club 
rewards from the premier 
league 
4. Controlling CBA 
and manipulating 
the premier 
basketball league 
Indeed, China has significantly controlled resources in a number of ways. It has 
gradually become more serious about obtaining a leadership position in the Asian 
Basketball Confederation (ADC) and has desired more influence in FIBA (see, 1 h, 2h 
and 4s in Appendix 6). It has strengthened players' selection, training and competition 
systems for the Olympics and World Championship (see 4h, 5h, 6h, 7h, 8h and 4s in 
Appendix 6), transformed the administrative structure and generated multiple sources 
of income for the elite basketball system (see 4h, 4s and 5s in Appendix 6). In 
addition, it has introduced a system of financial rewards to motivate players and 
coaches to win domestic and international matches (see 3s and 5s in Appendix 6). All 
the resources mentioned above were for the purpose of breaking out of Asia and 
entering the World class level in order to increase national pride and cohesion, and to 
demonstrate the superiority of socialism. 
At the same time, however, the Chinese government has displayed an opposite 
response, again in the name of nationalism and patriotism (see 1 s, 2s and 5s in 
Appendix 6), in that it attempted to reject the global culture of commercialism (see, 35, 
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Ss and 9h in Appendix 6). By the use of forceful action towards players, clubs, CBAL 
and even the CBA, (such as interfering in basketball players' transfer affairs, 
preventing seven major clubs from organizing a new super league, controlling the 
CF A and manipulating the Chinese Basketball Association League (CBAL) and 
dismissing a private professional club from the CBAL), the Chinese government only 
allowed commercial basketball activities to be developed on its own terms. In other 
words, the government became the major agent of Chinese elite basketball 
commercial rights and interests, and also set its own agenda and values in an attempt 
to reject the global culture that might endanger the government's main goal -
"Olympic and World Championship success". In the words of the director of the 
CBMC, Li Yuanwei, in 2004 "We have made our mind up to raise the profile of the 
national teams and without hesitation to use whatever resources we can and to pay 
whatever is necessary, regardless of the cost" (Li, Y.W. 2004). 
Although the government has in the short term demonstrated its capacity to intervene 
in the issues listed in Table 7.19, a number of tensions still exist in China's elite 
basketball system: first, the tension between the priorities of commercial clubs and 
national team development; second, between the highly paid and internationally 
mobile sports 'stars' and the centrally controlled elite development system; third, 
between commercial sponsors and the government; and fourth, between GAOS and 
the Chinese Basketball Association (CBA). 
First, regarding the tension between the interests of the emerging commercial club 
sector and the national priority ofthe Olympics and World Championship, there are 
many cases in which the government not only took most of the commercial rights 
from the domestic leagues and clubs, but also drafted key players from the clubs to 
prepare for international games without any compensation. Moreover, due to refusing 
to release its star players to join the national team, one of a handful of commercial 
clubs with links to private rather than state enterprise was dismissed from the CBA 
League in 2004. According to a senior manager of one of the CBAL clubs (Interview, 
7th January 2006), although the plans for organizing a new independent league died 
due to Chinese government suppression, it could possibly come to the fore again after 
the 2008 Beijing Games if the CBMC does not keep the promise which was written in 
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the "Northern Star Project" to let the clubs be more involved in decision-making in 
the CBAL and allow them a greater share of the commercial income. 
Second, as for the tension between players and the Communist Government, there 
was an opinion within the government that the players were not fit enough. They were 
fit enough to play at Chinese inter-club professional level, but not fit enough to 
compete in international competition. Therefore, the CBMC introduced a fitness test 
for club players, with the rule that if players did not pass the fitness test, they could 
not play (CBA, 2006g: 26). This is a national strategy to raise the performance of the 
national team. Another example relates to individual Chinese players. A former 
Chinese NBA player, Wang Zhi-Zhi, challenged the authority of the Communist 
Government in 2002 by remaining in the United States to play for his NBA team 
rather than returning to China to play for the national team. There are three 
identifiable issues which have arisen as a result of rapid commercialisation in relation 
to highly mobile international players. These issues not only set the agenda for the 
Chinese government, but also forced the Chinese government to respond. The issues 
are: the emergence of stars in the transfer system; movement of players abroad, 
involving the import and export of players and coaches; and the priority of the 
national team. 
Third, with regard to the tension between multi-national companies and government, 
there are a number of examples where the commercial organisation (NB A) attempted 
to expand and maximize its global market by introducing NBA China Games to 
compete with the Chinese national team. Although the NBA has quite a good 
relationship with the Chinese government, in terms of helping China improve the 
quality of the national team, it seems not to be the case with the NBA China Games. 
This was because the Chinese government set two conditions, one being to play by 
FIBA rules rather than NBA rules, and the other being that two Chinese NBA stars, 
Yao Ming and Yi lianlian must return to China to play for the national side rather 
than remaining in America to play for their NBA teams (Liu, X., 2007). Although an 
agreement was made by both sides to play by FIBA rules, but with two foreign 
players to replace Yao Ming and Yi lianlian in the NBA China Games (Sun, 2oo7a), 
the tension between the commercial interests ofNBA and the national interest of the 
CBMC remains. 
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Another example of the tension between commercial interests and the government is 
that Infront Sports & Media, the exclusive global marketing partner for the country's 
national basketball teams, attempted to put commercial interest above national interest 
when arranging international friendly matches. The head coach of the Chinese Men's 
Basketball Team, Jonas Kazlauskas, stated during his interview with Sina Sports, that 
"Due to the huge pressure from Infront Sports & Media, the Chinese Men's 
Basketball Team has to adhere to the commercial arrangements of Infront Sports & 
Media to compete in friendly matches, but this has a negative impact on our 
systematic training" (Yuan, 1. 2007). After signing a three-year-contract for $ 15 
million with CBA (Yan, Z. 2006), Infront Sports & Media arranged 35 friendly 
international matches within 138 days for the Team China Men's Basketball but the 
commercial implications appeared to be of greater importance than the quality of 
Team China's rival teams. Finally, the director of the CBMC, Li Yuanwei noted that 
"there were only five good contests among these friendly matches" (Sun, 2007b) and 
the head coach of the Chinese Men's Basketball Team, 10nas Kazlauskas, appealed to 
Infront Sport & Media by arguing "Please don't kill Team China for money next 
year" (Sun, 2007b). Clearly, there is a tension between the commercial interests of 
"NBA" and "Infront Sports & Media", which aims to maximise income, and the 
national interest of the PRC, which felt that the friendly matches against the toughest 
teams with FIBA rules would enable them to improve the quality of the national side 
and so win glory in the 2008 Beijing Games. 
Finally, as for the tension between the GAGS and the CBA, officials in the CBA 
complained that the GAGS had control over basketball and its development, 
personnel and financing, and this demotivated CBA staff and also increased the 
tension, especially in communication, between the CBA and the GAGS (Interview, 5th 
January 2006). 
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Chapter Eight: Conclusion 
8.1 Introduction 
Using the evidence gathered in the empirical case studies, this Chapter provides an 
evaluation of the utility of the globalisation theories as identified in the key questions 
outlined in Chapter 1. To reiterate, the principal questions we are concerned with 
answering are: 
1. To what extent did/does the Chinese government have a choice in its 
relationship with sport globalisation? 
2. To what extent can the Chinese government manage its interaction with sport 
globalisation? 
3. In what ways does the Chinese government seek to manage its relationship with 
sport globalisation? 
4. Methodological reflection 
5. How useful are the globalisation theories for analysis of the development of 
sport policy in China? 
Regarding the first three questions, we use the patterns of globalisation (see Figure 
8.1) developed by Houlihan (1994, 2003) as an analytical framework (see more detail 
in Chapter 2). A critical evaluation of the utility of Houlihan's analytical framework is 
provided in section 8.6. However, at this stage it should be emphasised that the 
references to specific 'boxes' indicates the predominant character of the relationship 
and does not indicate that other dimensions are unimportant. As mentioned in Chapter 
4, there is a problem in that in a country like China, it is difficult to distinguish the 
cultural/ideological and economic from the political, because the political system is 
still so dominant. Although we attempted to assess the depth of penetration of global 
values by using Houlihan's three categories of reach, all the evidence in the economic, 
political and cultural/ideological fields appeared to suggest that these changes were 
led by the Chinese government and that these were political decisions (embracing 
capitalism and transforming administrative structure) but that they led to social 
transformation (emerging individualism and commercialism in star athletes) and 
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economic changes (emphasis on commercial rights and sponsorship). The trend 
towards sport globalisation in the Chinese context is so complicated that it is diflicult 
for us to locate the global reach and local response in each case of the Olympic 
Movement, elite football and elite basketball in just one category of reach or onc 
precise response. This limitation of Houlihan's framework is discussed in section 8.6. 
Figure 8.1: Patterns of Globalisation 
Economic A B C 
Reach Ipolitical D E F 
Cultural! G H I 
Ideological 
Passive Participative Conflictual 
I Response I 
Source: (adapted in Houlihan, 1994: 371; Houlihan, 2003: 360) 
Regarding the concept of "choice" or "making the choice" raised by the first key 
research question, it is often very difficult to be able to identify that an agent is 
completely unconstrained by ~he structures due to "free will" or "free choice" of agent. 
As discussion in section 4.3 (methodological considerations) in Chapter 4, the 
domestic and international structures constantly "limited" or "facilitated" the choice 
of Chinese state agency. We utilize the concept of choice to take account of these 
institutional and structural constraints or facilitations and explore the Chinese 
government's degree of latitude for manoeuvre. In respect of question four, we 
discuss the methodological issues in relation to the indicators and the analytical 
framework selected for this research. Finally, the suitability of globalisation theories 
for analysis of the development of sport policy in China is considered in question five. 
As for the 'problems' of the validity of evidence from indicators, we have already 
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discussed these in Chapter 4. We are cautious and aware of the limitation of the data. 
Therefore, all the indicators we generate are strongly linked to each other (see 
Appendixes 4, 5 and 6), which helped us to look for consistency and logic between 
the variables, such as commercialisation and globalisation. This means that we are not 
relying on one indicator alone, but on a cluster of indicators which are all moving in 
the same direction. The values of indicators help to identify tensions, particularly 
between clubs and country, and also to analyse the relationship of the PRC to 
globalisation. In addition, the preliminary findings from the case studies (empirical 
research) have been presented at five conferences I in Europe and also in China, 
where our initial findings were generally endorsed and where we received some 
useful feedback. Although we have made every effort to maintain high levels of 
validity for this study, Maxwell still reminds us that 'validity is a goal rather than a 
product; it is never something that can be proven or taken for granted' (1996: 86). 
8.2 To what extent did/does the Chinese government have a choice in 
its relationship with sport globalisation? 
Here, we are interested in assessing the extent to which the Chinese government 
retains the capacity to have a choice in its relationship with sport globalisation. By 
carrying out the historical literature reviews in relation to the PRC's sport 
development in Chapter 3 and completing three empirical case studies in Chapters 5, 
6 and 7, three phases have been identified - withdrawal/isolation, manipulative 
I (1) Tan, T.C. (2006) Chinese Sports Policy and Globalisation: The Methodological Consideration for 
the Cases of Football, Basketball and the Olympic Movement, Conference of China Sport 
Management, Beijing Sport University, 6111 _9111 January 2006, pp.25; (2) Tan, T. C. (2006). The 
Methodological Consideration for the Cases of Football, Basketball and the Olympic Movement, The 
3th International Sport Sociology Summer School, 7 -15 August, 2006, Copenhagen, Demark. 
(Granted by ISSA); (3) Tan, T. C. & Houlihan, B. (2006). Globalisation and Chinese Sport Policy: The 
Case of the Olympic Movement, The 14th European Sport Management Congress, 6-11 Sep, 
2006, Nicosia, Cyprus; (4) Tan, T. C. & Houlihan, B. (2007). Globalisation and Chinese Sport Policy: 
lhe case of Elite Football. The International Sport Sociology Congress, 30 June-5 July, 2007, 
Copenhagen, Demark; (5) Tan, T. C., Houlihan, B. & Green, M. (2007). Globalisation and Chinese 
Sport Policy: The case of Elite Basketball, The 15th European Sport Management Congress, 
12-16 Sep, 2007, Turin, Italy. 
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engagement and, most recently, enthusiastic engagement. All these have been shaped 
to a significant extent by internal ideological shifts, for example the shift from 
international socialism to cultural isolation, and also by external diplomatic concerns, 
such as the dispute with Taiwan. In order to gain a deeper insight into the capacity of 
the Chinese government to make choices in its relationship with sport globalisation, 
three case studies were conducted and will be examined here under two sub-headings 
(Olympic Movement and Elite Football and Basketball) due to the remarkable 
similarities between the football and basketball case studies. 
8.2.1 Olympic Movement 
During the first phase China rejected the Olympic Movement and sought to 
participate in the GANEFO games after it failed to resolve the "two Chinas issue" 
with the IOC. During the second phase the Chinese government re-engaged with the 
Olympic Movement but appeared to be less interested in sport and more interested in 
the leverage that the Olympic Movement could provide in relation to its dispute with 
Taiwan. In the final phase, China participated in the Olympic Movement and focused 
on winning medals in the Olympic Games; it was chosen to host the 2008 Olympic 
Games in Beijing, it became a "good" Olympic member and it adopted an IOC 
market-approach (sport sponsorship) to run its National Games and to generate 
commercial income to support its elite sport system. As indicated by the hard and soft 
indicators outlined in Chapter 4 and Appendix 4 (such as Ih, 2h, 4h, 4s, 6h and 5s),2 
we have generated useful and valid evidence to enable us to evaluate the Chinese 
government's capacity to have a choice in its relationship with the Olympic 
Movement. According to this case study, China has demonstrated the capacity to 
exercise choice in its relationship with the Olympic Movement, as illustrated most 
clearly by its withdrawal from the IOC and most international sporting contacts 
during the 'Cultural Revolution'. However, the enthusiastic embrace of capitalism 
following the 'open door' policy introduced by Deng Xiaoping in 1978 illustrated by 
adopting a market-approach to manage its elite sport system and hosting the 2008 
1 These six indicators are as follows: 1 h. Formal engagement with international sport as a participant 
country (including membership, joining competitions, ranking, biding for or hosting global sport 
events); 2h.The number and position of Chinese sports representatives in the world sports governing 
bodies; 4h.The distribution of national sports budget in elite sport; 4s.The structure of sport governing 
bodies in PRC; 6h.The resource of coach development programmes for elite sport; 5s.The values and 
attitudes ofthe government towards commercial sport sponsorship 
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Olympic Games, has not only made a return to sporting (cultural) isolation less likely, 
but also much more difficult. From the perspective of Houlihan's framework (1994, 
2003), we find that China's position was moving from box E to somewhere between 
box E and box F. 
In the late 19505 and mid-1960s, the Chinese government established a set of values, 
namely anti-capitalism and anti-imperialism, that led to an attempt to reject the 
Olympic Movement by withdrawing from it and fully supporting GANEFO (Games 
of the New Emerging Forces) in order to challenge the authority of the IOC. 
After the late 1970s, the Chinese government was less reluctant to 'open its doors' 
and it appears that it was a case of China making up its own mind to reach out and 
bring in global influences, rather than global influences forcing their way in. This is 
seen especially in the slogan - "Sending human capital out and bringing foreign 
resources in" - by which athletes, coaches, managers and scientists were dispatched to 
gain new knowledge and skills from the outside world, and foreign experts, sponsors 
and companies were welcomed into China, to bring in new resources to promote the 
Chinese elite system. Although it was being enthusiastic about embracing capitalism, 
the Chinese government did not passively accept capitalist values. The PRC chose to 
allow Chinese athletes to be involved in commercial activities, but on the 
government's own terms. Not only did the government became the main agent of 
Chinese athletes' commercial rights and interests, but it also set its own agenda and 
values in an attempt to reject those aspects of the global culture that might endanger 
the government's main goal- "Olympic success". Indeed, from the perspective of the 
three main schools of globalisation theories, the argument of the hyperglobalists, such 
as Ohrnae, that contemporary globalisation defines a new era in which people 
everywhere are increasingly subject to the discipline of the global market (Ohmae, 
1990; 1995), appears not to hold true in the case of the Chinese government's capacity 
to make choices over its relationship with Olympic Movement. 
8.2.2 Elite Football and Basketball 
The trajectory of the PRC's involvement in global football and basketball is very 
similar to the case of the Olympic Movement, insofar as most critical decisions were 
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made by the GADS (the NSC before 1998). From Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2 in 
Chapter 6 and Figure 7.1 and Figure 7.2 in Chapter 7, it can be seen that the 
decision-making centre is located in the GAOS (NSC). Furthermore, Party members 
(dangzu) comprised the high ranking sport officials in the GAOS (NSC). 
Due to the dominant role of the GAOS, the process of PRC involvement in global 
football and basketball is very similar to the case of the Olympic Movement. During 
the first and second phase, for the same reasons, the PRC rejected FIFA and FIBA and 
sought to participate in the GANEFO Games at first, and then became more interested 
in the leverage that FIFA, FIBA, Asia Football Confederation (AFC) and the Asia 
Basketball Confederation (ABC) could provide to prevent the Taiwanese government 
gaining some advantage regarding its political agenda in terms of the "Two Chinas" 
issue. In the final phase, China participated in FIFA and FIB A, and focused on: i) 
winning medals in the Olympic Games, FIFA World Cup and FIBA World 
Championship; ii) hosting the Women's World Cup twice (1991, 2007), FIBA 
Women's World Championship in 2002 and the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing; iii) 
being a "good" FIFA and FIBA member; iv) adopting the European club system and 
NBA marketing approaches; v) introducing a system of financial rewards; an? vi) 
generating most of its income from the market by means of football and basketball 
sponsorship in order to support its elite football and basketball system. 
Indeed, all three case studies indicated four main similarities. Firstly, the Chinese 
government "chose" to have more influence in the IOC, FIFA and FIBA by 
centralizing China's diplomatic power within these three global organisations in its 
sport leaders, such as the Vice Sport Minister, Yu Zaiqing, who became an IOC 
executive member in 2004 and FIBA Executive member in 2006 and Zhang lilong, a 
CFA Vice President, was selected as one of the members of the Organising Committee 
for the 2006 and 2010 World Cups and for the 2008 Olympic Football Tournaments. 
Secondly, in these three case studies, the Chinese government "chose" Western 
market-oriented approaches to vitalize its out-of-date Soviet models. Thirdly, the 
government "chose" to take a short cut by carrying on the policy of "sending human 
capital out and bringing foreign resources in" in an attempt to raise the profile of all 
its national teams in the ranking for the Olympic Games, FIFA World Cup and FIB A 
World Championship (as shown in each section on the "Training System" in Chapter 
5.3.1; Chapter 6.3.1; and Chapter 7.3.1). Fourthly, the government often "chose" to 
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exercise its administrative authority to respond to the problems raised by globalisation 
and commercialisation. The main difference between the cases of football and 
basketball is that at one time both football and basketball "chose" to learn the 
European Model, but recently there has been a "decision" within basketball to refocus 
on the NBA model, which has a dominant global position. 
As with the first case study, the hard and soft indicators (such as, I h, 2h, 4h, 4s, 6h 
and 5s in Appendix 53 and Appendix 64) also helped to generate useful evidence 
which partly provides an answer to the first research question. Take indicators 4s and 
5s in Appendix 5 and Appendix 6 for example. By examining the structure of the 
CFA and tbe CBA (4s) and, tbe values and attitudes of the government towards 
commercial football and basketball (5s), we found that the Chinese government had 
made its own choice to transform its football and basketball administrative structure 
(based on that of the former Soviet Union) and move towards imitating the model of 
its Western counterparts. It introduced the Western club system and, to some extent. 
accepted the values of commercial football and basketball. Indeed, when high ranking 
leaders, such as Li Tieying, a member of the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC). 
and a State Councillor (1988-1998), insisted that the capitalist experiment be given 
the green light in the Chinese football and basketball system, the government 
appeared to be very confident of being able to manage the consequences of 
globalisation and commercialisation. This confidence led the Chinese government to 
"choose" to introduce multi-national sport management companies (such as IMG 
Sports & Entertainment and Media Company in the mid-1990s and Infront Sports & 
Media in the mid-2000s) and to send its high ranking sport officials (the director of 
the CBMC, Li Yuanwei, and the first vice Director of Competition Department in 
GAOS, Guo Jianjun) to learn from the NBA how to run a successful commercial 
J These six indicators are as follows: lh.Formal engagement with FIFA as a participant country 
(including becoming membership, joining competitions, ranking, biding or hosting for FIFA World 
Cup); 2h.The number and position of Chinese sports representatives in FIFA; 4h.The distribution of 
national sports budget in elite football; 4s.The structure of Chinese Football Association; 6h.The 
resource of coach development programmes for elite football; 5s.The values and attitudes of the 
fovemment towards commercial football 
These six indicators are as follows: th.Formal engagement with flBA as a participant country 
(including becoming membership, joining competitions, ranking, biding for or hosting FlBA World 
Championship); 2h.The number and position of Chinese sports representatives in FIBA; 4h.The 
distribution of national sports budget in elite basketball; 4s.The structure of Chinese Basketball 
Association; 6h.The resource of coach development programmes for elite basketball; 5s.The values and 
attitudes ofthe government towards commercial basketball 
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basketball league in the mid-2000s. 
Indeed, as in the case of the Olympic Movement, the Chinese government 
demonstrated its capacity to exercise choice in its relationship with sport globalisation, 
as illustrated most clearly by its withdrawal from FIFA and FIBA and most 
international sporting contact during the 'Cultural Revolution'. However, the 
enthusiastic embrace of capitalism (following the directions of the powerful State 
Councillor and Sport Minister, Wu Shaozu, in 1992), as seen in the fact that more than 
95 percent of the annual income of Chinese elite football and basketball relies on 
commercial football and basketball and that the door was opened more widely by 
"sending human capital out and bringing foreign resources in", has meant that a return 
to sporting (cultural) isolation is less likely and much more difficult. In the words of 
the director of CBMC, Li Yuanwei, at the 'Summit of Chinese Basketball 
Development' in 2007, "Although lots of new problems in Chinese basketball were 
raised by globalisation, the only way to tackle these problems is to insist that we 
'reform deeply' and 'open widely'" (Li, Y. W. 2007). 
According to Houlihan's framework, Figure 8.1., (1994, 2003), China's position in the 
cases of elite football and basketball was moving from being substantially/primarily 
in box E to somewhere between box E and box F. As with the case of the Olympic 
Movement, the PRC adhered to its "pure" communist values and attempted to reject 
global football and basketball by withdrawing from FIFA and FlBA and then fully 
supporting GANEFO in the late 1950s and mid-1960s, to challenge global football 
and basketball dominated by Western capitalist values. During the 1990s, when the 
Chinese government took certain decisions over global football and basketball, such 
as transforming the administrative structure of football and basketball to resemble 
Western models, introducing the Western club system, hosting the Women's World 
Cup twice (1991,2007) and the FIBA Women's World Championship in 2002 and the 
2008 Olympic Games in Beijing, and possibly bidding to host the 2018 Men's World 
Cup, we could possibly locate the government's position in box E. But when taking 
into account the anti-free market choices the Chinese government made, such as 
interfering in footballers' transfer affairs and preventing the seven major clubs from 
organizing a new super league,.it appears that they should be located box F. Using 
Houlihan's framework, we were able to summarize China's "choices" in relation to 
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the Olympic Movement, global football and global basketball in Table 8.1. 
Indeed, from the view point of the transformationalists, such as Rosenau (1997), 
globalisation pulls and pushes societies in opposing directions; it fragments as it 
integrates, engenders cooperation as well as conflict, and universalises while it 
particularizes. Just like the choices of the Chinese government in response to 
commercial football and basketball, cooperation (box E) and conflict (box F) can 
coexist. This phenomenon can therefore be described in relation to the process of 
globalisation as both contingent and contradictory. In addition, from the perspective 
of the sceptics, such as Gilpin (200 I: 21), "States continue to use their power to 
implement policies to channel economic forces in ways favourable to their own 
national interests and to secure ... a favourable share of the gains from international 
economic activities". In all three case studies, the evidence suggests that the Chinese 
government was able to exercise a considerable degree of choice to deal with the 
problems of commercialisation (organizing a new super league) and globalisation 
(player transfer) when these issues could possibly endanger the national interest. 
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Table 8.1: Summary of China's "choices" in relation to the Olympic Movement, global football and global basketball 
Patterns of Theoretical Implication 
Key Indicators Key Responses Reach and 
Response 
1. (lh). Fonnal engagement with international sport l.Withdrew from the IOC and most international sporting 1. Moving 1. Hyperglobalists' viewpoint 
!as a participant country (including membership, Fontact during the "Cultural Revolution"; from box E to not supported. More evidence 
. oining competitions, ranking, biding for or hosting somewhere in support of sceptics' 
Olympic Games); ~. Enthusiastically embraced capitalism (adopting a between box E argument. 
and box F 
Olympic 2. (Ss). The values and attitudes of the government ~arket-approach to manage its elite sport system and 
owards commercial sport sponsorship Ihosting the 2008 Olympic Games); 
Movement I 
~. Exercised arbitrary administrative authority to suppress 
he problems raised by globalisation and commercialisation 
1. (lh). Fonnal engagement with FIFA as a I. Rejected global football by withdrawing from FIFA and 1. Moving I. Part of transfonnationalists' 
participant country (including membership, joining hen fully supporting the organizing of GANEFO;· from box E to perspective can be found. 
~ompetitions, ranking, biding for or hosting FIFA somewhere 
~Iobal iWorld Cup); ~. Transfonned its old football administrative structure, 
[between box E 
~nd box F 
football ~. (4s). The structure of the CFA; Iwhich was learned from fonner Soviet Union, and started 
imitating the new model from its Western counterparts; 
3. Introduced European club system and, to some extent, 
3. (Ss). The values and attitudes of the government accepted the values of commercial football; 
owards commercial football; 
4. Exercised arbitrary administrative authority to suppress 
4. (9h). The tension between the Chinese he problems raised by globalisation and commercialisation 
professional football clubs and the government. 
- -- ----
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1. (1 h). Fonnal engagement with FIBA as a 1. Rejected global basketball by withdrawing from FIBA 1. Moving 1. More evidence to support 
panicipant country (including membership, joining and then fully supporting the organizing ofGANEFO from box E to he argument of the sceptics. 
competitions, ranking, biding for or hosting FlBA somewhere 
World Championship); ~etween box E 
12. Transfonned its old basketball administrative structure, and box F 
~Iobal 2. (4s). The structure of the CBA; ~hich was learned the from fanner Soviet Union and began 
basketball imitating the new model from its Western counterparts; 
~. Attempted to adopt the European Model at first, but 
p. (Ss). The values and attitudes of the government recently there has been a "decision" to refocus on the model 
owards commercial basketball; bfthe NBA and, to some extent, accept the values of 
ommercial football. 
14. Exercised arbitrary administrative authority to suppress 
14. (9h). The tension between the Chinese he problems raised by globalisation and commercialisation 
professional basketball clubs and the government. 
------- --- ------.~-
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8.3 To what extent can the Chinese government manage its 
interaction with sport globalisation? 
From the previous section, we know that the PRC demonstrated the capacity to 
exercise choice in its relationship with sport globalisation, but due to its enthusiastic 
embrace of capitalism, tensions emerged from this ideological shift which were 
highlighted in the three empirical case studies in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. The tensions are: 
i) athletes versus the Communist Government; ii) the GAOS versus the National Sport 
Associations (the Sport Management Centres); iii) clubs versus country (national 
teams); and iv) commercial sponsors versus the Communist Government. The 
tensions raised by an increase in the commercialisation of sport demonstrate the depth 
of the struggle over priorities between emergent commercial clubs and national team 
development, and also between highly paid and internationally mobile sports 'stars' 
and the state controlled elite (Olympic) development system. By examining these four 
main tensions, we aim to provide a much clearer picture which will enable us to 
evaluate the extent to which the Chinese government sustains the capacity to manage 
its interaction with sport globalisation. 
8.3.1 Olympic Movement 
Using the hard and soft indicators (such as, 3s, 4h, 4s, 6h and 5s in Appendix 4),5 we 
are able to identify two main tensions and find a possible answer to the question, "To 
what extent can the Chinese government manage its interaction with the Olympic 
Movement?" Take indicators 3s, 4h and 5s in Appendix 4 for example. By examining 
the attitudes and values of athletes towards material awards (3s), the distribution 
of the national sports budget in elite sport (4h) and the values and attitudes of the 
government towards sport commercial sponsorship (5s), we found that the two 
most obvious tensions are first between athletes and the Communist Government and 
second between the GAOS and the National Sport Associations (the Sport 
Management Centres). The first tension concerns the roles, rights and responsibilities 
S These five indicators are as follows: 3s.The attitudes and values of athletes towards material awards; 
4h.The distribution of national sports budget in elite sport; 4s.The structure of sport governing bodies 
in PRC; 6h.The resource of coach development programmes for elite sport; 5s.The values and attitudes 
of the government towards commercial sport sponsorship 
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of the athletes and the collective (national) interest as defined by the Communist 
Government. For example, Tiang Liang and Guo Jingjing, both Olympic gold 
medallists in diving, and Peng Shuai, a world-class female tennis player, all 
challenged the authority of the Chinese government. However, in the cases ofTiang 
Liang, Guo Jingjing and Peng Shuai, the government was so concerned that their 
individual commercial interests were impinging on their availability for national 
events that they were summarily 'removed' from the team. After acknowledging their 
"mistakes" in public, Guo Jingjing and Peng Shuai were permitted by the GAOS to 
return to the national teams in 2005 - 2006 (Liang, 2006). But Tiang Liang was not 
allowed to return to the national team partly because he refused to acknowledge his 
"mistake" in taking part in commercial activities and partly because his diving skill 
had been overtaken by other young national divers. 
Regarding the tension between the GAOS and the National Sport Associations (Sport 
Management Centres), such as the Chinese Athletics Association, Chinese Swimming 
Association and Chinese Badminton Association, officials in all three Associations 
complained that the GAOS controlled their sports in respect of development, 
personnel and financing. This not only resulted in staff in the Associations becoming 
less active but also increased the tension, especially in communications within 
different departments and between the Associations and the GAOS. Although officials 
in these Associations were reluctant to let the GAOS control their affairs, they all 
realised that they were under enormous pressure to win Olympic medals on their own 
soil in 2008. As voiced by one senior official in the Chinese Athletics Association, 
"The GAOS would guarantee the budget for training and competitions for the national 
squad and what is most important for their jobs is the athletes' perfonnance in the 
Olympic Games" (Interview, 10th January 2006). 
Indeed, these two main tensions in the case of the Olympic Movement are strongly 
linked to the commercialisation of sport. The Chinese government attempted to 
"discipline" its individual Olympic "star athletes" who were involved in too many 
commercial activities and to "command" its National Sport Associations to 
concentrate their minds on winning more Olympic medals in the 2008 Beijing Games. 
Therefore, the capacity of the PRC to manage its engagement with the Olympic 
Movement should not be underestimated. Political control remains strongly focused 
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on the GAOS reinforced by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, 
while administrative control, particularly over individual athletes, is exercised by the 
GAOS through its domination of the COC and the domestic Olympic federations. 
From the perspective of Houlihan's framework (1994,2003), we find that China's 
position should be located somewhere between participative and conflictual. The 
Chinese government attempted to reject sport commercialism (following the Olympic 
Movement) by "disciplining" its star athletes and "commanding" its National Sport 
Associations to refrain from being involved in too many commercial activities. More 
importantly, there is little evidence that the government's actions were the result of 
global forces. Indeed, viewed from the perspective of the hyperglobalists such as 
Strange (1996: 4), evidence that "the power of the world market is considered to be 
much more influential than nation-state" could not be found in the case of the 
Olympic Movement. Instead, the position appears to be closer to the arguments of the 
sceptics, such as Hirst and Thompson (1998: 17) who stress that, far from the nation 
state being undermined by the processes of internationalisation, these processes 
strengthen the importance of the nation state in many ways. 
8.3.2 Elite Football and Basketball 
As with the case of the Olympic Movement, the hard and soft indicators (such as, 2s, 
4h, 4s, 6h, 5s and 9h in Appendix 56 and Appendix 67) help us identify four main 
tensions from which we are able to answer the question "To what extent can the 
Chinese government manage its interaction with global football and basketball?" By 
examining indicator 2s.The attitudes and values of the Chinese government 
towards the human rights of elite athletes (for example, the transfer of players); 
6 These six indicators are as follows: 2s.The attitudes and values of the Chinese government and 
Chinese professional football clubs towards human rights of elite athletes (for example, the transfer & 
players); 4h.The distribution of national sports budget in elite football; 4s.The structure of Chinese 
Football Association; 6h.The resource of coach development programmes for elite football; 5s.The 
values and attitudes of the government towards commercial football; 9h.The tension between the 
Chinese professional football clubs and government 
7 These six indicators are as follows: 2s.The attitudes and values of the Chinese government and 
Chinese professional basketball clubs towards human rights of elite athletes (for example, the transfer 
& players); 4h.The distribution of national sports budget in elite basketball; 4s.The structure of Chinese 
Basketball Association; 6h.The resource of coach development programmes for elite basketball; 5s.The 
values and attitudes of the government towards commercial basketball; 9h.The tension between the 
Chinese professional basketball clubs and government 
339 
Chapter 8 - Conclusion 
and indicator 4s.The structure of the CFA and the CB A, the first two tensions 
identified are: i) footballers and basketball players versus the Communist Government; 
and ii) the GAOS versus the CFA (CFMC) and the CBA (CBMC). In the same way, 
by considering the indicators 9h.The tension between the Chinese professional 
clubs (football and basketball) and government and 5s.The values and attitudes 
of the government towards commercial football and basketball, the last two 
tensions identified are iii) clubs versus country (national teams); and iv) 
multi-national companies versus the Communist Government. 
As for the tension between players and the Communist Government, only players who 
passed a fitness test set by the CFA (the Coopers 12-min Run Test before 2003, and 
Yo-Yo Intennittent Recovery Test after 2003) could take part in the Super League and 
Division 1 championships. Although several national footballers such as Gao Feng, 
withdrew from national squads after failing the fitness test and challenged the 
authority of the Communist Government, despite having had a second chance to pass 
the test in 2003, the Chinese government did not change its mind. Rather, the Director 
of the CFA Competition Department, Ma ChengQuan, who was in charge of the 
fitness test for professional players in 2007, proclaimed that the CFA would carry on 
the policy of the "Yo-Yo Test" with a sanction, because it would push Chinese players 
to train harder and get them fit enough not only for domestic club matches but also for 
international competition (Ma, 2007). Following CFMC's step, the CBMC introduced 
a similar fitness test for club players, with the rule that if players did not pass, they 
could not play (CBA, 2006g: 26). This was a national strategy to raise the 
perfonnance of the national team. Another example relates to individual Chinese 
basketball players. When Wang Zhi-Zhi, one of the former Chinese NBA players, 
challenged the authority of the Communist Government in 2002 by remaining in the 
United States to play for his NBA team rather than returning to China to play for his 
own national team, he was not allowed to return to Team China until he 
acknowledged his "mistakes" in public in 2006 (Yang, 2006). Indeed, all three case 
studies show that it is a national policy to raise the performance of the national team 
by using state power to "force" players to achieve national goals. 
The second tension is between GAOS and the CFA and CBA. As with the case of the 
Olympic Movement, officials in the CF A and the CBA complained that GAOS had 
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control over football and basketball and their development, personnel and financing, 
which not only demotivated staff members in the two associations but also increased 
the tension, especially in communication between different departments of the two 
associations and the GAOS. But due to the subordinate status of the two associations 
and in the reformed administrative structure of GAOS (NSC) after the mid-1990s, 
officials in the CFA and CBA had no choice but to follow the "command" of the 
GAOS, which has the legal power to "discipline" sport associations (see more detail 
in the discussion in relation to the third question). 
The third tension is between clubs' commercial interests and the country's priority of 
the Olympics, World Cup and World Championships. There are many cases in which 
the government not only took most of the commercial rights from the domestic 
leagues and clubs, but also drafted key players from the clubs to prepare for 
international games without compensation. The tension reached its peak when the 
seven major basketball and football clubs attempted to organize a new super league in 
the late 1990s and in 2004 respectively and were promptly suppressed by the Chinese 
government and heavily criticised by senior officials in the GAOS and the CFA, such 
as Cui Dalin, the Vice Sport Minister, and Ma Chengquan, the director of the CFA 
Competition Department. These officials claimed that "the premier mission of the 
2007 CSL season is to fully support the 2008 Beijing Games and that stabilising the 
development of the CSL is secondary" (Wang, L. 2007). Moreover, due to its refusal 
to release its star players to join the national team, Beijing Aoshen, one of a handful of 
commercial clubs with links to private rather than state enterprise, was dismissed from 
the CBA League in 2004. Although Aoshen was eager to rejoin the CBAL in 2007, its 
application was dismissed again by the CBA, insisting that the home stadium of 
Aoshen must be relocated to mainland China from Macao (CBA, 2007). 
The fourth tension is between commercial sponsors and the government. One of the 
major commercial sponsors, Infront Sports & Media, attempted to become more 
involved in the decision-making process concerning the selection of the football head 
coach for the 2008 Olympic squad (Ma, D., 2006), and to put commercial interest 
above national interest when arranging internatio~al friendly matches (Xu and Zhang, 
2006). Although Infront Sports & Media was favoured by the German football 
coaches and its own representative, Liu Hao was involved in the decision-making to 
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select a football head coach for the Olympic Team, all three German candidates 
recommended by Infront Sports & Media were rejected by the other five key actors 
from the CFA (Ma, D., 2006). Indeed, the final decision to ratify an agreement to hire 
Serbian Ratomir Dujkovic as head coach for China's Olympic football team was made 
by the GAOS (Xu, l. 2006). As for arranging international friendly matches, Infront 
Sports & Media agreed to "do their best" to arrange international friendly matches to 
satisfy the requirements set by the CFA after the Director of the CFMC, Xie Yalong, 
officially criticised Infront Sports & Media, whose match arrangements in 2006 were 
unacceptable to the CFA because they were considered to be more concerned with 
playing against teams that would generate income rather than improve the national 
team (Zhu, 2006). 
As in the football case study, there was a very similar tension between Infront Sports 
& Media and the CBA. Infront Sports & Media, the exclusive global marketing 
partner for the country's national basketball teams, attempted to put commercial 
interest above national interest when arranging international friendly matches. The 
head coach of the Chinese Men's Basketball Team, Jonas Kazlauskas, stated during 
his interview with Sina Sports, that "Due to the huge pressure from Infront Sports & 
Media, the Chinese Men's Basketball Team has to adhere to the commercial 
arrangements of Infront Sports & Media and compete in friendly matches, but this has 
a negative impact on our systematic training" (Yuan, l., 2007). After signing a 
three-year-contract for $ 15 million with CBA (Yan, 2006), Infront Sports & Media 
arranged 35 friendly international matches in 138 days for the Team China Men's 
Basketball, but the commercial implications appeared to be more important than the 
quality of Team China's rival teams. Finally, the Chinese NBA superstar, Yao Ming, 
complained that there were too many commercial arrangements in these friendly 
matches (Zhu, 1., 2007) and the head coach of the Chinese Men's Basketball Team 
appealed to Infront Sport & Media by saying, "Please don't kill Team China for 
money next year" (Sun, B., 2007b). 
Although both Yao Ming and Jonas Kazlauskas criticized the commercial 
arrangements of Infront Sports & Media, surprisingly, the director of the CBMC, Li 
Yuanwei, (Sport.Sohu.Com, 2007) and the deputy director of the CBMC, Hu Jiashi, 
both defended Infront Sports & Media by arguing that "all the 35 friendly 
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international matches were requested by the coaches of Team China, ratified by the 
CBMC and arranged by Infront Sports & Media. Alllnfront Sports & Media did was 
just to fulfil the request of the CBMC" (Lan, Y., 2007b). Judging by the case of 
Infront Sports & Media, it appears that there was a certain compromise to enable the 
CBMC to balance commercial interests and national interests, because the CBMC 
needed the resources from the commercial profits of Infront Sports & Media to enable 
them to improve the quality of the national side in advance of the 2008 Bcijing Games. 
One thing is certain, that the CBMC was not passive in following the commercial 
rules of these multinational companies (MNCs) (such as In front Sports & Media). 
This is made clear in the words of the director of the CBMC, Li Yuanwei, who argued 
in 2004 that, "We have made our mind up to raise the profile of the national teams and 
without hesitation to use whatever resources we can and to pay whatever is necessary, 
regardless of the cost to achieve this" (Li, Y.W. 2004). 
Unlike elite football, there is a tension between the NBA and the government in the 
case of elite basketball. There are a number of examples where the commercial 
organisation (NBA) attempted to expand and maximize its global market by 
introducing NBA China Games to compete with the Chinese national team. Although 
. the NBA had a reasonable relationship with the Chinese government, in terms of 
helping China improve the quality of the national team, it appeared not to have been 
the case with the NBA China Games. This was because the Chinese government set 
two conditions, one being to play by FIBA rules rather than NBA rules, and the other 
that two Chinese NBA stars, Yao Ming and Yi Jianlian must return to China to play 
for the national side rather than staying in America to play for their NBA teams (Liu, 
X., 2007). Under pressure from the CBMC, the NBA agreed to play by FlBA rules, 
but with two foreign players to replace Yao Ming and Yi lianlian in the NBA China 
Games (Sun, 2007a). This appears to indicate that the CBMC was quite active in 
negotiations with the NBA rather than passively following NB A's commercial rules. A 
similar ongoing issue is that NBA Commissioner David Stem proclaimed in late 2007 
that "the NBA is going to cooperate with the CBA and GAOS to organize a 
China-NB A League" (Li, R., 2007). The director of the CBMC, Li Yuanwei, was 
cautious about the NBA's proposal, maintains that "the ranking of Team China 
Basketball in the 2008 Beijing Games will play a key role in deciding whether the 
NBA can establish a league in China or not" (Lan, 2007a), but he was also definite 
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about the fact that "If the NBA wants to organize a China-NBA League, they must 
cooperate with the CBA" (Lan, 2007a). 
When considering these four tensions, we found that the most obvious tensions in the 
case of elite football and basketball are strongly linked to commercial aspects. The 
Chinese government attempted not only to "force" its professional players to do 
certain things and to "command" its subordinate organizations (the CFMCICFA and 
the CBMC/CBA) in order to raise the profile of the national teams, but also to 
"suppress" the seven major clubs, to "dismiss" the defiant commercial club and to 
"curb" commercial sponsors, [nfront Sports & Media and NBA in order to prevent 
them jeopardizing its primary political mission (the glory of the 2008 Olympic Games, 
the FIFA World Cup and the FIBA World Championship). Based on these findings it 
would appear that the Chinese government has attempted, with reasonable success so 
far, to manage the impact of commercial interests on Chinese domestic 
footballlbasketball practices, elite footballerslbasketball players and professional 
footballlbasketball clubs. 
From the viewpoint of Houlihan's framework (1994, 2003), we find that China's 
position in elite football and basketball, similar to the case of the Olympic Movement, 
should be located somewhere between box E and box F. Although the Chinese 
government attempted to reject the key values of commercial football and basketball 
(i.e. the trend towards global football and basketball professionalism) by 
"suppressing" commercial clubs and by "curbing" commercial sponsors, [nfront 
Sports & Media and the NBA, the PRC still sought to achieve its political agenda by 
"forcing" its club footballers and "commanding" its dependent organisations (the 
CFMC/CFA and CBMC/CBA) to become involved in global football and basketball 
(specifically the 2008 Beijing Games, the FIFA World Cup and the FIBA World 
Championship). As a result there were problems, as with the Olympic Movement case, 
in locating the response of the Chinese government clearly in box E and box F. Using 
Houlihan's framework, we were able to summarize China's capability to manage its 
interaction with the Olympic Movement, global football and global basketball in 
Table 8.2. 
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Table 8.2: Summary or China's capability to manage its interaction with the Olympic Movement, global football and global basketball 
Capabilities demonstrated in managing tensions Patterns of Theoretical Implication 
Key Indicators arising from Globalisation & Commercialisation Reach and 
Response 
1. (3s). The attitudes and values of athletes I. "Disciplined" its individual Olympic "star 1. Located 1. Support for the hyperglobalists' argument 
owards material awards; ~thletes" who were involved in too many commercial ~omewhere !could not be found and more evidence 
~. (Ss). The values and attitudes of the activities (such as Tiang Liang and Peng ShuQt). Ibetween box IUnderpinned the position of the sceptics. 
~overnment towards cornmercial sport lE and box F 
~ponsorship; 
Olympic 2. "Commanded" its National Sport Associations to 
Movement 
~. (4s). The structure of sport governing bodies in oncentrate their minds on winning more Olympic 
PRC· pledals in the 2008 Beijing Games. 
1. (2s).The attitudes and values of the Chinese I. "Forced" its club footballers and "commanded" its I. Located I. Part of the transformationalists' argument 
government towards human rights of elite dependent organization, (the CFMC or CFA) to be somewhere ,-,an be supported. 
athletes (for example, the transfer of players); involved in global football (especially in 2008 between box 
Global 2. (4s). The structure of the CFA; lBeijing Games and the FIFA World Cup) to achieve E and box F its political agenda; 
football 
3. (Ss). The values and attitudes of the ~. "Suppressed" domestic commercial clubs and 
~overnment towards commercial football; 'curbed" commercial sponsors, Infront Sports & 
!Media in an attempt to reject the key values of 
~. (9h). The tension between the Chinese !commercial football so as to avoid endangering the 
IProfessional football clubs and government. performance of national teams (national interest). 
~---~.- --------
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l. (2s).The attitudes and values of the Chinese 1. "Forced" its professional players and 1. Located I. The hyperglobalists' argument can not be 
~overnrnent towards human rights of elite 'commanded" its subordinate governing body (the somewhere supported. Instead, the arguments of 
~thletes (for example, the transfer of players); ~BMC or CBA) to raise the profile of the national Ibetween box sceptics are mainly supported. 
~. (4s). The structure of the CBA; earns lE and box F 
IGlobal 
~. (9h). The tension between the Chinese 12. "Dismissed" the defiant commercial club and basketball professional basketball clubs and the 'negotiated" with MNCs, such as NBA and Infront 
~overnment; Sports & Media, to avoid them jeopardizing its 
political mission of glory in the 2008 Olympic 
~. (Ss). The values and attitudes of the pames and the FIBA World Championship. 
Igovernment towards commercial basketball. 
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Certainly, from the perspective of the transformationalists like Held et al (1999: 9), 
the power of national governments is not necessarily diminished by globalisation but, 
on the contrary, is being reconstituted and restructured (such as by creating the 
CFMC/CBMC and by introducing professional football and basketball clubs) in 
response to the growing complexity of the process of governance in a more 
interconnected world. In addition, to answer whether the Chinese government can 
manage its interaction with global football and basketball, such as with the NBA and 
Infront Sports & Media, the argument of the hyperglobalists, such as Ohmae (1990), 
which contends that two forces matter in the world economy, global market forces and 
transnational companies, and that neither of these is or can be subject to effective 
public governance, is problematic. Instead, the argument of the sceptics, such as Hirst 
and Thompson (1998: 183), that "sovereign nation states claimed as their distinctive 
feature the right to determine how any activity within their territory was governed 
[such as whether to let NBA organize a China-NBA League], either to perform that 
function themselves or to set the limits of other agencies [such as insisting on using 
FIBA rules in the NBA China Games]", is more persuasive. Although Hirst and 
Thompson (1998: 170) claimed that "the state remained a pivotal institution, 
especially in terms of creating the conditions for effective international governance", 
they acknowledged that "the state's capacities for governance have changed and in 
many respects [especially national macroeconomic management] have weakened 
considerably [particularly the interaction of CFMC and CBMC with Infront Sports & 
Media]." 
8.4 In what ways does the Chinese government seek to manage its 
relationship with sport globalisation? 
From the previous section, we know that the PRC demonstrated the capacity to 
exercise choice and manage its relationship with sport globalisation. In this section we 
are interested in understanding the ways in which the Chinese government seeks to 
manage its relationship with sport globalisation. Benefiting from Houlihan's 
framework (1994, 2003) and his concept of "the depth of global reach" we can better 
understand the strategic implications of the Chinese government's attempts to deal 
with the challenges of global sports from the economic, political and 
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cultural/ideological point of view. 
8.4.1 Olympic Movement 
In order to manage its relationship with the Olympic Movement, the Chinese 
government adopted a strategic approach in the political, economic and 
cultural/ideological spheres. Elements of the strategic approaches included: i) 
transforming the domestic administrative structure in order to use its political power 
more effectively and efficiently to manipulate international and domestic elite sport; ii) 
setting up Market Promotion Divisions in the COC and NSMCs and updating sport 
regulations to provide leverage over sport commercialisation; and iii) strengthening 
Chinese communist ideological education to manage the consequences of 
commercialisation. 
The soft and hard indicators, (such as, lh, 2h, 4h, 5h, Ss, 6h and 9h in Appendix 4),8 
particularly 2h.The number and position of Chinese sports representatives in the 
world sports governing bodies, 4s.The structure of sport governing bodies in the 
PRC and 4h.The distribution of national sports budget in elite sport, help us 
identify four main political strategies adopted by the Chinese government to deal with 
the challenges from the Olympic Movement. These four political strategies were: i) 
setting a target of 50 people to obtain leadership positions in the IFs and having clear 
strategies for taking an IOC seat; ii) transforming the administrative structure of 
domestic sport; iii) strengthening athlete selection, training and competition systems 
leading towards the Olympic Games; and iv) preventing coaches and athletes from 
going abroad. 
8 These seven indicators are as follows: I h.Formal engagement with Olympic Movement as a 
participant country (including membership, joining competitions, ranking, biding for or hosting 
Olympic Games); 2h.The number and position of Chinese sports representatives in the (OC and other 
world sports governing bodies; 3h. The number and purpose of sport facilities in China; 4h.The 
distribution of national sports budget within elite sport; 4s.The structure of sport governing bodies in 
the PRC; 5h.The number and purpose of special elite universities or training centres for elite sport; 
8h.The number of athletes in elite sport system. 
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The momentum to drive these strategies forward was the sheer dominance of the 
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (State Council) in transforming 
the administrative structure of sport. The design of 'three in one' or 'two in one' 
agencies was and is paramount in the state's construction of a centralised and 
simplified political and sporting administration to underpin the country's system of 
elite sport development. For example, the GAOS, the Chinese Olympic Committee 
and the All-China Sport Federation (ACSF) all report to the sports minister and the 
National Sport Associations (NSAs) and National Sport Management Centres 
(NSMCs) are under the control of one organisation - the GAOS. 
Figure 8.2: China's Centralised Elite Sports Structure 
GAOS (COC, ACSF) 
I I 
7 Non- Olympic Sport M.tnagemenl Centres 16 Olympic Sport Managemelll Centres 
(30 National Sport Associations) (28 lummer + ) winter National Span 
I Associations) I 
I National Squads 
It I Provincial Sport Bureaus I I Provincial Sport I I About 20,000 Elite Athletes I'rom Provincial level I Bureaus 
I Provin<ial Sport Ma .. g .... e", Cenlres I 
Figure 8.2, illustrates China's centralised and simplified administrative structure, and 
also depicts the common goal (,Olympic glory') and the remit of some of the sporting 
organisations and supporting agencies involved. The GAOS is the dominant 
organisation. Its main goal is Olympic glory and it sets medal quotas for each of the 
16 NSMCs working with Olympic sports. The primary concern of these Centres is to 
oversee and manage the training and ~onitoring of national teams. At the provincial 
level there are also sport bureaus and sport management centres with responsibility 
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for producing elite athletes for selection into the national squads. By centralizing and 
simplifying sport's administrative structures, the Chinese government is able to drive 
its elite athletes to win Olympic glory and encourage them to develop (governmental) 
values of raising national pride, increasing national cohesion and demonstrating the 
superiority of socialism. It also enabled the high-ranking officials in GAOS and 
NSMCs to obtain leadership positions in the IFs and take more IOC seats in order to 
influence decision-making at the international level. This makes it possible for the 
PRC to use its political power more effectively and efficiently to manipulate events in 
the international and domestic elite sport arenas. 
As for the economic aspect, we also used the indicators (3s, 4h, 4s, 6h, 5s and 9h in 
Appendix 4),9 particularly 4s.The structure of sport governing bodies in the PRC; 
4h.The distribution of national sports budget in elite sport; and 5s.The values and 
attitudes of the government towards commercial sport sponsorship. These helped 
us identify three main economic strategies adopted by the Chinese government in 
response to the Olympic Movement. These three strategies were: i) generating 
multiple incomes for the Olympic sport system; ii) introducing a system of financial 
rewards; and iii) combating the attraction of foreign commercialisation. These 
economic strategies were backed by the setting up of Market Promotion Divisions in 
the COC and NSMCs and by updating sport regulations to enable greater control and 
influence over sport commercialisation. 
As mentioned in Chapter 5 (see more detail in section 5.3.2 generating multiple 
incomes in Chapter 5) in 1992 high ranking officials in the NSC (GAOS) and State 
Council raised the alarm that the shortage of funds from the national budget available 
for sport development was becoming more and more serious. They highlighted, from 
a socialist viewpoint, the need to locate a new way to generate more income from 
different channels through a socialist market economy, in order to vitalise China's 
sport development. In order to cover the extremely high expenditure needed to win 
Olympic glory, three main sources of income were used to support Chinese elite sport 
9 These six indicators are as follows: 3s.The attitudes and values of athletes towards material awards; 
4h.The distribution of national sports budget in elite sport; 4s.The structure of sport governing bodies 
in PRC; 6h.The resource of coach development programmes for elite sport; 5s.The values and attitudes 
of the government towards commercial sport sponsorship; 9h.The tension between the national teams' 
sponsors and government. 
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systems. These three income sources were: the government sport budget (at national 
and provincial level); lottery funding; and commercial and sponsorship income. By 
concentrating its national budget on promoting the aims of Olympic glory, the central 
government encouraged provincial governments to invest their own sport budgets in 
the development of elite performers (by creating the National Games) and enabled the 
creation of the lottery to support the "Olympic glory" project. But when the Chinese 
government decided to adopt a market mechanism to generate commercial income 
(including sponsorship) it had to face a deep struggle over priorities between 
emergent commercial sectors (particularly sponsors) and national team development, 
and also between highly paid and internationally mobile sports 'stars' and the 
centrally controlled elite (Olympic) development system. 
In order to manage the consequences of commercialisation, Market Promotion 
Divisions in the COC and NSMCs were set up under the surveillance of the GAOS 
Finance Department. By creating these new governmental commercial agencies, the 
Chinese government was able to generate commercial income from its National Sport 
Associations, national teams and individual sports stars, but, more importantly, make 
sure that all commercial contracts and activities would not endanger the national 
priority ofthe performance of the national teams. Indeed, the GAOS, particularly the 
Finance Department, played a key role by "updating" the instructions and regulations, 
in four ways, in order to reduce the negative impact of commercialisation on Chinese 
elite development. These four ways were: i) controlling access by athletes to 
commercial activities; ii) redistributing a proportion of athletes' commercial income; 
iii) punishing athletes who were considered to be too heavily involved in commercial 
activities; and iv) asking the National Sport Management Centres (NSMCs) to refrain 
from involvement in commercial activities. 
Indeed, in 2000 GAOS issued "The Notice for Tightening Up the Administration of 
In-Service Athletes Involved in Commercial Activities" which stated that "all 
intangible assets of in-service Chinese athletes belonged to the state" and "all 
commercial activities have to be mediated by the national sport associations". In 2006, 
a more operational and practical regulation- "The Notice on Attempting to Manage 
Commercial Activities of National Squad Members by Contract"- was issued by the 
GAOS and each NSMC was asked to sign a commercial contract with its athletes. 
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Once athletes signed their name to this contract with their NSMCs, not only would 
their commercial activities be limited and their commercial profits redistributed by 
Market Promotion Divisions in the COC and NSMCs, but they could also be thrown 
out of their teams if they violated this contract, as was the case with Tian Liang (see 
more detail in section 5.4.1 combating the attraction of foreign commercialisation of 
Chapter 5). In addition to controlling the commercial activities of individual star 
athletes, in 2003, the GAOS also issued an official document called· "The Notice for 
Standardizing the Code of Practice of National Sport Management Centres"· which 
requested all NSMCs to submit their annual programme of competitions and key 
commercial contracts to the GAOS Finance Department before making any agreement 
with sponsors. In short, by creating new government commercial agencies within the 
GAOS, COC and NSMCs and by updating sport regulations, the Chinese government 
was not only able to centralize most commercial rights in the hands of the GAOS and 
therefore make sure that most commercial income could be redistributed within sport, 
but was also able to discipline or punish those who were involved in too many 
commercial activities at the expense of their main mission - "Olympic success first". 
As for the culturaUideological aspect, by examining the indicators, particularly 3s.The 
. attitudes and values of athletes towards material awards and 5s.The values and 
attitudes of the government towards commercial sport sponsorship, we identified 
that 'ideological education' was used to reduce the negative impact of 
commercialisation, particularly among elite athletes. Although China is embracing 
principles of western capitalism, patriotism, nationalism and ideology remain 
important expressions of national distinctiveness which can be realised through 
international elite sport success. Thus, in order to encourage Chinese athletes to 
compete wholeheartedly for their country, patriotism and nationalism are constant 
themes in the 'education' of elite athletes. According to the vice president of the 
Chinese Olympic Committee, who was one of the architects of the 'Olympic glory' 
project, 'The fundamental mission for Chinese athletes is to actively participate in 
international competition for the sake of the nation's pride' (Wu, S., 2001: 72). The 
vice president also maintained that 'Our job is to help athletes to establish their 
highest value in life, which is to be fervent patriots whose responsibility is to raise the 
national flag and to play the national anthem in the international sport arenas' (Wo, S., 
200 I: 72). The depth of feeling associated with elite sport success in China was also 
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highlighted: 'The value of the lives of Chinese athletes would be nothing if it was not 
linked to national pride' (Wu, S., 200 I: 239). 
To achieve such intense ideological indoctrination, responsibility for 'ideological 
education' was given to a senior manager of each national squad. Generally speaking, 
this education took the form of teaching o,n patriotism, collectivism and revolutionary 
heroism, in order to dilute and reduce the allure of materialism and money. In addition, 
the Chinese government educated young participa~ts in the Olympic principles of 
humanism and self-development, and this 'education' was aligned with the legendary 
history of Chinese advanced revolutionaries and Chinese Olympic or world 
champions in each sport. The annual ritual for celebrating new world champions in 
elite sport teams therefore became an important tradition and tool with which to 
inspire athletes to work harder in order to win these 'honourable titles' and emulate 
their eminent predecessors (Zhao, 2003: 41-4). Indeed, according to the sport minister, 
Liu Peng (2006), the whole purpose of 'ideological education' was to deeply implant 
the value of "national pride first and personal interest second" in each Chinese 
athlete's mind, in order to prevent star athletes (such as Tian Liang, Guo Jingjing and 
Peng Shuai) from having a negative impact by putting a high value on global 
capitalist sport individualism and commercialism. 
From the perspective of Houlihan's framework (1994, 2003), we find that China's 
position, in terms of the depth of 'reach' in economic, political and 
cultural/ideological spheres should probably be located somewhere between box B 
and box C, between box E and box F, and between box H and box I, respectively. 
Indeed, by taking strategic approaches in the political, economic and 
cultural/ideological spheres, the Chinese government demonstrated its capacity, in 
general, successfully to find ways to manage its relationship with the Olympic 
Movement, particularly by setting up new governmental commercial agencies in the 
GAOS, COC and NSMCs, updating sport regulations and strengthening Chinese 
communist ideological education. 
The view of the hyperglobalists, such as Ohmae, that "in a borderless world 
traditional national interest has no meaningful place" (1995: 64), could not be 
supported in the case of the Olympic Movement. Instead, there appears to be more 
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support for the views of sceptics, such as Vogel, (1996: 19) who argue that 
"Regulatory reform of the state is about more than liberating markets" an observation 
amply illustrated by the motives for the reform of the administrative structure for 
sport and the amendment to sports regulations. Vogel also commented that "Two 
things that typically concern state actors far more than private-sector actors are 
finding new ways to raise government revenue and designing new mechanisms of 
policy implementation" (1996: 19). Both these concerns are also illustrated by the 
actions of the PRC government first in establishing Market Promotion Divisions in 
the GAOS, COC and NSMCs and second in carrying on the design of the 'three in 
one' or 'two in one' agencies to achieve Olympic glory. Moreover, sceptics, such as 
Hirst and Thompson (1998: 180) note that "It is virtually impossible to continue to 
operate in the various world markets and, at the same time, to ignore the 
internationalised cultures that go along with that." Indeed, the way in which the 
Chinese government decided to give its elite athletes intense ideological 
indoctrination, particularly in nationalism, attempted to exclude the values of global 
capitalist sport individualism and commercialism (cosmopolitan culture). Hirst and 
Thompson acknowledge that "Complete cultural homogeneity and exclusiveness 
between cosmopolitan and national cultures are less and less possible" (1998: 180). 
This would, therefore, explain why the tension between the commercial interest of 
individual athletes and the collective (national) interest surfaced from time to time in 
the case of the Olympic Movement. 
8.4.2 Elite Football and Basketball 
In order to manage its relationship with global football and basketball, the Chinese 
govenunent took similar strategic approaches to those used with the Olympic 
Movement in the political, economic and cultural/ideological fields. These were: i) 
transfonning the domestic administrative structure so as to use its political power 
more effectively and efficiently in the international and domestic elite football and 
basketball arenas; ii) setting up a Competition Divisions in the CFMC (CFA) and a 
Marketing Department and CBA Management Office in the CBMC (CBA) and 
amending sport regulations in order to be able to control, or at least influence, 
commercialisation; and Hi) strengthening Chinese communist ideological education to 
manage the consequences of commercialisation. 
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Utilizing the soft and hard indicators (such as, lh, 2h, 4h, 4s, 5h, 6h, 7h and 8h in 
Appendix 510 and in Appendix 611 ), particularly 2h.The number and position of 
Chinese sports representatives in FIFA, FIRA, AFC and ARC; 4s.The structure of 
the CFA and CRA; 4h.The distribution of the national sports budget in elite 
football and basketball; and 9h.The tension between the Chinese professional 
footballlbasketball clubs and gOYernment, we are able to identify four main 
political strategies adopted by the Chinese government to deal with the challenges 
from global football and basketball. These four political strategies were: i) taking 
more seriously the aim of obtaining a leadership position in the AFC and ABC and 
desiring to have more influence in FIFA and FIBA; ii) transforming the administrative 
structure; and iii) strengthening the athlete selection, training and competition system 
towards the Olympics, World Cup and World Championship; iv) preventing the seven 
major football and basketball clubs from organizing a new super league. 
As with the case of the Olympic Movement, the momentum to adopt and maintain 
these strategies came from the sheer dominance of the Central Committee of the 
Chinese Communist Party (State Council), particularly the key actor, Li Tieying, a 
member of the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) and a State Councillor 
10 These eight indicators are as follows: I h.Formal engagement with FIFA as a participant country 
(including becoming a member, joining competitions, ranking, biding for or hosting FIFA World Cup); 
2h.The number and position of Chinese sports representatives in FIFA and Asia Football Confederation; 
4h.The distribution of the national sports budget in elite football; 4s.The structure of the Chinese 
Football Association; 5h.The number and purpose of special elite universities or training centres for 
football; 6h. The resource of coach development programmes for elite football; 7h.The ownership of 
special elite training facilities for football in China; 8h.The number of people or local clubs who 
participated in elite football 
11 These eight indicators are as follows: 1 h.Formal engagement with FIBA as a participant country 
(including becoming membership, joining competitions, ranking, biding for or hosting FIBA World 
Championship); 2h.The number and position of Chinese sports representatives in FIBAand Asia 
Basketball Confederation; 4h.The distribution of the national sports budget in elite basketball; 4s.The 
structure of the Chinese Basketball Association; 5h.The number and purpose of special elite 
universities or training centres for basketball; 6h. The resource of coach development programmes for 
elite basketball; 7h.The ownership of special elite training facilities for basketball in China; 8h.The 
number of people or local clubs that participated in elite basketball 
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(1988-1998), who encouraged the adoption of a western approach, in particular, 
capitalist principles, to revitalise the Chinese elite football and basketball system. The 
design of 'two in one' agencies was and is paramount in the state's construction of a 
centralised and simplified political and sporting administration that underpins the 
country's system of elite football and basketball development. For example, the 
Chinese Football Management Centre (CFMC) and the Chinese Basketball 
Management Centre were created by the GAOS in the 1990s, but the leadership and 
general function was exactly the same as in the CFA and the CBA. The title of 'CFA' 
and 'CBA' was used to connect with international organizations and 'CFMC' and 
'CBMC' was used to interact with the domestic political system. Under this design, 
the Chinese government was able to transfonn its football administrative structure in 
three ways: i) by setting up a highly institutionalized and rationalized Chinese football 
and basketball system; ii) by introducing the club system; and iii) by establishing 
football and basketball companies as commercial agents (see more detail in section 
6.3.1 and 7.3.1 The administrative structure in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7). The 
primary concern of the CFMC (CFA) and CBMC (CBA), as with the other NSMCs, is 
to oversee and manage the training and monitoring of its seven national teams 
respectively. By centralizing and simplifying its football and basketball administrative 
structure, the Chinese government could drive its elite footballers and basketball 
players in the CSL and CBAL clubs to strive for success in the Olympic Games, the 
FIFA World Cup and the FIBA World Championship and also encourage them to 
develop government's values of raising national pride, increasing national cohesion 
and demonstrating the superiority of socialism. It also helped high-ranking officials in 
the CFA, CBA and GADS (such as CFA vice President, Zhang Jilong, CBA vice 
President, Mr. Li Yuanwei and Vice Sport Minister, Yu Zaiqing) (see more detail in 
section 6.2.1 Engagement with FIFA of Chapter 6 and also in Table 7.3, 7.4) to 
obtain leadership positions in the AFC and ABA and take more FIFA and FIBA seats 
in order to influence the decision-making in the international sport regime. By so 
doing, the PRC could use its political power more effectively and efficiently in the 
international and domestic elite football and basketball arenas. 
As for the economic aspect, we used the indicators (such as, 3s, 4h, 4s, 6h, 5s and 9h 
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in Appendix 512 and Appendix 613 ), particularly 4s.The structure of tbe CFA and 
eRA; Ss.Tbe values and attitudes of tbe government towards commercial 
football and basketball; and 9h.Tbe tension between tbe Chinese professional 
footballlbasketball clubs and government. Five main economic strategies adopted 
by the Chinese government to respond to global football and basketball were 
identified, namely: i) generating multiple sources of incomes for elite football and 
basketball syste"ms; ii) introducing a system of financial rewards; iii) intervening in 
players' transfer affairs; iv) controlling the CFA and CBA; and v) manipulating the 
domestic professional leagues (such as CSL and CBAL). These economic strategies 
were supported by setting up of a Competition Division in the CFA and a Marketing 
Department and CBA Management Office in the CBMC (CBA) and by amending 
sport, football and basketball regulations to act as constraints on football and 
basketball commercialisation. 
As mentioned in Chapters 6 and 7 (see more detail in section 6.3.2 and section 7.3.2 
of Generating Multiple Incomes in Chapters 6 and 7), in 1993 high ranking officials in 
the NSC (GAOS) and the State Council highlighted the view that "Following the 
development of Chinese sport, the problem of investing more in the national sport 
budget and generating more extra sport income is a highly critical issue". Following 
the words of these political leaders the NSC issued two internal official documents in 
1993,14 which not only gave the CFA and CBA a green light to learn from advanced 
capitalist countries, but also empowered the CFA and CBA to generate multiple 
sources of income by establishing "economic bodies" (Jingji shiti) to subsidize elite 
football and basketball systems. After this, the Chinese government allowed the CF A 
and CBA to establish different "economic bodies" or companies (such as CFIDC and 
12 These six indicators are as follows: 3s.The attitudes and values offootball players towards material 
awards; 4h.The distribution of the national sports budget in elite football; 4s.The structure of the 
Chinese Football Association; 6h.The resource of coach development programmes for elite football; 
5s.The values and attitudes of the government towards commercial football; 9h.The tension between 
the Chinese professional football clubs and government. 
\3 These six indicators are as follows: 3s.The attitudes and values of basketball players towards 
material awards; 4h.The distribution of national sports budget in elite basketball; 4s.The structure of the 
Chinese Basketball Association; 6h.The resource of coach development programmes for elite 
basketball; 5s.The values and attitudes of the government towards commercial basketball; 9h.The 
tension between the Chinese professional basketball clubs and government. 
14 The first document is "The Suggestions of the NSC on Deepening Sport Reform" and the second is 
"Suggestions in Relation to Promoting Sport Marketing and Speeding Up the Process of Sport 
Industralisation" . 
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CSLC in the football case and the CBIDC and CBAEC in the basketball case) and to 
sign contracts with international sport management companies (such as IMG and 
Infront Sports & Media) in order to generate multiple incomes from the football and 
basketball market. After introducing a capitalist football and basketball system, the 
national football and basketball budget was considerably reduced to a few million 
yuan which was used to directly subsidize the national teams and Olympic squads. As 
a result, the Chinese elite football and basketball systems became heavily dependent 
on investment from commercial football clubs and the commercial incomes of the 
CFA and CBA, e.g. the CFA's commercial income, which was more than 50 times the 
national football budget in 2005. However, when the Chinese government decided to 
adopt a market mechanism and sponsorship to generate commercial income, as with 
the case of the Olympic Movement, it faced a serious struggle over priorities between 
the emergent commercial sectors (particularly clubs and sponsors) and national team 
development, and also between highly paid and internationally mobile football and 
basketball 'stars' and the state controlled elite (Olympics, World Cup and World 
Championship) development system. 
In order to manage the consequences of commercialisation, the Competition Division 
and two companies, CFIDC and CSLC, in the CFMC (CFA) and the Marketing 
Department, the CBA Management Office and two companies (CBIDC and CBAEC) 
in the CBMC (CBA) were set up under the supervision of the GAOS (see Fig~e 6.2, 
Figure 7.2 and Figure 7.7). By creating these new governmental commercial agencies, 
the Chinese government could generate commercial incomes from the CF A, CBA, 
national teams and individual sports stars, but more importantly, ensure that all their 
commercial contracts and activities would not endanger the national priority of the 
performance of the national teams. Indeed, by "updating" the instructions and 
regulations in football IS and basketball,16 the GAOS, particularly its Finance 
IS These key regulations are: "The Club Salary System ofCFA", "The CFA Regulation for the Transfer 
of Football Players", "The Temporary Regulation for Centralizing Accounting and Finance 
Management ofGAOS Affiliated Institutions" and "The Temporary Commercial Regulation of 
National Football Matches". 
16 These key regulations are: 1."The CBA Regulation for the Transfer of Basketball Players in 1996", 
2."The Temporary Regulation of the CBA for the Foreign Transfer Affairs of the Basketball Players", 
3."The National Regulation of the Registration and Transfer of Chinese Players (Temporary)", 4."The 
Notice for Attempting to Manage Commercial Activities of National Squad Members by Contract", 
5."The Regulation of the Commercial Rights of the CBA Registered Players", 6."The Temporary 
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Department, played a key role in reducing the perceived negative impact of 
commercialisation on Chinese elite football and basketball development in four ways, 
namely: i) setting a limit on the salaries and transfer fees that professional clubs could 
offer their players and their buyers; ii) creating a special procedure for dealing with 
the domestic transfer market; iii) controlling the CFA and CBA and iv) manipulating 
the Chinese Super League (CSL) and the CBA League (CBAL). By integrating these 
four strategies and updating the regulations in the "One Protocol & Two Licences" 
policy in football and in the "Two Protocols & One Licence" policy in basketball (see 
section 6.4.2 and section 7.4.2 Managing the consequences ofa more commercial 
system in Chapters 6 and 7), it allowed the CFA and CBA to own the exclusive 
commercial rights of domestic football and basketball leagues and recruit any club 
player unconditionally. It also allowed the CFA and CBA to shorten the season ofCSL 
and CBAL and intervene in players' transfer affairs in order to support their main 
mission - "Olympic, World Cup and FIBA World Championship success first". In the 
words of Cui Dalin, the Vice Sport Minister and Ma Chengquan, the director of the 
CFA Competition Department, "The premier mission of the 2007 CSL season is to 
fully support the 2008 Beijing Games. Stabilising the development of the CSL is 
secondary" (Wang, L. 2007). A similar argument can be found in the basketball case. 
In the words of the director of the CBMC, Li Yuanwei, "The whole meaning of 
Chinese basketball is to enhance the profile of the national teams .... Every club has 
to support and serve the nation's teams without any conditions" (Li, Y. W. 2004), and 
"The CBMC will use whatever resources we can to raise the profile of the national 
teams, regardless of the cost" (Li, Y. W. 2004). 
As for the cultural/ideological aspect, by examining the indicators, particularly 3s.The 
attitudes and values of footballers and basketball players towards material 
awards and 5s.The values and attitudes of the government towards commercial 
football and basketball, we identified that 'ideological education' was adopted to 
reduce the negative impact of commercialisation, particularly among star players. 
Indeed, the danger of creating 'peculiar men' was warned against by the political and 
party leaders in 1995 after the embrace of the principles of western capitalism. In 
Regulation for Centralizing Accounting and Finance Management ofGAOS Affiliated Institutions", 
7."The Competition Regulation of the CBA League in 2006-2007 Seasons", 8."The Action Project to 
be Qualified for the 2005-2008 CBAL Clubs". 
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addition to instigating suitable rules to regulate the material interests of clubs, coaches 
and players, the responsibility for carrying out intense ideological indoctrination was 
given to a senior manager of each national squad. Similar to the case of the Olympic 
Movement, the 'ideological education' took the form of teaching on patriotism, 
collectivism and revolutionary heroism, in order to dilute and reduce the allure of 
materialism and money. Moreover, in line with new policy, one to two weeks military 
training with the People's Liberation Army (PLA) became a new form of training 
strategy to "discipline" and "inspire" these highly-paid footballers and basketball 
players to work as hard as their PLA counterparts, in order to fight wholeheartedly for 
their country in international matches, especially in the 2008 Olympic Games. Indeed, 
the whole purpose of 'ideological education' as in the case of the Olympic Movement, 
was to firmly fix the value of "national pride first and personal interest second" in the 
mind of Chinese footballers and basketball players in order to prevent star players 
(such as Wang Zhi-Zhi) or 'peculiar men' from having a negative impact by adopting 
the values the of global capitalist sport individualism and commercialism. As stated 
by the Vice Sport Minister, Xiao Tian, the highest goal for Chinese basketball players 
was to actively participate in international competition for the sake of the nation's 
pride, because it was their responsibility to raise the national flag and to play the 
national anthem in the international sport arenas (CBA website, 2007). 
Similar to the case of the Olympic Movement, from the perspective of Houlihan's 
framework (1994, 2003), China's position, in tenns of the depth of 'reach' in the 
economic, political and culturaUideological fields should probably be located 
somewhere between box B and box C, between box E and box F, and between box I1 
and box I, respectively. But the problem is that in a country like China it is very 
difficult to distinguish the cultural/ideological and economic from the political, 
because the political system is still very dominant. Although we attempted to assess 
the depth of penetration of global values using Houlihan's three categories of reach, 
all the evidence in the economic, political and cultural/ideological spheres appeared to 
point to the fact that these changes were led by the Chinese government and were 
political decisions (embracing capitalism and transforming administrative structures). 
However, the government also brought about social transformation (emerging 
individualism and commercialism in star players, particularly the phenomenon of 
'peculiar men') and economic changes (emphasis on commercial rights and 
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sponsorship). The trend towards sport globalisation in the Chinese context is so 
complicated that it is difficult for us to locate the global reach and local response in 
the cases of global football and basketball in just one category of reach and one 
precise response. Using Houlihan's framework, we were able to summarize China's 
attempts to manage its interaction with the Olympic Movement, global football and 
global basketball in Table 8.3. 
361 
Table 8.3: Summary of China's attempts to manage its interaction with the Olympic Movement, global football and global basketball 
Main Strategies Adopted to Manage Patterns of Theoretical Implication 
Key Indicators Globalisation & Commercialisation Reach and 
Response 
IEconomic aspect: Economic aspect: Economic I. The hyperglobalists' viewpoint could not be 
aspect: supported and it appears to fit more closely to 
1. (4s). The structure of sport governing bodies 1. Set up Market Promotion Divisions in the COC he arguments of sceptics. 
!in the PRC; and NSMCs to generate multiple incomes for the 1. Located 
~. (5h). The distribution of national sports Olympic Sport System and introduced a system of somewhere 
Olympic Ibudget within elite sport; financial rewards [between box 
Movement 
Is and box C 
p. (Ss). The values and attitudes of the 2. Updated sport regulations as levers on sport 
~ovemment towards commercial sport ,-ommercialisation in four ways: i) controlling the 
~ponsorship; access by athletes to commercial activities, ii) 
edistributing a proportion of athletes' commercial 
income, iii) punishing athletes considered to be too 
heavily involved in commercial activities and iv) 
asking the National Sport Management Centres 
(NSMCs) to refrain from involvement in 
I,;ommercial activities. 
!political aspect: Political 
Political aspect: aspect: 
1. Set a quota of 50 people to obtain leadership 
I. (2h). The number and position of Chinese tpositions in the IFs and had clear strategies for I. Located 
~ports representatives in the world sports aking an IOC seat; somewhere 
~overning bodies; Ibetween box 
~. Transformed administrative structure; lE and box F 
~. (4s). The structure of sports governing bodies 
in the PRC; 
~. Strengthened athlete selection, training and 
~. (4h). The distribution of the national sports competition systems leading up to the Olympic 
L___ _ __ bud~~t in c:lite sp()~ 
---
games; _ 
-----
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~. Prevented coaches and athletes from going 
14. (2s).The attitudes and values of the Chinese ~broad. 
~overnment towards human rights of elite ~ulturaV 
lathletes (for example the transfer of players); ideological 
~ulturaVideological aspect: aspect: 
!culturaVideological aspect: 
I. Used 'ideological education' to inculcate the 1. Located 
1. (3s). The attitudes and values of athletes ~alues of "national pride first and personal interest somewhere 
egarding material awards; second" in each Chinese athletes' mind between box 
H and box I 
~. (Ss). The values and attitudes of the I 
~overnment regarding commercial sport 
~ponsorship. 
I 
Economic aspect: Economic aspect: Economic 1. Part of the transformationalists' argument 
I ~spect: ~as supponed but more evidence backed the 
1. (4s). The structure of the Chinese Football 1. Set up Competition Divisions in the CFA to ~ase of the sceptics. 
~Iobal Association; generate multiple sources of income for the Elite 1. Located lOootball System; ~omewhere 
football between box 
2. (Ss). The values and attitudes of the ~. Introduced a system of financial rewards; B and box C 
government towards commercial football; 
3. (9h). The tension between the Chinese 3. Updated sport & football regulations to control 
professional football clubs and government. football commercialisation in three ways: i) 
ntervened in footballers' transfer affairs, ii) 
~ontrolled CFA and iii) manipulated Chinese 
Super league (CSL) 
Political aspect: Political aspect: Political 
aspect: 
I. (2h). The number and position of Chinese 1. Took more seriously the aim of obtaining a 
sports representatives in FIFA and the Asia leadership position in the Asia Football 1. Located 
Football Confederation; Confederation (AFC) and desired to have more somewhere 
influence in FIFA; between box 
-~--- ----------_ .. _---
----- ------- ---- -- ----
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lE and box F 
t2. (4s). The structure of the Chinese Football 12. Transformed administrative structure; 
iAssociation; 
~. (4h). The distribution of the national sports 13. Strengthened athlete selection, training and 
~udget with in elite football; !competition system regarding towards World Cup 
land Olympics; 
4. (9h). The tension between the Chinese ~. Prevented seven major clubs from organizing a i 
professional football clubs and government. !new super league. 
Cultural/ideological aspect: !cultural/ideological aspect: 
Cultural/ I 
ideOlogical 
aspect: 
I 
1. (35). The attitudes and values of football 1. Used 'ideological education' and "military 
players regarding material awards; Itraining" to prevent star players from becoming 1. Located 
'peculiar men". somewhere 
~. (Ss). The values and attitudes of the between box 
~ovemment regarding commercial football. H and box I 
!Economic aspect: Economic aspect: Economic 1. Part of transform ationa lists' viewpoint was 
aspect: ~upported but more evidence supported 
I. (4s). The structure of the Chinese Basketball 1. Set up a Marketing Department and sceptics' perspective. 
iAssociation; Management Office in the CBMC (CBA) to 1. Located 
generate multiple sources of income for the Elite somewhere 
Global Basketball System; between box 
B and box C 
basketball ~. (Ss). The values and attitudes of the 2. Introduced a system of financial rewards; 
~overnment regarding commercial basketball; 
~. (9h). The tension between the Chinese 3. Updated sport & basketball regulations to 
professional basketball clubs and government. control basketball commercialisation in three 
ways: i) intervened in basketball players' transfer 
affairs, ii) controlled CBA and iii), manipulated 
CBA League (CBAL) 
----------
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olitical aspect: olitical aspect: olitical 
1. (2h). The number and position of Chinese I. Took more seriously the aim of obtaining a 
ports representatives in FIBA and the Asia leadership position in the Asia Basketball I. Located 
asketball Confederation; on federation (AB C) and desired to have more somewhere 
influence in FIBA; etween box 
and box F 
· (4s). The structure of the Chinese Basketball · Transformed administrative structure; 
ssociation; 
· (4h). The distribution of the national sports · Strengthened athlete selection, training and 
udget within elite basketball; ompetition system leading towards the FIBA 
orld Championship and Olympics; 
· (9h). The tension between the Chinese · Prevented seven major clubs from organizing a 
rofessional basketball clubs and government. ew super league. 
ulturaV 
ulturaVideological aspect: ulturaVideological aspect: 
1. (3s). The attitudes and values of basketball l. Used 'ideological education' and "military 
layers regarding material awards; aining" to prevent star players (such as Wang I. Located 
hi-Zhi) from becoming individualistic and omewhere 
· (Ss). The values and attitudes of the etween box 
overnment regarding commercial basketball. and box I 
- -------------
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By taking strategic approaches in the political, economic and cultural/ideological 
fields, the Chinese government demoristrated its capacity, to some degree, to 
successfully find effective ways to manage its relationship with global football and 
basketball. This was shown particularly by: i) the setting up of new governmental 
commercial agencies such as (such as the CFA Competition Division, CFIDC and 
CSLC in football case and the Marketing Department, CBA Management Office, 
CBIDC and CBAEC in basketball case); ii) updating sport, football and basketball 
regulations; and iii) strengthening Chinese communist ideological education. 
From the perspective of the transfonnationalists, rather than globalisation bringing 
abo~t the 'end of the state', it has encouraged a spectrum of adjustment strategies - by 
setting up new governmental commercial agencies, updating sport, football and 
basketball regulations, and strengthening Chinese communist ideological education -
and, in certain respects, has produced a more activist state. In addition, the sceptics 
share a similar viewpoint to their transfonnationalist counterparts. Vogel contends that 
"regulatory reform by definition involves reformulating the mechanisms of policy 
implementation" and is amply illustrated by the updating of sport, football and 
regulation and the influence of the policies of "One Protocol & Two Licences" in 
football and "Two Protocols & One Licence" in basketball. Modification of 
implementation mechanisms in turn, affects the very ability of state actors (GAOS, 
. CFA Competition Division, CFIDC, CSLC, the CBA Marketing Department, CBA 
Management Office and CBIDC and CBAEC) to perform their functions, which is 
why they insist on giving their own needs and preferences high priority (Olympic, 
World Cup and World Championship glory) as they pursue regulatory refonn (Vogel: 
1996: 19). 
8.5 Methodological reflection 
In this section, we focus on four main methodological challenges and reflect on how 
they were addressed and the implications for the validity and reliability of this 
research. These four issues relate to: i) indicators; ii) data collection; iii) the author's 
position as a Taiwanese researcher; and iv) the author's position as a critical realist. 
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Firstly, regarding the quantifiable and qualitative indicators we adopted to guide us 
during the collection and analysis of relevant data, there are three critical 
methodological questions we need to reflect upon, namely: i) was the original choice 
validated?; ii) how useful were these indicators?; and iii) did any new indicators 
emerge during the research? 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, on completion of the literature review in relation to 
globalisation theories and Chinese cultural/ideological, economic and political context, 
we were better able to grasp the main debates among the three main schools of. 
thought on globalisation and make sense of sport development in the Chinese context. 
The review also assisted us in deductively generating the indicators. Indeed, a number 
of indicators were adapted from well-established indicators in the area of economic 
globalisation (Held etc, 1999; I-lirst and Thompson, 1996; Vogel, 1998), such as (I h) 
Formal engagement with international sport as a participant country (including 
membership, joining competitions, ranking, biding for or hosting global sport events), 
(2h) The number and position of Chinese sports representatives in the world sports 
governing bodies, (5h) The distribution of the national sports budget in football, 
basketball and other elite sport and (9h) The number of people or local clubs which 
participated in football and basketball and other elite sports. Many of the indicators 
are quantitative and focus on the value of trade, the patterns of trade, the balance of 
trade between different partners and what is traded. To some extent, we adapted these 
and discussed the level of investment in elite sport, the development of network 
relationships and the strength of those relationships. 
In addition, by reflecting on other globalisation literature (particularly in the sport 
sector), several key issues emerged including: i) the function and structure in both the 
governmental and the non-governmental spheres as manifest in the works ofWeiss 
(1998: x), Vogel (1996: 20) and Houlihan (2004: 53); ii) the issue of player transfer 
highlighted by Houlihan (2004: 62-66), Maguire (1999: 97-127) and Maguire and 
Stead (1997: 59-73); and iii) the commercialisation of sport by Slack (2004), Maguire 
(1999: 128-143) and Houlihan (2003: 345-363). These emerging issues helped us to 
identify indicators such as (4s) The structure of sport governing bodies in the PRC, 
(2s) The attitudes and values of the Chinese government and clubs towards human 
rights of elite athletes (for example, the transfer of players), (9h) The tension between 
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the professional clubs and government or the tension between the national teams' 
sponsors and government. A reflection on the PRC's sport history also helped us to 
understand that the Chinese government made a clear strategic decision about the 
importance of the Olympic Games. We therefore aimed to generate indicators which 
related specially to the Olympic Games such as (6h) The resource of coach 
development programmes for the Olympic sport and (7h) The ownership of special 
elite training facilities for Olympic sport in China. 
Indeed, by regular meetings with supervisors and by reviewing the literature in 
relation to globalisation theories and sport development in the PRC, we generated 9 
hard indicators and 5 soft indicators for our research. But the challenge was to answer 
the question "How useful were these indicators?" In order to access these indicators, 
in 2006 the author presented a paper in relation to these indicators - "Chinese Sports 
Policy and Globalisation: The Methodological Consideration/or the Cases of 
Football, Basketball and the Olympic Movement"- at the Conference of Cltina Sport 
Management in Beijing Sport University and at Tlte 3rd International Sport 
Sociology Summer Scltool, in Copenhagen, Demark (granted by ISSA). During these 
two conferences, there were no challenges and no suggestion of extra indicators. 
Although we had a positive response from Chinese scholars and Western sport 
sociologists, we did not take this for granted. We then faced another challenge - "Did 
any new indicators emerge during the research?" After each interview, there were 
some reflections on the usefulness of these indicators, particular from the Chinese 
academic interviewees. In addition, there was a constant process of reflection as the 
author went though each of the three case studies, and regularly met with supervisors 
to discuss whether anything was being missed, or whether the indicators were indeed 
as useful as we hoped they would be. Generally, we found they worked but we also 
carried out subtle refinement based on feedback from interviewees and supervisors. 
The first refinement was to delete indicator - The distribution of national sports 
budget in elite sports and traditional sports - and integrate it into indicator (4h) The 
distribution of national sports budget in elite football, elite basketball and other elite 
sport. The reason for doing so is that it is very difficult to identify the precise 
proportion of the national sport budget allocated to elite sports and traditional sports 
because the NSC (GAOS) tended to calculate the national budget using the names 
"elite sport" and "mass sport". Besides, the proportion of the national and provincial 
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sport budget invested in sport for all decreased from 2.38 percent in 1990 - 1994 to 
1.39 percent in 1995 - 1999. And there was only 2 million yuan per year for 
deVeloping sport for all in the GAOS Sport for All Department and less than I million 
yuan from the sport budget for each provincial government to invest in mass sport 
each year (see more detail in section 4.3.2, Generating mUltiple incomes in Chapter 
4). 
Other indicators, such as (2s).The attitudes and values of the Chinese government and 
clubs towards the human rights of elite athletes (including anti-doping policy, 
women's rights, the situation of over-training athletes and the transfer of players) were 
also refined. Indeed, our initial list of indicators was much longer. If we wished to 
investigate athletes' rights, there were a number of issues we could explore, for 
example, rights in relation to anti-doping, women's rights and children's rights. We 
decided to choose players' freedom of movement because this issue was most likely to 
be affected by commercial objectives. There was a commercial aspect to anti-doping 
and women's participation but it was, at least, most prominent in relation to the 
freedom of movement of athletes and presented the Chinese government with the 
hardest challenge. 
We do not think there is any indicator that we ignored but we had to be selective 
within these indicators. In tenus of quantifying elite success, we looked at Olympic 
medals and world ranking in football and basketball but we did not look at world 
ranking in individual Olympic sports. We were going to have more complicated 
quantitative indicators but within all indicators we had to ask ourselves what were 
going to be their most revealing aspects. Some indicators that were identified were 
more narrowly focused than others, such as realising Chinese membership of IFs and 
IOC. That was simple and straightforward. However, with investment in elite sport, 
there would be many different types of investment, such as central government, 
provincial government, municipal government and commercial investment. Presented 
with the whole range, we had to choose one which we felt would be the most useful 
and revealing indicator. Overall, our indicators appear to have been very useful 
because they emphasized the importance of getting hard evidence wherever possible. 
There is a general critique of much of the literature on globalisation because it is very 
vague as to what constitutes greater or lesser globalisation. This is seen in the 
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argument ofHoulihan (1994) and Maguire (2000: 366) in which they point out the 
need to develop criteria by which to judge the 'reach' and 'response' of global flows on 
local cultures and we attempted to address that problem. 
Secondly, as for the data collection, the most challenging job would be the interviews, 
particular regarding the issue of recording interviewees. Gratton and Jones (2004: 
148-149) suggest that the best option during the interview is to record it on tape, but 
as we mentioned in Chapter 4, Party and government officials in the PRC did not like 
to interpret official policy, particular if it was being tape-recorded, due to the political 
monitoring of their comments. It raised a critical issue for us - "Should the researcher 
choose to tape-record during his interview in order not to be distracted by having to 
concentrate on writing notes on what was revealed?" or "Should the researcher choose 
to gain more frank responses and explore further unexpected perceptions from the 
interviewees at the expense of tape-recording?" Before travelling to Beijing for the 
fieldwork, the researcher had conducted interviews with five Chinese sport academics 
in the UK using a tape-recorder. Influenced by these successful interviews, the 
researcher made an assumption that Chinese sport academics would be more 
open-minded than Chinese sport officials. Therefore the researcher adopted different 
approaches towards different interviewees. For the sport academics, duri~g the 
interview the researcher used a digital recorder after gaining consent. For the sport 
officials, at the beginning, the researcher attempted to record the conversation during 
the interview. Several sport officials in GAOS told me that they regarded me as a 
friend and would tell me more about what I wanted to know if I switched my digital 
recorder off. They also reminded me that it was almost impossible for Chinese sport 
officials to give their real opinions and information by putting a digital recorder in 
front of them. Under these circumstances, the researcher had no choice but to give up 
tape-recording in favour of writing notes during the interview, in order to obtain more 
useful accounts from these Chinese officials. Indeed, in order to keep their accounts as 
accurate as possible the researcher attempted to rebuild their key account by recording 
his own voice according to the notes taken and the fresh memories recalled following 
the end of the interview. The researcher was aware that it was impossible to rebuild 
the account exactly, but at least the key issues and main meaning of their account 
would be maintained. 
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Although the political structure of the PRC discouraged the researcher from using a 
recorder, the unique propaganda mechanism embedded in the political system in 
general and the sport system in particular, allowed the researcher to access these high 
ranking sport leaders' accounts from documents and articles for example: i) yearbooks, 
such as "The Yearbook of Sport and Physical Education of the PRC (1949-2005)", 
"The Yearbook of Chinese Football (1992-1998)", "China Football Encyclopedia", 
"The Compilation of the CBA Documents (1997-2005); ii) reminiscences, such as 
"HE Zhengliang and Olympics", "Think and Practice: The History of The Olympic 
Strategy", "The Chinese Football Under My Understanding: the Reminiscences of 
Wang lunsheng"; iii) official websites, such as GAOS, COC, BOCOG, CFA, CBA; iv) 
databases, such as SPORTINFO.NET.CN and China National Knowledge 
Infrastructure (CNKI); and v) newspapers, such as China Sport News, Sina Sport 
News, Titan Sport News, Tom Sport News, Sohu Sport News and Xinhuanet News. 
By supplementing and triangulating accounts provided by high ranking officials with 
the official regulations ("The Compilation of Chinese Sport Regulation (1949-2004),'), 
official statistics ("Statistical Yearbook of Sport by GAOS (NSC)" and internal 
statistics in CFA and CBA), it was possible to reduce the disadvantage of not 
tape-recording the interviews with sport officials. Indeed, we quoted these high 
ranking sport leaders' accounts more than those of our interviewees' (middle ranking 
sport officials) because we found that their values and attitudes towards global sport 
were very similar due to the hierarchical political structure in the Chinese sport 
system. Although most interviewees' accounts were very similar to those of the high 
ranking sport leaders, there were some differences, particularly in the interests of 
GAOS and National Sport Management Centres (such as CBMC, CFMC, CVMC). 
Indeed, by carrying out different approaches towards sport academics and sport 
officials, the researcher reached three conclusions: i) some of my sport academic 
interviewees in Beijing were very cautious about answering my questions; ii) some 
sport officials were more willing to talk with me than were the sport academics; and 
iii) when I was introduced personally to some, I was able to obtain a mor~ open 
account. These conclusion are similar to Manion's experience (2003: 62) that the 
Chinese officials (including sport academics in China) were cautious about 
interpreting official policy, particularly in front of a digital recorder, due to the 
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political monitoring of their comments. 
Thirdly, being a Taiwanese citizen conducting Chinese research in Loughborough 
University, raises two issues worthy of comment namely my status as both an -
'outsider' and an 'insider'. Due to the researcher's Taiwanese background and having 
never been to the PRC before, the researcher attempted to detach himself as an 
outsider to observe his research subjects. Interestingly, being a Taiwanese citizen and 
conducting Chinese research in a Western context meant that these interviewees 
regarded the researcher as an outsider. By taking advantage of the reputation of the 
Institute of Sport & Leisure Policy at Loughborough University and the famous 
English football Premier League, most interviewees regarded the researcher as an 
expert in sport policy but a beginner in Chinese sport study. Indeed, most of my 
interviewees had a very good image of university education and sport development in 
the UK. To some extent, it made them more willing to express their opinions when 
comparing the Chinese situation with the sport cases in the UK, particularly the 
English football Premier League. In addition, all the interviewees understood my 
Taiwanese background. Therefore, most of them explained to me in more detail why 
sport policy in the PRC was so different from Taiwan's and Western cases. That gave 
me a unique opportunity to ask "naIve" but "sensitive" key questions with less offence. 
Nevertheless, some of the interviewees were reluctant or even directly refused to 
answer my sensitive questions. 
Although I had an advantage over Western scholars in sharing the same language and 
Chinese culture when carrying out my research objectives and trying to make sense of 
the information, this insider position may have affected my research from data 
collection to data interpretation due to the tension between China and Taiwan. Indeed, 
one of my interviewees in the GAOS personnel Department asked me to send my CV 
and interview questions to her because she told me that due to my Taiwanese 
background she had to help me ask for the approval of the Office of Taiwan, Hong 
Kong and Macao in GAOS External Affairs Department. Fortunately, after their 
official monitoring process, she told me that she welcomed me to conduct the 
interview in GAOS and Beijing Sport University as a friend without any further 
formal application. Indeed, as a Taiwanese to conduct research in China is more 
difficult than for Chinese scholars but, as mentioned previously, casting myself in the 
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image of the "Western scholar" and taking advantage of information exchange could 
enable them to feel that my research would, to some extent, contribute to linking 
China to the global world. 
In addition, as Taiwan has a unique relationship with China, this could lead me to be 
more sceptical about accounts from Chinese Communist Party officials and 
government officers. I acknowledge that it is impossible for me to change the reality 
that I am a Taiwanese educated under the structure of the Kuomintang (KMT) 
government - a long time rival of the Chinese Communist Party. Although I am not in 
sympathy with Chinese government policy, particularly in its attempts to prevent 
Taiwan from being involved in international organisations, such as the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) and United Nations (UN), I am an academic researcher, and 
understand that it is a historical contingency between China and Taiwan both of which 
continue to pursue their own national interests. Therefore, there is nothing I can do 
about that historical contingency in which I was involved, but from time to time I 
have to remind myself to remain detached for the purpose ofanalyzing the data 
collected when I am in the UK. Indeed, I have been staying in the UK for almost four 
years and have not returned to Taiwan since early 2004. Although this is not the best 
way to detach myself from being affected by the Taiwanese situation, at least I do 
whatever I can to take a reflective approach and to avoid ethnic bias which could 
affect the validity and reliability of my research. 
Fourthly, as for the author's position as a critical realist, we found it is useful to adopt 
the implications of critical realism for the question of structure and agency in our 
research. Critical realists, such as Bhaskar and Archer, insist that structure and agency 
reside in different temporal domains, such that the pre-existence of structure is a 
condition of individual action. They state that 'structures (as emergent entities) are not 
only irreducible to people, they pre-exist them, and people are not puppets of 
structures because they have their own emergent properties which mean they either 
reproduce or transform social structure, rather then creating it' (Archer et ai, 1998: 71). 
In that sense, the claim is that policy outcomes are contingent, and that in the global 
context during specific periods they could be appropriately explained by accounts of 
structures within which states' actions occur, the development and reproduction of 
such structures as a consequence of the agents involved, and the power struggles 
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which take place between various forces (groups and individuals) within those 
structures. In addition, Giddens remarks that "every act which contributes to the 
reproduction of a structure is also an act of production, and as such may initiate 
change by altering the structure at the same time as it reproduces it" (1979: 69). 
Marsh et al share a similar view, arguing that "Agents are, in a sense, 'bearers' of 
structural positions, but they interpret those structures. At the same time, structures are 
not unchanging; they change in part because of the strategic decisions of the actors 
operating within the structure"( 1999: IS). 
Indeed, as critical realists, it is better for us to understand the relationship between 
structure and agency as follows: i) 'pre-existing social structure makes a difference to 
the course of events in the social world by influencing the actions that people choose 
to undertake' (Lewis 2000: 258); ii) as well as facilitating agency, social structures 
also constrains it; iii), social structure and agency are held to be recursively related 
(Marsh et al. 1999: 15). These critical realist concepts help us to make sense of the 
actions of the state within the global context. According to Therbom (1999), 
globalising structures, including markets, finance, culture, human rights, and what he 
tenns the interactive 'world stage of actors' very often operate within nations through 
cross-cultural interchanges or experience of global governance. 
We found that the heuristic and simplified figure of Linda Weiss (2003: 6) (see Figure 
8.3), to some extent, helped us to understand the action of the PRC (sport policy) 
within the globalising structures in our three case studies. According to Weiss (2003: 
2-15), the structures constraining and enabling or facilitating state agencies in the 
global context could be regarded as having two dimensions: 'economic logic of exit' 
and 'political logic of insecurity and competition'. For 'economic logic of exit', 
globalisation is seen to be intrinsically constraining because openness involves the fall 
of national barriers to trade, investment, and financial flows, exposure to increasing 
capital mobility (via the multinationalisation of production and growth of global 
financial markets), and also confonnity to intergovernmental agreements requiring, 
for example, that governments open their markets to foreign trade and financial 
institutions as well as eliminating certain subsidies to industry. Unlike the 
constraining dimension of the economic logic of exit, the enabling dimension of 
globalisation reveals a "political logic of competition and insecurity", which generates 
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incentives for governments to take initiatives that will strengthen the national system 
of innovation and social protection. By adopting Weiss's concept in which 
globalisation (structures) 'constrain' and 'enable' (facilitate) the action of state 
agencies to shape certain outcomes, we attempt to explain part of the interaction 
between globalisation (structure) and the Chinese state (agency) in our three case 
studies. 
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Figure 8.3: The logics of globalisation, domestic institutions and state responses 
Source: Adapted from Weiss (2003: 6) 
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Regarding the case of the Olympic Movement, the commercialisation (commercial 
sponsorship) following the spread of the Olympic Movement in the Chinese elite 
sport system (particularly commercial sponsorship of Team China and individual star 
athletes). As previously mentioned in the case of the Olympic Movement, two main 
tensions (athletes versus the Communist Government and the GAOS versus the 
National Sport Associations) are strongly linked to the commercialisation of sport (or 
economic logic of exit). In order to avoid commercialisation endangering the 
performance of national teams and prevent national property (elite athletes) from 
leaking into the outside world (the political logic of insecurity' and competition), the 
Chinese government not only established Market Promotion Divisions in the COC 
and NSMCs (organizational arrangement) to monitor the commercial contracts of 
national teams and individual elite athletes, but also issued regulations (normative 
orientations) such as "The Temporary Regulation for Dispatching Athletes to go 
abroad by NSC " and "The Notice for Attempting to Manage Commercial Activities 
of National Squad Members by Contract in 2006", to prevent Chinese athletes from 
going abroad and to limit the star athletes' involvement in too many commercial 
activities. By influencing 'organizational arrangements' and 'nonnative orientations' 
affected by globalisation structures ('economic logic of exit' and 'political logic of 
insecurity and competition'), the Chinese state could shape the outcomes of the 
redefinition of policy instruments and the renewal of policy capacity so as to 
concentrate on winning more Olympic medals in the 2008 Beijing Games. 
As for the case of elite football, following the open-door policy the Chinese 
government established CFMC (CFA) (organizational arrangement) and began 
introducing the Western club system to vitalize its out-of-date Soviet system 
(pressures for innovation) in the early 1990s. After setting up this more competitive 
and material-oriented club system, four main tensions arose. In particular, the tension 
between clubs' commercial interest and the country's priority of the Olympics and the 
World Cup when clubs wanted to organize a new premier league to reduce Chinese 
government control (reduced policy autonomy and capacity). In order to manage 
the challenge of commercialisation (demands for social protection) which arose 
after introducing the Western commercial club system, the Chinese government not 
only adopted the "One Protocol & Two Licences" policy and issued the official 
document, "The Regulation of Commercial Management for Jia A League and the 
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CFA Cup" in 2002 (normative orientations), but also set up The China Football 
Association Super League Company (CSLC) to dominate the decision-making of the 
CSL (organizational arrangement). Indeed, under intense pressure to prepare for the 
2008 Olympic Games (political logic of insecurity and competition), the attempts of 
these commercial clubs were suppressed by the Chinese government. In addition, 
senior officials in the GAOS and the CFA, such as Cui Dalin, the Vice Sport Minister, 
and Ma Chengquan, the director of the CFA Competition Department, both claimed 
that "the premier mission of the 2007 CSL season is to fully support the 2008 lleijing 
Games and stabilising the development of the CSL is secondary" (redefinition of 
policy instruments and renewal of policy capacity). 
Regarding the case of elite basketball, according to the fonner director of the Chinese 
Basketball Management Centre (1997-2002), Xin Lanchcng (1998: 4), following in 
the footsteps of Chinese football, the Chinese government introduced the commercial 
club system (economic logic of exit) in the mid-1990s and set up the CllMC (CBA) 
in 1997 (organizational arrangement) in order to deal with an increasingly 
commercialized and professionalized basketball in a global context (pressures for 
innovation). After adopting this more commercial club system, four main tensions 
arose as mentioned previously. One of the tensions was between the Chinese 
government and multi-national companies (such as IMG and Infront Sports Company). 
Although in 1995 IMG offered a six-year commercial contract worth $ 3 million per 
year to help the PRC build up and maintain the CBA League, the Chinese state paid 
by selling the commercial rights of the CBA League and clubs to IMG (reduced 
policy autonomy and capacity). Learning a lesson from co-operation with the IMG, 
the CBMC (CBA) established its own company- the "China Basketball Industry 
Development Corp" (CBIDC) - in 1998 (organizational arrangement) and 
attempted to use CBIDC as a lever to manage the relationship with its biggest 
commercial sponsor - Infront Sport - by setting this up as a joint venture company, 
CBA & Infront Sports Company (CBAISC), owned by Infront (49 percent) and the 
CBIDC (51 percent) (normative orientations). As discussed in section 7.3.2 the 
reason for establishing the CBAISC was to avoid Infront controlling the market of the 
CBA League and clubs. More importantly, the Chinese government attempted to set a 
new agenda to protect its national interest by tbe redefinition of policy instruments 
and tbe renewal of policy capacity. According to a senior official in CBIDC, "The 
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Chinese domestic basketball leagues are not as privatized as NBA and these leagues 
have to shoulder the responsibility of national interests (national teams), so we still 
have to guide the direction of the CBAISC and its decision-making". (Interview, loth 
January 2006) 
8.6 How useful are the globalisation theories for analysis of the 
development of sport policy in China? 
In this section, we focus on the discussion about the usefulness of the two frameworks 
adopted for analysis of the development of sport policy in China in tenns of 
globalisation. These two frameworks are: the framework of the patterns of 
globalisation (see Figure 8.1) developed by Houlihan (1994, 2003) and the framework 
of the theorization of globalisation (see Table 2.1) developed by Held et al (1999). 
As for Houlihan's patterns of globalisation, they are particularly useful in organizing 
and analyzing evidence in tenns of three types of "response" (passive, participative 
and conflictual) and three levels of "reach" (economic, political and 
culturallideological). Using this framework, we were able to summarize China's 
response to global sports (Olympic Movement, global football and global basketball) 
in Table 8.4 and to encapsulate the strategic implications of the way in which the 
Chinese government sought to deal with the challenges of global sports from the 
economic, political and cultural/ideological point of view in Table 8.3. 
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Table 8.4: Summary of China's response to the Olympic Movement, global 
football and global basketball 
iPassive Participative Conflictual 
IAn inability to lSufficient control over resources to provide lI\ set of values that leads to 
~eaning hallenge the ecipient cultures with leverage llttempts to reject the global 
global culture ulture 
None 1. Setting a quota of 50 people to obtain l. Preventing coaches and 
leadership positions in the IFs and athletes from going 
having clear strategies for taking an IOC abroad 
plympic 
seat 2. Combating the 
2. Strengthening athlete selection, training attraction of foreign 
IMovement and competition systems leading towards commercialisation 
the Olympic games 
3. Transforming administrative structure 
and generating multiple sources of 
income for Olympic Sport System 
4. Introducing a system of financial 
rewards 
None 1. Taking more seriously the aim to obtain l. Intervening in 
a leadership position in the AFC and footballers' transfer 
Global desiring to have more influence in FIFA affairs 2. Strengthening athlete selection, training 2. Preventing seven 
football and competition system for the major clubs 
Olympics and World Cup from organizing new 
3. Transforming administrative structure super league 
and generating multiple incomes for the 3. Controlling CFA and 
Elite Football System manipulating Chinese 
4. Introducing the system of financial Super league (CSL) 
rewards 
None 1. Serious attempts to obtain leadership l. Controlling basketball 
position in the ABC and desire to have players' transfer affairs 
more influence in FIBA 2. Preventing Jia A clubs 
Global 
2. Strengthening athlete selection, training from organizing new 
and competition system towards World super league 
basketball Cup and Olympics 3. Dismissing a private 
3. Transforming administrative structure professional club from 
and generating mUltiple incomes into the premier league 
Elite Basketball System 4. Controlling CBA and 
4. Introducing the system of financial manipulating the 
rewards premier basketball 
league 
Houlihan's framework is a useful analytical tool to act as a starting point in the 
process of analysing the relationship between the Chinese government and global 
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sports but it was not adequate for capturing the trajectory, momentum and complexity 
of globalisation. Although these three case studies show that the experiences are 
roughly the same in terms of the three main research questions, we can see that 
Houlihan's framework fails to locate the global reach and local response in these case 
studies in just one category of reach and one precise response. Indeed, as discussed, 
the trend of sport globalisation in the Chinese context is so complicated that it is 
difficult to reach a clear-cut conclusion at the political, economic and 
culturallideologicallevels, and to indicate one pure response in the passive, 
participative and conflictual aspects. In addition, the fact that Houlihan's framework 
appeared to be unsuccessful in capturing the trajectory and momentum of the 
relationship between China and global sport, also encourages the researcher to locate 
relationships as either participative or conflictual when the reality is more complex 
and subtle. 
Furthermore, Houlihan's 'reach' and 'response' model is static and resembles a 
snapshot of China in mid-2007, but it does not really explain how China got there and, 
more importantly, what is the trajectory of China's relationship with globalisation? We 
understood that Houlihan's framework is a heuristic device which was useful as a 
starting point for our research, but it did not capture the ambiguity, the exception and 
trajectory of China's relationship with globalisation. In order to overcome these 
problems, we suggest two ways to refine Houlihan's framework. The two ways are to 
remove the lines among three types of response and among three levels of reach, and 
to locate the different responses in economic, political and culturallideologicallevels, 
which allow us to capture the momentum and trajectory of the relationships between 
the Chinese government and global sports. (see Figure 8.4). 
381 
Chapter 8 - Conclusion 
Figure 8.4: The Suggested Movement in Patterns of Responses to Globalisation 
Passive 
Economic 
I Reach I Political 
Cultural! 
Ideological 
Response I 
Participative Conflictual 
1992 ____ _ ... 2007 
2007 .... _________ Mid-1950s 
2007 .... ____ Early-1970s 
Note: I. The broken-line arrows indicates the extent of change from the date indicated. The line in the 
political level is longer than the one in the cUlturallideologicallevel suggesting the movement 
has been greater from contlictual to participation. 
2. The dot (.) indicates the location of the relationship between the PRC and global sport in 
2007. 
After refining Houlihan's framework and plotting the result of China's response to 
global sport, it is possible to overcome the limitation of Houlihan's framework in 
terms of capturing the ambiguity, the exception and trajectory of China's relationship 
with globalisation. As discussed earlier, the ways the Chinese government responded 
to global sport are roughly the same. Thus, we use the football case to illustrate the 
momentum and trajectory of the relationships between the PRC and global football at 
the economic, political and cultural/ideologicallevel. From Figure 8.4, the 
relationships within these three levels in 2007 can be located using arrows to show the 
·direction of change and where they are coming from so as to attempt to capture 
change and dynamism. 
Firstly, at the economic level, the purpose of the Chinese government in introducing 
the Western club system was 'to catch up with advanced football countries in a short 
period of time' and 'to generate commercial income to support its elite football 
system'. As discussed in Chapter 6, as a result of the calculations ofa group of 
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Chinese leaders, the club approach, in particular the European onc, with the support of 
private and state-owned enterprise and wider society, was adopted in 1992 in order to 
develop a strong national football team. But the ambition of the Chinese government, 
which attempted to maintain the socialist ideal and take advantage of capitalist 
elements at the same time when reforming its elite football system, turned out to be 
problematic. The point of conflict occurred because both sides (government and club 
owners) had very different priorities when running the Chinese professional football 
league. From the government's point of view, it regarded the professional clubs not 
only as a 'talent pool' to support national teams unconditionally, but also as a 'money 
tree' to cover about 95 percent annual budget of the CFA. As for the perspective of the 
club owners, the main purpose for them to run a commercial club is to make a profit 
without intervention from the government. 
Indeed, most Chinese professional football clubs in the early 1990s were transformed 
from provincial football teams under the guidance of the Chinese government. Until· 
that time, most CSL clubs were owned by large companies. With their different 
priorities the relationship between government and club owners became increasingly 
conflictual as football in China became more and more of a business. According to a 
top manager of one of the CSL clubs (Interview, 6th January 2006), although the plan 
for organizing a new super league finally died out due to Chinese government 
suppression, it could be forcefully revived after the 2008 Beijing Games. Taking the 
football case at the economic level, we suggest that the dynamism of that relationship 
between the Chinese state and global football began in a participative way in 1992 but 
moved towards the conflictual dimension in 2007 (see Figure 8.4 at the economic 
level). 
Secondly, at the political level, it could be divided into three phases to explain the 
trajectory of the relationships between the Chinese government and global football. 
During the first phase, China rejected global football and sought to participate in the 
GANEFO games after it failed to resolve the "two Chinas issue" with the IOC. During 
the second phase, the Chinese government re-engaged with global football but 
appeared to be less interested in football and more interested in the leverage that FIFA 
and the Asia Football Confederation (AFC) could give it in relation to its dispute with 
Taiwan. In the final phase, China participated in global football and focused on 
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winning medals in the Olympic Games and FIFA World Cup, hosting the Women's 
World Cup twice (1991, 2007), possibly bidding to host the 2018 World Cup, being a 
"good" FIFA member, adopting the European club system, introducing a system of 
financial rewards, and generating most of its income from the market by means of 
football sponsorship, to support its elite football system. An analysis of these three 
phases suggests that the dynamism of the political relationship between the PRC and 
global football began from a conflictual stance in the late 1950s but moved towards 
the participative dimension in 2007 (see Figure 8.4 at the political level). 
Thirdly, with regard to the culturaVideologicallevel, we attempted to focus on the 
trajectory of the values and attitudes of the Chinese government towards its athletes 
and others involved in sport whose way of life appeared to change after the open-door 
policy in the late 1970s in general and the introduction of commercial football club 
system in the early 1990s in particular. It is possible to divide the process into three 
phases to capture the trajectory of the cultural/ideological relationships between the 
Chinese government and global football. During the first phase China rejected global 
football socially during the Cultural Revolution. Not only did the Vice Premier, I le 
Long, accused of 'taking the bourgeois road' (Zhou ziben zhuy daolu), die in jail in 
1969, but also numerous elite players, coaches and administrators were purified, 
persecuted and tortured, football facilities were widely destroyed and international 
sports contacts virtually ended. During the second phase, China reintroduced the 
modem football system after the end of the Cultural Revolution. All footballers in 
national squads (World Cup team, Olympic squad, U16, U19) were selected from 22 
"significant cities and areas for football in China" (SCAAFF) in which footballers 
were prohibited from being transferred and from being involved in commercial 
activity. During the third phase, from the establishment of the commercial club system, 
the free movement of Chinese elite footballers between domestic and foreign clubs 
has become possible, although the Chinese government was still uneasy about their 
material-orientated attitude and behaviour (shown by its views on "peculiar men"), 
and attempted to manage them by imposing ideological education, army training, 
limited salary, limited transfer fee and limited movement of players. According to 
these three phases, we suggest that the dynamism of the culturaVideological 
relationship between the PRC and global football began from a conflictual point 
during the Cultural Revolution but moved towards somewhere between a participative 
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and conflictual dimension in 2007 (see Figure 8.4 at the culturallideologicallcvel). 
As for the framework of theorization of globalisation (see Table 2.1) developed by 
Held et al (1999), Jarvie's 'four useful values of theory to analyze sport phenomena' is 
a valuable starting point for the examination of the usefulness of the framework of 
Held et al (1999). Jarvie's four useful values of theory are: i) asking theoretical 
questions to explain or generalize about sport, culture and society; ii) allowing 
theoretical testing; iii) illuminating circumstances or equally destroying certain 
cherished myths; and iv) stimulating new ideas (Jarvie, 2006: 19). 
Firstly, regarding asking theoretical questions, the three main schools of globalisation 
theorists highlighted in Held et ai's framework (1999) focus on the debate over the 
state's role in the global process, which is very firmly focused on what the 
government is doing and the policy of government towards its relationship with 
globalisation. The emphasis on state-centred analysis in this framework allows us to 
raise three main theoretical questions: i) to what extent did/does the Chinese 
government have a choice in its relationship with sport globalisation? ii) to what 
extent can the Chinese government manage its interaction with sport globalisation? iii) 
in what ways does the Chinese government seek to manage its relationship with sport 
globalisation? In addition, the indicators we generated to measure the relationship 
between the Chinese state and global sport were inspired by, and derived from, the 
work of these three main schools of globalisation theorists as discussed in the 
previous section. Indeed, these three main schools of thought on globalisation identify 
concepts which make us sensitive to certain questions. For example, the sceptics, such 
as Vogel (1996) and Weiss (2003) were constantly reminding us of the ability of the 
state to adapt and retain its power through its capacity for re-regulation and 
transformation of administration. The argument of hyperglobalists forces us to address 
questions which are sometimes taken for granted. Of course, globalisation is 
transforming the world and the argument that the state is being undermined by the 
power of finance and capital is plausible but there was little evidence in our case 
studies to support the hyperglobalists' perspective, particularly in the case of the NBA 
which depends on Chinese state acquiescence and support (such as CBA and GAOS) 
if it wanted to organize a China-NB A League after the 2008 Beijing Games. In 
addition to the arguments of the hyperglobalists and sceptics, the perspective of the 
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transfonnationalists also forces us to address different questions about globalisation 
and helps us come to the same view as the sceptics or sceptics-transformationalists 
which enables us to have a much more sophisticated view of, and produce more 
sophisticated answers to, all our three questions. 
Secondly, as for allowing theoretical testing, both Houlihan's and Held et aI's 
frameworks (1999) provided us a unique opportunity to evaluate their utility. As 
mentioned previously, with the empirical evidence generated from indicators which 
were inspired by, and derived from, the works of these three main schools of 
globalisation theory, we could evaluate Houlihan's framework and even refine it. 
Regarding Held et ai's framework (1999), the empirical evidence displayed in our 
three case studies suggest that the argument ofhyperglobalists, such as Ohmae (1990, 
1995), Strange (1994, 1996) and Albrow, M. (1996) who not only see the end of the 
nation-state and its role being replaced by MNCs and IFs, but also argue that in a 
borderless world traditional national interest has no meaningful place, is problematic 
and not very persuasive. Instead, the position appears to be closer to the arguments of 
the sceptics, such as Hirst and Thompson (1998), Gilpin (200 I) and Vogel (1996), 
who stress that, far from the nation state being undermined by the processes of 
internationalisation, these processes strengthen the importance of the nation state in 
many ways. Indeed, the Chinese state continues to use its power to implement policies 
(such as the "One Protocol & Two Licences" policy in football and the "Two 
Protocols & One Licence" policy in basketball) to channel economic forces in ways 
favourable to their own national interests (the Olympic, World Cup and FIBA World 
Championship glory) and to secure a favourable share of the gains from international 
economic activities (particularly by setting up new governmental commercial 
agencies such as Market Promotion Divisions in the coe and NSMCs, CFIDC and 
CSLC in the CFA, and CBIDC and CBAEC in the CBA). 
Thirdly, with regard to illuminating circumstances or destroying certain cherished 
myths, Held et ai's framework (1999) provides a chance to illuminate the 
circumstances of globalisation. From our three main theoretical research questions 
and the empirical evidence gathered, we illustrated that the Chinese government not 
only made its own choice in becoming involved in global sport and demonstrated its 
capacity to manage the four main tensions which arose from commercialisation, but 
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also had specific strategies (administrative transformation and rc-regulation) to 
manage its relationships with global sport at the economic, political and 
culturaVideologicallevels. All the evidence indicates that the taken-for-granted 
argument ofhyperglobalists who proclaim 'the end of the state' can be regarded as a 
myth or illusion. Indeed, regarding the role of the Chinese state in these three case 
studies, building state capacity rather than discarding it would appear to be the lesson 
of dynamic integration. It appears to suggest that the world we are living in is far from 
globalised, rather, the term globalising or internationalisation are more appropriate in 
connection with the three cases in the Chinese context. 
Finally, as for stimulating new ideas, it may be time for Held et al (1999) to refine this 
framework because there is something of an overlap between sceptics' and 
transformationlists' point of views. For example, these two schools of theorists agree 
that the government would take the approach of administrative transformation and 
re-regulation in order to manage its relationship with globalisation (or 
internationalisation). Although both schools argue that the state plays a key role in the 
process of globalisation (internationalisation), the main difference is that the sceptics 
argue it did so voluntarily having calculated its national interests. The 
transformationlists, however, contend that the state was forced to become involved 
under pressure from globalisation. Indeed, it appears that considerable empirical 
evidence supports the sceptics' point of view whereby the Chinese government 
demonstrated its capability to make choices over its relationship with sport 
globalisation and made up its own mind to reach out and bring in global influences, 
rather than global influences forcing their way in. However, a slightly different 
interpretation could argue that some of the evidence, such as allowing transfer, and 
allowing high payment for sport stars could possibly be regarded as evidence of a 
transformationalist trend because it is difficult to identify the difference between the 
state simply "adjusting" and the state "giving in". Although the framework of Held et 
at (1999) is a useful tool to help us understand and analyse the relationship between 
the Chinese state and global sport, it still has the potential to be developed further 
with greater sophistication, given the evidence of sport globalisation generated in this 
study. It could well be that Houlihan, a theorist of sport globalisation, is right in 
claiming that we should underline the importance of treating globalisation as an 
open-ended set of processes which do not necessarily lead to a fixed destination (2008: 
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570). Essentially, Houlihan who was inspired by these three main schools of 
globalisation theorists, particularly Hirst and Thompson (1999), attempted to develop 
a similar model (Houlihan, 2008: 561-2) by identifying 'sport and the outcomes of 
globalisation' in three stages: internationalised sporting world, multinationalised 
sporting world and globalised sporting world. Although Houlihan modestly 
acknowledges the problematic nature of his model, he reminds us that there is a 
pressing need to refine the concept of sport globalisation and give it a greater degree 
of precision, thus allowing for the identification of the process and the criteria that 
have to be present before the identification of globalised sport is possible (2005: 69). 
Indeed, in this concluding Chapter we had attempted to utilize different frameworks 
(such as Held et al (1999), Houlihan (1994, 2003» to help us understand the role of 
the state in shaping domestic engagement with international sport. Substantially 
consistent evidence suggests that the Chinese government" played a dominant role as a 
mediator in the commercialisation and globalisation of sport in the cases of the 
Olympic Movement, elite football and elite basketball, by adopting normative 
orientations and organizational arrangements in the context of the Chinese state. This 
conclusion endorses the suggestion that increased regulation is the most likely 
consequence of intensive globalisation. In the words ofVogel (1996: 2-3), "the 
rhetoric of globalisation ... serves only to obscure what is really going on", 
"liberalism requires reregulation" and 'I find stronger markets but not weaker 
governments". Vogel also concludes that globalisation has brought with it "regulation 
not deregulation". In terms of our three case studies in the context of the PRC, we 
conclude and echo Houlihan's argument - "it is more accurate to talk of 
internationalised, rather than globalised, sport" (2005: 69). 
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Appendix 1: Time Table for tbe Interviews of the Research 
Date Ioterviewees Place 
10 IJun I 05 Senior Staff in Sport Information Centre in GAOS lOA 
23/ Nov 105 Executive Member in BOCOG Loughborough 
071 Dec 105 
251 Nov /05 Chinese Sport Visiting Professor in Loughborough University, UK Loughborough 
~II Dec I 05 Chinese Sport Visiting Professor in De Montfort University, UK Bedford 
pI! Dec I 05 Chinese Sport Visiting Professor in De Montfort University, UK Bedford 
~3/ Feb I 06 Telephone 
19/ Decl 05 Professor in Olympic Study Centre in Beijing Sport University Beijing 
~81 Dec 1 05 
~81 Jun I 06 Telephone 
201 Dec I 05 Senior member in the Department of Sport Management in Beijing Sport Beijing 
University 
231 Decl 05 Senior Staff in the Chinese Sport Museum under GAOS Beijing 
231 Dec I 05 Senior Staff in the Anti-Doping Commission of COC Beijing 
231 Dec I 05 Senior Staff in Personnel Department in GAOS Beijing 
231 Dec I 05 Senior Staff in the Training Centre for Sport Officials and Coaches in Beijing 
GAOS 
241 Decl 05 Professor in the Olympic Study Centre in Beijing Sport University. Beijing 
271 Decl 05 Senior Staff in the Chinese Volleyball Association Beijing 
271 Decl 05 Senior Staff in the CBA Training and Technical Department Beijing 
281 Decl 05 Professor in the Football Department in Beijing Sport University (Former Beijing 
Football Club Player) 
281 Dee! 05 Professor in Football Department in Beijing Sport University Beijing 
~81 Decl 05 Former Manager of Beij ing Guoan Football Club Beijing 
~91 Dee! 05 Senior Staff in The Journal oJ Sport History and Cultural under GAOS Beijing 
POI Dee! 05 Former Senior Staff in the External Affairs Department in GAOS Beijing 
031 Jan/ 06 Senior Staff in the Beijing Sport University under GAOS. Beijing 
031 Jan/ 06 Professor in Beijing Central Financial University Beijing 
041 Jan/ 06 Senior Staff in the Sport Industry Section of Finance Department in GAOS Beijing 
041 Jan/ 06 Senior Staff in the Section of Sport Policy under the Policy and Regulation Beijing 
Department in GAOS 
051 Jan/ 06 Senior Staff in the CF A Comprehensive Department Beijing 
pSI Jan/ 06 Senior Staff in the CBA Comprehensive Department Beijing 
061 Jan/ 06 Senior Staff in the Beijing Guoan Football Club Beijing 
~7lJan I 06 Senior Staff in the Beijing Duck Basketball Club Beijing 
~21 Jun 106 Telephone 
P91 Jan/ 06 Junior Staff in the Sport Department of BOCOG (Swimming Discipline) Beijing 
~91 Jan/ 06 Senior Staff in the Sport Department of BOCOG Beijing 
101 Jan/ 06 Senior Staff in the Training Centre for Sport Officials and Coaches in Beijing 
GAOS 
101 Jan/ 06 Senior Staff in the Department of Competition in Chinese Athletics Beijing 
Association 
101 JanI 06 Senior Staff in the Chinese Swimming Association Beijing 
10IJanI 06 Senior Staff in the Personnel Department in GAOS Beijing 
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121 Jan/06 
101 Jan/06 Senior Staff in the Chinese Basketball Industry Development Company Beijing 
IllJanI 06 Professor in the Basketball Department in Capital Institute of Physical Beijing 
Education, Beijing. 
III Jan/ 06 Former Head Coach of PLA Football Team & Club Beijing 
131 Jan/ 06 Senior Staff in the CBA Training and Research Department Beijing 
131 Jan/ 06 Former Senior Staff in the Policy and Regulation Department in GAOS Beijing 
I3lJanI 06 Senior Staff in the section of Team China under the GAOS Competition Beijing 
and Training Dc£artment 
161 Janl 06 Senior Staff in the Market Management in GAOS Beijing 
161 Jan/ 06 Senior Staff in the Scientific and Educational Department and Beijing 
the Personnel Department in GAOS 
16/ Jan/ 06 Senior Staff in the CFA Technical Department Beijing 
17/ Jan/ 06 Senior Staff in the CF A Competition Department Beijing 
181 Jan/ 06 Senior Staff in the CF A Comprehensive Department Beijing 
181 Jan/ 06 Senior Staff in the CF A Registration Office Beijing 
191 Jan/ 06 Senior Staff in the CF A Financial Office Beijing 
19/ Jan/ 06 Senior Staff in the Basketball Department in Beijing Sport University Beijing 
~3/ Mar/06 Former Staff in Sport Apparatus Centre in GAOS Shanghai 
13/ Mar! 06 Telephone 
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Appendix 2: Indicators of Engagement with Globalisation (HarderfMore 
Robust/Quantifiable) 
lh. Formal engagement with international sport as a participant country (including 
membership, joining competitions, ranking, biding for or hosting global sports 
events) 
2h. The number and position of Chinese sports representatives in world sports 
governing bodies 
3h. The number and purpose of sport facilities in China 
4h. The distribution of national sports budget to elite football, elite basketball and 
other elite sports 
Sh. The number and purpose of special elite universities or training centres 
6h. The resource of coach development programmes for elite football, elite basketball 
and other elite sports 
7h. The ownership of special elite training facilities for elite football and elite 
basketball in China 
8h. The number of people or local clubs that participate in elite football and elite 
basketball 
9h. The tensions between professional clubs and government or the tensions between 
the national teams' sponsors and government 
Appendix 3: Indicators of Engagement with Globalisation (SofterlLess 
Robust/Qualitative) 
Is. The extent to which (reach in which) the Chinese government accepting the values 
and attitudes of the IOC, commercial football and commercial basketball 
2s. The attitudes and values of the Chinese government and clubs in relation to the 
rights of elite athletes (for example, the transfer and players) 
3s. The attitudes and values of athletes toward material rewards 
4s. The structure of sport governing bodies in the PRC 
Ss. The values and attitudes of the government toward the commercial soccer, 
commercial basketball and sport commercial sponsorship of national squads 
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Appendix 4 
Case Study 1: Olympic movement 
Indicators of Engagement with Globalisation (Harder/More 
Robust/Quantifiable) 
I h. Formal engagement with international sport as a participant country (including 
membership, joining competitions, ranking, biding for or hosting Olympic Games) 
2h. The number and position of Chinese sports representatives in world sports 
governing bodies 
3h. The number and purpose of sport facilities in China 
4h. The distribution of national sports budget to elite sport 
Sh. The number and purpose of special elite universities or training centres 
6h. The resource of coach development programmes for elite sport 
7h. The o\\nership of special elite training facilities for Olympic sport in China 
8h. The number of athletes in the elite sport system 
9h. The tensions between the national teams' sponsors and government 
Indicators of Engagement with Globalisation (SofterlLess 
Robust/Qualitative) 
Is. The extent to which the Chinese government accepting the values and attitudes of 
the IOC 
2s. The attitudes and values of the Chinese government and clubs in relation to rights 
of elite athletes (for example, the transfer & players) 
3s. The attitudes and values of athletes toward material rewards 
5s. The structure of sport governing bodies in the PRC 
7s. The values and attitudes ofthe government toward the sport commercial 
sponsorship 
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Appendix 5 
Case Study 2: Football 
Indicators of Engagement with Globalisation (HarderlMore 
Robust/Quantifiable) 
I h. F onnal engagement with international sport as a participant country (including 
membership, joining competitions, ranking, biding for or hosting FIFA World 
Cup) 
2h. The number and position of Chinese sports representatives in FIFA 
3h. The number and purpose of football facilities in China 
4h. The distribution of the national sports budget to elite football; 
5h. The number and purpose of special elite universities or training centres for elite 
football 
6h. The resource of coach development programmes for elite football 
7h. The ownership of special elite training facilities for football in China 
8h. The number of people or local club they participate in elite football 
9h. The tensions between the professional football clubs and government 
Indicators of Engagement with Globalisation (Softer/Less 
Robust/Qualitative) 
Is. The extent to which the Chinese government accepting the values and attitudes of 
commercial football 
2s. The attitudes and values of the Chinese government and Chinese professional 
football clubs in relation to the rights of elite athletes (for example, the transfer 
and players); 
3s. The attitudes and values of football players toward material rewards 
4s. The structure of the Chinese Football Association 
Ss. The values and attitudes of the government toward commercial football 
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Appendix 6 
Case Study 3: Basketball 
Indicators of Engagement with Globalisation (HarderlMore 
Robust/Quantifiable) 
I h. Fonnal engagement with international sport as a participant country (including 
membership, joining competitions, ranking, biding for or hosting FIBA World 
Championship) 
2h. The number and position of Chinese sports representatives in FIBA 
3h. The number and purpose of basketball facilities in China 
4h. The distribution of the national sports budget to elite basketball 
Sh. The number and purpose of special elite universities or training centres for elite 
basketball 
6h. The resource of coach development programmes for elite basketball 
7h. The ownership of special elite training facilities for basketball in China 
8h. The number of people or local clubs that participate in elite basketball 
9h. The tensions between the Chinese professional basketball clubs and government 
Indicators of Engagement with Globalisation (SofterlLess 
Robust/Qualitative) 
Is. The extent to which the Chinese government accepting the values and attitudes of 
commercial basketball 
2s. The attitudes and values of the Chinese government and Chinese professional 
basketball clubs in relation to the rights of elite athletes (for example, the transfer 
and players) 
3s. The attitudes and values of basketball players towards material rewards 
4s. The structure of the Chinese Basketball Association 
Ss. The values and attitudes of the government towards commercial basketball 
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